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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about many fascinating developments in the former 
socialist republics. Sudden change in all spheres of life was accompanied by an information 
avalanche. New and old ideas and concepts, works of art and ways of living were either 
rediscovered from within – as, for example, alternative (samizdat1) literature and films – or 
brought in from the outside. Everywhere new initiatives and arrangements were coming up 
that had previously been unthinkable, from new schools with alternative or more advanced 
teaching programs to new criminal networks, from new television programs to new consumer 
products. Along came also a new language that was to give names, at times clumsy or 
misplaced, to the new reality.  
My attention was attracted by so called “public organizations” (obshchestvennie 
organizatsii) that had appeared in great numbers since the end of communism. Organizations of 
this name existed also before 1991; they were formal branches of the Communist Party that 
dealt with particular social concerns, such as youth or women’s issues. However, the “public 
organizations” of the 1990s seemed different. In some cases, new offices were being rented, 
equipment installed, and working conditions were more luxurious than what other public or 
private organizations could afford at the time. In other cases, the organizations consisted of 
no more than a phone, a fax, and an Internet connection in somebody’s living room. 
Whatever the practical arrangement, the purposes and the activities of these “public 
organizations” remained unclear to an outsider’s eye. In fact, neither their activities nor their 
sources of income were “public” - a kind of secretive veil was draped around the new world 
of these organizations. The people working in these organizations were often perceived as a 
new type of entrepreneur – those who know how to get “grants” to pay their own salaries.  
References to “grants, funds, and projects” evoked a language that was both 
technically specific and mystifying because its real-world referents remained elusive. I started 
to explore some questions that seemed evident but, surprisingly, had not been raised before: 
Why do these organizations have to register as “public organizations”; what are those “grants” 
                                                 
1 Samizdat is a Russian word for “self-published”; it is commonly used to refer to informal home-made 
publications of writers and essayists who were banned from being published in official state controlled publishing 
houses during socialism. 
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they receive; how are they different from salaries or profit; who grants them and for what? 
Knowledge of English vocabulary was important for understanding the answers I received. 
However, those answers raised new questions. It turned out that the correct name of “public 
organizations” was “non-governmental organizations” or NGOs, that they had to be 
supported in the name of “civil society”, and that “grants” were a part of the “assistance” that 
Ukraine was receiving to an unprecedented extent from various “donors” after it became 
officially independent in 1991. I was discovering a whole new world, in which the 
enchantment with the concept of “civil society” was as striking as the skepticism towards 
“public organizations” that I encountered in Ukraine.  
The “projects” and “grants” given to Ukrainian organizations were described by the 
donors as the most effective means to facilitate democracy in Ukraine, to ensure that the 
democratic change would be truly encompassing and long-lasting, and to make Ukrainian 
people more democratically minded. In Ukraine, however, these initiatives were mostly 
perceived as a peculiar money flow that was going to a small group of people on obscure 
terms. They were believed to be short-term, insufficient, and ineffective. The two sides of the 
story clearly did not match, and yet both foreign donors and “public organizations”/ NGOs 
were speaking about the same “projects” and accountable for the same money. The 
discrepancy was so obvious that both sides must have been aware of it as well. It is at this 
point that I found the main puzzle of this dissertation: are the donors blind or do they just not 
care; are the locals wicked or just plain stupid; and how is it that both sides continue to do 
what they are doing? What are the mechanisms that enable the meaningful functioning of a 
civil society assistance discourse in Ukraine?  
I tackle these questions by making a detailed inquiry into a particular type of NGO 
activity. I have analyzed assistance to women’s NGOs in Ukraine by the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) delivered in the period from 1992 to 2005. In 
addition to the relevance of prior personal knowledge, the choice of the donor and the 
recipient in this research is based on their perceived mutual importance. Since the main focus 
of this study is on how exactly assistance matters for both the donor and the recipient, and on 
the meanings that are constructed through assistance, it is useful to choose a case in which the 
mutual importance of assistance is widely recognized. Taking this as a starting point, I have 
looked into how exactly this importance is (re)created by all sides involved in the interaction 
over assistance.  
Ukraine is one of the largest recipients of American assistance, whose significance for 
the USA has been stated on many occasions. In the 1990s the USAID program in Ukraine 
was the third largest in the Agency after Egypt and Israel, and it remains one of the key 
recipients of American assistance today. Ukraine is also an example of a country that is being 
reinvented as a sovereign entity, and its relations with the USA are in the making. These 
relations are particularly important for the US due to its position between Russia and the EU, 
bordering on the NATO states and being an aspiring NATO candidate itself. 
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USAID is different from other foreign donors in several respects. It is a governmental 
agency whose vision and policy are explicitly connected to American foreign policy and 
security interests. This means that, first, its primary goal is to sustain the national interests of 
the United States, whose role in world politics is fairly distinct and at times controversial 
compared to other states; second, it faces many more practical constraints in terms of 
accountability and programming than other donors, such as private foundations or 
(international) non-governmental organizations ((I)NGOs). In fact, some practitioners argue 
that these features of the US governmental assistance set it aside from other assistance efforts 
and limit the more general applicability of findings and recommendations developed about it. 
Such a remark would have been difficult to argue with, had the world of international 
assistance not been showing evidence to the contrary. Notwithstanding one’s commonsensical 
expectation of what different political actors stand for, within the span of little more than a 
decade it has become increasingly difficult to tell the mission statement of Novib/ Oxfam 
International from that of USAID or the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and, in some 
parts, even from that of the Royal Dutch Shell). This dissertation therefore, aims at eliciting 
those core points of “assistance rationale” that make assistance a significant political process 
rather than just a set of programs implemented by a particular organization.  
An observer may argue that a dedicated NGO means something different by civil 
society than a big multinational does. Another way to make this objection is to say that it does 
not really matter what an organization says as long as it does “the right thing”. The ambition 
of this dissertation is to show exactly the opposite. I argue that the discursive dimension of 
assistance is of as much political consequence as the material one and that by sharing the 
discourse different kinds of organizations also share the field of political possibilities that they 
create.  
My starting point is that, just like practices, discourses are contextual – they do not 
exist in some kind of abstract world of ideas but only during particular moments, when they 
are enacted by certain actors in a certain setting. The assistance discourse does not exist just in 
the head of the USAID Assistance Administrator; it is (re)enacted in the daily operations of 
USAID, it is further taken up by various assistance partners, and it travels even further to the 
assistance implementers and recipients. This means that different actors interact in particular 
sites and in the process construct the meaning of assistance. For the purposes of the present 
research I identify three core sites of interaction in this assistance chain: the USAID 
headquarters in Washington DC; different mediating organizations in Kiev; and local NGOs 
that receive assistance. I inquire into the discursive processes that take place within each site 
of interaction as well as across these sites over the given period of time. This logic of inquiry 
structures the dissertation as a whole.   
The remainder of chapter one is dedicated to an overview of theoretical ideas about 
civil society and assistance. In section 1.2, I look into normative and theoretical reinventions 
of the civil society concept at three related sites of knowledge production: theories that were 
developed in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; ideas about civil society that 
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emerged in Western Europe and North America; and, in a separate subsection, theories that 
strive to conceptualize a new space for civil society that would transcend the boundaries of 
sovereign states – transnational or global civil society. This discussion makes clear that 
different theoretical ideas are embedded in particular circumstances of knowledge production 
and have to be examined within their respective contexts. This implies that different thinkers 
who work with the concept of civil society do not necessarily mean the same thing by it. In 
section 1.3., I turn to more applied theories of civil society, especially to the mobilization of 
the term within the field of democratization assistance. I show that applied theories of how to 
enhance democracy and the role of civil society therein are dominated by the so-called 
“transition paradigm”. According to this paradigm, the future trajectory of post-socialist 
countries is assumed to be clear and self-evident. Those countries have been seen as being “on 
the road to democracy”, and their political and social life has been analyzed in terms of 
following or deviating from this path. Such thinking has precluded the posing of questions 
about the internal coherence of the paradigm itself or its applicability to the relevant context. 
This discussion shows how ideas are not neutral but can translate almost directly into political 
projects that have an impact on political and socio-economic developments in particular 
countries.   
In chapter two of this dissertation I explore civil society as an empirical phenomenon 
rather than a theoretical concept: I look into different forms of civic activism in Ukraine both 
before and after 1989. Although it is important to acknowledge the different theoretical levels 
on which the notion of civil society operates, it is even more important to acknowledge their 
interrelated and mutually dependent character. This means that political uses of the civil 
society concept often drive theoretical conceptualizations, and vice versa - normative ideals 
are translated into political tools. Chapter three is dedicated to clarifying the methodological 
standpoint of this dissertation and positioning it vis-à-vis other approaches. I show how both 
the theoretical and the empirical puzzles discussed in the previous two chapters can be 
clarified by applying dialogical discourse analysis as based on the writings of the Russian/ 
Soviet thinker Mikhail Bakhtin. I also discuss the particular toolkit that I use for my analysis.  
Chapters four to six contain my case study analysis, they each deal with one of the sites 
of interaction: Washington DC, Kiev, and local NGOs, respectively. The case study is based 
on material I collected during four fieldwork trips to each of these sites as well as on other 
primary material that I could gather through on-line research. Altogether I have spent seven 
months in Ukraine. I initially studied civil society assistance in general and collected a very 
diverse set of data relating to activities of different donors and trajectories of different civic 
organizations in Ukraine. Although I soon made the choice to focus on the specific case of 
USAID assistance to women’s NGOs, this data provided for a solid contextualization of my 
case study in the bigger picture of civil society assistance to Ukraine. During my fieldtrips to 
Ukraine I also aimed at collecting data outside of the capital and, whenever possible, from 
different regions in the country.  
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My five-week field trip to Washington DC was focused specifically on US 
governmental assistance; I collected primary documents and interviewed civil servants, 
experts, and consultants at USAID, the State Department, and other organizations that act as 
assistance subcontractors. The full list of interviews is provided in appendix I. The quotations 
from interviews that are provided throughout this dissertation were selected as the most 
illustrative “on-the-record” statements. However, my understanding and interpretation of the 
complex world of assistance would have been severely hampered without the many more 
“off-the-record” interviews and informal exchanges I conducted throughout the whole project 
period. My core documentary sources include strategy papers, intermediary and final reports, 
requests for applications (RFA), assessments, evaluations, and fact sheets by the donors, as 
well as various project descriptions and publications by the NGOs. As a rule, the donors have 
been much more willing to share their printed materials. Unfortunately, many smaller NGOs 
in Ukraine proved less prolific when it came to paper work, and in many cases also less 
accessible for interviews. The interactions at the local NGO level have therefore been 
reconstructed on the basis of more fragmented data and by drawing more on informal 
exchanges.  
All this data was analyzed with the help of Bakhtinian dialogical discourse analysis by 
identifying the core notions that sustain the civil society assistance discourse and define its 
meaning. Importantly, I do not see the civil society assistance discourse as a discourse of a 
particular actor, instead, I look into how it is (re)enacted by a variety of actors in each site of 
interaction. Chapters four to six are dedicated to the three core sites of interaction – 
Washington DC, Kiev, and local NGOs – respectively. In chapter seven I make a comparison 
between these three sites and discuss the stability and the transformations of the civil society 
assistance discourse across these three sites. These chapters are structured according to three 
questions, starting from the most general to the most specific: the meanings of assistance, the 
meanings of promoting civil society through assistance, and the meanings of empowering 
women (through civil society and through assistance).  
 
1.2. Civil Society:  Contextualizing the Rediscovery 
 
As many other politically prominent notions, the concept of civil society has to be understood 
in the particular context of its (re)emergence. Both its normative and empirical contents 
developed as a response to particular historical circumstances; even a cursory look at the 
history of the concept in Western societies reveals a whole of range of competing visions of 
why it is important to develop a civil society and what forms it should take.2 This debate is 
complicated even further by the recent attention to alternative, non-Western conceptions of 
                                                 
2 Michael Edwards, Civil Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), Virginia A. Hodgkinson and Michael W. Foley, 
eds., The Civil Society Reader (Hanover and London: Tufts University, University Press of New England, 2003), 
Adam Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: The Free Press, 1992). 
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civil society.3 Over the past few decades, there has been a growing interest in the concept of 
civil society among otherwise very different actors. The varied uses of the concept of civil 
society in recent debates are documented in a classification offered by Adam Seligman. He 
suggests that, firstly, civil society is widely used as a political tool, “a slogan”, by various social 
movements and parties, among which Eastern European social movements are prominent 
examples. Secondly, civil society is used as an empirical term or a variable to describe and 
explain social phenomena and the performance of political institutions. This second use is 
often connected to broader debates on democracy and citizenship. Thirdly, civil society figures 
as a normative concept, “a normative ideal, a vision of the social order that is not only 
descriptive, but prescriptive, providing us with a vision of the good life.”4 Civil society is thus 
both a normative and a descriptive notion, and the structure of the theoretical and empirical 
discussions presented in this dissertation reflects this duality of the concept. 
However, neither a normative nor a descriptive empirical understanding of the notion 
of civil society is possible outside of the particular context in which it is created and sustained. 
The goal of this dissertation is to provide such situated understanding of the concept of civil 
society in the context of (post-)Cold War East-West dialogue in order to comprehend social 
and political effects that the concept of civil society and its use have created in the former 
Soviet countries. Therefore, I am primarily interested in three particular historical contexts: the 
reinvention of civil society during the late socialism of the 1970s and 80s in Eastern Europe 
and the former Soviet Union, the rise in popularity of civil society theories in Western Europe 
and North America over the same period, and the recent development of theories of “global” 
or “transnational” civil society that position civil society beyond the borders of a particular 
state (or group of states). By confronting these three theoretical realms with each other I 
illustrate the diversity in civil society thinking as well as disparities in understanding seemingly 
similar notions that exist between these different sites.  
My argument for acknowledging the situatedness of knowledge, however, should not 
be mistaken for an attempt to reinforce the existing political and cognitive maps. Quite to the 
contrary, I show in this dissertation that it is the interaction between the different 
sites/regions that is essential to political processes. This leads me to conclude that, even 
though it is possible and important to have a dialogue about the nature and purpose of civil 
society, it is futile and at times even dangerous to assume that such a dialogue can be 
conducted on the basis of one shared universal idea(l).  
As a response to the new conditions of the post-Cold War era, a number of scholars 
working on the so-called post-socialist region plead for a questioning if not abandonment of 
regionalist theoretical and cognitive maps.5 The political and theoretical implications of the 
unreflective reproduction of conceptual geographies have been highlighted by many scholars 
                                                 
3 Simone Chambers and W. Kimlicka, eds., Alternative Conceptions of Civil Society (Princeton, Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2002). 
4 Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society, p.201. 
5 See, for example, Chris M. Hann, ed., Postsocialism: Ideals, Ideologies and Practices in Eurasia (London: Routledge, 
2002), Katherine Verdery, What Was Socialism, And What Comes Next? (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
1996). 
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who study the “region” from different disciplinary backgrounds. As Stephen Sampson notes, 
“the study of Eastern European societies has been plagued by our adherence to concepts”, 
such as “postsocialism”, “postcommunism”, and “transition”.6 Due to their vagueness, such 
concepts allow one to maintain the structures that are – or are assumed to be – well known 
and to draw on the conceptual apparatus of well established subdisciplines. However, the 
usefulness of such terms can be quite limited in that they are based on a traditional 
dichotomization consolidated during the Cold War. They imply a certain degree of stability 
and uniformity of the region and the processes of change that take place across these 
countries, and they juxtapose the entire region too strongly to the western “other”.  
Keeping apart the analytical framework for analysis of the region and these empirically 
observable discursive constructions is a way to enlarge the scope and the impact of studies of 
current developments in the region as well as of historical analyses of socialism as experienced 
by these countries. This would entail placing the countries of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union within a broader political geography and posing new comparative questions. To 
date much of the work that has engaged with countries in the region has been framed in terms 
of distinct transformations from what used to be a formation opposite to the democratic 
capitalist West towards a new projected order. The latter has mostly been conceptualized in 
the teleological terms of attaining the more advanced stage believed to be occupied by the 
West. Here one could refer to a wealth of studies of democratization across different parts of 
the world7 and to works focusing on specific issues in democratization, such as gender.8 
Important broad-scope findings notwithstanding, I would argue that scholarship which is cast 
within such regional oppositions is responsible for analytical blindness towards the issues of 
translatability and applicability of seemingly identical notions; it also fails to see the interaction 
among and interrelatedness of region-based constructions. 
When accounting for the re-invention of civil society in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union before and after the collapse of communism it is important not to 
mistake the distinctiveness of the socio-historical circumstances of socialism in those countries 
with the analytical construction of the “East” as a region distinct from the “West”. This 
opposition was sustained also by the “Eastern” side. As Adam Michnik recalls, one of the 
wide-spread beliefs in the region was the “utopia of the West”.9 The opposition between East 
and West is a powerful and politically charged construction, which was not only used to 
                                                 
6 Steven Sampson, "Beyond Transition: Rethinking Elite Configurations in the Balkans," in Postsocialism: Ideals, 
Ideologies, and Practices in Eurasia, ed. Chris Hann (London: Routledge, 2002), 297. 
7 To name just a few: Guiseppe Di Palma, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1990), Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and 
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), Joan Nelson, ed., Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1994), Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and 
Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
8 Jane S. Jaquette and Sharon L. Wolchik, eds., Women and Democracy: Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), Marilyn Rueschemeyer, ed., Women In the 
Politics of Postcommunist Eastern Europe (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E.Sharpe, 1994). 
9 Adam Michnik, "The Rebirth of Civil Society," 'Ideas of 1989' Public Lecture Series at the London School of Economics, 
no. 20 October (1999). 
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maintain the Cold War discourse but also had a formative influence on the discourses of 
“transition” and democratization after the collapse of communism. The latter remain 
persistent as new categorizations emerge: “The east-west divide formerly based on ‘cold war’ 
has now been replaced by the west’s concentrated effort to ‘modernize’ the east and to 
‘integrate’ the former communist states into European economic, political, and security 
frameworks.”10 This dissertation aims to further explore the dynamics of such “East-West” 
interaction and to identify the mechanisms that sustain it.  
The need for seeing East and West as mutually constitutive social and political 
formations is stressed, for example, by Peggy Watson, who issues a plea for “a framework that 
relativizes Communism and competitive democracy with respect to each other, rather than 
confining itself to the legacy of Communism as a single and overstretched explanatory 
variable.”11 Maintaining rigid divisions between the two poles – the East and the West – 
prevents us from seeing an impressive degree of overlap and mutual influence. In the words 
of Stephen Sampson, “the West is not just a place ‘out there’; it is ‘here’ among us”; it has 
become a reality rather than just a representation.12 This point is also extensively elaborated in 
the work of Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, who underscore the fact that during the Cold War 
“the ‘East’ and the ‘West’ constituted politically important audiences for each other.”13 This 
mutually constitutive relationship between “East” and “West” is one of the core assumptions 
of this dissertation. By employing a dialogical discourse analysis model I further reveal the 
discursive mechanism that enable such a relationship. In order to understand the interaction, it 
is important to account for the particular meanings that constitute each of the sides involved 
in it as well as for the ways in which notions are communicated and meanings are “shared” or 
contested. In the following three subsections I explore the meanings of civil society as they 
developed in the “East”, in the “West”, and in what is understood as a “transnational” 
framework (“transcending” geographic regions).   
1.2.1. Eastern European debates on civil society 
 
The revival and fundamental redefinition of the concept of civil society by intellectuals in 
Eastern Europe in the 60s, 70s and 80s contributed greatly to the current re-invention of this 
eighteenth century concept. Although the political importance of events in Eastern Europe of 
that time is widely acknowledged, the intellectual contribution made here is sometimes 
questioned. Several Western European thinkers noted in the wake of ‘revolutions’ in Eastern 
                                                 
10 Steven Sampson, "The Social Life of Projects: Importing Civil Society to Albania," in Civil Society: Challenging 
Western Models, ed. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p.121. 
11 Peggy Watson, "Civil Society and the Politics of Difference in Eastern Europe," in Transitions, Environments, 
Translations: Feminisms in International Politics, ed. Joan W. Scott, Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1997), p.23. 
12 Sampson, "Beyond Transition: Rethinking Elite Configurations in the Balkans," p.299. 
13 Susan Gal and Gail Kligman, The Politics of Gender After Socialism (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 2000), p.9. 
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Europe that there were hardly any new ideas developed in the region.14 Jürgen Habermas 
spoke of a “total lack of ideas that [were] either innovative or oriented towards the future.”15 
All in all, it has been argued that all Eastern Europeans did then was to quote the liberal 
classics and to mobilize the idea of civil society for political purposes. In some accounts this 
similarity between ideas from the West and the East was treated as proof of the irrefutability 
of one universal concept of civil society, to which every free individual must aspire; here 
Ernest Gellner’s work is a telling example.16 However, others have argued that, given the 
situated nature of any knowledge production, Eastern European ideas about civil society do 
not replicate but rather represent a unique synthesis of radical and liberal agendas; they are 
also argued to have had a formative influence on the wider radical debate on democracy.17 In 
the discussion that follows I show that due to the specificity of the historical context in which 
authors like Adam Michnik, Jacek Kuron, Vaclav Havel, and Janos Kis - to name just a few – 
wrote, they looked at civil society and its role for democracy from a particular perspective. 
This made their thinking different from “Western ideas” in interesting ways. I particularly 
focus on the “individualist” moral ethic developed by many thinkers in the “East” and on the 
empirical conceptions of civil society as a particular realm that was largely seen as confined to 
the private sphere and as based on immediate family and friendship relations.  
In Eastern Europe theories of civil society mainly strove to re-regulate the relationship 
between the individual and the state. Given the oppressive (post-) totalitarian nature of the 
state, these concerns were highly political. The following core notions were at stake: individual 
freedom, solidarity, and morality. Concern for individual freedom was here different from the 
individualism of Western liberalism; it was more focused on the freedom to relate to others 
and to form solidarities based on personal choice rather than on official ideology. A 
distinction was made between the top-down enforced collectivism and egalitarianism 
experienced and the desired freedom of individual choice, thus separating the repressive 
official public sphere from an alternative sphere of freedom.  
Some of these theories are closely connected to activities of the Polish independent 
trade union Solidarity and to lessons learnt from the attempts at democratic opposition in 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia in 1956 and 1968, respectively. They signify aspirations to create 
a successful democratic opposition in the face of crude force used by the Soviet Union to 
dominate these countries. There is, however, considerable divergence between the experiences 
and ideas of dissidents and intellectuals in different socialist countries. Whereas much of 
Adam Michnik’s work can be read as a rethinking of strategies and tactics for Solidarity and is 
highly political in the sense of traditional politics, dissidents from other countries were more 
preoccupied with developing anti-communist ethics rather than thinking in terms of social and 
political change. These differences are often overlooked in work that is done on civil society in 
                                                 
14 See for example: Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe (New York: Times Books, 1990), 
Timothy Garton Ash, We the People (London: Granta Books, 1990). 
15 Quoted in Mary Kaldor, Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). 
16 Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 
17 Gideon Baker, "The Changing Idea of Civil Society: Models From the Polish Democratic Opposition," Journal 
of Political Ideologies 3, no. 2 (1998). 
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Eastern Europe, which is most of the time confined to the study of the Solidarity movement 
in Poland and the charismatic signatories of Charter 77 in the former Czechoslovakia. 
Understanding the peculiar nature of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union and differences in their trajectories is one of the key steps towards 
understanding the recent events in those countries before and after the collapse of 
communism. 
The suppression of individuality and the politicization of private life under socialism 
prompted the appearance of a realm of independent or “parallel” activities, which were 
perceived as an alternative to official culture and official politics. Interpretations of the 
content and the social and political implications of these activities varied not only across 
different socialist countries but also among different groups within a given country. Generally, 
there seems to be agreement that during socialism a two-fold public sphere existed, which 
consisted of an official state-controlled public sphere and an alternative public sphere or a 
“parallel society”,18 as Václav Benda called it.19 While there is clear unanimity as to the nature 
of the official state controlled public sphere, there are divergent ideas as to what were the 
meaning and the aims of the “parallel polis” or “independent society”. Most of the time this 
alternative public sphere was invested with high moral values, as a space for the preservation 
of “normality” and “authenticity” in the face of the oppressive state and its de-humanizing 
ideology, which “offers the human beings the illusion of an identity, of dignity, and of 
morality while making it easier for them to part with them.”20 The alternative public sphere 
was defined as harboring “the force of life” and seen as an alternative to the degradation of 
politics in such regimes. 
It was also often conceived of as a realm of morality based on its own ethics, as argued 
by Jirous: “The essential characteristics of the ‘independent society’ are kindness, tolerance, 
respect for the opinions of others, the acceptance of different human beings with love.”21 
New forms of communication were believed to be emerging here: “Under the orderly surface 
of the life of lies, therefore, there slumbers the hidden sphere of life in its real aims, of its 
hidden openness to truth.”22 The “truth” of the alternative sphere was opposed to the “lies” 
on which the official public sphere was believed to be building its ideology. This shows that 
the opposition was created not between the true alternative ideas and the false ideology of the 
state but between being sincere in one’s deeds and thoughts and lying about one’s beliefs and 
intentions. The official public sphere was criticized not because it was based on a false idea 
but because it was promoting and even enforcing insincerity and hypocrisy about one’s ideas.   
                                                 
18 There are a variety of labels that were used to denote this sphere, such as “parallel” or “independent society”, 
“underground” or “alternative culture”, “counterculture”, “second society”, and “parallel polis”. Empirically, all 
these labels refer to the same phenomenon of activities outside the official state-controlled public sphere; 
theoretically, however, they carry different ideas about the character and aims of such activities – a point I 
elaborate on later in the text.  
19 Václav Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," Social Research 
55, no. 1/2 (Spring/Summer 1988). Originally presented in a samizdat essay The Parallel Polis of 1977. 
20 V. Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central and 
Eastern Europe, ed. J. Keane (Hutchinson, 1985), p.28. 
21 Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.227. 
22 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," p.41. 
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Unlike many preceding theories of transformation, change, and even revolution – 
Marxism-Leninism being the one closest to home – Eastern European theories of the 1970s 
and 80s were more concerned with means rather than ends. It was believed that, in order to 
defeat the oppressive state, one has to find ways of acting that are essentially different from 
those utilized by the state. Having had direct experience with what George Konrad termed 
“Jacobin-Leninist tradition”, many Eastern Europeans argued in favor of a radically different 
method for change.23 Not only did Eastern European thinkers of the time reject the idea of a 
violent revolution but they were also especially cautious about the principles that would 
inform their own action. The belief was that those would shape the outcomes of action, and 
that if one wants to reach a “normal”, just, and truthful society, one has to adopt those 
principles from the very beginning, to start “living in truth” right away. Developing different 
means of action was believed to be a political project in itself. In the words of Jiri Dienstbier, 
an early spokesman of Charter 77: 
 
The basic aim of the self-organization of civil society, of independent and 
parallel activities, is the preservation and renewal of normality, as we understand 
it in the European tradition. This means the renewal of civic awareness and interest 
in the affairs of the community; it means an appeal to the quality of work and 
decency in human relationships; it means the attempt to maintain and expand 
awareness of one’s legal rights, self-education and assisting in the education of 
others, writing books, publishing periodicals, putting on plays, holding 
seminars, exhibitions, concerts etc. And it also means forming judgments, 
without emotions and with an effort to get as much information from as wide 
a variety of sources as possible, on various aspects of the domestic and 
international situations.24 
 
In the words of Adam Michnik, Eastern Europeans did not have a revolutionary 
utopia, for their utopia was “regaining the right to a normal national, civic, religious, 
economic, and political life.”25 
 
It follows from the very essence of these attempts to form an “independent 
society” that at their core will always be the creation of islands of plurality that 
may become a prefiguration of a pluralistic society […]; independent activities 
will probably continue to encourage the elements of pluralism, as well as 
everything that we have learnt – that is, tolerance, a revulsion toward ideological 
thinking and toward all forms of violence, whether overt or hidden, etc, in order that 
these qualities may become firmly rooted.26 
 
                                                 
23 George Konrad, Antipolitics: An Essay, trans. Richard E. Allen (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984). 
24 Jiri Dienstbier in Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.231. 
25 Michnik, "The Rebirth of Civil Society." 
26 Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.225, emphasis added. 
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Attempts to create an independent sphere completely outside the control of the 
abusive state were famously captured by the notion of “anti-politics”.27 George Konrad argued 
that anti-politics should aim not at capturing state power but at pushing the state back from 
various spheres of life, and in such a way curtailing its powers. This theory aimed at recasting 
the public sphere rather than retreating into the private. Yet, “anti-politics” in Konrad’s 
formulation is also very much an anti-politician perspective. For him, politicians in control of 
state power cannot be “improved” because their position and their philosophy of life are 
inherently violent and self-interested. They have to be accepted as a necessary evil and kept at 
bay by other, inherently moral intellectual forces that should come from civil society. The two 
realms, however, are and will always be separate and antagonistic towards each other. In 
Konrad’s words:  
 
Politicians have to be guarded against because the peculiarity of their function 
and mentality lies in the fact that they are at times capable of pushing the button 
for atomic war. […] No thinking person should want to drive others from 
positions of political power in order to occupy them himself. I would not want 
to be a minister in any government whatsoever. […] My worst nightmare is to 
have to tell millions of people what to do next. The opposition thinker is not a 
member of any shadow cabinet.28 
 
Here the state is equated with people of a particular breed whose “mentality” and nature are 
inherently different from those of a “thinking person”. The latter voluntarily chooses to stay 
outside of the state and mocks its ambition to “tell millions of people what to do next.” “Anti-
politics” is not about transforming politics but about expanding the “outside” of politics and 
keeping that realm free of everything (negative) that is embodied in politics.   
There were, however, a few qualifications made to the notion of “anti-politics” in 
terms of how far one could go in turning one’s back towards the state and disregarding it. 
There seemed to lie a danger in trying to push for disregarding the official politics and 
everything connected to the state completely. In a clear-cut world of an oppressive system on 
the one hand and rightful dissidence on the other a potential for dialogue and for a search for 
new solutions could be lost somewhere along the way. As the former Protestant clergyman 
and Czech dissident Jan Šimsa put it,  
 
I think it is dangerous to overload concepts like “independent society”. We 
have to keep in mind all of society, culture, science, all of life in its 
indivisibility. In a sectarian understanding of independence, I see the danger of 
depoliticization and the danger of remaining too long in seclusion.29  
 
                                                 
27 Konrad, Antipolitics: An Essay. 
28 Ibid., p.96-119. 
29 Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.245. 
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To illustrate this point, Šimsa points to the problematic nature of the so-called “kitchen 
debates”30 and home education, due to the fact that they were not aimed at educating and 
sharing information beyond just a closed circle of friends. There was a danger of turning 
dissident activities into a ghetto rather than facilitating their broader societal impact and 
potential for change. 
The question of how political “anti-politics” could and should be was hotly debated at 
the time. According to Václav Benda, the parallel polis  
 
…cannot completely ignore the official social structures and systematically 
remain separate from them (this is reflected in the more extreme aspects of the 
ideology of the underground) nor can it merely reject them and be their 
negative image […]; variety, but not absolute independence, for a parallel 
course can be maintained only with a certain mutual respect and 
consideration.31 
 
How such coexistence could be endorsed without allowing independent activities to 
be corrupted by the state was a question of key importance. In this respect, the argument for 
“putting the society first”, as for example discussed by Jiři Dienstbier, seems particularly 
valuable. The idea of the “self-organization of civil society” is based on the belief that if the 
state does not perform its functions of responding to social needs, civil society has to self-
organize and therefore enter into a dialogue with the state and to contest its totalizing 
demands for power. “The state is too important a social institution to be understood merely as 
a parasitical organ that can be gradually pushed out of the life of society.”32  
The ideas that laid a basis for the activities and identities of the Polish movement 
“Solidarity” and of KOR33 are the most proactive and explicitly political responses to this 
dilemma in the whole of Eastern Europe. Building upon the idea of the prevalence of political 
means versus political ends, some Eastern European thinkers developed the concept of a 
“self-limiting revolution” that would be aimed not at capturing state power but rather at a 
peaceful transformation of society towards autonomous self-organization outside of it. This 
would allow the establishment of a new order in which civil liberties and human rights would 
be safeguarded. The Polish movement “Solidarity” sought neither to form a political party nor 
to capture state power. It sought neither the restoration of capitalism nor the withering away 
of the state. The importance of the concept of the “self-limiting” revolution is that - unlike the 
classical Marxist understanding of history and revolution as contesting the state on its own 
ground - it does not aim at the total destruction of a despotic state: “The ‘independent society’ 
does not compete for power.”34 After all, such a strategy would put revolutionary forces 
themselves in the place of uncontested state power and, thus, threaten to undermine citizen 
                                                 
30 “Kitchen debates” are a peculiar phenomenon in socialism, when people would gather informally at each 
other's homes to discuss philosophical, ethical or political issues, to read and talk about art and literature 
excluded from the official “culture”.  
31 Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.217. 
32 Ibid.: p.230. 
33 Komitet Obrony Robotników (Workers’ Defense Committee) 
34 Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.227. 
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self-organization and defense against the despotic state.35 Indeed, the close knowledge of 
“vanguardist” top-down change as realized by the Bolsheviks was seen as an example of a 
revolution that signified a transition from a despotic monarchic state to a despotic proletarian 
state.  
In moving away from radical ideas of revolution and reform while maintaining the 
emphasis on civic activism, Polish émigré philosopher Leszek Kolakowski argued in favor of a 
reconstruction of the social sphere through oppositional practices which would create a realm 
free from state control.36 This opposition was to be aimed not at influencing the state directly 
but at addressing an independent public, in order to form a culture of new citizenship based 
on rights and principles of equality. “Every act of defiance helps us build the framework of 
democratic socialism, which should not be merely or primarily a legal institutional structure 
but a real, day to day community of free people.”37 This “society-first” argument was 
presented as a more viable strategy for creating a counterbalance to the state, in which case the 
pressure on the state from below would be more of a by-product than an end in itself.38 
Developing such a sphere was believed to provide the necessary safeguards in the face of the 
oppressive state. “The commonness of revolutionary attitudes among the citizens and the 
resulting tendency of the citizens to control the authority are sufficient to guarantee that the 
sphere of regulation does not reach beyond the range of administration.”39 
However, there were divergent views as to the political implications of “parallel” 
activities, and in fact, even as to their possibility. Recalling events in Poland, George Konrad 
reports on the mixed feelings that he and his fellow Hungarian intellectuals had. He admits to 
the perceived impossibility for Hungarians at the time to have something like KOR and to 
wide-spread doubts about whether the Poles would ever succeed, even though everyone 
wanted them to.40 Many intellectuals at the time preferred a more individual and more 
contained conception of opposition. Some (for example Havel) believed that every 
individualist act outside of the official public space was in itself an act of political significance 
since it defied the logic of the regime. Dissidents like Jiří Dienstbier believed that the political 
impact of creating such a sphere arose from the mere fact of its existence: “What is the 
meaning of independent activities that openly declare themselves as such? When a citizen 
proclaims that he will not allow his citizenship to be taken from him, he renews the very 
notion of citizenship itself.”41 Therefore, much effort was invested by such thinkers into 
developing and maintaining an individual moral stand rather than into attempts to mobilize 
the broader public. This view is close to the ideas supported by some Soviet dissidents. For 
                                                 
35 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). 
36 Leszek Kolakowski, "The Fate of Marxim in Eastern Europe," Slavic Review 29, no. 9 (1970), Leszek 
Kolakowski, Toward a Marxist Humanism: Essays on the Left Today (New York,: Grove Press, 1968), Leszek 
Kolakowski and Stuart Hampshire, The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1974). 
37 Adam Michnik, Letters From Prison and Other Essays (Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1985), p.148. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Leszek Nowak, Power and Civil Society: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Real Socialism (Westport: Greenwood, 1991), 
p.64. 
40 Konrad, Antipolitics: An Essay. 
41 Jiří Dienstbier in Benda et al., "Parallel Polis, or an Independent Society in Central and Eastern Europe," p.231. 
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them, what mattered was an individual act of opposing the regime rather than attempts at 
mobilizing masses or achieving the actual regime change. The latter task, most of the time and, 
according to some accounts, even in early 1989, seemed virtually unattainable given the 
perceived stability of the Soviet system.  
In the Soviet Union the idea of opposing the regime as an individual in one’s private 
realm rather than as a community in its alternatively constructed sphere was even more 
pronounced. Dissidents like the famous historian Roy Medvedev were, in his own words, 
“dissenting against the authorities from a moral point of view. They never developed a goal to 
be political leaders.”42 The dissidents were very brave intellectuals but not organizers with a 
political program that would answer the question what should be done once the Soviet Union 
disappeared. The realm of dissidence in the USSR was not the realm of collective opposition 
but the realm of critically minded and marginally positioned individuals. In an interview ten 
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union another prominent dissident Larisa Bogaraz 
explained: “The dissidents weren’t representing anyone. We wanted the situation to be just like 
that. Each dissident could represent himself.”43 In fact, their dissidence was largely based on 
ignoring the system and is exemplified in a subculture of “janitors and night guards”44 – 
people who chose for the utmost marginality in the socialist system for the sake of securing 
their freedom from the state.45 Opposition to the state took place first and foremost on the 
level of ideas or rather on the level of rejecting ideological totalities and through the choice of 
staying outside of and partly disregarding the state.  
These ideas are reflected in a peculiar understanding of the relationship between 
public and private, in which the public represents the “wrong” kind of politics and the private 
is seen as a realm of individual freedom. The “parallel society” was private and largely based 
on familial ties and small circles of friends, whose relations with each other were predicated on 
high degrees of trust and almost intimacy, due to the potential dangers of even seemingly 
innocent activities.46 Reporting on the results of extensive interviews conducted in 1980, 
Krzysztof Nowak concludes that  
 
In his private role, an individual was relatively outspoken and could trust […]; 
the politicized sphere of public life gave rise to the division of the world into 
the private and the public realm […]; in the private realm people could be 
frank and “authentic”, whereas in the public realm they were forced to obey 
the alien rules. For them [Nowak’s informants] the public world was 
                                                 
42 The Russia Project: Whatever Happened to the Soviet Dissidents (Reese Ehrlich, 2001 [cited April 29, 2004); available 
from http://www.russiaproject.org/transcripts/dissidents.html. 
43 Ibid.([cited). 
44 Another metaphor that is sometimes used to refer to this phenomenon is the “boiler room” subculture.  
45 For an ethnographic account of this life vnye (“outside”) see Alexei Yurchak, Everything Was Forever, Until It Was 
No More: The Last Soviet Generation, ed. Paul Rabinow (Princeton University Press, 2005). 
46 As, for example, a legally prosecutable practice of telling jokes (anekdoty) in the Soviet Union was a way of 
expressing mockery and distaste for the official rhetoric of the state. See Alexei Yurchak, "The Cynical Reason of 
Late Socialism: Power, Pretence, and the Anekdot," Public Culture 9, no. 2 (1997). 
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“artificial”, a world where you had to pretend things and must not tell the 
“truth”.47 
 
According to another account 
 
[…] in authoritarian states citizens seldom become persons until they are in 
private, with their families, among friends, at their cottages. As citizens, they 
are more apt to stylize an appropriate behavior for themselves, maintaining 
certain rules of behavior that become habitual. There is always tension 
between natural, spontaneous behavior and “official” behavior.48 
 
What is particularly revealing in this quote is the rigidity of the opposition between the 
private as “natural” and the public as the “habitual” that is mirrored by another opposition 
between “persons” and “citizens”. This points to a significant belief that one’s role as a citizen 
(which, as Battek argues further, is not chosen freely but imposed by circumstances of one’s 
birth) is not only devoid of creativity and self-expression but is actually inhibiting these human 
qualities. By implication, individual freedom of expression is only possible in one’s private role 
as a “person”. For Rudolf Battek, the private realm offers an alternative – “the spiritual”, 
which he defines as “ethical postulates, sensitive creation, analytical and synthetic processes of 
learning and self-discovery […], feeling, knowing, giving, learning, loving, [and] believing.”49 
This alternative is essentially concerned with the intellectual, creative, and emotional needs of 
an individual rather than the collective, and it endows the private sphere with a multitude of 
roles that could otherwise be spread between different realms, such as the church, the 
educational system, and the family.  
Such distrust in the “official” sphere was elegantly described as a so-called “’as if’ 
game” that characterized people’s behavior in public. In a much quoted example given by 
Vaclav Havel in his landmark essay The Power of the Powerless, the manager of the fruit and 
vegetable shop places the slogan “Workers of the World, Unite!” in his shop window. He does 
so not because he feels truly concerned about the unity of the workers all over the world but 
because “that poster was delivered [to him] from the enterprise headquarters together with the 
onions and carrots.”  The greengrocer sees the slogan as a way to signal his loyalty to the 
regime and thus, to secure himself. He does not have to be passionate or sincere about it 
because it is sufficient to behave “as if” he believes it, and the authorities behave “as if” they 
believe he believes. This mechanisms places individual citizens in the position of being 
simultaneously accomplices and victims of the regime.50   
What is significant in this analysis is that it shows how hypocrisy and oppression 
cultivated in the socialist public sphere were commonly reproduced by the system and its 
                                                 
47 Krzysztof Nowak, "Covert Repressiveness and the Stability of a Political System: Poland at the End of the 
Seventies," Social Research 55, no. 1/2 (Spring/Summer 1988): p.184-87. 
48 Rudolf Battek, "Spiritual Values, Independent Initiatives, and Politics," in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens 
against the State in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1985), p.101, emphasis added. 
49 Ibid., p.97. 
50 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," p.27-29. 
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citizens. The conscious retreat into the private and the explicit disinterest and disdain of the 
public were feeding into rather than subverting the existing system. Czech academic Miroslav 
Kusy presents a similar argument:  
 
People continue to play the game of “as if” and keep their reservations to 
themselves. They have grown accustomed to the confusion of concepts and 
the relativity of moral values. Not only that, they have been able to turn this 
weapon of real-socialist ideology to their own advantage. With its help, they 
ideologize their own behavior vis-à-vis the regime and justify their way of life 
within the context of the harsh reality. […] People expect no change in the 
foreseeable future, and consider any effort to bring about such change as vain 
and dangerous. Like the regime, the nation becomes offensive about what it 
already has.51 
 
There is a widespread argument that the Soviet regime collapsed so rapidly and 
irrevocably partly due to the fact that nobody in the society, including the ruling elite, cared 
for it anymore. The arguments outlined above introduce another way of looking at the apathy, 
hypocrisy, and disillusionment that characterized late socialism and its citizens. It shows that 
just “talking the talk” and “playing the game” is not a mask one is free to put on and off 
retaining a “real” face under it. The “talk” and the “game” are real and constitutive of the 
identities of the actors involved. In this dissertation I show how an intricate combination of 
“old” and “new” talks is at work in the more recent “post”-socialist reality.  
What was distinct about Eastern European thinking before the end of socialism was 
an aversion towards grand ideologies. The biggest contribution of those theories could be said 
to be their consciousness of the methods of resistance and their primacy over the anticipated 
outcomes. Even the most proactive ideas about civil society maintained the tight connection 
between the means and the ends, emphasizing that the civil society movement would lose the 
moment it would start using the same means as the oppressive state. The alternative means, 
however, were mostly conceptualized in individualistic and private terms.  
As this overview of different “Eastern ideas” about the meaning of civil society has 
shown, there were fewer affinities and uniformities behind the “iron curtain” than is 
customarily assumed. The wealth of ideas developed in different socialist countries is better 
understood as a range of thinking than as a coherent East European approach. These 
divergences are also clearly visible in different post-socialist experiences for different societies. 
In addition, there is less continuity between the meaning-making and reality before and after 
1989 than is often believed. In other words, what seemed a meaningful form of civil society 
under the socialist regime did not resonate with the realities after its collapse. This points to 
the need to investigate the meaning of civil society in its particular context and as shaped by 
cultural and historical dynamics. This dissertation presents such a type of research.   
                                                 
51 Miroslav Kusy, "Chartism and 'real socialism'," in The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central and 
Eastern Europe, ed. John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1985), p.165-66. 
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1.2.2. Western theories on civil society 
 
The discussion below illustrates further how, due to different historical contexts, the concept 
of civil society as well as other important notions such as “trust”, “solidarity”, and “civility” 
may carry completely different meanings. More specifically, I focus below on the conception 
of an individual and its position vis-à-vis the public and the private that developed in the 
mainstream civil society theories in the “West”.52 Whereas in the “East” an individual was 
seen as a source of morality and the basis for a normative judgment, in the “West” the 
discussion defines an individual in negative terms. An individual is (often implicitly) perceived 
as a source of problems such as apathy, extremist beliefs, rent-seeking, and distrust. The 
concept of civil society is therefore put forward to counterbalance or mitigate those features 
and is believed to reside in the collective public realm that goes under a variety of labels, such 
as the Habermasian “public sphere” or the neo-Tocquevillian associationalism.  
Associationalism – despite a variety of labels in different countries53 – reflects politics 
of the non-Marxist secular left, especially their belief in civic and political liberties. Empirically, 
it sees civil society as a “space of uncoerced human association and also as a set of relational 
networks – formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology – that fill that space.”54 It 
is therefore implied that familiar or interest-based relations need to be mediated by a 
collectively constructed sphere. These concerns have been expressed most famously by Jürgen 
Habermas.55 According to his analysis, in Western societies the private interest is increasingly 
occupying the public sphere, and the state relates to its citizens more as to clients or 
consumers of services. Thus, individuals are developing dependency on the state and lose 
interest in as well as skills for critical public debate and critical reasoning. These tendencies are 
reinforced by the professionalization of politics and the marketization of the media. Such 
developments in supposedly established democracies fall short of the normative ideal of the 
public sphere and civil society.56  
This debate is largely predicated on arguments about “civility” as a value imbedded in 
civil society, which carries the potential to counter the “background of growing 
disorganization – violence, homelessness, divorce, abandonment, alienation, and addiction” 
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that is evident in capitalist societies of today.57 The growth of apathy and individualism and 
the lack of interest in public affairs are all referred to as worrying tendencies that decrease the 
democratic quality of affected societies. As I noted above, all of these negative features are 
implied to be coming from individuals left to their own devices. Therefore, civil society is 
meant to be a site to cultivate public morality and trust that would become prerequisites to a 
more democratic society. The relevant virtues are argued to be best learnt in associational 
networks of citizens, which function as “schools for citizens” in two important respects. 
Firstly, they teach active engagement and, secondly, - some would say even more importantly 
– the teach “how to live with the many different forms of social conflict.”58 
One of the most famous strands of this kind of thinking is the one based on a neo-
Tocquevillian revival of the study of voluntary associations and of ideas about social capital. It 
emerged in the 1950s-1970s with the studies on civic culture famously represented by Almond 
and Verba.59 These studies provoked much interest in the relationship between interpersonal 
and social dynamics and the broader political context. They were focusing on questions of 
group formation and functioning in various countries and on characteristics of interpersonal 
relations in the public realm, with a specific concern for varying degrees of trust. This 
variation was seen to translate into political processes in which people are more or less willing 
to cooperate politically with their fellow-citizens, depending on the “existence of more basic 
social values – widespread social trust and a high evaluation of considerateness and generosity 
in people – and … the fact that these permeate the political system.”60 
One of the most influential studies on social capital and associationalism is Robert 
Putnam’s Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.61 Starting with similar 
assumptions Putnam has taken this argument further by postulating in his research on 
democracy in Italy that civicness and social trust are necessary preconditions for democracy 
and development.62 Although some criticism was leveled at this study on methodological and 
historical grounds,63 it became a reference point for civil society research since. An important 
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addition to the civic culture argument made by Putnam is that what matters for democracy are 
not only the formal institutions of representative democracy but also the informal institutions, 
social relations and patterns of trust, in which formal political processes are embedded. On 
the basis of an extensive study of the impact of the regional reforms introduced in Italy in 
1970, he argued that the social capital generated through a variety of informal institutions 
explains the relative performance of democracies. As Putnam states in the oft-quoted 
conclusion: “Tocqueville was right. Democratic government is strengthened, not weakened, 
when it faces a vigorous civil society. […] Building social capital will not be easy, but it is the 
key to making democracy work.”64 A so-called “Putnam link” – a link between building trust, 
values, and skills through voluntary association and enhancing democracy – has been 
considered eye-opening for the study of civil society in both democratizing countries and 
established democracies.65 
The weakness of Putnam’s argument, however, lies in the fact that, while looking for 
explanations for differential developments in the north and the south of Italy, he disregards 
the role of political parties, movements, distinct ideologies, and beliefs in institutional 
performance and democratic outcomes.66 He is also, as Syndey Tarrow was one of the first to 
point out, leaving unexplored the impact of the state on the social capital dynamic.67 
Furthermore, criticizing Putnam many scholars have argued that notwithstanding the 
contribution of his study on exploring relationships of cooperation and social trust, it fails to 
demonstrate a causal relationship between civil society as he conceives of it and the success of 
democracy. Quite on the contrary, it has been argued that a vibrant and robust civil society, if 
developing alongside weak political institutions, can produce non-democratic effects. For 
example, Berman shows that the Nazi movement in the Weimar Republic emerged from a 
vibrant and well-organized civil society.68 Other, closer to date examples include the rise of 
extremist groups like the Russian National Unity and the Romanian National Union or the 
World Church of the Creator and the Nation of Islam.  
For Putnam any association or network regardless of its goals and the nature of its 
political engagement (or lack thereof) makes for a rich associational life; he fails to make a 
distinction between democratic and non- or even anti-democratic values that may be at the 
core of these organizations and networks. To quote Amy Gutmann’s critique:  
 
Among its members, the Ku Klux Klan may cultivate solidarity and trust, 
reduce the incentives for opportunism, and develop some “I’s” into a “we’s” 
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… [but] … the associational premises of these solidaristic ties are hatred, 
degradation, and denigration of fellow citizens and fellow human beings.69   
 
To extend this criticism: Putnam fails to address the challenge of “bad civil society”.70 Without 
the intention of completely dismissing civil society, “bad civil society” is a cautionary tale that 
helps refine and contextualize ideas about civil society. Drawing on examples from various 
historical contexts in which voluntary associations actively and publicly challenge the values of 
civility and reciprocity through the promotion of hate, bigotry, racism, anti-Semitism, and 
aggressive xenophobia, Chambers and Kopstein argue that - counter to the direct causal link 
between dense associational life and democracy – such groups present a threat to democracy 
and democratic values.71  
When talking of networks of trust and solidarity, it is important to acknowledge that 
their impact on tolerance and pluralism in society is highly dependent on their composition 
(are they exclusively white or male or upper class?) as well as on their connections with other 
networks. That is to say that such networks do not generate democratic values per se: 
“Knowing that a church-based women’s reading group is essentially a bonding experience 
does not tell you whether they are reading ‘The Turner Diaries’ or ’The Color Purple’.”72 To 
address this criticism, Putnam later developed the typology of “bonding” and “bridging” 
social capital, i.e. social capital based on developing solidarity within a group and social capital 
developed by connecting across different kinds of groups differentiated by class, race, gender, 
and so on. Unfortunately, this important extension of his argument still has to find its way 
into civil society programs that are aimed at building civil society, especially those that are 
developed in the context of aid/ assistance.  
The fallacy of the neo-Tocquevillian revival of associationalism is that its added value 
is often predicated on a straightforward opposition between civic engagement and individual 
apathy and isolation, which commonsensically sustains a preference for the former rather than 
the latter. Importantly, by focusing exclusively on individual values, it disregards the 
institutional contexts and socio-economic conditions in which associations exist or are 
expected to exist. It assumes that individuals have equal access to social capital and that the 
social capital generated within different groups has the same value in the society as a whole. 
This, however, seems at best naïve given the inequality of groups differentiated by gender, 
class, or ethnicity.73 Along similar lines, Chambers and Kopstein argue for bringing back in the 
socio-economic factors behind the choices that people make and for putting “civil society 
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theory back into contact with some traditional issues of social justice.”74 Being much more 
than a straightforwardly materialist argument about ideas produced by material conditions, this 
view helps to enhance the discussion about the promotion of democratic values by placing 
citizens’ beliefs and values into a complex context of various factors. “Poverty, downward 
social mobility, diminished economic expectations, and even basic inequality [defined as a 
result of changes or threatened changes in life chances] … can create illiberal citizens that no 
amount of deliberation will convince otherwise.”75 Having problematized the substance of 
associational life, Chamber and Kopstein argue for the need to conduct context-sensitive 
comparative studies that would allow mapping out various reasons for which different people 
join different groups with different effects for democracy. 
As the discussion above has shown, under different political, socio-economic, and 
cultural conditions the relationship between an individual and the public sphere is understood 
very differently from the ideas that developed in Eastern Europe. The concept is also invested 
with different normative expectations. Understanding this difference is an indispensable 
starting point for understanding the dialogue between East and West about the democratic 
promise of civil society and ways to endorse it.  
1.2.3. Global civil society and transnational relations 
 
Over the past few decades a vast body of literature has emerged that strives to conceptualise 
civil society in transnational or global terms. Research into transnational relations dates back 
almost three decades; this means it started before the end of the Cold War. In fact, some 
Eastern European thinkers were incorporating ideas of “globalization” or “global 
technological civilization” into their writing back in the 80s.76 This research tradition started 
off as a debate between the ‘state-centered’ and the ‘society-dominated’ view in international 
relations.77 Later, for example in a volume edited by Thomas Risse-Kappen, the discussion 
was picked up and taken a step further to “examine how the inter-state world interacts with 
the ‘society world’ of transnational relations.”78 Various contributions to that volume as well as 
other more recent research have shown that these interactions follow different patterns and 
lead to different results depending on particular circumstances, such as the type and strength 
of the state(s) in question, the degree of development of domestic civil societies and their 
transnational connectedness, and the issue area concerned.  
Among the wealth of theories about political globalization and the role of civil society, 
there are two broad strands that are of particular relevance for this dissertation: the literature 
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that addresses the theoretical and normative question of a “global ethic” and the literature that 
explores empirically the “global polity” and the features of global politics.  
The “global ethic” literature is primarily concerned with exploring theoretical 
possibilities for a global democracy. It is largely driven by a normative assumption that “global 
power should be democratized.”79 Under this heading fall the literature on global governance 
and theories of “cosmopolitan”, “normative”, and “substantive” democracy, which emphasize 
the connection between politics and moral purpose and value. Perceived from this 
perspective, the core task of global/ transnational civil society is the transnational promotion 
of democracy.80 It thus places the promotion of democracy and civil society in the context of 
global changes in economy, politics, and culture.81  
A central issue raised is whether and how the processes of economic globalization can 
be complemented with the establishment of a civil society that would reinvent the meaning of 
democracy on a global scale. Global civil society is seen as important for countering the 
adverse consequences of economic globalization on social equity across different social 
segments nationally and between different countries and regions globally. As one of the 
proponents of this approach has phrased it, “globalization-from-above” by market forces can 
and should be moderated by the “globalization-from-below” spearheaded by civil society.82 
According to another even more proactive statement, the world needs “a multilevel strategy 
and program to impose new rules on the global economy while transferring wealth and power 
to ordinary people – a worldwide economic and political democratization.”83 Such activities 
are seen as both a counterweight to neo-liberalism, in particular to pressures to privatize and 
marketize public goods, and a way to achieve greater social equity. Democracy protects and 
defines individual rights and liberties conceived of comprehensively to include civil, political, 
economic, and cultural rights; it fosters a degree of social equality; it induces participation in all 
forms of social governance; it helps identify and inculcate support for the collective good; and 
it promotes domestic and international peace.84 Thus, rather than dismissing the processes of 
economic globalization as destructive, several authors have suggested that it is possible to 
enjoy the benefits and to mitigate the shortcomings of economic globalization, provided the 
guiding ideas of globalization are amended to prioritize the protection of public welfare.85  
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Therefore, normative concerns within theories about global civil society also have a 
practical political side to them. Envisioning an alternative global order is driven by the 
explicitly formulated goals of achieving social and political equality on a global scale. The 
following quote from the work of Richard Falk is exemplary of such aspirations:  
 
To introduce the idea of “normative democracy” is to offer a proposal for a 
unifying ideology capable of mobilizing and unifying the disparate social forces 
that constitute global civil society, and to galvanize the political energy that is 
associated with globalization-from-below […]; thereby reconnecting politics 
with moral purpose and values [the term] calls attention to the moral 
emptiness of neoliberalism [and] consumerism.86 
 
In addition to growing global inequalities, the new conditions of a “risk society” do 
not only present a technical challenge but also introduce a new political dynamic. New 
nuclear, chemical, and other health threats, for example, have a potential to affect everyone, 
and this interdependence brings about new forms of governance that cross the traditional 
hierarchies and, ultimately, can lead to a new type of democracy. It is argued along 
Habermasian lines that the new threats can motivate the creation of a new public sphere 
defined by an open debate.87 Global civil society is thus seen as a more suitable arena for 
mobilization in the face of new risks and environmental threats that affect populations across 
geographical, social, and political divides.88  
Some criticisms of these theories are interesting for the purposes of this dissertation. 
The first criticism questions the universalist nature of the theories of global civil society; the 
second criticism follows from the first and points to the fact that theories of global civil 
society contradict the idea of democracy. According to the first criticism, most theories of 
global civil society fail to question or at least situate the content of the norms and moral values 
that global civil society is envisioned to uphold. Global civil society is positioned as a shared 
and equal community. It is believed that civil societies, whatever their point of origin, are 
essentially the same and are based on the same values and norms. 
I contend that these theories would benefit from treating ideas, values, and norms as 
culturally and historically contingent phenomena whose political dynamic is a worthwhile 
object of research. To these ends, a large theoretical and methodological apparatus is available 
from the literature on social constructivism and sociological institutionalism.89 This literature 
                                                 
86 Falk, "Global Civil Society and the Democratic Prospect." 
87 Ulrich Beck, "From Industrial Society to Risk Society: Questions of Survival, Social Structure and Ecological 
Enlightenment," Theory, Culture and Society 9 (1992). 
88 Barry Holden, "Democratic Theory and Global Warming," in The Ethical Dimensions of Global Change, ed. Barry 
Holden (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), Anthony McGrew, "Democracy Beyond Borders?: Globalization and the 
Reconstruction of Democratic Theory and Politics," in The Transformation of Democracy?, ed. Anthony McGrew 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997). 
89 Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations," International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999), Martha Finnemore, "Norms, Culture, and World 
Politics: Insights From Sociology's Institutionalism," International Organization 50, no. 2 (1996), Martha Finnemore 
and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," International Organization 52, no. 4 
(1998). 
 31 
shows that at the very least, the relevant norms and values should be studied not as a given 
constant but as variable empirical phenomena defined by particular instances of interaction 
between the transnational and the domestic. In this dissertation I take up an interpretative-
constructivist approach to show how ideas and discourses about civil society acquire new 
meanings as they travel from one context, for example donor headquarters, to another, such 
as a local NGO in a small Ukrainian town. Moreover, I show how the interaction between the 
two different contexts transforms the discourse as a whole, so that the meanings developed in 
one context influence those in another. I further show that (changing) ideas about civil society 
constitute particular types of civil society actors.  
This brings us to the second criticism: The “global” spread of particular norms and 
values by civil society actors does not necessarily have to be interpreted as a sign of global 
democratization. If democracy is about empowering communities to constantly (re-) negotiate 
normative rules, then universalizing and naturalizing a particular set of norms and values 
cannot be considered democratic. Danilo Zolo, one of the critics of Held’s ideas about global 
democracy, can be cited here. He criticizes the universalist approach to democratic norms on 
two counts. First, Zolo argues, it undervalues the complex interaction between normative 
structures, on the one hand, and cultural and economic processes, on the other; and, second, it 
reveals an ethnocentric prejudice and shows indifference to non-Western political and juridical 
traditions. Tony Coates likewise points to the “blind spot which conceals from view the 
specific cultural origins and particular limitations of cosmopolitan values (their excessive 
individualism, for example)” and facilitates a kind of imperialism.90 This critique is a useful 
reminder of the need to ask whose values and discourses are taken as the basis for the 
“common” democratic vision and how they might interact with other visions and norms.  
In much of the “global civil society” literature, ideas about democracy are usually 
conflated with the idea of a global civil society. It is assumed that civil society is both the 
bearer of democratic values and a legitimate crusader that can bring these values to every 
corner of the world. Most definitions of a “global civil society” reflect these strong democratic 
aspirations. For example, Mary Kaldor, a well-known proponent of the concept of global civil 
society, defines it as the “global process through which individuals debate, influence, and 
negotiate an ongoing social contract or set of contracts with the centers of political or 
economic authority.”91 Global civil society is also defined as the bearer of alternative visions of 
a more sustainable, compassionate, and democratic future world order.92 The claims of 
morality inherent in the concept of global civil society are further captured in arguments about 
shifting the centers of power, emancipation, and empowerment of the poor and the 
marginalized. In the words of Mary Kaldor, civil society is about “political emancipation, 
empowerment of individuals and extension of democracy.”93  
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Another strand in the global civil society literature deals with what can be broadly 
defined as the governance issues of a “global polity”. It is based on the core assumption that 
the political realm is increasingly globalized and that civil society is an essential aspect of this 
globalization. It shares the normative concern with the “global ethic” approach; however, its 
focus is more empirical. It aims to explore the various forms that global civil society takes and 
the various effects it produces. Under this heading fall the diverse and well-developed 
literatures on global social movements, “epistemic communities”, (international) non-
governmental organizations (I)NGOs), and transnational advocacy networks.94  
In this dissertation I focus on a particular segment of this broad phenomenon: non-
governmental organizations (NGOs). Foreign assistance to civil society actively engages 
NGOs both from the “West” and from the “East”: The former administer the majority of 
foreign assistance projects and the latter are the preferred partners in such projects. Moreover, 
as I discuss extensively in chapters four to seven, often foreign assistance projects are 
explicitly aimed at creating and supporting local NGOs. I discuss the main features of the 
dialogue between (transnational) Western NGOs and their local counterparts and the 
implications it has on the development of local civil society.  
It is believed that civil society actors such as NGOs are well-positioned to cooperate 
across borders and to mobilize more effectively for change.95 Many authors have worked to 
conceptualize and measure the political influence of NGOs and to identify conditions under 
which transnational NGO coalitions are likely to have an impact upon either domestic or 
international politics.96 This line of research has been particularly targeted at exploring two 
aspects: first, the ways in which transnational civil society exercises influence over decision-
making in the international arena, for example via environmental or peace movements; 
second, the successes of transnational coalitions in countering violations by particular 
governments through the so-called “boomerang effect”. The “boomerang effect” is a process 
through which activists in a particular country link up with their counterparts in other 
countries through transnational activist networks in order to put pressure on their 
governments from the outside. This often happens in situations when governments are 
unresponsive to their civil societies and is characteristic of such issue areas as human rights or 
the environment.97 
Civil society is said to have a special empowering quality, since it tends to include 
stakeholders whose voice is often not heard in “traditional” decision-making: It disrupts old 
hierarchies and spreads power among more people and groups. This is what Jessica Mathews 
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calls the “power shift”.98 Not only are the operations of global civil society more democratic 
than those of other actors on the global scene, there is also a kind of a spill-over effect that 
deepens democracy globally and creates new ways in which undemocratic governments or 
socially irresponsible corporations can be held accountable. Within this framework 
globalization is believed to offer possibilities of emancipation on a global scale, thus breaking 
through regional divisions, such as those between North and South. It offers an alternative 
route for individual citizens to enter into a dialogue with the centers of political and economic 
power. Mary Kaldor calls this phenomenon the “domestication of the international.”99 Such a 
perspective can be understood as an actor-based approach that keeps a particular focus on the 
strategic use of different kinds of resources towards achieving a set of political goals. In other 
words, the success of civil society lies in its strategic action vis-à-vis (if not against) powerful 
actors, both state and private.  
This strategy is elaborated in detail by Brecher, Costello, and Smith in their book 
Globalization from Below.100 They call it a “Lilliput Strategy” used by those marginal to the 
dominant centers of power – even though some social movements and activist groups may be 
small and powerless, when united by “a sense of solidarity, a common belief system, and a 
common program” they can exercise substantial leverage.101 In other words, the power of the 
powerless lies in their strategic united action towards a just cause. This assumes a certain 
rigidity in the world order with one global center of power vis-à-vis which the margins are 
formed, and further, the assumed unity in the center implies unity in the margin. This thinking 
is captured, for example, in the following quote: “Global capital has usurped powers that 
rightfully belong to people and to their representatives in government.”102 Without any 
intention to question the moral principles of those opposing the injustice caused by the global 
distribution of wealth, my interest here is in the actual mechanisms on which such a new 
“global polity” is argued to be functioning.  
 
Globalization from below remains rooted in a wide range of specific 
movements around specific concerns. But its unifying vision reframes these 
activities in ways that show their connection to the broader problems of 
globalization experienced by others. It interprets particular movements as 
responses to a common situation and as a part of a common struggle.103 
 
I argue that such “reframing” and “interpretation” are complex political phenomena 
themselves rather than just strategic moves of no consequence to the phenomena that are 
being reframed. In the analysis presented in chapters four to seven I inquire whether and how 
“reframing” and “interpretation” can transform reality and actors’ identities in significant 
ways.  
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The aspiration to give voice to the “powerless” is one of the cornerstones of the 
analysis of transnational advocacy networks by Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink. They 
show how transnational advocacy networks can mobilize four types of instruments: 
information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability politics. All four 
are essentially based on mobilizing and strategically employing values and norms. Information 
politics entails providing “politically usable” information to those who for some reason lack 
access to it, thus empowering otherwise marginal groups. Symbolic politics is based on 
mobilizing symbols, actions, or stories that have high legitimacy internationally. Leverage 
politics means acting in the name of those who cannot call upon powerful actors on their 
own. Accountability politics means obliging powerful actors to act on principles they have 
formally endorsed.104 As all of these politics are exercised, it is believed that the domestic civil 
society is empowered through its connection to the transnational civil society, not only 
because of the resources and the leverage it gains vis-à-vis domestic centers of power but also 
because framing their position in terms of internationally recognized norms helps legitimize 
civil society actors’ claims. One of the prominent examples that have received much scholarly 
attention is the demise of the Soviet block and the role that different coalitions between 
dissidents and critically minded groups in the East and civic groups and social movements in 
the West played in it.105 
Importantly, the actors who engage in these politics are said to share a quality that sets 
them apart from those against whom they act, such as, for example, multinational 
corporations or central governments. Keck and Sikkink define the members of transnational 
advocacy networks as “principled political entrepreneurs” who act on their conviction and 
moral principles. According to these authors, this is what makes such actors essentially 
different. Picking up on this idea, Sperling, Ferree, and Risman introduce the term of “moral 
entrepreneurs” in their analysis of women’s transnational networks. “Moral entrepreneurs” are 
those who contribute to building organizations and discourses that have moral implications.106 
Altogether the argument is that the moral basis of the discourse and practice of various groups 
who can be defined as global/ transnational civil society can be seen as a safeguard against 
some of the ethical challenges and political tensions other actors might face. It is contended 
that due to this moral basis civil society is less prone to corruption, rent-seeking, and 
hierarchical and undemocratic practices towards its members, because its members voluntarily 
choose to act according to their moral principles. While the work of the authors cited above is 
rich in empirical analysis, further investigation is necessary in order to understand under what 
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conditions transnational networks created in the interest of the powerless and of democracy 
may also subvert rather than enhance the existing inequalities. 
This leads to a related question: To what extent can and should norms and values be 
seen as strategically utilized instruments? Does their instrumentalization not contradict the 
democratic idea(l) itself? It should be noted that the impact of norms as instruments depends 
upon the degree to which they are framed and recognized as universally accepted and as an 
essential and natural component of democratic development. For example, to go back to a 
case study in the book by Keck and Sikkink, the success of the international campaign on 
violence against women is attributed to the connection that was established to the norm of 
human rights.107 The authors argue that only after the famous “Women’s Rights are Human 
Rights” slogan was created, activist efforts in different parts of the world could be united 
under that banner and higher international awareness of the issue as well as some legislative 
change could be attained. In turn, this worked only because the concept of “human rights” 
had earlier become one of the most central and undisputable international norms.  
The fact that constructing common strategic frames can be highly sensitive politically 
has been powerfully exposed by various women’s activists and feminist scholars. Here, as in 
the “global civil society” literature, the debate can also be seen as two-fold: On the one hand, 
the theoretical normative component is dedicated to systematizing feminist knowledge and 
developing and refining theoretical and epistemological issues; on the other hand, the 
activism-oriented literature is focused on developing analytical and empirical categories that 
can be utilized towards researching as well as creating women’s movements and women’s 
activism. The distinction between the two concerns in feminist literature is not always clear-
cut, for it is replete with scholars who reflect upon practical political consequences of certain 
epistemological positions as well as scholars who discuss theoretical implications of particular 
empirical findings and activist positions. Without any ambition to go deeply into the complex 
debates that characterize both literatures as well as the dialogue between them I bring in 
several points that to my mind usefully illustrate both theoretical and political tensions that 
can arise around attempts to define a common “global” agenda. 
The analysis by Karen Offen offers a very useful historical-theoretical discussion of 
the meaning of the terms “feminism” and “feminist”.108 The author shows that even a cursory 
look at the history of women’s movements in different cultural contexts reveals conflicting 
understandings of what it means to act on behalf of women. By citing such examples as 
German ideas of male/female complementarity and critiques of social institutions or Swedish 
“motherhood” feminism, she shows that the Anglo-American tradition of equality of rights is 
only one way of understanding women’s issues and women’s activism. The general argument 
is that this diversity has to be considered and theorized if one is to arrive at a meaningful 
theoretical definition of “feminism”. Indeed, the very term “feminism” invokes a host of  
theoretical and political debates. One of the tensions between feminist political science of the 
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“classical” period of the 70s and its post-feminist turn in the 90s is that between the idea of 
empowering women as the oppressed and subjugated class, therefore assuming that there is 
such a distinct group as women that share the condition of oppression, and the idea of gender 
as a construct, which is constituted by the opposition “male – female”, which is reconfigured 
in a variety of contexts and implicates both the “male” and the “female” part of the 
opposition. This tension is well captured in the analysis by Barrett and Phillips, who argue that 
in the 1970s feminists disagreed substantially (and fiercely) over what the cause of women’s 
oppression might be but “did not really question the notion of the cause itself. Nor was there 
any difficulty with the idea of oppression, which seemed to have self-evident application.109 
Also, for most feminists of the time gender issues were cast in social structural terms; in this 
sense “feminists united in the importance they attached to establishing the fundamentals of 
social causation.”110 
One of the critiques of this position came from the so-called “black” feminists, who 
pointed to the issue of power inequalities between women of different backgrounds, rather 
than between women and men.111 According to one of the early critiques, universalizing the 
category of a woman (on the basis of defining one particular group as a norm) brings to life 
several axioms that underlie international “gender” policies and perspectives: Women are the 
same due to the shared fact of their oppression; they are always the victims of male violence, 
of religious fundamentalism, and of familial code; they are always dependent and have little 
access to the material and symbolic resources of society. Regardless of the particular historic 
and cultural meanings of womanhood, women in “other” countries are defined as oppressed, 
traditionalistic, and legally illiterate.112 In other words, being defined by the Other, objects of 
international donor activities are inevitably defined as the Other.113  
Other authors have provided historical examples of earlier women’s movements to 
illustrate the problematics of inequality between different women and of the politics of 
agenda-setting within women’s movements. For example, the history of the women’s 
movement in France from the end of the XVIII century onwards, which was torn by class 
clashes,114 or the “fallen women campaign” that was led by British upper-class women on 
behalf of their Indian “sisters”.115 According to a historical analysis by Antoinette Burton, 
British women were particularly outspoken on the issue of prostitution, in which “Eastern 
harem slaves”116 presumably found themselves, and used it to frame the broad discussion of 
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women’s subjugation. However, their agenda and activities were much more fragmented on 
the issues that concerned the situation of British women and their disfranchisement at home. 
These tensions have been more recently captured in the “sisterhood” – “difference” 
debate. Some feminists have argued in favor of strategic alliances between women that should 
be based on the discovery of shared oppression.117 They have defined “sisterhood” as a 
political project that would lead to the success of the (global) women’s movement. For 
example, the two volumes edited by Robin Morgan, published some fifteen years apart, both 
insist on the apparent possibility and success of “sisterhood” as a universal global strategy.118 
This position, however, has been criticized as one that leads to a complete erasure of 
positional differences between women and sustains hegemonic constructions. Thus, many 
authors have instead argued in favor of acknowledging “difference” between women.119 The 
insistence on the notion of “difference” has raised another question: whether or not it may 
still be possible to develop a common political agenda. For example, Ann Sisson Runyan 
provides a useful discussion of whether the plurality of positions denies any possibility for 
feminist solidarity.120 Such research, however, remains highly theoretical and, similarly to the 
discussions about “cosmopolitan” democracy, addresses the normative rather than the 
practical empirical dimension of the problem.   
Related to this dilemma is the issue whether there has to be a (global) women’s agenda 
at all. Should women keep to women-specific issues even if their experience and intuition 
point to other kinds of issues and concerns? Felly Nkweto Simmonds provides the example of 
the International Women’s Conference in Copenhagen in 1980. The event was literally split 
into two between the delegates who were concerned with the Israeli occupation of Palestine 
and wanted to include in the conference report a call to “eliminate imperialism, colonialism, 
neo-colonialism, Zionism, racism, and apartheid” and those who rejected such language and 
were upset that “key political questions of concern to women” were not being sufficiently 
addressed in the conference.121 Not surprisingly, those who rejected the call were mostly the 
delegates from Australia, Canada, the US, and Israel. What is more important for the present 
discussion, however, is the issue of whether and how the women’s movement is capable of 
responding to different systems of oppression, both local and global, and whether the 
insistence on “sisterhood” and “women’s issues” cannot turn into a straight-jacket for activists 
who may want to respond to some other issues that are not globally recognized as “questions 
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of concern to women”. This is one of the dimensions of debate that render “global 
sisterhood” difficult.  
These discussions are also of relevance to the general “global civil society” debate. It is 
noticeable that in most cases the origins of the concept of a “global polity” lie in the 
“Western” (or “Northern”) part of the world, and the question of how to reconcile the 
“global” and the “local”, or rather the different localities marked by differential power 
positions, remains to be investigated both theoretically and empirically. This dissertation is 
dedicated to exploring the mechanisms through which this Western-based notion of civil 
society connects to its local counterparts. By focusing on a particular field of interaction 
between Western and non-Western NGOs, I aim to shed light on a particular facet of the 
complex phenomenon of transnational activism. I argue that we will not understand whether 
global civil society exists and whether it achieves its proclaimed goals unless we look at the 
mechanisms through which it is constituted.   
 
1.3. Assistance: Theories of Transition and Democratization 
 
The (renewed) interest in civil society in the last decade of the twentieth century has 
characterized not only academic debates but also policy-making. In particular foreign 
assistance policies were transformed substantially as a result of the increased importance of 
ideas about civil society. In this section I explore applied theories on whether and how 
democracy and civil society can be externally supported that laid the conceptual groundwork 
for the post-Cold War assistance policies of different countries. Understanding this thinking is 
important for understanding assistance itself – what set it in motion, what kinds of outcomes 
it led to, and what effects it created. It is also key for understanding the “lessons learnt” in 
almost two decades of assistance. Such “lessons” are not only about what has changed as a 
result of more experience, increasing adjustment, and better evaluation, but also, and even 
more importantly, about what cannot possibly be “learnt” given particular conceptualization 
of assistance, its goals, and methods.  
1.3.1. Making democracy happen: How and why to assist  
 
Starting off from the recent wave of regime change in different parts of the globe, famously 
termed the “third wave” of democratization by Samuel Huntington,122 numerous studies have 
emerged striving to conceptualize the change towards democratic regimes, “to determine why 
countries do or do not evolve, consolidate, maintain, lose, and re-establish more or less 
democratic systems of government”,123 and what makes for the consolidation of democracy. 
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These attempts to conceptualize democratization struck a chord with many policy 
communities, in which a new vogue of promoting democracy worldwide was on the rise. 
Actors as varied as U.S. and European governments, high-level officials, and other 
governmental, quasi-governmental, nongovernmental, as well as private organizations and 
academics were busy exploring the virtues of supporting democratization around the globe. 
The mobilization of financial resources and technical support towards democratization in 
policy circles was accompanied by a similarly overwhelming mobilization of attempts to 
define, predict and analyze the trajectory of democratization, its stages and ultimate goals in 
academic literature.  
This amalgam of ideas about what has to happen after the collapse of a previous 
totalitarian or authoritarian regime formed the basis for the so-called “transition paradigm”.124 
The transition paradigm rests on the key assumption that any country that has been freed 
from any form of dictatorial rule is moving towards democracy and, thus, presents a case of a 
democratizing country or a country “in transition to democracy.” According to Carothers, “in 
the first half of the 1990s […] numerous policy makers and aid practitioners reflexively labeled 
any formerly authoritarian country that was attempting some political liberalization as a 
‘transitional country’.”125 Transitional countries are perceived as being on a path towards 
establishing clearly defined democratic institutions and free market economies. They are being 
described and evaluated on the basis of the degree of progress made along these lines. The 
assumption is that all it takes is the desire to abandon communist legacies and to embrace new 
democratic and capitalist ideals.126 The paradigm postulates a so-called “snowballing” effect 
amongst democratizing countries, as a result of which countries cannot help but democratize 
following the examples set by others.127 
Within this paradigm, there is also a strong belief in “demonstration effects” – the 
effects produced by the exposure to and exchange with established democracies.128 
Knowledge of democratic principles and practices elsewhere is believed to inspire 
oppositional elites to pursue democratic change and reform. The assumption here is that 
Western democracies serve as a standard to which other nations should aspire. Upon closer 
inspection this line of argumentation is supported only by few and ambivalent examples of 
formerly colonial states, which are argued to be more successful in their democratic reforms 
after longer colonial rule because they had more time to embrace liberal and democratic values 
                                                 
124 A term coined by Thomas Carothers. T. Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy 
2002. 
125 Ibid., p.6. 
126 It is precisely for the reasons described below that some authors reject the term “transition” altogether; for 
example, Barbara Einhorn has argued for the term “transformation” to indicate the departure from western 
notions of a historical progression from state socialism to liberal democracy. See Barbara Einhorn, "Discussant's 
Comments," in Making Transition Work for Women in Europe and Central Asia: World Bank Discussion Paper 411, ed. 
Marina Lazreg (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000). 
127 Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
128 Ibid. 
 40 
from their British or French colonizers.129 These authors go on to argue that shorter colonial 
rule in Africa can be used as an explanation for a weaker democratic legacy in some African 
countries.  
The “transition paradigm” has a highly prescriptive character: it assumes that a 
particular condition of democracy has to be attained by any country. Democratization is seen 
as evolving according to several universal stages borrowed from the recent literature on 
democratization, such as the break-up of the previous regime, transition, and consolidation.130 
This language has filtered through into various policy documents: for example, one of the 
recent USAID NGO Sustainability Indexes uses “early transition, mid-transition, and 
consolidation” as the three stages of democratization according to which countries are 
classified. The question is of course whether this concern with pre-defined stages could stand 
in the way of appreciating those developments that do not fall neatly into the paradigm. Does 
this universalizing model of democratization not assume that democratic reform is always 
framed within the same set of institutions, which are designed in the image of those theorized 
by the Western liberal thought?  
I concur with Carothers on the fact that the “transition paradigm” remains the 
dominant paradigm not only in policymaking, as I show in chapter four, but also in many 
academic analyses of assistance. There is a wealth of academic studies available today that aim 
to show whether and how assistance has facilitated transitions in the countries of the former 
Soviet Block. Rather than questioning the framework of assistance, these studies evaluate the 
impact of different donors according to the goals stated by the donors themselves. For 
example, Alexander Cooley, in an analysis published as part of the “Nations in Transit” report 
by Freedom House, looks at whether different donors have facilitated the transition to 
Western-style democracies and market economies. He shows that different donors have had 
different impacts on the developments in the former Soviet countries depending on the 
severity of conditions imposed by them. Having analyzed different cases, he argues that 
stricter conditionality led to major transformative impact, as for example in the cases of EU 
and NATO assistance, whereas the weaker conditionality that characterizes assistance by 
INGOs led to limited impact and helped to reform only those countries that already had a 
true commitment to change.131  
This approach has also been taken up by Davis and Dombrowski, who distinguish 
between “explicit” and “implicit” conditionalities imposed by donors in order to explain the 
varying impact donors had on the consolidation of political and economic reforms in different 
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post-Soviet countries.132 The implicit assumption of much research into assistance remains 
that universal lessons could be learnt to improve the aid/ assistance processes. Assistance is 
conceptualized as negotiation between donors and recipients in which both sides try to pursue 
their interests. In the overview that introduces their edited volume Western Aid in Post-
Communism: Effects and Side-effects, Lehrer and Korhonen reach the following general conclusion:  
 
The lessons [to be learnt from assistance failures] derive largely from missed 
opportunities of coordination, information-sharing, and identification of 
complementary interests and appropriate beneficiaries. […] Had the lessons of 
prior aid experience in Latin America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa 
been more systematically transferred, perhaps some of the lost output, 
corruption, instability, violence, and trauma of post-communist experience 
might have been avoided.133 
 
Although I share with these authors the conviction that assistance has gone awry on many 
fronts, my understanding of the underlying causes of these failures is different. As I 
substantiate further in this dissertation, the reasons that have “prevented” donors from 
learning from both their previous experiences and their current interactions with the recipients 
go beyond their lack of interest or commitment. I show that it is the discursive structure of 
the interaction between the donor and the recipient that places limits on how far both sides 
can go into mutual learning. Moreover, no universal lessons can be learned because the 
meaning of a successful assistance and a successful transition depends on particular contexts 
of assistance 
Another crucial dimension of assistance is the transfer of ideas. The ideational 
perspective conceives of the impact of foreign assistance in terms of transition of and 
adaptation to ideas, values, and norms. It argues that looking at material and institutional 
conditions is not sufficient for understanding developments in different countries and that 
ideas, norms, and values should be researched with comparable zeal. Over the past two 
decades there has been a renewed interest in the role of ideas specifically in the context of 
foreign policy-making and transnational relations.134 It has been argued that ideas matter, due 
to the constituting and socializing power that they have in both the international arena and 
domestic politics. They exert a “soft” form of power - to use an international relations term - 
that constitutes the interests and identities of actors rather than directly coercing them.135 In 
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line with the general idea of “transition”, it is believed that the “West” has a role to play in 
exposing the “East” towards the right ideas and ideals. The actual mechanisms through which 
such “soft power” is exercised and the results it can (or indeed fails to) achieve in different 
contexts have been researched within the international socialization literature. Some light has 
been shed here on whether and how international norms can be adopted in different transition 
countries and the conditions and scope of influence of these norms on political systems, 
processes, and policies.136 It is argued that exchanges of ideas on certain issues and the 
networks and coalitions that emerge around those ideas can (and should) substantially 
transform domestic as well as international politics. 
In this dissertation I go further by arguing that ideas are not just an important part of 
reality or a tool of soft power but are themselves social and political phenomena that are 
embedded in socio-political and historical circumstances. For example, rather than looking at 
how successful the “transition paradigm” is in different environments, it is important to ask 
what constitutes this paradigm itself and what political implications follow from its utilization. 
Another problematic feature of the “transition paradigm” is that foreign assistance in 
the form of grants, loans and technical assistance is conceived of as a merely technical 
intervention and not as a political tool closely connected to global political and economic 
interests as well as security considerations. Such a technical view of assistance leads to 
confusion and inconsistency: on the one hand, it is argued that it has to be up to domestic 
actors and structures to determine the outcome of democratic reform; on the other hand, 
assistance is introduced without looking into the nature of those domestic actors and 
structures and without problematizing the relations between domestic and foreign actors.  
The “transition paradigm” is also criticized for its ethnocentric nature, which justifies a 
simple transfer of (ideal) models based on the cultural experience and ideology of donor 
countries. The most important implication of the “transition paradigm” is that it justifies the 
non-reflexive transplantation of norms, values and institutions onto the new assistance 
settings. This leads to ignoring the local forms of civic activism as well as the cultural and 
historical context of a given polity and to underestimating local ownership and local 
autonomy.137 This seems reasonable given a “no preconditions” argument introduced as early 
as 1970, which sets forth an optimistic view that democracy can travel easily and “anyone can 
do it.138 It can appear in places where no one would expect it from looking at the historical, 
political, and economic legacies of a given country. This argument, however, applies more to 
the unexpected break-ups of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes rather than to the actual 
processes of democratization. The fact that these two phenomena are conflated is illustrative 
of transition paradigm thinking. According to the infamous argument by Francis Fukuyama, 
after the collapse of communism in different places around the world we are witnessing “the 
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end of history” in the sense that history itself resolved the biggest twentieth century dispute 
about the best political system and capitalist liberal democracy proved to be the only 
alternative for the future. This implies that the demise of previous regimes equals (at least the 
first stage of) democratization.139 Democracy, it has further been argued, does not need 
especially favorable conditions, and “genuine democrats need not precede democracy.”140 In 
other words, democracy is not brought about from within but is a result of an inevitable turn 
of history.  
The literature cited here makes almost the exact opposite argument to both the “East” 
and the “West” civil society thinking I discussed above as far as the origins and the nature of 
democracy are concerned. Whereas the concept of civil society itself developed as a result of 
thinking about how citizens can ensure and contribute to democratic self-governance in their 
societies, the Western “transition paradigm”, perhaps ironically, sees democracy in somewhat 
Marxian terms as a “natural” stage in a country’s development.  
Given this perhaps irreconcilable difference between the concept of civil society and 
those of democratization and transition, it is even more puzzling to see that, in fact, the notion 
of civil society has become one of the cornerstones of the post-Cold War democratization 
theory and practice. The following section addresses this puzzling connection.    
1.3.2. Making democracy work: Civil society and NGO-ization  
 
Civil society is believed to be essential for safeguarding the gains of democratization. It is seen 
as emerging from the democratic process rather than being a pre-condition to it: As Lary 
Diamond argues, civil society is probably more essential for consolidating and maintaining 
democracy than for initiating it. Civil society is said to contribute to deepening, 
consolidating,141 and maintaining democracy in a variety of ways. It allows holding state 
officials accountable in between elections, stimulates political participation, and increases 
citizens’ political efficacy and skill as well as elucidating norms of tolerance, trust, moderation, 
and accommodation in society. It also provides additional channels of interest expression and 
pursuit for marginalized groups. In addition, civil society can breed new political leaders and 
generally enhance the accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, and legitimacy of the 
political system, granting citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it. Last 
but not least, many civil society organizations are explicitly engaged with improving 
democracy through election monitoring, human rights campaigns, democratic reform 
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Comparing Experiences with Democracy, p.53. 
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initiatives, and anticorruption action.142 In other words, there are few things civil society 
cannot do. This optimistic (over-) investment of the concept of civil society with the multiple 
democratic effects it can produce is one of the explanations for its emergence as a newly 
discovered missing link in progressive social development. This also explains its popularity as 
a foreign policy tool: civil society incorporates a variety of tasks and activities aimed at 
different social and political goals without entering the realm of party politics.  
 There are also other, practical reasons for the attractiveness of the civil society concept 
to many donors, whose aid budgets are now much smaller than during the Cold War period, 
such as, for example, the simple cost-effectiveness that it offers. Unlike large-scale industry 
reorganization,, banking restructuring, or engineering projects, support to NGOs does not 
require large inputs of capital; this allows both downsizing and maintaining programs and 
influence.143 For example, US foreign aid shrank by approximately fifty per cent in real terms 
from the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s. “Civil society assistance made a virtue out of necessity 
by providing a theoretical justification for the small-scale assistance dictated by many donor 
budgets.”144 
The instrumentalization of the concept of civil society towards fulfilling a set of 
donors’ priorities involved a redefinition of the concept itself. In a different way and to a 
different degree this re-definition took place both in the East and in the West, which leads me 
to conclude that the processes of “NGO-ization” of civil society described by several authors 
increasingly take on a global character.145 NGOs are ever more formalized and 
professionalized, and they increasingly resemble bureaucratic corporate structures. In this 
sense, according to Mary Kaldor, they represent the “tamed” version of the “new” social 
movements. NGOs are often at the head of international campaigns; however, their methods 
are different from those of social movements or protest groups. “Instead of holding marches 
or hanging banners off buildings, NGO members now use computers and cell phones to 
launch global public-relations blitzes that can force issues to the top of policymakers’ ‘to do’ 
lists.”146 
Unlike other, informally organized groups and movements, NGOs have the advantage 
of being closer to policy-makers and having expertise in certain policy areas. This point is also 
echoed by Jessica Mathews, who contends that, unlike social movements, NGOs are the real 
experts, whose “[…] expertise approximate[s] and sometimes exceed[s] those of smaller 
governments and of international organizations.”147 However, this proximity to the 
“traditional” bureaucrats may dull the critical edge of those NGOs. In this sense, there is 
always a tension between gaining more power and influence by entering the traditional power 
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structures and staying outside of them out of fear of cooptation. Such concerns are expressed, 
for example, in the analysis by Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan of the future potential of the 
ATTAC movement. The authors caution that to retain its popularity and political impact the 
organization should try to maintain a “balancing act” between “becoming institutionalized 
into the political mainstream or being resigned to the status of permanently alienated 
opposition.”148 
The more formal operationalization of civil society in terms of NGOs is also 
developed within some academic research, for example, the studies of the so-called “third 
sector” and its role in economic development conducted at the Johns Hopkins University 
Center for the Study of Civil Society.149 The argument of these authors is that civil society as a 
sector may be “the greatest innovation of the twentieth century”,150 because “everyone is 
doing it” and we are “in the midst of a global ‘associational revolution’.”151 In their own 
applied way, Salamon and Anheier are taking a structuralist and instrumentalist approach to 
pursuing the world-wide study of organizations which are formal, private, non-profit 
distributing, self-governing, and voluntary. These organizations, they argue, have only recently 
been conceptualized as a social sphere that goes beyond more traditional oppositions of 
market vs. state or public vs. private. Salamon and Anheier and their colleagues classify and 
analyze third sector organizations worldwide and measure their impact on social capital and 
economic and political development. Their argument for reclaiming civil society as a sector is 
that, although it takes different forms in different contexts, it has developed into a major 
social and economic force that accounts for a far larger share of national employment and 
recent employment growth than is widely assumed. It also boasts substantial operating 
expenditures.152 This line of research has contributed immensely to the connection and often 
substitution that is made between civil society and non-governmental organizations. In 
chapter two, I describe the empirical developments engendered by this turn to NGOs within 
the context of civil society assistance to the former Soviet Block. 
Notwithstanding its weaknesses, due to its broad outlook, the NGO-impact studies 
approach acknowledges and empirically illustrates a few important points: firstly, that civil 
society organizations do not develop in the same way in all parts of the world; secondly, that 
their development is historically contingent; and, finally, that their relations with the state and 
the market are characterized by various degrees of proximity and overlap that make for 
relations more complex than usually assumed by the proponents of the triadic sectoral view. 
However, an attempt to introduce a distinction between civil society and the third sector is 
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made only in passing and with no further implications for the “third sector” research 
framework. The claim that “the term ‘civil society’ would not apply to a particular sector, but 
to a relationship among the sectors, one in which a high level of cooperation and mutual 
support prevailed” never found further elaboration.153 Instead, what was passed on by these 
studies was expertise in quantifying the activities of certain organizational units attributed to 
civil society and a justification for developing the tools that would allow doing so across a 
variety of contexts.  
However, there is nothing universal about what NGOs are and how they operate in 
different contexts. The practical existence of NGOs is based on legal institutions and national 
norms in their home countries. In addition, more often than not, they receive substantial 
financial support from their own governments. It is increasingly the case that NGOs are 
contracted by their own governments as well as foreign donors to implement a range of 
projects at home as well as abroad. For example, a donor such as the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) rarely works with local institutions directly; instead it 
contracts for-profit or not-for-profit agencies to implement its programs, including those 
aimed at supporting local NGOs. This means that, regardless of the degree of freedom NGOs 
have, these contractual relationships have a defining impact on their priorities and procedures. 
More specifically, contractual relationships between NGOs and their donors introduce 
undemocratic incentives for NGOs by emphasizing effective implementation over democratic 
practice. The moral mission of NGOs is often in conflict with issues of organizational 
survival. NGOs have to compete with each other for resources. They tend to downplay 
difficulties or problems and to focus on easily quantifiable successes that can be attractive to 
the mass media in order to increase their profile and improve their track record. In the words 
of Simmons, “even legitimate, well-established groups sometimes seize on issues that seem to 
be designed more to promote their own image and fundraising efforts than to advance the 
public interest.”154 One could mention here the Brent Spar incident or the failure to ratify the 
Convention on Biodiversity in the US to illustrate how actions of a particular NGO or 
coalition can create more confusion or even harm than contribute to the common good. 
Simmons suggests that such incidents are “a useful reminder of the complexity of the role that 
these groups now play in international politics […]; hailed as the exemplars of grassroots 
democracy in action, many NGOs are, in fact, decidedly undemocratic and unaccountable to 
the people they claim to represent.”155  
In addition, it is likely that organizations will show a high degree of adaptation to local 
contexts of operation in those cases when the local specificity can impact on their 
organizational survival.  As Stephen Krasner states,  
 
 […] for international actors coercion (especially formal legal requirements) 
and competitive pressures will lead to variations in institutional forms across 
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states. Transnational actors will organize themselves differently in different 
countries. They may arrange themselves as bribe givers in one place, lobbyists 
in another, and diplomatic emissaries in still a third.156 
  
Transnational NGOs will perceive different tools and strategies as legitimate and/or 
effective depending on the context and the issue. They may choose to work with governments 
on a common project or they may choose to act independently, if not in an adversarial 
manner. My research has shown that, while in Ukraine several NGO projects emphasize the 
need for cooperation with the public sector, organize common roundtables on various issues, 
and are involved in strengthening local governance, transnational NGOs operating in Belarus 
tend to take a much more oppositional stand. Their choice of local counterparts among the 
domestic civil society groups is also driven by a variety of contextual factors; they may be in 
favor of working with grass-roots and community organizations in Russia and be wary of the 
same in some of the Central Asian countries, where grass-roots activism is often driven by 
nationalist and religious agendas. Women’s NGOs may seek transnational coalitions, especially 
around such international campaigns as “16 Days of Activism Against Gender Violence”, and 
yet show lack of interest in domestic women’s groups that do not talk the language of 
“gender” or “activism”. 
There are several comparative works published to date from which it follows that 
there are persistent structural features of civil society promotion programs that create 
problematic outcomes and unintended consequences in very different contexts.157 According 
to the comparative analysis by Ottaway and Carothers across Eastern Europe, Latin America 
and the Middle East, the dependencies of NGOs on their donors in these otherwise very 
different contexts are so strong because their survival is predicated on their interaction with 
the donors and not with fellow-citizens or institutions. The impact that different material and 
institutional factors have on the nature and activities of NGOs has been addressed in the 
literature that combines insights from political economy and organization studies. The former 
perspective gives primary importance to the material factors that define NGO existence, 
whereas the latter shows theoretically as well as empirically how institutional isomorphism 
impacts upon the identities and behaviors of organizations.158 Both bodies of literature, 
however, tend to dismiss the idea(l) of civil society and democracy as pure rhetoric or “lip 
service” that is of no consequence in the face of material power relations. In other words, 
such studies are skeptical of the proclaimed missions and value statements and tend to look 
for the real reasons for donor engagement that may hide “behind” their lofty words.  
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For example, Alexander Cooley and James Ron examine three different cases of 
transnational assistance159 to show and explain failures of implementation and negative (un-
)intended consequences that resulted from the operation of different international actors in 
various contexts. Drawing on their findings, the authors interpret some dysfunctional 
organizational behavior as a rational response to systematic and predictable institutional 
pressures to which international organizations are subjected, such as competition for 
resources, hierarchical relationships, organizational insecurity, and fiscal uncertainty. It is 
contended that, contrary to the global/ transnational civil society arguments discussed above, 
the growth of NGOs worldwide and their increasing involvement in policy-making and policy 
implementation lead to an increase in uncertainty, competition, and insecurity for NGOs 
rather than strengthening them. It is also suggested that the increasing bureaucratization and 
marketization of NGO activities generates incentives that produce dysfunctional outcomes.160  
Having analyzed Russian NGOs from the same neoinstitutionalist perspective, 
Henderson has reached very similar conclusions. She contends that, despite the funders’ self-
proclaimed moral intentions, they helped institutionalize a vertical and isolated (although well-
funded) civic community based on “principled clientelism”.161 According to Henderson, this is 
a direct result of the so-called “grant game”, which consists of “a set of incentives and 
sanctions that encourages a separate pattern of behavior that undermines rather than facilitates 
civic behavior” and impedes collective action.162 She also pays attention to idiosyncrasies 
between the donor’s organizational styles and those of the recipients of assistance and argues 
that they predetermine the outcomes to a greater extent than proclaimed agendas and 
envisioned goals. She finds, for example, that “the goals of many Western agencies were to 
facilitate small, grassroots initiatives. Yet Russian civic groups tried to mimic the 
organizational style of the Western assistance agencies operating in Russia, which are wealthy, 
centralized, and bureaucratized ‘corporate’ NGOs.”163  
Such analysis, however, misses an important dimension, namely that of specific ideas 
or discourses that enable particular organizational forms and incentives. The processes 
described by Cooley and Ron as well as by Henderson would have been inconceivable without 
the managerial discourse of “performance”, “outcomes”, and “efficiency”. None of these 
notions are simple givens, and alternative situations could exist in which NGO activities and 
organizational forms could be organized, for example, by an alternative discourse of “long-
term commitment”. 
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Another limitation of such a materialist perspective on civil society is that it tends to, 
first, naturalize existing power relations and, second, overemphasize socio-economic 
hardships to the extent that individuals emerge as primarily conditioned by those. On the first 
point, it seems too simplistic to take for granted the idea that rich donors always determine the 
activities of those in need of resources. Even though conventional wisdom tells us that “he 
who pays the piper calls the tune”, it would make most of political analysis redundant if all it 
took to understand politics were to find out who pays. On the second point the literature 
comes too close to implying that no ideal can be pursued until material needs are satisfied. If 
this were directly translatable into social reality, it would mean that the poor would show the 
highest level of individualism and rent-seeking among all groups. However, in the real world 
one often finds the exact opposite, when altruism, solidarity, and mutual support are 
particularly strong under harsher circumstances. In fact, many of the examples of women’s 
activism presented in chapter two are in contradiction with such a “material security first” 
argument. 
 
1.4. Conclusion  
 
In the second half of the twentieth century Eastern European socialist societies presented a 
peculiar social and political context, in which the relationships between the public and the 
private sphere were defined by a lack of personal freedom and total politicization. Civil society 
was, under these conditions, proposed as a realm that would allow individual self-expression 
and freedom of moral judgment. In contrast, the re-emergence of civil society theories in the 
“West” was most often seen as a response to the growing individualism and apathy that 
characterized capitalist societies of the same period. The main purpose of civil society in this 
context was thus to aid in a revival of the public sphere and of various associations 
preoccupied with a shared social purpose. Although notions such as “solidarity”, “trust”, and 
“civic awareness” were widely used in both sites, it should not be assumed that the 
conceptions of civil society with which they were associated were the same. To complicate 
matters further,  neither theoretical realm or site of knowledge production produced a  single 
dominant interpretation of the reality encountered or a coherent body of literature. In 
addition, an emerging literature on transnational relations provided the framework for another 
conception of civil society that strove to go beyond the geopolitical divisions that 
characterized the world during the Cold War. Now that this particular historical condition is 
past, ideas of “global civil society” gain even more prominence. However, their disjunction 
from a particular locality is at the same time their strength and their weakness. This 
dissertation is a theoretical and empirical attempt to further clarify the resulting emerging 
research agenda.  
What is more, this chapter has shown that applied theories on how civil society can 
and should be promoted in the former Soviet Block are embedded in a particular approach – 
the “transition paradigm”. According to this approach, the future trajectory of post-socialist 
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countries has been assumed to be clear and self-evident (on both sides of the old Cold War 
divide, even if for different reasons), and no space has been created for innovative thinking 
about solutions for individual countries. Instead, all countries involved were seen as being on 
“the road to democracy”, and their political and social life was analyzed in terms of following 
or deviating from this path as well as meeting the “universal” expectations of democratization. 
However, fifteen years after the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, reality seems 
much more complex and ambivalent than that. For practical and political reasons foreign 
assistance has become an important factor on the post-Soviet political scene, and thus, the 
intended and unintended effects it has created deserve careful examination.  
Overall, the tendency in policy-making is to support formal professionalized non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) – a trend which has been termed the “NGOization” of 
civil society. This tendency is equally visible in Western democracies and in the context of civil 
society assistance to the former Soviet countries. Seen from this perspective, the dialogue 
between foreign assistance and local NGOs is shaped by their shared institutional 
environment and the set of incentives and constraints it imposes. Some of these institutional 
features include bureaucratization, a focus on short-term goals, and competition. They can 
prevent NGOs, both transnational and domestic, from building long-term relationships and 
from learning from their common failures and successes. They also inevitably exclude from 
the dialogue a variety of NGOs that do not fit into such institutional arrangements. In the 
next chapter, I will look into the practical effects of NGO-ization that have been observed in 
Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries. 
 Overall, the scholarly literature is unanimous in attributing an important role to donor 
programs. Even if they diverge in their theoretical approaches and political judgments, most 
authors point out that it is key to account for the dialogue between foreign donors and local 
civil societies. Building on these diverse findings, this dissertation asks how exactly foreign 
assistance matters for the development of a local civil society. 
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Chapter 2: Assisting Women’s Activism in Ukraine 
 
2.1. Civil Society and Gender in (Post-)Socialism 
 
In the previous chapter I have introduced theorizing by Eastern European thinkers that 
developed as a response to particular conditions of “post-totalitarianism”. I have focused in 
particular on conceptions of “public” and “private” and the role of civil society. In this 
section, I elaborate on these notions further by outlining empirical conditions and identities 
that were formed at that time. I also discuss the issues of continuity and change pertaining to 
the collapse of the Soviet system. This chapter provides a general overview of how civic 
activism in general and towards women’s issues in particular developed before and after the 
collapse of socialism. The aim of this account is to lay open the complexities of the empirical 
context as well as the continuities and divergences between the so-called socialist and post-
socialist periods. Since the focus of this dissertation is on the dialogue between the “West” 
and the “East”, this chapter shows how this dialogue has developed between women-activists 
and points to tensions it contains.  
2.1.1. The varying perceptions of activism 
 
Eastern European societies before 1989 as well as the Soviet Union were characterized by the 
dictatorship of a political bureaucracy over society, which underwent economic and social 
leveling – a condition often referred to as “post-totalitarianism”.164 Unlike in the fully 
totalitarian system, in post-totalitarianism or late socialism brutal repression and government 
by fear took on a more anonymous and selective form. The regime no longer strove to fully 
control the bodies and souls of its subjects and to bring everyone under a single will; what it 
required was rather passivity, opportunism, mediocrity, and cynicism. The post-totalitarian 
system demanded conformity, uniformity, and discipline, rather than faith and commitment.  
As exemplified by the notions of a “parallel society” discussed in chapter one, the gap 
between the official propaganda and the social and political reality was so tremendous that 
many citizens of socialist countries developed deep-seated distrust not only of public 
institutions and official channels of information – be they the state controlled mass media or 
educational systems – but also of discourses that constituted the public sphere. As an 
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anecdote goes: when people in the former Soviet Union received the opportunity to travel 
abroad more easily165 in the early 1990s, some were utterly surprised to find out that the 
Apartheid regime in South Africa as well as racism in the USA actually existed and were not 
inventions of Soviet anti-capitalist propaganda.  
Slavoj Zizek coined the term “cynical subjects” to refer to the citizens who were aware 
of the gap between ideology and social reality and at the same time chose to adapt to this gap 
rather than to take an active stance in changing the situation.166 In these societies, between the 
two minorities of those who were truly convinced in the ideals of the Communist Party and 
those who were actively dissident, the majority of the people – whether party members or not 
- were consciously passive and shared an aversion to grand ideas of any sort. Differences 
between different socialist countries notwithstanding, what seemed to have been shared by 
everyone living under “socialism” was their antipathic position vis-à-vis an all-intrusive state 
that was imposing particular identities and a particular belief system on them.   
In this context, the meaning of terms such as “independent” activities or a “parallel 
polis” calls for further explanation. The fact that these activities were conducted outside of the 
official state-controlled public sphere does not suffice for their understanding. The often-
quoted examples of “underground” cultural activities were very different from both individual 
acts of civil disobedience by dissidents and wider anti-communist social movements. These 
activities were everything the state, official culture, and ideology were not – a way of 
disregarding the official culture rather than confronting it. These tendencies became 
increasingly widespread in the 1970s and 80s, among the so-called “last Soviet generation”. As 
Alexei Yurchak, a cultural anthropologist and a representative of the last Soviet generation 
himself, put it, “in this respect, it is more accurate to speak, for example, of nonofficial culture 
than of ‘counter culture’ or the ‘underground’, both of which imply resistance to or 
subversion of official ideology and culture, and thus an involvement in their official logic.”167 In 
other words, the strategy was developed to disregard the official public sphere and to mock it 
in the private. This strategy, however, did not entail direct confrontation or purposeful 
subversion.  
This idea of “non-involvement” produced a peculiar understanding of what a 
politically meaningful action was. The fact that official ideology was built around notions 
borrowed from Marxian class struggle created a strong aversion among the passive majority 
against ideas of political mobilization of any kind. It meant that any claim to bigger ideals or 
any activist position ending with an “-ism” were perceived with a high degree of distrust and 
even disdain. As is vividly captured by a quote from Jan Jirous, an art historian closely 
associated with the musical underground: “any vertical organization – hierarchization – of the 
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‘independent society’ would at the same time bring its demise […]; an organization requires 
both a hierarchy and a program; we are fed up with both.”168  
These attitudinal dynamics also had an important impact on the public understanding 
of “acts of civil courage”, their nature and their scope. Here “civil courage” refers not only to 
overt protests and political actions but also to expressing oneself freely in small-scale every-
day situations. According to an insightful and empirically grounded analysis by Krzysztof 
Nowak, the oppressive system was based not only on overt revolutionary terror and coercion 
but also on an intricate set of mechanisms or, in Nowak’s words, “defense lines” that 
sustained the stability and “no-alternativity” of the communist regime. The “legitimation of 
the regime through no-alternativity” was performed through “constraint applied indirectly or 
‘reified’ in forms of social life and symbolic communication.”169 Such peculiar forms of 
oppression fed into a “pragmatic attitude” or a “cynical reason” on the part of the majority of 
society, which was based on protecting oneself and one’s life through abstinence from public 
action, through pragmatic conformity based not on belief or conviction but on convenience.  
Such convenience came with a price – even in small-scale every-day situations, let alone in 
mass public gatherings, people would choose to remain silent.  
Nowak holds that this line of defense works set up by the state was built upon 
instilling despondency and a sense of hopelessness. In the words of one of his informants: 
“There was no such situation in which people were afraid to speak up. Whereas, people did 
not want to talk because they had become convinced as to the ineffectiveness of speaking up.”170 The 
pragmatic choice not to get involved also led to a lack of appreciation of other people’s active 
positions. Nowak describes this rationale very well: “One becomes a hero when one braves a 
great danger in the name of a grand cause, while exposing oneself to harassment only because 
one is attracted to the more common and less grandiose values is tantamount to earning the 
label of an impractical person who does poorly in life in spite of his noble intentions.”171  
This shows that the position of a dissident was much more ambivalent than is usually 
assumed these days. It also points to a tension which is often overlooked, due to the overall 
enthusiasm that the figure of a dissident evokes, especially in the West – a tension around the 
meaning of being a dissident in a socialist society. Many people have tried to address the issue 
of the apparently marginal and almost detested position of dissidents during socialism. For 
example, Václav Havel argued that dissidents were avoided by the majority in society due to 
fear of being associated with them or due to the shame of being afraid while others were 
outspokenly opposing the system.172 On the other hand, the Russian poet Joseph Brodsky has 
disputed Havel’s claim by pointing out that, given the seeming stability of the system, 
dissidents were simply perceived as impractical and slightly abnormal, a sort of “God’s fools” 
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deserving pity rather than active support.173 Such an ambivalent relationship between the 
figure of a dissident and the majority of the people also continued after the collapse of the 
Soviet system.  
In a somewhat prophetic essay written just a few months before the historical change 
of 1989 Jiřina Šiklová talks about the “silent majority”, people in the “gray zone” who, 
although politically uninterested, will be of immense importance in the course of anticipated 
changes. Šiklová supposed that the people who were not involved in active opposition during 
socialism would turn out to be “the ones who will take over the leadership of the society.”174 
These people  
 
[…] are employed within the structure, in jobs roughly in keeping with their 
qualifications; they are not ostracized, they want to retain the minor advantages 
that the regime grants those who stay within the norm. At the same time, they 
strive not to get “into” anything, not to damage anyone; they are often helpful 
to others persecuted by the political regime. On the other hand, they take no 
visible stands against the establishment and so to some degree compromise 
themselves.175 
 
According to Šiklová’s predictions, which turned out to be largely true in the light of 
subsequent events, such people would move to the forefront the moment the situation would 
change and new opportunities for employing skills and expertise would arise, whereas the 
dissidents might have to face redundancy. “The dissidents may have moral superiority, but 
they must also realize that they have lived, or survived, for twenty years outside ‘the structure’, 
for the most part in isolation, out of touch with scientific institutions and institutes.”176 Šiklová 
also supposed that people who were actively opposing the regime could also experience a sort 
of a loss of identity after its demise:  
 
The dissidents will also lose much that is valuable to them […] Lost to them 
will be their unity, which up till now was considered a matter of course; their 
cohesiveness, their solidarity, their uniqueness, their moral superiority, their 
aura of being persecuted and ostracized, and along with these, a certain 
nonresponsibility for everything that is wrong in politics and society.177 
 
Another precaution voiced by the dissidents themselves concerned the idealization of 
the views and methods of dissidents and the demonization of those of former communists. 
Instead, as Adam Michnik has argued, both should be seen as mutually constitutive identities 
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created by and embedded in the socialist system. This means that both should be transformed 
under the new circumstances.  
 
Immediately after Communism, the following problem arose: we all – both the 
Communists and the anti Communists – were bastards of the Communist 
system, who were mentally shaped by this system. And so a tendency 
immediately emerged of wanting to replace the Communists, as soon as they 
were removed from power, by the Solidarity structures. So that after “the 
leading role of the Communist Party” – as we used to call it – comes the time 
of the leading role of the Solidarity trade union. And further, from the 
churches’ pulpits you easily hear: “for forty-five years we had Communists in 
power – now it is time for us, the Catholics.”178  
 
In addition, many of the dissidents who had been active during socialism did not 
become active in the public life after its collapse. With the exception of a few prominent 
figures, like Václav Havel in the Czech Republic, there was almost no connection between 
dissidents and post-1989 elites; even more strikingly, in many countries, including Ukraine, the 
old nomenklatura successfully moved into post-1989 positions of power. General patterns of 
societal relations that developed under socialism persisted after its collapse, thus shaping the 
new post-socialist societies alongside with the new processes of democratization and 
introduction of market economy.  
Coming back to the discussion of the “as if game” that I have introduced in the 
previous chapter, it is important to acknowledge the persistence of informal networks and a 
peculiar type of individualism and particularism that developed as a response of acting “as if” 
in the socialist public sphere. In her analysis Peggy Watson spells out the following dynamic: 
The perceived lack of scope for effective autonomous action in the public sphere triggered 
two complementary tendencies. First, it led to the valorization of an “insider” status in the 
public sphere and the increased negative significance of an “outsider” status. This could be 
rephrased as an overall lack of trust in fellow-citizens other than those that belong to one’s 
family or personal network and even as heightened social intolerance – a peculiar mixture of 
social vulnerability and hostility. Second, the overall disbelief in political and social goals 
officially declared in public was supplemented by the rise of an individualist, consumption-
oriented, and family-centered ideology, which, however, was difficult to pursue given low 
standards of living, limited availability of consumer goods, and low quality of social services. 
Watson provides an illuminating comparison between the post-War Stalinist era (the 50s) and 
the late socialism (especially the 70s and 80s). Whereas the living and working conditions as 
well as state coercion were harsher in the post-War period, the overall dynamism, social 
mobility, and increased levels of education experienced then translated into a (more strongly) 
shared sense of social advancement. In contrast, the late socialism was characterized by both a 
higher quality of life and a higher dissatisfaction with it, by an increased feeling that it was 
impossible to reach self-fulfillment. This latter tendency was due to the inability of citizens to 
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engage reflexively with formal institutions and the public sphere, on the one hand, and to the 
lack of opportunity and resources to fulfill individual goals, on the other.179  
This dynamic also translated into particular understandings of the “public good” and 
of appropriate ways to produce and to (re)distribute goods and benefits in the society. Again, 
as a critique on an unreflective assumption that civil society – understood as a parallel polis or 
otherwise – necessarily produces the desired democratic effects, the other face of “parallel 
activities” can be evoked. During socialism, the “parallel polis” comprised not only parallel 
cultural or political activities but also a parallel economy. These informal economic networks 
were a way to make up for the failures of distribution in the state-controlled economic system 
and for the ineffectiveness of state social services. They embodied a survival strategy that was 
employed not by the politically or socially marginalized minority but by the majority of the 
population that was underprivileged by the state. Ironically perhaps, in late socialism the 
bureaucratic state apparatus itself was thoroughly pervaded by the “economy of favors” and 
clientelist networks.180 Even more interestingly, the parallel economy was largely perceived as 
an effective response to the failures of the socialist system and in that sense as a way to 
contribute to the common good. An administrator who used personal networks to arrange 
some extra benefits for a particular enterprise would more commonly be seen as socially 
responsible rather than corrupt. In fact, these perceptions are still very visible today, especially 
on the local level. Mayors and civil servants still draw their legitimacy from delivering services 
rather than from adhering to transparent democratic procedures.181 In general, the public good 
is defined in terms of material security and good services rather than in terms of legal equality 
or justice.  
What is often overlooked in the analysis of (post-) socialism is that, empirically 
speaking, the widely acclaimed “parallel polis” and the often stigmatized “parallel economy” 
are two sides of the same pattern of survival strategies developed by the society in the face of 
an ideologized, intrusive, and ineffective state. Both faces of the “parallel polis” are embedded 
in the particular condition of (post-) socialism:  
 
Both were based on the ethics of particularist loyalty in the face of the regime 
that paid lip service to the common good. Both included an effort to create 
and reproduce a sphere of relative autonomy from the totalitarian ambitions of 
the state. This can, on one level of analysis, be treated as “resistance”; on 
another level, however, it can be seen as a way of adapting oneself to the 
existing mechanisms of domination – and even of reproducing them.182 
 
                                                 
179 Peggy Watson, "Explaining rising mortality among men in Eastern Europe," Social Science & Medicine 41, no. 7 
(1995). 
180 See for example Steven Sampson, "The informal sector in Eastern Europe," Telos 66, no. Winter (1986). 
181 This is evident in different post-socialist countries. Henk van de Graaf notes the same attitudes in local 
administrations in Romania: “the mayor is corrupt but we have got asphalt on the streets” (November 9, 2005, 
personal communication).  
182 Mikko Lagerspetz, "From 'Parallel Polis' to 'The Time of the Tribes': Post-Socialism, Social Self-Organization 
and Post-Modernity," Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 17, no. 2 (2001): p.6. 
 57 
Instead of having an ethical and political potential, it can endorse clientelism, nepotism and 
hidden corruption183 in the form of informal distributive and power networks.  
The degree to which these informal “parallel” structures shaped the (post-) socialist 
societies and impacted on the nature of their transformations is reflected in the following 
analysis by Janine Wedel. In her account of Polish society in 1990 Wedel describes  
 
[…] a complex system of informal relations, in such forms as “social circles”, 
horizontal linkage networks, and patron-client connections, all carried on in 
one sense outside authorized institutions […]. Although not explicitly 
institutional, the relationships are regularized and have clear patterns. 
Understanding these patterns is the key to understanding not only Polish 
society today [back in 1990] but also how it is going to respond to coming 
changes.184 
 
Indeed, the persistence of informal and network structures of social and political relationships 
in the former socialist countries has been emphasized in some of the literature.185 Given the 
changing socio-economic context, the actual services that are exchanged through these 
informal networks may be changing: For example, in addition to the exchange of primary 
goods and services, there is also more and more exchange of practical information. However, 
the relationships themselves still largely shape the political, social, and economic 
developments in the former socialist states. The history of privatization in the early 1990s is 
perhaps one of the most notorious examples of how administrative resources were utilized by 
the old Soviet elite to maintain economic and political power after the collapse of socialism.186  
Some researchers conclude that not only do such informal networks remain strong in 
the post-socialist societies but they also have proven to be a major obstacle to democratic 
change.   
 
The founding principle of the “power of the powerless” – the stress on 
“immediate personal trust and the informal rights of individuals” has in the 
post-socialist condition become, from being a shield against totalitarian 
ambitions of the repressive state, a major obstacle for the development of 
democracy beyond formal, procedural participation.187  
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This points to the tension between the idea of “anti-politics” discussed in chapter one and the 
actual reality of the political transformation in those countries. When the socialist regime went 
down, the envisioned public sphere as a sight of morality did not get strengthened but 
disappeared along with this regime. In a way, the ideologized official public sphere and the 
alternative “parallel polis” were mutually reinforcing constructions. Both must be understood 
as a legacy of (post-) socialist societies, but neither can continue to exist without the other. 
While the informal relations persisted, the collapse of the Soviet Union led to formal and legal 
changes that enabled new forms of civic participation. Below I focus more specifically on the 
rise and the development of non-governmental organizations in Ukraine.  
As the state system changed, the legal normative basis that regulated civic activism in 
Ukraine was also transformed. The Soviet law that had declared any unsanctioned gathering of 
more than three people for other than personal purposes illegal was abolished. Two important 
laws were passed: the Law “On Citizens’ Associations” (in 1992) and the Law “On Charity 
and Charitable Foundations” (in 1997). This enabled the growth of officially registered civic 
organizations. To illustrate the growth, some numbers are compiled in table 1 below.  
 
Table 1: 
Quantitative dynamics of NGO development in Ukraine188 
 
Year Number of NGOs 
1991 319 
1992 1, 356 
1993 3, 257 
1994 5, 302 
1995 8, 352 
1998 17, 781 
1999 22, 263 
2001 25, 500 
2002 30, 000 
2005 41, 000 
 
However, the numbers themselves are a poor indicator of what the NGO boom is about. My 
field research into women’s NGOs specifically points to the fact that on average 50% of 
officially registered NGOs exist only on paper (as so-called “briefcase” NGOs). For example, 
during my field visit to Kharkov I did the following recount of women’s NGOs that were 
registered with the municipality as of January 1, 2002. The list consisted of 52 NGOs, out of 
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which at the moment of my inquiry seventeen did not exist; eleven were in reality no more 
than four with several “official” faces each; and only five turned out to be active 
organizations, whose set-up and activities corresponded directly to what the official registry 
presented. The remaining nineteen NGOs were private creations by one or two energetic 
personalities. Such MONGOs (My Own NGOs), as I suggest calling them, were only 
operational when and if their creator thought it useful. In the majority of cases an NGO was 
composed only by a few women equipped with an Internet connection and a fax machine. I 
offer further evidence and analysis of these developments in chapters five and six.  
 In addition to often existing only on paper, NGOs are not evenly distributed across 
the country. According to the data collected by a research team of Ukrainian civic leaders, 
considerably fewer NGOs are found in the agricultural areas (36-41 of officially registered 
NGOs per 100,000 people); in the developed areas the number of NGOs is higher (50-68 
NGOs per 100,000 people); and the highest rate is found in the capital (87 NGOs per 100,000 
people). The number in Kharkov, the second biggest city, is average (52 NGOs per 100,000 
people). Most NGOs operate within a particular city (39%), 33% of NGOs work within the 
whole oblast, and 8% have national and international status (those are mainly based in Kiev, 
Kharkiv, Lviv, Odessa, or Donetsk).189 
 The numbers quoted above cannot be treated as a direct indication of civic activism 
writ large, in fact overall civic participation in Ukraine remained low throughout the 1990s.190 
The levels of membership and the numbers of volunteer personnel are extremely low 
compared to NGOs in Western Europe and even in the “new” EU member states. Ironically, 
as the number of civic organizations was growing in the 1990s, citizen participation in them 
was decreasing. If 30% of the population were members of civic organizations in 1991, this 
number dropped to 13% by 1996 and came down even further to 7.8% in 1999. Here it is 
important to remember that the average profile of a civic organization in Ukraine also 
changed towards the mid- and the late 1990s. The civic groups that were active and/ or had 
large constituencies before 1991191 had either disappeared or became considerably less active. 
James Richter in his analysis of post-Soviet Russia summarizes this tendency in the following 
way: 
 
The movement organizations did not fare well in the first decade of the post-
Soviet era […]; civic powerlessness dominated the society. Many people 
expected the state to supply their education, employment, housing, health care, 
and even recreation, as it had under the Soviet regime, and the continued 
concentration of political and economic power gave them little reason to believe that 
public action would change anything. Most Russians again retreated into private 
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worlds relying on their gardens, their networks, and barter to insulate themselves 
from economic turmoil.192 
 
According to the nationwide sociological poll conducted by the Innovation and 
Development Centre in Kiev in 2000, the general level of participation in public life was fairly 
low: 59% of Ukrainians reported to never have taken part in public life. For NGOs 
specifically, the figures reflect even lower interest: 83% of the population never took part in 
NGO activities. The main reasons provided by respondents were: no free-time - 18.9%, lack 
of desire - 16.8%, absence of trust in public organizations - 8.4%, absence of desired types of 
NGOs - 7.9%, and lack of information concerning NGOs and their activities - 6.6%. 
Attitudes of the population towards NGOs are most positive in the cities (with 76% in Kiev 
and 51% the average across Ukraine). Out of those supporting NGOs, 75% have a university 
education. The majority of population is not well informed about the activities of NGOs.193 In 
addition to the decrease in civic activism in general, the behavior of NGOs themselves is 
partly responsible for these tendencies. James Richter points out:  
 
Even committed social service organizations frequently reproduced the Soviet 
pattern of small private worlds, where the director and a few other activists – 
often personal friends or former coworkers – allocated organizational 
resources according to personal loyalty rather than more disinterested criteria. 
Such practices reinforced the perception that NGOs exist primarily to enrich 
the organizers, discouraging others from participating in NGO activities.194  
 
Being new in their structure, NGOs remain embedded in a complex web of “old” and “new” 
types of social relations.  
2.1.2. The meanings of gender and women’s issues 
 
In the socialist or post-totalitarian context, gender as one of the key dimensions of subjectivity 
also had peculiar characteristics. Unlike a more “classic” conception of gender as a binary 
opposition of power constituted by a dominating and a dominated side that originated in 
Western/Northern capitalist societies, gender in socialism was formed by a different power 
context. The gendered subject was positioned in higher-level power relations between the 
individual and the state. This resulted in a unique lived experience of a shared subjugated 
position by both genders, which did not eliminate gender differences but rather relativized 
them vis-à-vis other power structures.  
As Hana Havelková, a prominent Czech sociologist, has argued, as a result of the 
totalizing nature of the socialist state “the orientation toward the private sphere was an 
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essential, psychologically formative consequence of the suppression of public subjectivity. The 
family assumed a special function as the refuge of moral values.”195 Here the connection to ideas 
of civil society as a sphere of morality is clear. Given the strong party control over education, 
media, and other forms of public discourse, family and close friends were the only alternative 
“schools of political thought”, spaces for critical discussion and moral education. This seems 
to stand in stark contrast to the classical idea that morality and education cannot be obtained 
through family or kinship ties but only through civil society. Civil society in socialism was 
located in the private sphere, whereas in liberal democracy it is located in the public sphere. 
Therefore, “as a consequence of the practice of really existing socialism,196 the concepts of 
private and public have meanings and functions different from those of Western countries 
[…]; the relation of the individual subject to the public sphere is abstract, while the subject’s 
relation to the private one is concrete.”197  
In a less idealistic tone, other scholars have used the label of “neo-traditionalism” 
coined by Jowitt to describe this dynamic.198 In her analysis Peggy Watson shows that the 
tremendous importance of family and household was a sign of “creative” social adaptation to 
systemic exclusion in the public sphere that was experienced by both men and women under 
socialism. In those industrially modern societies traditional family models were preserved by 
the society in order to create alternative spaces for self-articulation, to organize social life, and 
to sustain “coherence” – all of which was to help self-protection and survival. In this way, 
individual survival was connected to family survival, which in turn crucially depended on the 
“learned resourcefulness” of women, their paid and unpaid labor.199 In other words, both men 
and women subscribed to a traditionalist gender division partly as a result of their peculiar 
relation to the socialist state. To my mind, seeing gender in this way is crucial for 
understanding the seeming lack of gender awareness by Eastern European women bemoaned 
by their Western counterparts. I would argue that, on the contrary, in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union women were acutely conscious of the gendered nature of their social 
relationships but perceived them as the only survival strategy vis-à-vis the state system.  
According to an in-depth analysis by Hana Havelková, rather than being an issue of 
“false consciousness”, the disinterest in feminism and the desire to attain positive change and 
equality for men and women alike has to be conceptualized in different terms due to the 
specificity of the socialist system as experienced by both men and women. Havelková 
attributes this “supra-feminist” syndrome, as she calls it, to specifically socialist forms of 
individual subjectivity and private/public distinction. Since the totalitarian government strove 
to undermine individual autonomy and exercised objectifying practices vis-à-vis all its citizens, 
men and women alike, “a positive concept of the subject” defended by feminist theorists in 
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the West had to be applied to men as well.200 In a similar fashion, in socialism - unlike in the 
West - the gendered divisions of power did not correspond to the division between public and 
private: An “…overriding division was drawn between the Communist Party and all those 
who were its objects. In spite of the fact that women did not sit on the Party Central 
Committee, they, like men, were given positions in accordance with the degree of their loyalty, 
not their abilities.”201 This point is echoed by Peggy Watson, who writes that “under state 
socialism, society was politically excluded as a whole, and citizens, far from feeling excluded 
relative to each other, were held together in a form of political unity, it was this essential unity 
that made possible the idea of Solidarity.”202 
 Some authors have argued that the importance of the private sphere as a 
counterbalance to the oppressive system and the central role that women played in it placed 
them in a more privileged position as compared to men. “Where the subject was oppressed in 
the public sphere, the family represented for the woman, much more than the man, the 
possibility of choice and escape from the political blackmail. Women consciously made use of 
this opportunity.”203 Without any intention to overestimate the gains that such gendered 
divisions gave to women, I would argue that there was more congruence between the gender 
expectations of women and opportunities they had to meet them than was the case for men. 
Peggy Watson expresses a similar idea when she refers to “a fixed and traditional notion of 
masculine identity in a political and economic context, which thwarted traditional masculinity 
by precluding autonomous activity outside of the private sphere.”204 Public performance and 
career were often tied to compromising oneself and one’s principles in favor of the official 
party ideology. Facing such pressures, men were in need to reassert their self-worth and their 
masculinity in the face of day-to-day humiliation and ideological pretence. Such refuge was 
only available in the private realm. In this sense, unbalanced as they were, Eastern European 
roles in the family, which might have seemed to reinforce traditional gender roles and 
formulas like “two people – one career”, had a different meaning and a different economy 
behind them. This is also evident from Havelková’s observation that many women admitted 
to having deliberately encouraged the patriarchal manners of their husbands as a way to boost 
their self-confidence.205  
 Different experiences of men and women are reflected in different social dynamic in 
these two populations. Research is available that shows the rise in male mortality from the 
1960s onwards and higher suicide rates (markedly among the non-married population) as well 
as higher consumption rates of alcohol and more recently, non-traditional recreational drugs 
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by men as compared to women.206 Such tendencies are argued to be primarily caused by 
“psychosocial factors” such as the ones elaborated on above.207 They also translated into 
different experiences by men and women after the collapse of socialism. The “learned 
resourcefulness” of women became particularly important for survival during the difficult 
period of social and economic collapse of the early 1990s. 
 After the collapse of socialism, both men and women were eager to re-establish 
themselves as free subjects in the public sphere. Notions of liberal citizenship and gender-
blind equality were eagerly embraced and constructed as a common interest for all social 
groups. Seeing gender roles in terms of a mutually beneficial social contract, women (and 
men) did not see the need to think of the new social or political conditions in gendered terms. 
This partly explains the lack of interest in identity politics and in feminist agendas in particular. 
However, as the oppressive state withered away in 1989 and 1991, the gendered power 
structures in these societies changed along with other transformations, and thus it is likely that 
the gendered social contract would need to change as well. In this context, the question 
whether a distinct women’s identity and political agenda should develop remains open to 
debate.  
This issue has been particularly visible within the East-West dialogue on what the goals 
of women’s activism should be – a process that has yielded as much frustration and 
misunderstanding as cooperation. In the words of Barbara Einhorn, “the ‘myths of transition’ 
have arisen partly from contesting notions of the position and project of feminist identities 
reflected in the continuing and difficult East/West feminist dialogue.”208 An account of the 
early East-West encounters presented below is very illustrative: 209  
 
The common (to be fair, there are certainly exceptions, too!) pattern goes like 
this: a Western academic gets a grant for research on Eastern Europe. She uses 
her grant money to travel to the area and we spend hours and hours with her 
answering questions and providing her with data and information – sometimes 
making them up, as we lack basic research on such issues in our intellectual 
context. Then she flies herself back and nobody sees her anymore. Several 
months later, if we are lucky, we receive a photocopy of an article published in 
one of the feminist journals. I say photocopy – the one-year subscription of a 
Western academic journal still could represent an equivalent of one month of 
our incomes. And there we read a report of “our” world, full of misspelled 
names, misunderstood points, unconfirmed information, and rarely any insight. 
[…] There are still many humiliating experiences of facing the ones who know 
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more and have more. Or who present themselves as knowing and having 
such.210 
 
To add another side to this story it is worth mentioning that this particular account itself was 
published in the leading Western feminist journal Signs as early as 1995. Yet, it highlights the 
fact that the way a particular dialogue constructs the relative positions of those interacting is as 
important as what they are interacting about. My own findings presented in chapters four to 
seven provide a detailed account of such interactions characterized by unequal power relations 
not only between the “East” and the “West” but also between different women in the “East”.  
Indeed, tensions around understanding the meaning and priorities of women’s 
activism in post-socialist countries were and still are a constant feature of East-West debate in 
academic, activist, and policy circles. One of the key problems in the early 1990s was an 
obvious lack of information about the situation and needs of women in the former socialist 
block, which had been perpetuated by decades of Cold War. In a sharp phrase by Czech 
dissident Jirina Šiklová: “Western observers suffer from a mixture of insights and illusions 
about women’s emancipation in our region.”211 Early east-west contacts were marked by much 
disagreement and misunderstanding. In the early 1990s a Russian activist described the 
dialogue in the following terms:  
 
Mutual understanding between Russian and Western women ends where 
discussion of the women’s movement begins. To put it somewhat bluntly, 
Soviet women are convinced that Western women have no problems and 
therefore they participate in the women’s movement, while Western women 
are bewildered that Soviet women have so many problems, but no 
movement.212  
 
Lissyutkina goes on to enumerate some of the many points of disagreement between Eastern 
and Western feminism, all of which have to do with the fact that women’s problems in the 
two environments were shaped by two different political and economic systems.  
The core point of disagreement has been the issue whether there has to be a specific 
women’s agenda at all. Many prominent women-dissidents in the East saw no point in 
articulating a specific women’s agenda. They believed that the struggle for fundamental 
societal change should be prioritized, whereas women’s issues could be addressed later on. In 
the words of a famous Soviet dissident, Elena Bonner: “You know, our country is on such a 
low socio-economic level, that at the moment we cannot afford to divide ourselves into ‘us 
women’ and ‘us men’. We share the common struggle for democracy, a struggle to feed the 
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country.”213 Hana Havelková provides a good summary of the main arguments why women in 
post-communist countries did not feel any considerable urge to articulate women’s issues in a 
manner recognizable to their Western counterparts:  
 
The lack of interest in women’s problems originates in the syndrome of 
putting general human problems above particular issues of sex-related identity, 
an attitude strengthened by the pre-Revolutionary political dissent, which 
focused on issues of political freedom. An assumption that sexual identity is 
natural, as well as the conviction that women’s emancipation has been 
accomplished and that no one has really benefited from it, all discourage 
attention to women’s issues.214  
 
I would add to these attempts to understand the ambivalences of the discursive field 
on women’s issues in post-socialism that in the Soviet Union discourses of change and 
emancipation, which could be utilized by an opposition, were long appropriated and 
institutionalized within the Soviet state discourse. To be able to oppose this appropriation one 
had to come up with a recognizably different frame, which would evoke the promise of real 
change rather than well-known propaganda. Women did not believe in “emancipation” at 
home as well as “women’s oppression” and lack of rights in the West because they thought 
those were ideological constructions. In other words, being “emancipated” did not have a 
meaning beyond the propaganda cliché. Women were told to have been emancipated and yet 
they saw no improvement in their condition and, more importantly, no way to act for change. 
As one of the early spokeswomen from Ukraine said:  
 
During the last seventy years, the notion of women’s emancipation formed 
part of a highly unpopular socialist or communist totalitarian ideology, which 
was, moreover, of foreign (Russian) origin. Such ideas as the communist 
feminism of Alexandra Kollontai, female emancipation and equality of the 
sexes were totally discredited by their Soviet practice, even though this equality 
existed on paper. Feminism and emancipation are now dirty words.215  
 
In other words, feminist discourse (or at least the version of it that was introduced into initial 
East-West exchanges in the late 1980s and early 1990s) largely drew on discursive frames and 
mechanisms too similar to the socialist state-led emancipation. In order to make it successful a 
different frame would have to be used or at least a fair amount of translation into locally 
resonant notions would have to be performed.  
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This concerns not only the issues that are discussed but also the way the relative 
positions of different parties to the dialogue are constructed. In an article published by the 
Prague Gender Studies Center Jirina Siklova writes:  
 
We object to some of the Western feminists’ insensitive conduct towards us; as 
those who “already know everything” they class our arguments among 
“teething troubles” we will soon get over. This sometimes reminds us of the 
attitudes of apparatchiks or of those imparting political indoctrination.216 
 
This is why, regardless of their interpretations and conclusions, many of the authors who did 
research on women’s activism in post-1991 Russia and Ukraine report to have collected much 
material that shows a constant emphasis by local women on “translation”, on “finding our 
own way.” This is evident, for instance, from the following quote:  
 
I have thought a lot about what would it mean to be a feminist in this country, 
about whom we can call feminist and whom we cannot […]; for our country, I 
think, it is especially important that the ideal of women’s emancipation has 
been used in ways as a façade for non-emancipation, not only for women, but 
also non-emancipation of men.217  
 
However, this initial denial of the feminist agenda does not exhaust the range of positions on 
the issues of gender and women’s issues that have developed over the past decade. In fact, it 
can be argued that a certain type of feminist consciousness is developing as a part of 
transformation and change in the East. 
As is evident from this discussion, the East-West dialogue about the meaning of 
women’s activism was and still is far from unproblematic and serves as a good example of the 
(re)negotiation of the meaning of civil society itself. Western women, especially feminists, 
were expecting a rise in women’s organizing in post-socialist countries, for two reasons. First, 
this expectation was due to a belief shared by the majority of Western feminist activists218 that 
the worsening of the material socio-economic conditions of women would translate into their 
mobilization to tackle these problems. Second, change itself was seen to create new 
opportunities for women’s activism at home as well as for building up global alliances between 
women. More recently it has been argued that even if the position of women under socialism 
had peculiar characteristics, the rapid spread of global capitalism into these countries makes it 
increasingly similar to that of women elsewhere.219 The process of change in Eastern Europe 
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is marked by a transformation of the relationship between public and private spheres and, 
thus, the gender dimension of civil society is also likely to change in substantial ways. Gender 
takes on a new specifically political meaning, because it begins to matter with respect to how 
individuals come to be differentially included within the new political community created by 
democratic citizenship. Peggy Watson formulated this change in the following way: “Within 
liberal civil society, citizens are excluded relative to each other in a way that was impossible 
under Communism. It is democratization itself that brings a new, essentially divisive, political 
force to gender relations.” The fact that gender begins to matter may in fact be seen as an 
illustration of the masculinism at the heart of Western democracy. 220 
As the discussion above shows, the meaning of a (gendered) identity is constituted by 
the contextualized meanings of private and public, as well as by the castings of power 
structures within and across the public and the private spheres. As the society undergoes 
transformative changes, so do the identities and subjectivities it contains. These 
transformations are made sense of on the basis of the previous experience, of aspirations for a 
particular kind of change, and of new experiences that cannot be accommodated within the 
well-known notions. My own discussion in the following chapters as well reveals this 
complexity around the notion of gender. 
2.1.3. Women’s activism pre- and post- 1991 
 
The first wave of women’s activism in Ukraine began as early as the 1860s with women 
struggling to obtain access to higher education. The activities of women’s clubs and unions of 
the time, both in Naddnipryanska Ukraine (eastern and central parts), which was part of the 
Russian empire, and in western Ukraine, which then mostly belonged to Austria, were similar 
to those in other parts of Europe. After the Bolshevik revolution, however, the two regions 
diverged strongly: Whereas in western Ukraine many women’s organizations continued 
functioning till World War II (they also maintained closer ties with diasporic and other 
European women’s organizations), Soviet Ukraine denounced those organizations as 
bourgeois, and in their place a new revolutionary women’s movement was created. The period 
from 1917 to 1929 in Soviet Ukraine was characterized by the proclaimed “general 
emancipation”. Equality of men and women was an important issue for the new regime. 
Women’s issues and women’s activism were institutionalized in the 1920s in the form of the 
zhenotdel (women’s department) in the Communist Party. The department was effective in 
passing a series of laws on marriage, abortion, and property rights for women.221 
Stalin’s rule set an end to these developments and started the so-called “invisible 
years” for women’s issues.222 The zhenotdel was abolished in 1930s, when Stalin declared that 
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zhenskii vopros (the “woman question”) had been successfully resolved. Instead, a new section - 
zhensector - was introduced for purely propagandistic goals. It was not before the period of the 
“Khrushchev’s thaw” that zhensovety (women’s councils) were created with an explicit agenda 
of improving the position of women as a response to the recognition that more could be done 
to ensure women’s political and economic leadership.223 The councils, however, remained 
closely directed by the Communist Party and their agenda was predicated on official ideology. 
An important task of these councils in the international arena was to be a mouthpiece for the 
supposedly emancipated Soviet women and, thus, to show that the Soviet state surpassed 
capitalist countries in its treatment of women. The supposed progress in the position of 
women was framed as another manifestation of the superior nature of the socialist state. Any 
social or political criticism on the real position of women was therefore inconceivable within 
the official discourse.  
As part of his perestroika and glastnost reforms, the last Secretary General of the 
Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, authorized the establishment of the Rada Zhinok 
Ukrainy – a separate Council of Women of Ukraine in 1987, which was headed by Maria 
Orlyk, a long-term party functionary. “Gorbachev hoped that women would be able to help 
promote his policies of reforming the ruling structures, not replacing them.”224 However, as 
subsequent events showed, the council did not mobilize women around party lines, and many 
councils did not try to push for the party agenda beyond what was compulsory.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Council of Women of Ukraine as well as 
other formerly state-organized women’s organizations redefined themselves as independent 
organizations as soon as it was possible for them to do so. The Rada Zhinok Ukrainy renamed 
itself into the Spilka Zhinok Ukrainy (Confederation of Women of Ukraine). Similar 
developments were happening in Russia, where the Soviet Women Committee re-emerged as 
the Union of Women of Russia. Spilka Zhinok Ukrainy redefined its goals as attaining equality 
between men and women; protecting women from negative consequences of economic 
transition; and promoting the establishment and development of women’s small businesses. It 
opened its own enterprise, Kalina, and regularly conducted professional trainings for women. 
Many former zhensovety continued their work on similar social agendas: They organized around 
providing support for the handicapped, working with children from disadvantaged families 
and orphans, or running soup kitchens for the homeless, for example.  
An important feature of organizations like Spilka Zhinok Ukrainy, which is often 
overlooked by pro-Western feminist researchers, is the considerable amount of local expertise, 
activist experience, and human resources that they possess. The Soviet Women’s Committee, 
for example, had a long record of advocating peace as a women’s issue at international fora 
and maintained extensive links with international women’s organizations. Their active 
members developed an identity of high profile activists explicitly oriented towards mainstream 
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politics. This is partly an explanation for the fact that women’s organizations that grew from 
those long-standing official structures are now showing clear concern with nationwide 
activism and are relatively successful at making their voice heard in mainstream politics. 
Already during the Gorbachev years towards the end of the Soviet era, the Soviet Women 
Committee was awarded seventy-five seats in the Congress of People’s Deputies.225 It 
continued by organizing a political block, “Women of Russia”, that managed to elect twenty-
one women to the State Duma (Russian Parliament) in the election of December 1993.   
The “wind of change” in the late 80s also brought about new oppositional 
movements, of which the popular front Rukh (Movement) in Ukraine is one prominent 
example. A women’s group, Zhinocha Hromada (Women’s Community), headed by a prominent 
dissident, Maria Drach, emerged from within this movement; in the fall of 1992 it became an 
independent organization with a broad grass-roots base in Ukraine, the Russian Federation, 
and in Eastern Europe. One of its main emphases is on state policies that would improve the 
welfare of children. It clearly sees itself as keeping alive the traditions of Ukrainian women’s 
organizations of both pre-1914 and pre-1939 vintage. Remarkably, it also serves as an 
umbrella organization for women’s organizations of ethnic minorities in Ukraine (such as 
Jewish, Tatar, or Korean women).226 
Around the same time, independent women’s groups were being formed in small 
towns across Western Ukraine. By January 1992 representatives of the branches of the 
independent Women’s Union Soiuz Ukrainok, headed by Athena Pashko, wife of prominent 
opposition leader and presidential candidate Viacheslav Chornovil, convened in Kiyv to claim 
to be “the heir to the democratic traditions of the Women’s Union that functioned in Ukraine 
since 1917 and had been liquidated as the result of Bolshevik occupation.”227 The Women’s 
Union of Ukraine, which was recognized by the International Council of Women, existed 
during the period of the Ukrainian National Republic (formed in 1917); after the Bolsheviks 
came to power in Ukraine it continued its activities in exile in the 1920s.228 Then the 
organization’s primary focus was on the revival of Ukrainian cultural heritage and national 
values; they were engaged in much charity and educational work. Another influential all-
Ukrainian women’s organization that works to promote Ukrainian culture, traditions, and 
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history is Olena Teliha Society. There are also other ethnic women’s groups that work to 
promote their indigenous cultures such as Rumunski Pani (Romanian Ladies) in Chernivtsi, the 
Jewish women’s community Myloserdya (Compassion) in Kiyv, or the League of Crimean Tatar 
Women in Simferopol, among others.  
One of the first and most impressive instances of independent women’s mobilization 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s was a movement that mobilized in response to the abuses in 
the army as well as recruitment and deployment rules. Mothers of draftees became the first 
effective nation-wide pressure group called Komitet Soldatskykh Materiv (the Committee of 
Soldiers’ Mothers). In addition to the abuses by the higher-rank commanders, which persist in 
the army to the present day, there was a growing concern about the rules according to which 
soldiers were serving in Soviet republics other than their own or could even be sent directly to 
war. In the times of the disastrous war in Afghanistan this meant that teenage boys without 
any military experience were sent directly to the frontlines; in Russia this problem persists to 
the present day with the on-going Chechen war. In Ukraine public uproar also grew over the 
fact that recruits were used to clean up the nuclear waste after the explosion at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power plant in 1986.  
The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers first organized in Moscow and held its first mass 
demonstrations there in 1989. In September 1990 the Committee held its first All-Union 
Congress in Moscow, demanding of Gorbachev to create a Presidential Inquiry Commission 
to investigate the abuses in the army. Despite the unprecedented nature of this protest, 
achievements were moderate. It was not before November that Gorbachev authorized a 
commission with limited competence, making sure not to undermine the authority of the 
military. Out of 107 cases investigated it was only in four that the commission was able to 
prove that the real cause of death of the recruits was mistreatment by superiors. This became a 
sobering experience for the Ukrainian faction of the movement, and some argued that it was 
the disillusionment with the All-Union army response that motivated those women, led by 
Liudmyla Trukhmanova and Valentyna Artamonova, to express their support for Ukrainian 
independence and an independent Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian faction of the Committee 
held its mass rally in Zaporizhzhia in August 1991, within days of the proclamation of 
Ukrainian independence on August 24, 1991.229 
Although not having any strong affinities with nationalist groups, these women 
reasoned that it would be easier to pressure the Ukrainian national army than that of the 
whole Soviet Union. Even more importantly, the dissolution of the Soviet Union would mean 
the end of imperialistic wars that were taking so many lives. In the words of one of the 
women activists: “We mothers finally realized that the Soviet Union is such a huge state that 
such atrocious actions could take place and it would be impossible to prove anything… and so 
we began the struggle for our independent state and for our army.”230   
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Concern with the welfare of children and families due to the difficult socio-economic 
situation, environmental problems, and the deteriorating health care system was behind a 
variety of self-help groups and organizations that focused on social issues. Issues of child 
protection were forcefully being put on the agenda of many smaller groups, which began 
forming Associations of Mothers of Large Families throughout the Newly Independent States. 
In Ukraine such an Association was officially formed in 1993; by 1996 it had 25 local chapters 
around the country.231 
Mobilization of women across the country culminated in a major political 
demonstration with an explicitly political agenda. Held in Kiev on the International Women’s 
Day, the 8th of March 1991, it brought together the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, the 
Union of Women of Ukraine, the newly formed Committee of Families with Many Children, 
an umbrella organization for associations of mothers with more than five children, and 
“Mama – 86”, a group of mothers whose children had been born around the time of 
Chernobyl. 
Most of these early initiatives had an explicitly maternalist focus; values of 
motherhood and child protection proved to be the most productive frame for women’s 
mobilization at the time. These were effectively tied into the then powerful nationalist 
discourse of Ukrainian revival, even though this should not be seen as a purely strategic choice 
of framing and agenda-setting. I would argue that particular formulations of women’s issues 
that developed at the time reflect a complex interplay between different discourses and 
subjectivities constructed within them. Strategic or not, however, this connection clearly 
rubbed the wrong way with many Western feminist observers, for whom the frame resonated 
with a “backward” and “traditionalist” period that preceded the “real” emancipation of 
women in the West. Women’s protests of the time were described with a measure of 
condescension, if not pity, as immature, almost expressions of “false consciousness”. For 
example, Marta Bohachevsky-Chomiak writes: “In the euphoria of the days of the collapse of 
the USSR the organizations of women that emerged often returned to the rhetoric of the 
nineteenth century of the woman as the keeper of the hearth, the solace of the heart, the giver 
of life, the guardian of children.”232 
From this arises a certain ambivalence that is evident in the literature on how to 
categorize different women’s groups. Women’s activism in the former Soviet Union is often 
described as an opposition between the “old” or “traditional” women’s groups and the “new” 
women’s groups - groups and organizations that were formed as a result of post-1991 
interactions with Western counterparts.233 “New” women’s organizations had no ties to ex-
Soviet structures nor were they connected to the nationalist project. This way of classifying 
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women’s groups reflects a general ideological bias in the West, which defines civil society as an 
inherently “apolitical” concept. It is seen as a sphere that cuts across and goes beyond 
traditional political cleavages, hence its apparent popularity both on the left and on the right. 
Such accounts also tend to undervalue women’s mobilization that occurred on the basis of 
“regressive” traditional roles or that originated in Soviet organizational structures. These are, 
however, the cleavages that are constructed by Western observers rather than local women 
themselves. According to my own findings, which I discuss in greater detail in the following 
chapters, the cleavages between local women’s organizations are more often of a material 
rather than an ideological kind. Ukrainian women-activists are particularly concerned about 
different degrees of access to material and symbolic resources and to emerging power 
networks – these often cut across ideological positions of different women’s organizations.  
Identifying different types of women’s organizations and classifying them is far from a 
straightforward endeavor. Some attempts have been made but they seem to draw on blurred 
and ad hoc criteria, which is understandable given the short history and lack of 
institutionalization of the organizations that are being described.234 It is not my intention to 
rectify this by suggesting a better classification or providing a detailed account of women’s 
organizations in Ukraine; rather I offer an overview of general tendencies in women’s activism 
and account for changes that are taking place. Most importantly, I reflect on tensions and 
problematic aspects within these developments. Similarly to the dynamic I described for 
NGOs in general, the peak in the formal registration of women’s organizations occurred 
around the mid-1990s, partly as a result of preparation for and of the after-effects of the Forth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. In recent years, the overall growth of 
women’s NGOs has subsided: “There’s a sort of a crisis now. There are fewer grants and 
there are no more new organizations.”235 The projects implemented by women’s NGOs are 
more thematically focused and there are fewer differences between “old” and “new” 
organizations in terms of their activities and engagement with the donors. The NGOs sector 
seems to be moving towards more homogenization.  
The interaction between local women’s groups and their Western (often feminist) 
counterparts – Western women who came to work in the Newly Independent States in the 
early 1990s - has proven highly important for the institutionalization of certain forms of 
women’s activism. Following the influential work by Keck and Sikkink discussed in chapter 
one, some scholars suggest calling them “feminist moral entrepreneurs” - a group of women 
who see their goal in building organizations and discourses that have moral implications . 
Undoubtedly, these women have played an important role in the making of “new” women’s 
activism. A major institutional outcome of this interaction was the US-NIS Women’s 
Consortium, a large umbrella organization that connected women’s groups all over the former 
Soviet Union, American women’s NGOs, and, most importantly, major donors such as the 
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Eurasia Foundation and USAID. The idea of founding a consortium between women’s 
organizations in the former Soviet Union and women’s NGOs in the US came about around 
the time some American women activists and development professionals came to Moscow to 
participate in conferences on “transition” and the role of women. Their travel was largely 
supported by USAID and the McArthur Foundation, as well as some other donors eager to 
develop a cohort of experts on the region with field experience. Many had a background in 
the peace and Green movements; others were career people from the field of development. A 
woman that played a pivotal role in networking with the Russians and lobbying for a common 
project on the Hill was Elise Fiber Smith.236 On the Russian side the key person was Elena 
Ershova, who had a background in US studies with a specialization in mass movements and 
social protests; on the Ukrainian side it was Olena Suslova, formerly a member of Soiuz 
Ukrainok.   
Although initially Moscow-based, the Russian and Ukrainian part of the Consortium 
split into two around 1995, partly due to the pressure for independence of the part of its 
Ukrainian members. In 1996, under the leadership of Ershova, a not-for-profit Consortium of 
non-governmental women’s associations was officially registered in Russia.237 At the same time 
USAID funded a West-NIS Women’s Consortium that included organizations in Ukraine, 
Moldova and Belarus. This latter grant was largely biased towards Ukrainian organizations, 
which reflected the tremendous importance given to the country in all of USAID's assistance 
projects for the region.  
At early stages the activities of the Consortium were largely aimed at training women 
in technical skills pertaining to fund-raising and running an NGO. This was unanimously 
pushed for by the Western and the local sides.238 The idea was to teach women how to write 
projects that would be acceptable by any western donor (e.g. drawing on application guidelines 
from the Global Fund for Women). Russians and Ukrainians were eager to embrace this 
knowledge as well. According to Sperling, Ferree, and Risman, who studied the Russian side 
of the Consortium, “technology transfer rather than promoting a particular set of projects”, 
that is an emphasis on skills rather than agendas, came out of the seminars in different parts of 
Russia and was pushed for by Russians.239  
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The case study findings I present in chapters five and six support this claim. In 
addition, I discuss the implications of such a “technological” approach to the West-East 
exchanges. What is already clear from the discussion above, however, is that NGOs in the 
former Soviet Union form new types of more “professional” activism, provide alternative 
sources of income and employment, and create a new field of entrepreneurship. In the 
following section I take a closer look at the donors’ involvement in the region and at particular 
characteristics of NGO development that have been identified in the literature. 
 
2.2. Assistance: Donor Involvement and NGO Development 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, foreign assistance programs worldwide changed in many 
important respects, due to changing foreign policy objectives, reassessments of the past 
achievements, and financial imperatives.240 Assistance was now driven by new goals and 
priorities as well as by the emergence of new assistance regions, among which the former 
Soviet block played a prominent role. In this dissertation I focus specifically on American 
governmental assistance administered by the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID).  
2.2.1. Assistance encounters  
 
The end of Cold War unleashed unrealistically high expectations on both sides about the 
envisioned success of economic and political reform, and the eventual discrepancy between 
the verbal and the monetary support granted to countries undergoing reforms led to much 
subsequent disillusionment. Scholars point to the fact that the failures of assistance in Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union are also the result of inadequate funding.241 The 
discourse of rebuilding “the other” part of Europe was organized around the metaphor of a 
new Marshall Plan,242 which stood for the vision of remaking the European countries 
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initiative to date. It is also important in a historical sense since it paved the way for other forms of international 
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shattered by the cruel history of communism. The importance of this metaphor at the early 
stages of American assistance was extensively addressed by Wedel: “The words ‘Marshall Plan’ 
became almost a metaphor for America’s role as a white knight. They carried a powerful 
sentimental appeal that called to mind one of America’s most celebrated moments of global 
leadership and enlightened self-interest.”243  
The expectation was that Western assistance after 1989 would become a new 
“Marshall Plan” for quick and painless recovery; however, the actual structure and content of 
the assistance efforts were dramatically different from the actual Marshall Plan as well as from 
the rhetoric around it. Unlike the post-war Marshall Plan that consisted to more than 90% of 
grants, the post-1989 transition assistance largely consisted of technical assistance, export 
credits, loans and debt relief.244 While foreign consultants placed much emphasis on providing 
advice and “technical assistance”, assuming that after decades under communism people 
lacked basic knowledge, Eastern Europeans – buying into the “Marshall Plan” rhetoric - were 
mostly counting on receiving large sums of grant money. 
According to Wedel, the progression of assistance efforts in Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union went through three main stages: Triumphalism, 
Disillusionment, and Adjustment. The last phase manifested itself differently in different 
countries.245 Although I do not use these stages for structuring my own findings, I find them 
helpful metaphors that grasp the interactive nature of the aid story and frame it in terms of 
ideas, expectations, and reactions rather than in the technical terms of resource transfer. 
Clearly, not everyone was triumphalist or disillusioned in the same way. Also, there were 
people who remained consistently skeptical or optimistic throughout the whole period. As 
Wedel admits herself, these phases were largely predictable outcomes of the isolation of the 
Cold War and the great expectations unleashed by its sudden end. This, however, does not 
diminish the importance of efforts to understand the exact meanings of triumph and 
disillusionment, as well as of more recent attempts at improvement and adjustment. This 
dissertation is inspired by a similar interest in how exactly the East-West assistance dialogue 
has evolved. However, unlike Wedel, I show that, rather than being subsequent stages, these 
three categories are continuously re-enacted through East-West interactions.  
After the collapse of communism, the prevailing idea on both sides was that the West 
should serve as a model for Eastern European political, economic, and cultural revival; the 
“return to Europe” became a popular metaphor on both sides. An important problem was the 
lack of knowledge and understanding of the new assistance setting. The perceived “European-
ness” of some post-communist countries masked the mistakes of assuming that the two sides 
                                                                                                                                                    
cooperation such as the OECD and NATO. It is important because it established a certain framework of 
relations between the United States and the European nations. The success of the Marshall Plan inspired 
President Harry S. Truman to extend it to less developed countries throughout the world under the Point Four 
Program initiated in 1949. 
243 Janine R. Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe (Palgrave, 2001), p.17. 
244 Tanya Narozhna, "Failed Expectations: Or What is Behind the Marshall Plan for Post-Socialist 
Reconstruction," Kakanien Revisited, no. 29.11 (2001), Melanie S. Tammen, "Aiding Eastern Europe: The 
Leveraged Harm Of "Leveraged Aid"," Policy Analysis, no. 139 (September 10) (1990). 
245 Wedel, Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe. 
 76 
were speaking the same language, while in reality there was much misinterpretation and a 
disturbing mismatch of expectations. The “West” and the “East” did not have the same 
understanding of what the priorities and directions for change should be and, therefore, how 
this change should be assisted. Post-1989 foreign assistance programs were designed and 
implemented as a contribution to the long-awaited East-West dialogue and exchange, 
cushioned by the rhetoric of “the return to Europe” of those historically and culturally 
European countries that had been long separated due to an accident of history.246 “The 
prevailing idea, in both East and West, was that Eastern Europe should look to the West not 
only for financial help and political models but also for economic strategies and cultural 
identity.”247 The representations as well as self-perceptions of foreign donors in terms of their 
interaction with the post-socialist countries were constructed as larger than technical 
assistance – they were framed by the discourses of integration and partnership. I largely 
confirm these conclusions on the basis of my own findings in chapters four to six.  
However, this partnership meant that the “East” would respond to the preferences 
defined by the “West” and would build democracy and civil society with the tools approved 
by the “West”. Western policy makers have been criticized for not taking into account the 
ways in which their support to democracy and civil society interacts with and relates to other 
policies pursued by governments and international organizations.248 Assuming that 
democratizing countries should simply “catch up” with the model offered by assistance, the 
donors paid little attention to the overall political context in which this model was introduced. 
For example, some of the conclusions reached after a three-year collaborative research based 
at the Columbia University point out that, 
 
Fearing they might lose funding, the USAID and US-based NGOs have been 
reluctant to provide Congress with the information showing that communists 
or nationalists have in any way benefited from or been affected by democracy 
assistance. The evidence suggests, however, that if ideas and practices take 
hold, they usually do so in ways that encompass a wide spectrum of political 
actors with varied commitments to democratization.249 
 
The contributors to this study suggest that what is highly important for democratization is a 
critical mass of local civic organizations and other institutions that are embedded in society 
firmly enough to be able to produce and push for proposals that respond to the domestic 
needs.  
 Despite of the uniformity of the “model” different post-socialist countries to which it 
was applied were not dealt with in the same way. Various gradations were introduced as to the 
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degrees of European-ness of the new assistance recipients. The more developed “Visegrád 
countries”250 were viewed as almost Western European countries that would catch up quickly, 
while the south-eastern European countries were not widely considered as partners or 
candidates for integration by foreign donors and especially the USA. Further differentiations 
emerged in 1991, when the former Soviet Union split up into 15 newly independent states. A 
new distinction was made that defined the nations with nuclear weapons and sizable deposits 
of natural resources – Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus – as more “developed” or 
more promising in terms of transition and more attractive for assistance than, for example, 
countries in Central Asia or the Caucasus. As Janine Wedel has argued, this could mainly be 
explained by geopolitical concerns of the donor countries.251 In these differentiations between 
the Newly Independent States other factors played a role as well, however: from the presence 
of a nuclear arsenal on the territory of some states to the strong Ukrainian American and 
Armenian American lobbies in the US Congress and the continuing primacy of Russia. 
However, these differentiations have not translated into context-sensitive program designs 
differentiated by country. The differences between countries in the region were mainly 
collapsed into loose teleological categories of those countries which were “ahead” and those 
“lagging behind” on the road to transition. However, all the countries were firmly believed to 
be trotting down the same road. The Cold War idea of an evil empire as a political and socio-
economic monolith that embodies everything anti-Western translated into democratization 
and free market programs supposedly applicable to the region as a whole. The belief was that 
in every previously authoritarian or totalitarian country democratization was to be observed 
and that the specific conditions of the regime break-up did not matter for the course of 
democratization. This particular vision was also important for ideas regarding whether and 
how civil society can be built from the outside in the “newly democratizing” countries.  
 The most important criticism of the assistance effort is not that it did not lead to the 
proclaimed results but that it did not try to develop an approach that would be relevant for the 
countries in question. In the words of Mendelson:  
 
Western NGOs should not be held accountable for the spread and the scope 
of political transformation or lack thereof in specific states. They should, 
however, be held responsible for their analysis of what is most feasible and 
needed in a given situation, in other words, for the strategies they use to pursue 
their goals.252  
 
In this dissertation I go further to investigate the constitutive nature of a particular 
understanding and “analysis of what is most feasible” in civil society assistance to Ukraine.  
                                                 
250 Poland, Hungary, and former Czechoslovakia signed the so-called “Visegrád declaration” on coordinating 
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Eurasia," p.24. 
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2.2.2. “Effects and side-effects” of civil society assistance 
 
One of the most striking peculiarities of the post-Cold War assistance is its enthusiasm about 
ideas of promoting democracy and civil society in different parts of the world, and the fact 
that this enthusiasm is widely shared by a variety of donors.253 Van Rooy summarizes this 
enchantment with the concept of civil society in the following way: “the idea of civil society 
has become omnipresent because it rings most of the political, economic, and social bells.”254 
Some scholars have, however, argued that the popularity of civil society in policy making 
circles constitutes a problem rather than presents a solution:  
 
The problem with the language of civil society is that it is used to explain 
almost everything: social disintegration in North America, the democratic 
surges in China, the transformation in Eastern Europe, the relative wealth of 
Northern Italy, the efforts to remove Moi from his Kenyan throne, and the 
dominance of the free market, among other things.255 
 
A similar worry is expressed in the book by Howell and Pearce who point to the depoliticizing 
character of the “conceptual elasticity” of the concept of civil society and especially its usage 
in the realm of assistance.256  
Confusion about the meaning of support to democracy and civil society was also 
responsible for the miscommunication between “East” and “West” after the end of Cold War. 
The lack of knowledge of the local setting beyond the Cold War intelligence reports and 
propaganda meant that the use of vague concepts was exacerbating rather than improving 
understanding and dialogue. This is well explained by Janine Wedel:  
 
At the start of the aid story, there was a gigantic disconnect between East and 
West – a disconnect forged by the Cold War and exacerbated by the barriers of 
language, culture, distance, information, and semi-closed borders […]; the 
disconnect lived on, even as circumstances changed after the collapse of the 
Berlin Wall.257  
 
Below I investigate the implications of this “disconnect” for the development of civil society 
in the former Soviet Block.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Block, donors started supporting civil society by 
providing grants and technical support to non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It was 
believed at the outset of assistance initiatives to the former Soviet Block that no local 
democratic institutions were present in any form, which was of course true to a certain extent, 
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given the nature of the previous regime. What was interesting, however, was that the absence 
of those democratic institutions was believed to be a sufficient proof of absence of any kind 
of civil society. This view seems at best limited, given that those totalitarian regimes did not 
collapse on their own but through considerable citizen pressure. Given such failures to 
acknowledge home-grown theories and practices of civil society, most donors were initially 
driven by the assumption that civil society had to be built afresh and reserved for themselves 
the privilege of defining what kind of civil society was to be built and how. Since NGOs were 
indeed non-existent, the success of civil society programs was, and still is, evaluated on the 
basis of quantitative growth of NGOs. 
The interaction of women’s groups in the former Soviet Union with Western donors, 
their extensive participation in donor-driven programs, and dependence on donor-distributed 
resources all have had a major effect on their development. On the basis of her extensive 
study of women’s NGOs in Russia, Sarah Henderson concluded that despite many similarities 
and complicating factors, the gap between home-grown civic groups and NGOs that are 
mainly provided for by Western assistance agencies is disturbingly big. She shows that  
 
The activities, goals, and structure of groups that receive foreign assistance 
differ substantially from those who rely primarily on domestic funding […]. 
Groups that had received funding tend to reflect the post-materialist values of 
the donor, such as concerns for gender equity, environmentalism, or respect 
for human rights, rather than the survivalist, materialist bent of many 
organizations that rely solely on domestic sources of financial support.258 
 
Henderson refers to this difference between civic groups by a “tale of two civic 
organizations”: The one type of organizations grew out of interactions with foreign donors, 
whereas the other one is representative of the so-called indigenous activism. Her research 
provides strong empirical evidence that foreign assistance indeed matters for the development 
and nature of civic organizations. However, I would argue that dichotomizing the two types of 
organizations is dangerous due to the ease with which it allows one to put a positive and a 
negative label on the two “types”.  
The negative features and dysfunctional outcomes that some researchers found in the 
operations of local NGOs are seen as coming directly from the “project life” in which these 
NGOs exist (and by which some of them are created).259 NGO projects tend to be devoid of 
mechanisms that would allow their participants to effectively learn from their failures and to 
incorporate those lessons in their future activities. The fact that “projects” are oriented 
towards reporting quantifiable results within a short-term framework constrains the range of 
options as to what NGOs can be meaningfully doing with the help of foreign funding.260 
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Sarah Mendelson points to the inherent contradiction of this approach that requires 
“quantitative measurements of qualitative transformations” and thus builds on the wrong 
premise.261 In addition, being mostly targeted at the short-term, assistance projects often do 
not allow Western donors and their implementing partners to go beyond a set of well-
established links with a few domestic NGOs.  
Another important dimension to this dialogue are the power inequalities not only 
between the donor and the NGO but also among different NGOs. The stronger and richer 
NGOs are inevitably setting the terms and the format for interaction with their counterparts. 
Moreover, due to their interest in the available resources, material and symbolic, smaller NGO 
are prepared to compromise on their own visions and missions and are likely to downplay the 
irrelevance of the plans of action proposed from the outside. Practically, this can create 
undemocratic hierarchical relationships between different NGOs (especially between 
transnational and local ones); it can lead to the strengthening of certain local NGOs in a way 
that creates boundaries and inequalities within the local civil society and supports a local NGO 
elite.262 
 In addition, the majority of foreign-supported NGOs are almost unanimously accused 
of lacking a grassroots constituency; they also fail to establish and maintain cooperative 
relations with other civic groups.  
 
Rather than building networks and developing publics, [civic] groups 
consciously retained small memberships, hoarded information, and engaged in 
uncooperative and even competitive behavior with other civic groups. In short, 
groups pursued individual, short-term gains rather than collective, long-term 
development.263 
 
The divisions between groups that have established connections with the West and 
outsiders to this practice are very strong. Many funded groups are in competitive relations 
with each other since they are well aware of competing for the same pot of relatively limited 
resources. In her study of women’s activism in Russia Valerie Sperling shows that foreign 
assistance has fostered internal rivalries, jealousies, and overall divisiveness among and within 
groups.264 Sarah Henderson also echoes these findings:  
 
Many groups, funded and unfunded, tended to be small, relatively distrustful of 
others, and focused on guarding their civic turf. What was surprising, however, 
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was that foreign aid was not necessarily ameliorating these problems; rather, it 
seemed to be exacerbating them, despite its intentions to the contrary.265  
 
Scholars increasingly talk about the “ghettoized” position of NGOs in the former 
Soviet Union in the sense that they are closer to their donors and other transnational partners 
than to their government or society.266 It is quite unclear whose interests NGOs represent and 
who their constituencies are. When discussing these criticisms, Sarah Henderson makes an 
important point by connecting these concerns to the issue of sustainability. Counter to the 
mainstream policy discourse that defines sustainability predominantly in monetary terms,267 
she notes that after-funding sustainability assessments of these groups should be based on 
their capacities to represent domestic constituencies.268 However, being both representative of 
a certain constituency and sustainable still does not directly translate into democratic effects. It 
is therefore important to neither demonize the externally supported initiatives nor to 
romanticize the local ones regardless of their substance.  
In addition to such findings of broad-scale effects, there is also an extensive literature 
showing that on an individual level aid has created new identities. A “new” generation of 
professionals has moved to the foreground. These people, sometimes referred to as “fixers” 
or brokers, became proficient in facilitating the “dialogue” between East and West or 
sometimes “explaining” the East to the West. Most of the time these were people who spoke 
good English, mastered the conventions of “Western style” communication, and knew how to 
get things going locally while at the same time projecting the right image of professionals to 
their foreign counterparts.269 These people formed a new “civic elite” or even, as for example 
Sarah Henderson suggests, a “civic oligarchy”.270 Now, more than a decade into the “civil 
society building effort”, this group has become increasingly visible - “the indigenous 
development professionals, an aspiring elite, who are part of the human fallout of 
international development aid.”271  
Some have argued that activists that received Western assistance were socialized into 
Western professional ways; these civic groups tend to mimic the organizational style of 
Western assistance agencies, which are wealthy, centralized and bureaucratized corporate 
NGOs.272  
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The most enduring effect of the aid effort so far has been the formation of a 
new local elite of “development professionals.” The trouble is that the value 
produced by these people takes the form of project “deliverables” that are 
unlikely to have any bearing on the deteriorating living conditions of the mass 
of the population. Meanwhile the young professionals imbibe a set of Western 
values and earn Western salaries. They become unemployable in their local 
societies.273  
 
Anthropologist Ruth Mandel echoes this observation by saying that “local people 
trained in the servicing of the aid industry have been rendered unsuitable to work for their 
own governments” due to the pay differences but also due to the fact that this new cadre has 
been socialized into different organizational structures with different work styles and ethics.274 
She is particularly outspoken in her dissatisfaction with the role played by this new elite: “The 
local development workers have become proselytes of the international development 
missionaries, and the rhetoric of civil society, privatization and democratization is their 
catechism.”275   
What comes across as somewhat ironic is that, while on the one hand donor activities 
are biased towards certain kinds of civic activists, donors are, on the other hand, often 
dissatisfied with the local people they have to work with, reporting some kind of “donor 
fatigue” and dissatisfaction with the delivered results.276 Often putting the blame on Soviet 
legacies, they fail to see their own contribution to the consolidation of the “civic elite” they 
interact with. In this dissertation I will therefore pay particular attention to the mutually 
constitutive nature of the dialogue between the donor and the local NGO.   
 
2.3. Conclusion  
 
Particular configurations of the public – private realms during socialism also created particular 
perceptions of and attitudes towards issues of activism and gender. Moreover, current socio-
political transformations engender complex changes in these attitudes and impact on people’s 
ideas of meaningful civic action. I have argued that foreign assistance has proven to be a 
highly influential factor on the changing post-socialist scene, specifically with regard to its 
promotion of particular new forms of civil society.   
The promotion of civil society in the form of NGO support has created a variety of 
ambiguous effects, such as financial dependency, upward accountability, and the adjustment of 
structures and agendas of organizations to their donors. This has led to corrupt practices 
within funding-eligible organizations as well as to rivalries between them and to a complete 
communication vacuum between donor-funded and other groups and associations. The 
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observable massive proliferation of nongovernmental organizations is also argued to have 
fallen short of fulfilling the challenges of citizen empowerment and growth of alternative 
centers of power. On the contrary, it generates isolation and fragmentation rather than 
networks, communication, and pluralism.  
Given a widely shared understanding of the “assistance” effort as a project that 
embodies a mixture of arrogant attitudes and plain ignorance of particular contexts, it seems 
surprising that in the real world of civil society assistance alternatives are not being introduced. 
Despite years of experience in different contexts around the globe and a whole range of 
failures that are recognized by the donors themselves, we still do not see those more modest 
and reasonable scenarios introduced. Coming back to the questions posed in the beginning of 
this book, it remains unclear why, given such a range of negative effects, donor practices 
persist rather than being abandoned altogether. Some researchers argue that “it is not aid in 
and of itself that is flawed but the way, in which it is designed and implemented.”277 This is a 
convenient and largely commonsensical way to make an argument; however, it does not 
provide any tools for effectively separating the chaff of bad design from the wheat of good 
intention. I suggest retaining a degree of skepticism about the extent to which such a 
separation is actually possible. I argue that “good intentions” do not exist in and of 
themselves; instead, the intentions as well as the design and implementation of the projects 
they motivate are constituted by a particular discourse. Therefore, in order to understand how 
certain tendencies created by the assistance effort came about and to be able to judge the 
potential for reversing them, it is important to identify the particular discursive mechanisms 
that sustain them.   
                                                 
277 Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations, p.170. 
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Chapter 3: Dialogical Discourse Analysis 
 
During my fieldwork in one Ukrainian city I went to interview the head of a women’s NGO. 
The NGO was based in her flat and when I entered, I discovered a living room, in which 
among the usual furniture and some personal things a computer and a fax machine stood. 
What was the meaning of those objects? They were there not as mere signs of an increasing 
use of modern technology by the Ukrainian population but had been purchased with a grant 
that was – according to the donor’s definition – part of the “technical assistance to promote 
democracy in Ukraine.” For the head of the NGO herself, these objects were an integral part 
of creating an NGO. Such an understanding of a computer and a fax machine in somebody’s 
living room was not obvious. However, if an official from the donor agency that provided 
such “assistance” had come to visit in order to see how it “was promoting democracy in 
Ukraine”, he or she would not have been surprised to see a computer and a fax machine. He 
or she would not have been expecting to find a peaceful demonstration of human rights 
activists in that living room as a sign of “democracy in Ukraine”. To him or her a computer 
and a fax machine would have made sense.  
It is these kinds of observations that lead me to argue that things do not just make 
sense as such; they are made to make sense. The goal of this dissertation is to look into how 
exactly that is made possible. Misplaced names, foreign words, clumsy phrases, unintelligible 
adaptations of English words in written and spoken Russian and Ukrainian are not just alien 
creatures flown in by foreign guests. They are also actively employed by local actors to make 
sense of new and old realities and, in fact, to (re)enact realities. Below I elaborate on a 
theoretical perspective and a research model that allow me to conceptualize civil society 
assistance as a discourse that is (re)enacted through interactions between foreign donors and 
Ukrainian NGOs.  
 
3.1. A Genealogy of Discourse Theories 
 
Discourse theory belongs to a set of theories which has emerged as an acknowledgement of 
and an attempt to overcome limitations of mainstream positivist approaches to social science 
primarily by grounding itself on different ontological and epistemological foundations. It 
emphasizes the inherent ambiguity of social and political phenomena and provides a context-
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dependent, historicist, and non-objectivist framework for analyzing society.278 In the words of 
Maarten Hajer:  
 
This tradition has an anti-essentialist ontology; it assumes the existence of 
multiple, socially constructed realities instead of a single reality, governed by 
immutable natural laws. Characteristically, the approach takes a critical stance 
towards “truth” and puts emphasis on the communications through which 
knowledge is exchanged.279 
 
Discourse theory is positioned against theories and methodologies that - in a manner 
characteristic of natural sciences - define their goal as “to explain phenomena and events in 
objective universal terms.”280 These theories are based on a particular understanding of 
knowledge as a value-free search for empirical confirmation of causal accounts with the 
highest possible degree of generalizability. This approach rests on several key assumptions, 
such as the distinction between discovery and validation, belief in the possibility of neutral 
observation and in the neutrality of the language that frames this observation, and a value-free 
conception of scientific knowledge (i.e. a rigid separation between facts and values).281 Science 
is therefore seen as aimed at the production of falsifiable laws and theories, and results of 
social science inquiry are meant to be utilized for predicting comparable or future events. This 
approach characterizes schools of thought such as logical positivism, behavioralism, and 
certain forms of structural functionalism, (critical) realism and Marxism.282 Discourse theory, 
on the other hand, “is concerned with understanding and interpreting socially produced 
meanings rather than searching for objective causal explanations.”283 These socially produced 
meanings (or systems of meanings) are seen as both constituted by social practices and ideas 
in political life and constitutive of political activities in that they enable certain forms of social 
and political action and constrain others. In other words and applied to this dissertation, there 
would be no civil society specialists and centers within the donor agencies without the civil 
society discourse; at the same time, these institutional components influence the development 
of civil society discourse. 
Some ideas defining the discourse analytical paradigm are argued to be already found 
in the transcendental turn in Western philosophy, in particular in Kant and Hüsserl, in the 
sense that this turn shifted the focus of inquiry from concrete facts to their conditions of 
possibility. Unlike transcendentalists, though, discourse theorists see those conditions as 
context-dependent and variable.284 Critiques of structuralism285 and interpretative sciences such 
                                                 
278 David Howarth, Discourse (Buckingham: Oxford University Press, 2000), Jacob Torfing, New theories of discourse: 
Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). 
279 Maarten Hajer and Wytske Versteeg, "A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: 
Achievement, Challenges, Perspectives," Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 7, no. 3 (2005): p.176. 
280 Howarth, Discourse, p.126. 
281 Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1975), p.13. 
282  G. Delanty, Social Science: Beyond Constructivism and Realism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997). 
283 Howarth, Discourse. 
284 Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek, p.84. 
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as hermeneutics, phenomenology, and deconstructivism, which interpret texts and analyze 
how objects and experiences acquire meaning, have had a major impact on the development 
of discourse theory.286 The so-called “linguistic turn” produced a major shift in the social 
sciences that implied moving from looking at language as a neutral medium, which conveys 
pre-existing meanings, to looking at language as a social phenomenon in itself. Since then 
discourse theory in the social sciences has become more rigid but also more diversified.  
Analyzing discourse means asking “how the discourses, which structure the activities 
of social agents, are produced, how they function, and how they are changed.”287 The main 
preoccupation of discourse analysis is the study of production of meaning in different 
historical contexts, which is seen as a prerequisite for all forms of social and political behavior. 
According to Hajer, “Discourse analysis has three particular strengths; the capacity to reveal 
the role of language in politics, to reveal the embeddedness of language in practice and to 
illuminate mechanisms, and answer ‘how questions’.”288 
Different structures of meanings make possible different forms of conduct. For 
example, in the case of the post-1989 development of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe it has been widely argued that foreign 
aid agencies play a key role in determining the nature of newly emerging NGOs. The 
discourse analytic contribution to the study of this process is the analysis of how the 
interaction between NGOs and their donors constructs and contests different systems of 
meaning, which enable or constrain different activities of NGOs as well as donors themselves.  
 Most often (if in a slightly confusing turn) systems of meaning have been called 
“discourses”, which can be defined as  
 
a relational totality of signifying sequences that together constitute a more or 
less coherent framework for what can be said and done. The notion of 
discourse cuts across the distinction between thought and reality […]; it does 
not merely designate a linguistic region within the social, but is rather co-
extensive with the social.289  
 
These “totalities of signifying sequences” have also been referred to as genres -  “the 
aggregates of means of collective orientation in reality”290 - or as discursive formations – 
regular bodies of ideas and concepts, which claim to produce knowledge about the world.291 In 
this dissertation I use the definition of “discourse” that has been developed in the work of 
Maarten Hajer: “Discourse is defined as an ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categories 
                                                                                                                                                    
285 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), Mikhail Bakhtin, Speech 
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Stoker (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), p.115, emphasis in the original. 
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289 Torfing, New Theories of Discourse: Laclau, Mouffe and Zizek, p.300. 
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through which meaning is given to social and physical phenomena, and which is produced and 
reproduced through an identifiable set of practices.”292  
A number of studies have shown how ideas and notions combine and blend in 
seemingly coherent structures labeled “interpretative repertoires”293 or narratives and story-
lines, which have significant social and political implications. Story-lines or narratives combine 
elements of various ideas and lines of argumentation into a seemingly coherent whole and, 
thus, conceal discursive complexity. Furthermore, they can themselves subsequently become a 
political reality in their own right and then stand in the way of more reflexive institutional 
change. 294 It is for this reason that it is vital to study how meanings are produced, function 
and change (or are possibly contested and subverted).  
Acknowledging that meaning is not a pre-given quality of a phenomenon but is rather 
ascribed to it allows one to problematize processes of defining, categorizing, and framing the 
social. Meanings constitute identities and strategies of actors as well as public access to and 
understanding of the problem at hand, and problem selection and analysis. For example, the 
presence of massive numbers of predominantly female undocumented workers in countries of 
the European Union can be interpreted as a “trafficking” problem rather than as an illegal 
migration problem.295 This shift in meaning has implications for how alien women are 
represented, i.e. as victims or as criminals, for opinions about these women held by the wider 
public locally and internationally, as well as for what measures are being enforced to “deal” 
with these women.  
However, it is important not to mistake the totalizing nature of such structures of 
meaning for their universality. The fact that a system of meanings has gained dominance over 
the discursive field does not make it the “true” system of meaning. It is the inherently dialogic 
nature of language that provides for constant (if at times less prominent) contestation of 
meanings. It is even more important to highlight that such structures of meaning or discourses 
are not only multiple but are also in constant interaction with each other. Therefore, the 
discourse paradigm questions the idea of a structure on two key assumptions: the possibilities 
of a fixed center and of finite closure. Unlike the structuralist assumption that a fixed center 
exercises a universal power of structuration and signification, the discourse paradigm sees 
structures as contingent and plays of meanings as infinite and dynamic. It therefore offers new 
understandings of such traditional social science oppositions as structure and agency, or center 
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and periphery. In fact, it allows moving beyond these dichotomies in the sense of 
acknowledging their dynamism and contingency. The discourse paradigm makes it possible  
 
to problematize the underlying assumptions that make the two alternatives 
contradictory and to inscribe them within some new undecidable logic that will 
make room for both in such a way that neither neutralizes the opposition nor 
sublates it into a higher order synthesis.296 
 
In the case of civil society assistance I argue that foreign assistance discourse and 
practice determine the conditions of possibility for the nature and content of civil society. I 
show in the subsequent chapters that foreign assistance defines what forms of citizen 
involvement qualify as civil society in Ukraine, mainly by downsizing the concept to the realm 
of non-profit non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and by delineating the range of 
activities performed by NGOs. Conceptualizing the impact of foreign assistance in these 
terms means redressing the discursive/extra-discursive opposition. This opposition is a 
product of a rigid analytical division between language (the signifier) and reality (the signified), 
which has dominated structuralist approaches in linguistics and the social sciences. Discourse 
analysis aims to overcome this opposition by asserting that social meaning is relationally 
constructed as a part of a discourse which cannot be reduced to a semantic region or aspect of 
the social totality, since it weaves together meaning and action in complex language games.297 
Language is not mirroring or expressing the “truth” or the “reality out there”; rather, it is 
through language that reality actually happens, subjectivities are created and expressed, social 
activities are developed and pursued, and power-relations are tried out and consolidated.298 
Therefore, there is no way to approach the world by-passing language and testing how the 
world really is on its own terms. “It follows that language can only be compared with language 
and not with the world directly.”299 Therefore, looking at assistance from a discourse 
theoretical perspective is important not because language or discourse is an important part of 
reality but because it is the only reality there is. 
This position should, however, not be seen as a reiteration of idealist arguments in the 
fashion of the realism/idealism debate.300 Seeing every object constituted as an object of 
discourse does not imply that there is no world external to thought; it asserts instead that 
every object with its specificity is always constituted as such within a discourse.301 To come 
back to the example I give in the beginning of this chapter, there is no doubt that with the 
help of donor funding NGOs buy equipment and furniture and that these items are physically 
present in a rented office space or private home. But whether the specificity of these objects is 
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constructed in terms of “technical assistance”, “creating open and free access through the 
Internet to Western concepts of civil society” or “strengthening the NGO sector”302 depends 
on the particular discourse that is employed. Moreover, the particular meaning of these objects 
has implications for how and to what ends they can be utilized.  
To put it differently, discourse theory does not deny that objects have extra-discursive 
existence but it does contest the possibility of their having an extra-discursive meaning. This 
approach also has implications for questions of knowledge production, firstly, since theoretical 
objects are never understood as given by the world of experience and facts but as constructed 
in historically specific systems of knowledge.303 Secondly, “decisions about the truth and falsity 
of statements are settled within orders of discourse (or paradigms) using criteria established by 
those orders themselves.”304 The orders of discourse are, therefore, neither true nor false in 
themselves. In the words of Foucault, “the political question […] is not error, illusion, 
alienated consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself.”305 
A social scientist and her writings also exist within discursive structures and 
conceptual frameworks which are politically and historically defined. “In the social science 
[…] both the researchers and their objects of research are meaningful practices and social 
constructions.”306 There is no “god trick” or objective(fying) gaze from nowhere a scientist 
could perform in order to narrate the world as it is.307 In other words, there is no “objective” 
scientific vision that is not embodied in a particular scientific subject and practice. The illusion 
of the “god trick” implies the power to represent without being represented and has been 
severely criticized as an underlying principle of racism, sexism, colonialism, eurocentrism and 
many other extreme “isms”. As has been made evident by a number of scholars, scientific 
objectivity is contingent in itself as it can only come from a partiality of perspective and not 
from transcendence, just as vision always comes with particular ways of seeing.308 
“Objectivity” therefore comes from a critical positioning of the knower within discursive 
formations rather than from assuming it inherent in scientific expertise. “Feminist objectivity 
is about limited location and situated knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of 
subject and object.”309 Similar epistemological claims have been put forth in science and 
technology studies,310 which call for acknowledging that knowledge and the boundaries of 
science are all implicated in historically specific power structures. 
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Due to its potential to go beyond such dominant notions as objectivity, structure, and 
materialism, discourse theory opens up possibilities for working out and applying different 
analytical tools for studying society. “The main consequence of a break with the discursive / 
extra-discursive dichotomy is the abandonment of the thought / reality opposition, and hence 
a major enlargement of the field of those categories which can account for social relations.”311 
Having clarified the kinds of questions that can be asked with the help of discourse analysis, 
the next step has to be taken, namely identifying the appropriate ways of answering them. In 
what follows I offer some tools that can be used for delineating a discourse, identifying the 
key elements on which it is based, and explaining how a certain discourse sustains itself given 
the multiple and constantly changing nature of social reality. I adopt a methodological 
framework that is based on the work of the Russian/Soviet philosopher of language and 
literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin.312  
 In the next section I outline in greater detail the theoretical apparatus of a discourse 
theory that was worked out within the Bakhtinian school, which emerged in the Soviet Union 
in the 1920s and was developed mainly in the texts of Makhail Bakhtin himself through to the 
1960s. The latter, though primarily focused on the study of a novelistic genre, introduce 
notions of dialogism or dialogicality (dialogichnost) as a key quality of discourse and seek to 
explain the tensions and changes within and across discourses by means of a model that 
introduces an interplay of centripetal and centrifugal discursive forces. 
 
3.2. Dialogical Discourse Analysis: Mikhail Bakhtin 
 
3.2.1. Bakhtinian theories  
 
Even the driest and flattest positivism […] 
cannot treat the word neutrally, as if it were a 
thing, but is obliged to initiate talk not only 
about words but in words, in order to penetrate 
their ideological meanings – which can only be 
grasped dialogically, and which include 
evaluation and response.313 
 
                                                 
311 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p.110. 
312 Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin (1895-1971) has gained credit as a distinguished scholar posthumously, his 
major works having only recently been translated into many languages. Due to the turbulent events of his time, 
some of Bakhtin’s writings have been either lost or only recently discovered and published for the first time. His 
most productive years coincided with the post-October revolution (1917) chaos of civil war and famine, Stalinist 
purges, World War II and German occupation. Mikhail Bakhtin spent most of his professional life in provincial 
obscurity. His was a historical period particularly difficult for scholarly and creative work, as the state ideology 
had been gradually overtaking all spheres of life. A so-called Bakhtinian circle was a tradition of meetings for 
discussions on most current topics of philosophy and aesthetics that Bakhtin and other intellectuals of his time 
maintained in several cities (St. Petersburg, Vitebsk, and Moscow). 
313 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, p.352. 
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The theoretical heritage of Mikhail Bakhtin is an interesting strand of discourse theory, which 
is at times unjustly neglected in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. It is particularly fascinating that 
many of his ideas preceded the better-known post-structuralist theories of discourse that 
developed in continental Europe in the second half of the twentieth century (of which 
“archaeology”, “genealogy” and “problematization” by Michel Foucault are the best known 
landmark examples). Having developed at a different time period and in a drastically different 
environment, Bakhtinian ideas, although building on similar epistemological grounds, took a 
somewhat different direction and offered different solutions to understanding the discursivity 
of the social and the political. In the context of this dissertation I find it particularly appealing 
that Bakhtin was developing his ideas in the same context that shaped the identities of many 
civil society scholars and activists who are currently involved in the institutionalization of civil 
society in Ukraine. Although the context of my research is a rapidly changing one, such 
cultural affinity of ideas can be of tremendous help for understanding these processes as they 
unfold under the dual influence of historical legacies and new interactions.  
Key in this respect is a different understanding of the political and especially of the 
power/resistance nexus. While in Western Europe conceptualizations of power were 
fundamentally influenced by the Marxist tradition (if not in their continuity, then in their point 
of departure), “East of the Elbe” Marxism became so firmly institutionalized within the 
oppressive power structures that instead of entering into a dialogue with it, however critical, 
thinkers of different backgrounds were often trying to conceive of fundamentally different 
analytical grounds. Bakhtin’s work represents a prominent example of such intellectual efforts. 
In this section I outline his main ideas concerning discourse and its workings.  
The importance of Bakhtinian texts (including those by Voloshinov and Medvedev)314 
lies in their basic ideas about the socially implicated and interactive nature of language, which 
undoubtedly represent an early “social turn” in linguistics. The counterpoint of these texts are 
Saussurean structuralist linguistics, namely the structuralist dichotomy of language (langue) and 
speech (parole). Bakhtinians maintain that “the meanings of words are derived not from fixed 
relationships between abstract signs but from the accumulated dynamic social use of particular 
forms of language in different contexts and for different and sometimes conflicting 
purposes.”315 
Writing contra Ferdinand de Saussure, Bakhtin defined language not as a system of 
signs but as meaning constructed in interaction.316 Material reality and everyday practice is 
constantly reconstructed and renegotiated in interaction, meaning-making being key to 
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everyday life. This allowed Bakhtin to move away from a more hierarchical and systemic 
picture that conceives of language as a composition of different unit levels to looking at 
socially embedded interactive phenomena. “Discourse317 is a social phenomenon – social 
throughout its entire range and in each and every of its factors, from the sound image to the 
furthest reaches of abstract meaning.”318 
Bakhtin complicates the understanding of language as a socially implicated system of 
meanings by introducing the concept of dialogichnost (dialogism or dialogicality) and explaining 
the dynamics of meaning that this creates. Dialogicality in Bakhtinian terms means that a word 
cannot be viewed as an independent entity because every word or utterance exists in relation 
to and in a constant dialogue with other words and utterances. Every word consists of a 
multiplicity of people’s voices as well as of the social practices and contexts they evoke. For 
Bakhtin dynamics of meaning-making are implicit in every word (here “word” is conceived 
not as an abstract signifier in a Saussurean sense but as an instance in which a word is 
practiced, i.e. in which it is either thought, said, or written).  
 
Only the mythical Adam, who approached a virginal and as yet verbally 
unqualified world with the first word could really have escaped from start to 
finish the dialogic inter-orientation with the alien word that occurs in the 
object. Concrete historical human discourse does not have this privilege: it can 
deviate from such inter-orientation only on a conditional basis and only to a 
certain degree.319 
 
Bakhtin suggests that the dialogicality that takes place in a word is multileveled in that 
it is not only about responding to an immediate utterance but also to the whole corpus of 
meanings constructed at a given period of time. A word has dialogic orientation  
 
first, amid others’ utterances inside a single language (the primordial dialogism 
of discourse), then amid other “social languages” within a single national 
language and finally amid different national languages within the same culture, 
that is the same socio-ideological conceptual horizon.320 
 
The dialogue is also conducted with a variety of audiences and arguments beyond the 
actual situation of interaction. In other words, for Bakhtin, people talking about certain 
objects are confronted with meanings, connotations, and social practices which have already 
been created, used and contested by someone else. In his words, 
 
… no living word relates to its object in such a singular way: between the word 
and its object, between the word and the speaking subject, there exists an 
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elastic environment of other alien words about the same object, the same 
theme, and this is an environment that it is often difficult to penetrate… . 
Indeed, any concrete word (utterance) finds the object at which it was directed 
already as it were overlain with qualifications, open to dispute, charged with 
value, already enveloped in an obscuring mist – or, on the contrary, by the 
“light” of alien words that have already been spoken about it. It is entangled, 
shot through with shared thoughts, points of view, alien value judgments and 
accents. The word, directed toward its object, enters a dialogically agitated and 
tension-filled environment of alien words, value judgments and accents, 
weaves in and out of complex interrelationships, merges with some, recoils 
from others, intersects with yet a third group: and all this may crucially shape 
discourse, may leave a trace in all its semantic layers, may complicate its 
expression and influence its entire stylistic profile.321 
 
This dialogical orientation of a word not only retrospectively responds to things 
previously said but also projects what will be said after a given utterance. Thus, every utterance 
is at the same time an exercise of accommodation or appropriation of other people’s words 
and of projection of meaning, which both creates possibilities and constrains future 
utterances. “Forming itself in an atmosphere of the already spoken, the word is at the same 
time determined by that which has not yet been said but which is needed and in fact 
anticipated by the answering word.”322 Dialogicality is thus a result of the heteroglossic nature 
of reality itself. Heteroglossia is a name for the “dynamic multiplicity of voices, genres, and 
social languages” that characterises social order. The potential of the multiplicity of meanings, 
which is inherent in every word, can become realized at certain moments, when existing 
notions are re-appropriated to include new and sometimes conflicting meanings or when 
altogether new labels are created to substitute for the existing notion.  
The mechanisms that pull together certain meanings at the expense of this inherent (in 
a sense limitless) multiplicity as well as the mechanisms that introduce alternative meanings are 
captured by the interplay of so-called centripetal and centrifugal forces, respectively. 
Centripetal forces produce authoritative, fixed, and homogenizing effects by putting together 
and consolidating a (dominant) discourse or a “unitary language”, in Bakhtinian terms.  
 
Unitary language constitutes the theoretical expression of the historical 
processes of linguistic unification and centralization, an expression of the 
centripetal forces of language. A unitary language is not something given but is 
always in essence posited – and at every moment of linguistic life it is opposed 
to the realities of heteroglossia.323  
 
Concrete verbal and ideological unification and centralization develops in vital connection 
with processes of sociopolitical and cultural centralization.324 The “authoritative” or dominant 
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discourse provides a particular pure representation of power that claims to be universal but it 
is never the only possible representation. 
 Similarly to what was later argued by Foucault, the “unitary language”’ (or the 
dominant discourse in Foucauldian terms) exercises a structuring power over subjects by 
creating identities and conditions of possibility for action. Understanding discourse in such a 
way provides us with new understandings of power. Traditionally, power was conceived of 
either as coercion/domination, with its alter ego - resistance (an asymmetrical relationship of 
power), or as consensus (strategically negotiated power). The new understanding is that power 
does not only originate from the “strategic game” of an actor; it also structures that game and 
the subjectivity of an actor in a certain way.325 Drawing on this tradition, Hajer has argued that 
“creating a joint understanding of the world, developing knowledge, and following particular 
guidelines is power.”326  
Centrifugal forces, on the other hand, are the forces of diversification and change that 
work to disrupt and subvert the “unitary language”. In Bakhtin’s writings, centrifugal forces 
are represented in the “carnivalesque”, i.e. practices of contesting/subverting the dominant 
and the official, turning things upside-down, when the bottom becomes the top and the top 
becomes the bottom or, in a metaphor inspired by medieval carnival culture, the fool is the 
king and the king is the fool. “Carnivalesque” elements emerge out of an inherent inadequacy 
or impotency of dominant meanings to respond to the complexity of the reality made up of 
multiple interactions. Centripetal and centrifugal forces are metaphors suggested by Bakhtin in 
his book on Rabelais327 and medieval literature. He uses them to describe the constant “push-
and-pull” effect between the structuring power of a dominant system of meanings – Bakhtin 
uses the term “officialdom” – and the inherent playful or, to use Bakhtin’s term, “the 
carnivalesque” nature of language. The processes of centralization and decentralization, of 
unification and dis-unification themselves intersect in an utterance.328 Bakhtin talks about 
carnival practices that employ radical reversals of meaning in order to render the key 
principles of the power structure meaningless and to question their authority. The idea of the 
interplay between the “officialdom” and the “carnivalesque” complements and substantiates 
Foucault’s postulate “where there is power, there is resistance”, which was formulated but 
never empirically addressed by Foucault himself. 
If one pursues the model suggested by Bakhtin, it becomes clear that the interplay 
between centripetal and centrifugal forces can produce moments of tension and rupture that 
may lead to changes in meaning. I suggest calling these moments of change openings. Openings 
                                                 
325 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-77, 
Michel Foucault, "The Subject and the Power," in Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, ed. Hubert 
Breyfus and Paul Rabinow (Brighton: Harvester, 1982). 
326 Hajer and Versteeg, "A Decade of Discourse Analysis of Environmental Politics: Achievement, Challenges, 
Perspectives," p.181. 
327 Due to a political and ideological controversy around Bakhtin’s major work on Rabelais, which he submitted 
as his doctoral dissertation in 1946-49, the presently world-renowned monograph Rabelais and His World had to 
wait nineteen years before it was first published in 1965. Some of Bakhtin’s other books were also refused 
publication during his lifetime. 
328 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, p.272. 
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are the points at which one can see the “unitary language” disrupted. Openings are not words 
or utterances of a particular kind, i.e. there is no word or utterance that could be an opening 
per se. An opening is a discursive event,329 in which words, speakers, contexts of 
word/utterance production and reception come together in a way that suggests new meanings. 
Accounting for openings is important since it allows pointing out alternative meanings that 
serve as a contrast field to the dominant discourses under study. This is an important addition 
to a Foucauldian type of analysis, which stays short of accounting for a simultaneous interplay 
of different meanings. Though being praised for his accounts of the workings of discourses 
and discursive formations, Foucault is often criticized for failing to systematically single out 
ruptures and tensions within a discourse and emergences of alternative meanings. “There is a 
marked absence of attention to tensions, let alone contradictions, within discourses that 
provide the raw material for the discourses of resistance.”330  
The idea of openings is similar to the concept of “dislocation” developed by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in their influential work on Hegemony and Socialist Strategy.331 
“Dislocations are events that cannot be symbolized by an existent discursive order, and thus 
function to disrupt that order.”332 In this sense they reveal the contingency of discursive 
structures. Laclau and Mouffe argue that, taken further, dislocations can create new forms of 
identification, which are captured firstly within myths and further within social imagery. They 
fail, however, to pinpoint why and under what conditions this can become a possibility. I 
would, therefore, like to emphasize that “openings” is a descriptive notion rather than an 
explanatory tool. In other words, indications of alternative meanings should be analytically 
separated from ascribing them with transformative power. A separate question that has to be 
empirically and theoretically addressed remains whether the new meanings that are created in 
the interaction indeed have an impact on the dominant discourse to the extent of changing it 
or whether and under what conditions they are appropriated instead. In the next section I 
move on to discussing how the notions introduced so far can be applied to the study of the 
impact of foreign assistance on the development of civil society in Ukraine. 
3.2.2. Applying Bakhtinian theory to the study of donor-NGO interaction 
 
If foreign assistance to civil society is conceptualized as a discourse, this means that ideas 
about what constitutes assistance, its goals and methods are both constitutive of reality and are 
constituted by reality. Institutional changes within USAID, such as the foundation of the 
Center for Democracy and Governance, the introduction of civil society specialist positions, 
and budget appropriations for the promotion of civil society and democracy, are all 
                                                 
329 ”Discursive event” is a descriptive term I use, which should not be mistaken for the “speech event” 
introduced by D. Hymes, The Ethnography of Speaking (Washington, DC: Anthropological Society of Washington, 
1962), D. Hymes, ed., Language in Culture and Society (New York: Harper & Row, 1964)..  
330 Trevor Purvis and Alan Hunt, "Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology, Discourse, Ideology..." British 
Journal of Sociology 44, no. 3 (1993): p.489. 
331 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. 
332 Howarth, Discourse, p.111. 
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inconceivable prior to the idea that the American government has a role to play in the political 
transformation of the former Soviet Block and that such a transformation should entail 
building up civil societies in the respective countries. At the same time, such institutional and 
material factors can gradually transform the discourse and change its meanings. Indeed, as I 
show in the following four chapters, the scope of the change that has occurred within the civil 
society assistance discourse in a period of little more than a decade is striking.  
 The most important Bakhtinian element to the definition of a discourse is the notion 
of dialogicality. If dialogicality is the founding principle of discursive operations, this means 
that civil society assistance discourse cannot be seen as a stable set of ideas that originate at 
US governmental agencies. Instead, civil society assistance discourse is constantly (re)enacted 
within interactions between different actors that operate in different contexts, and each of 
these interactions can redefine this discourse in new ways. Such a dialogic conception of 
discourse constructs it as a living phenomenon rather than a stable structure or a set of 
discursive tools. Defined in such a way, discourse is neither a structure that fully dominates 
actors, nor is it an instrument that can be strategically utilized by actors. This emphasis on the 
transformations of a discourse allows us to understand how it functions across different 
contexts of interaction.  
 Such a contextual vision of discourse follows a Wittgensteinian idea that utterances 
cannot be usefully understood outside of the practices in which they are (re)produced and 
transformed. In other words, this is a situated (or “sited”) understanding of discourse. In his 
recent work, Hajer explores possibilities of conceptualizing this dimension of discourse. His 
suggestion is to add a dramaturgical dimension to the analysis: Through use of such concepts 
as “performativity” and “performance” he conveys “the understanding that certain meanings 
constantly have to be reproduced, that signification must be enacted, and that this takes place in 
a particular ‘setting’.”333 Although the model of analysis that I present below does not 
incorporate the dramaturgical dimension, nor does it employ concepts such as “performance”, 
the idea of the situated “enactment” of a discourse is key to the overall approach that I 
develop.  
 In the case of USAID civil society assistance to Ukraine, I have identified three core 
sites of interaction at which the discourse is (re)enacted. The first site of interaction is Washington 
DC. It includes the institutional settings of donor agencies and bureaus with certain 
procedures and modes of operation; at the same site there are also various organizations that 
are involved in donors’ activities either through subcontracting or through providing 
consultancy services, such as American NGOs, think tanks, or consultancy firms. The second 
site of interaction is Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. This is the site at which actors from a variety of 
backgrounds interact towards implementing civil society assistance programs. These include 
the donor mission to the country, representatives of subcontractors and consultancy firms, 
local think tanks, and NGOs. In a way, Kiev is a point of mediation between the international 
                                                 
333 Maarten Hajer, "Rebuilding Ground Zero: The Politics of Performance," Planning Theory & Practice 6, no. 4 
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and the local discourses. The third site of interaction are the settings of local women’s NGOs. 
Each NGO should also be viewed in the diversity of its interactions with its constituencies, 
other local and international civil society groups, and local administrations. Their site is the 
final receiving point of the assistance chain, which also connects back to the other two 
localities. Therefore, the relevant discursive interaction takes place not only within but also 
across the sites. None of the sites should be viewed as a uniform actor; rather each is defined 
by the complexity of interactions that take place within and across them. In this sense, there 
are no clearly defined center and margins of donor-NGO interaction, since those are 
constantly re-negotiated at different sites of interaction334 as well as across them. The so-called 
“donor-speak”, for example, is key to NGO interaction with foreign aid agencies. In addition, 
NGOs also need to communicate with many more actors – from city council bureaucrats to 
the actual recipients of NGO services - for whom these notions may mean something else, if 
they seem relevant at all.  
The civil society assistance discourse is structured by a constant interplay between 
centripetal and centrifugal forces. In order to understand the dynamics of how these various 
sites are tied together by a common discourse of institutionalizing civil society, it is necessary 
to reveal the workings of a “unitary language” that pulls these multiple sites together so as to 
create a seemingly uniform system of meanings. I show how such a totality creates a common 
language and practice and, ultimately, engenders particular identities and activities. Centripetal 
forces of the discourse are embedded in a set of discursive centers – key notions that together 
form a coherent system of meaning that defines what assistance to civil society is. Therefore, 
the first step in the analysis is to identify these discursive centers as they emerge from 
interactions at the respective sites. This coherence, however, is never fully stable due to the 
workings of centrifugal forces that contest the taken-for-granted-ness and the unity of the 
discourse. These forces are visible in the alternative meanings and interpretations that are 
present within various (re)enactments of the assistance discourse. They introduce the so-called 
openings in the “unitary language” and force its transformations.  
Ultimately, the analysis reveals whether and how the civil society assistance discourse 
creates conditions of possibility for Ukrainian women’s NGOs. It shows how exactly civil 
society, its activities, and its role in a democratizing society are defined, and helps explicate the 
dominance of these definitions. To quote Schudson, “the power of the story is not so much 
that there are limits to the number of plausible interpretations but that the interpretations we 
encounter are of it and not of some other story.”335 Or, as Hajer argued, the power lies in 
creating the very terms with which politics is conducted.336 In other words, however much 
discontent with the civil society assistance discourse is expressed on different planes of 
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335 Michael Schudson, "How Culture Works: Perspectives from Media Studies on the Efficacy of Symbols," 
Theory and Society 18, no. 2 (1989): p.157. 
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interaction, the interactions in different localities are defined and structured by its main 
discursive centers rather than by some other notions and meanings. Whether or not the 
openings and alternative meanings add up to overthrow the dominant discourse or to render it 
meaningless has to be investigated for each particular instance.  
 
3.3. Conclusion  
 
The dialogical discourse analysis discussed in this chapter is particularly useful for 
understanding how assistance is constituted by interactive processes of meaning-making. 
Given the overall agreement among scholars and practitioners alike that foreign assistance 
matters for the development of civil society, it is important to ask how exactly foreign 
assistance is made to matter. It is important to reveal the mechanisms that enable different 
actors to render civil society assistance meaningful. In the following chapters I reveal 
discursive mechanisms that ensure the stability of civil society assistance discourse despite 
many criticisms that are not only widely recognized in the academic literature but, by now, 
have also been internalized by the donor itself. Drawing on ideas of the situated and dialogical 
nature of the discourse, I identify three core sites in which civil society assistance discourse is 
enacted – Washington DC, Kiev, and local NGOs. The structure of the remaining four 
chapters of this dissertation follows the logic of this division into sites. Chapters four to six 
correspond to the study of the civil society assistance discourse within each of the three sites. 
Chapter seven is dedicated to exploring the connections between the three sites by comparing 
their core elements as well as transformations in meaning across them. 
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Chapter 4: Washington DC. The Origins of Assistance 
 
The assistance discourse originates in the governmental departments and federal agencies 
based in Washington DC. In this chapter, by focusing on assistance programs by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID), I investigate the development of the 
core discursive centers that sustain this discourse. I show that the discourse of “assistance” is 
relatively new but highly prominent in US foreign policy. Its emergence was characterized by 
the sense of urgency and uniqueness felt at the end of the Cold War. In fact, “novelty” and 
“uniqueness” became the founding features that defined the nature of “assistance” discourse. 
The emergence and development of “assistance” discourse was constitutive of political and 
institutional change in the US foreign policy.  
The overall coordination of the U.S. assistance is placed within the U.S. Department 
of State. More than a half of US government funds are administered by USAID, including 
almost all funds allocated for the support to civil society and democratic reform. USAID is an 
independent federal government agency that receives overall foreign policy guidance from the 
Secretary of State. USAID’s history is said to date back to the Marshall Plan and the Truman 
Administration’s Point Four Program. The actual institution was founded in 1961 with 
President John F. Kennedy signing the Foreign Assistance Act. USAID became the first U.S. 
foreign assistance organization whose primary emphasis was on long-range economic and 
social development assistance efforts. The involvement of USAID in Ukraine and other 
former Soviet republics started after the official demise of the USSR in 1991, whereas its 
operations in the other “satellite” countries were launched in 1989.  
After the end of the Cold War adjustments were made at the federal agencies and new 
units were created. In 1991 a New Independent States (NIS)337 Task Force was established 
that comprised just six people. These were mainly development professionals with much 
experience in many other parts of the world but not in the former Soviet Union. In 1993 the 
Bureau for Europe and New Independent States (ENI) was formed that combined the 
Eastern Europe Task Force and the NIS Task Force. At the same time USAID was 
intensively seeking contacts with people who had knowledge of Russia and Ukraine either 
through previous contacts or as academics specializing in Russian studies. There were a 
number of universities that had had linkages to Ukraine during the Soviet times. There were 
also a few Ukrainian Americans who were willing to renew linkages with Ukraine or even go 
there to work. As a result, what is now called the Europe and Eurasia Bureau was formed by 
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both “insiders” and “outsiders” to the existing “aid” machinery. Thus, a new concept changed 
the average profile of the professionals working with it.   
 The need for Russia and Ukraine specialists resulted in a staff that was much more 
mixed than in other bureaus in terms of professional backgrounds. Many of the people who 
came from the diaspora had a stronger commitment towards Ukraine than is usually the case 
with the so-called “development professionals” who specialize in a certain theme or area 
rather than a country. The new bureau was also in many ways disconnected from the other 
regional bureaus within USAID. In the words of a USAID official: “nobody quite knew what 
they were doing there in that bureau but it was said to be different from everything else.” The 
concept of “assistance” created a new bureau different from other ones and a new cadre of 
USAID officers; at the same time it enabled the reconciliation of these new discursive and 
institutional structures with the existing ones.  
 According to the Bakhtinian framework of dialogical discourse analysis, this site of 
interaction is the point of origin of the “unitary language” of “assistance”. I first explore the 
core ideas that define this discourse and justify its emergence and development. I further 
focus on the specific element of “assistance” at stake in this analysis – support to civil society. 
In fact, civil society itself is a category whose entry into the discursive field of US foreign 
policy was enabled by the “assistance” discourse. Despite its apparent (and expected) uniform 
and authoritarian nature, the civil society assistance discourse is sustained by several seemingly 
different discursive centers, such as “institutional capacity building”, “empowerment”, and 
“sustainability/ phase out”. This internal diversity is important because it ensures a certain 
degree of flexibility and adaptability of the assistance discourse to both external and internal 
political change. I further focus on gender and women’s issues within the larger civil society 
assistance discourse and discuss how a particular definition of these issues transforms the idea 
of women’s “empowerment”.  
 
4.1. Assistance: The Rise of The “Unitary Language” 
 
The founding principles of the assistance discourse are its emphasis on novelty and difference 
and the ideas of urgency and political significance. From the very beginning around 1989-1992 
“assistance” was defined not in terms of what it has to do but in terms of what it should not be 
– it should not be the same as development “aid”. It was argued that the new political context 
required new approaches, and so it was a widely shared belief that going into the countries of 
the former Soviet Block would require a new discourse that would define a new set of tools 
and mechanisms. The whole concept of providing financial and technical aid or support had 
to change. In our interview Deputy Assistance Administrator at USAID Barbara Turner 
explicitly referred to this process:  
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Russia338 was a great power and it remained great in many areas and they were 
still orbiting satellites around the world, the scientists were still producing high 
quality pharmaceuticals; we were very sensitive to the concern of the country 
that did not want to be seen as the ones on welfare; they did not want to be 
seen as poor African countries, they felt they were beyond that […]. So we 
started from the beginning trying to talk about it more as a partnership and more 
as assistance and a transition program rather than that they were developing 
countries […]. We did try to use very different terminology in those countries.339  
 
 Here the discourse of assistance is defined through such terms as “partnership”, 
implying that support is provided on an equal footing and does not resemble charity. The 
discursive center of “transition” is also important because it implies a clear goal and a well-
defined timeframe for change. It means that restructuring in the recipient countries as well as 
assistance itself are temporary and that the destination envisioned for each country is clear and 
self-evident. In other words, “transition” is not about what should happen in those countries 
but about how quickly it can happen.  
In many areas the countries of the former Soviet Union had a potential comparable to 
if not exceeding that of the US, especially in the area of military, nuclear and space 
technologies. They also had a well-developed and heavily subsidized welfare system, literacy 
rates of almost a hundred percent, and high levels of higher education. At the same time, the 
collapse of the whole system and the political and economic instability that followed 
threatened rapid degeneration and abuse of powers and resources. Thus, the general feeling in 
Washington DC was that the US had to intervene and intervene fast in order to exert 
influence over the direction of change in these countries. The collapse of the USSR was said 
to present: “an historic opportunity for a transition to a peaceful and stable international order and the 
integration of the independent states of the former Soviet Union into the community of 
democratic nations.” It was asserted that the “world/ international community has a vital 
interest in the success of this transition [and that it is] imperative for donor countries and 
institutions to provide the expertise and support necessary to ensure continued progress on 
economic and political reforms.”340  
There was an agreement that the collapse of the Soviet Union was an event of 
unprecedented magnitude and that maintaining the newly emerging international order 
depended on steering the “transition” of the countries of the former Soviet Union in the right 
direction; hence the emphasis on democracy, open markets, and political reforms. Assistance 
was about providing expertise and advice on how these goals could be attained more quickly. 
The United States government set forth two main reasons for its “assistance” to the former 
Soviet Union (fSU): it was economically beneficial and it was key to ensuring American 
national security. Both notions remain the cornerstones of the US foreign policy towards the 
fSU until today. They were clearly outlined in the FREEDOM Support Act:  
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The United States is especially well-positioned because of its heritage and 
traditions to make a substantial contribution to this transition; […] failure to 
meet the opportunities presented by these developments could threaten United 
States national security interests and jeopardize substantial savings in United States 
defense that these developments have made possible; the independent states of 
the former Soviet Union face unprecedented environmental problems that 
jeopardize the quality of life and the very existence of not only their own 
peoples but also the peoples of other countries; trade and investment 
opportunities […] will generate employment and other economic benefits for 
the United States as the economies of the independent states of the former 
Soviet Union begin to realize their enormous potential as both customers and 
suppliers.341 
 
The urgency and enthusiasm of the “assistance” discourse created the space for 
unprecedented proactive measures and unusually high spending. The first appropriations 
under the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) came to USD 742 and 1,760 million for fiscal years 
1993 and 1994, respectively.342 According to the cumulative figures for the fiscal years 1992 – 
2003 released by the US Department of State, the US government spent a total of about 
twenty billion dollars on assistance programs to the twelve countries of the former Soviet 
Union,343 out of which more than three billion ($ 3.328 million) were spent in Ukraine in 
support of economic restructuring, democratization, and reforms in the health and social 
sectors. USAID was responsible for expending roughly half of these funds.  
This was the largest US assistance effort at the time. However, as the US Congress was 
passing these budgets, USAID officers were busy figuring out how to spend the money in a 
way that would reflect the new ideas and imperatives. In other words, the new discourse about 
a “new” and “different” assistance had to be further substantiated with new notions and ideas 
about how assistance should take place. Moreover, these new notions had to be developed 
within the shortest possible time-frame. In the words of Donald Pressley, Assistant 
Administrator of the USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia: “Central and Eastern Europe 
and the republics of the former Soviet Union were a new frontier for USAID in 1989. As a 
result, USAID had to try new approaches, move quickly, and constantly adjust to changing 
circumstances.”344 Assistance became a powerful discourse, the actual content of which, 
however, had yet to be defined. According to a more passionate account of another former 
USAID official:  
 
The original program itself was literally written on the back of a napkin. That’s 
not an exaggeration! USAID put together a blueprint of what it needed to do, 
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344 Pressley, Donald L. "Preface." In A Decade of Change: Profiles of USAID Assistance to Europe and Eurasia, edited 
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it sent it to Congress, Congress immediately allocated [funds]. Now just step 
back and think that you were spending something like a billion dollars on the 
part of the world you knew nothing about, you had no idea what to spend it 
on and you must spend it, you get told by Congress: get it out, just shove it out 
of the door.345  
 
The political imperatives of delivering assistance were apparent much before an 
understanding of what kind of assistance was needed could develop. While it was politically 
important to stress the different nature of “assistance” as compared to “aid”, it took longer to 
establish the actual content that had to match the promise of “assistance”. Although it was 
established that the former Soviet Union had to be treated differently, the question of how 
differently remained open to a plentitude of programmatic and institutional responses. 
However, the urgency and strong emphasis on “novelty” of assistance also played an 
important constitutive role in the overall nature and direction of these discursive and 
institutional responses. In answering the “how” question, priority was given to solutions that 
took the least preparation and promised to yield tangible results the fastest. Such solutions 
turned out to be mostly of a technical nature and were designed with very little attention to 
the possible specificity of the new assistance countries.  
The “new” recipients of assistance were not defined in terms of their specificity but in 
terms of their uniformity in the face of “assistance, as exemplified in the notion of a new 
“region” to be assisted. In 1989 the U.S. Congress passed the “Support for East European 
Democracy (SEED) Act” to  
 
promote political democracy and economic pluralism in Poland and Hungary 
by assisting those nations during a critical period of transition and abetting the 
development in those nations of private business sectors, labor market 
reforms, and democratic institutions; to establish, through these steps, the 
framework for a composite program of support for East European 
democracy.346 
 
This Act became the founding document that created the new “region” of the co-called 
SEED countries, which were to become the first recipients of “assistance”. The same Act was 
used to extend assistance to other countries in Eastern Europe and three former Baltic 
republics of the USSR. In 1992 another Act was passed - the Freedom for Russia and the 
Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) Support Act (FSA) to 
“support freedom and open markets in the independent states of the former Soviet Union”. 
The overall coordination of the U.S. assistance was placed within the U.S. Department of 
State. More than half of US government funds for assistance purposes were (and still are) 
administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including 
almost all funds dedicated to support for civil society and democratic reform. 
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In its programs in the region USAID always showed special attention to Ukraine, a 
preference which was primarily driven by security and geopolitical concerns, such as Ukraine’s 
strategic position between Russia and Europe and its nuclear arsenal. When the Soviet Union 
broke up, Ukraine had on its territory the third largest strategic nuclear arsenal in the world – 
greater than those of the United Kingdom, France, and China combined. More recently (with 
all the nuclear warheads dismantled back in 1996) the US strategic interest in Ukraine is 
explained as follows: 
 
The United States has a strong national security interest in Ukraine’s successful 
transition to a stable and independent, democratic, market-oriented, and 
prosperous state, with good relations with its neighbors and strong links to the 
West. Its successful transition may assist similar transitions elsewhere in the region. With a 
population of approximately 50 million and a strategic location between Russia 
and Central Europe, Ukraine is important for building a secure and undivided 
Europe.347 
 
Strong US interest in the political and economic situation in Ukraine has also been 
evident before and during the presidential election in Ukraine in 2004, with high-level officials 
stating that the US wants to see “open, free, full and fair elections”, which will determine the 
democratic credentials of Ukraine’s next president.348 On many occasions the election was 
described as an opportunity to accelerate development and integration with European and 
Euro-Atlantic institutions, and great concern was voiced about the campaign and the election 
rounds falling short of international standards.349  
Altogether assistance discursively created a new political geography. Although the 
division into the so-called First, Second, and Third World countries did not disappear 
completely, a new “region” of assistance emerged as well as a new idea of the world in general. 
Initially, the discursive center of the new “region” was replicating the old Cold War divide; it 
included all the countries of the former Soviet Block (both satellite countries and the former 
Soviet republics). This was reflected not only in the merger of the SEED and FSA task forces 
that I mentioned earlier but also in the programming practices used. In the early 1990s 
appropriations were allocated for the “region” as a whole and the programming was done 
centrally for all the countries at once. In other words, there were no country-specific programs 
or funds. Also, some of the programs that were under way in Poland or Hungary before 1993 
were duplicated in the other countries that “joined the region”. Eleven thematic projects were 
authorized by the USAID that were seen as appropriate for all these countries and were 
implemented across the board.  
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The projects listed in a USAID Fact Sheet dated June 1993 are, for example, energy 
efficiency and market reform, environmental policy and technology, health care improvement, 
private sector initiatives, food systems restructuring, democratic pluralism initiatives, housing 
sector reform, economic restructuring and financial reform, foundation for technical 
assistance (the Eurasia Foundation), NIS exchanges and training, and special initiatives that 
comprised quick response/cross-sectoral activities, emergency humanitarian assistance and 
pilot programs/innovative approaches. The latter category was introduced to ensure some 
flexibility in funds allocations beyond the other designated fields. The list of initiatives seemed 
diverse enough to include a variety of activities across countries and worded in general enough 
terms so that the actual implementation could take a variety of forms largely depending on the 
subcontractors who won the contracts. Such “emptiness” of assistance should be understood 
as a response to its “urgency”.  
Currently, the discursive center of a “region” is increasingly being transformed. 
Different countries that once belonged to the “region” are now placed under different 
headings. Many of the SEED countries are EU members now and so do not receive any 
assistance – they belong to the category of the “countries that graduated from assistance”. The 
SEED funding has subsequently dropped and goes mainly to the Balkans today. After the 
events of 2001 and the two wars that followed, US foreign policy is increasingly preoccupied 
with a new “region” – that of the Middle East. As the political geography is being 
reconfigured, Central Asian countries and countries in the Caucasus are more and more 
considered in the context of their proximity to this strategic “region”, rather than in the 
context of their post-communist heritage. The discursive center of the “region” of assistance 
that emerged in the early 1990s is thus currently being reconfigured.  
In 2001 an attempt was made to reflect some of these changes in the administrative 
set-up of the State Department and USAID. As an official from the US Department of State 
Office of the Coordinator for US Assistance to Europe and Eurasia explained:  
 
New Independent States weren’t new any more, and it was decided that they 
shouldn’t necessarily be treated as one unit together. They are different 
countries now. At one point there was talk of putting the Central Asian 
countries with other parts covering Asia. That didn’t happen so we have got 
this enormous Europe and Eurasia office that goes from Dublin to Dushanbe; 
it’s 55 countries now, it’s the largest bureau with over 500 people working.350  
 
Although the Europe and Eurasia Bureaus still remain intact, it is likely that some of the 
countries involved will be re-clustered in the near future.  
Another tendency that points to the dissolution of the “region” within the “assistance” 
discourse is the shift that is occurring from thinking in terms of geographical clusters to 
thinking in terms of “performance indicators”. Assistance programs are now evaluated 
according to a variety of sectors, and each country’s performance is measured per sector. 
                                                 
350 Eisen, August 5, 2004, interview by the author. 
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Thus, “assistance” is now increasingly redefined through such notions as “evaluation” and 
“performance”.  This is in stark contrast to the “assistance” discourse as it developed through 
the 1990s. Due to the strong imperatives to set up the operations quickly there were no 
assessments conducted in those countries then, with the exception of short “field reports”. 
Towards the late 1990s assessments in certain areas were introduced; however, until the 
present day there are hardly any evaluations available on programs implemented. The 
difference between an assessment and an evaluation is that the former is conducted to assess 
the need for a new program and recommend the best tools, while the latter evaluates the 
results of the programs that are being/were implemented. While there have been a few 
assessments conducted on the basis of which new programs were introduced, there are 
virtually no evaluations of the successes and failures of previous programs.   
This is currently changing with the recently launched agency-wide “Initiative to 
Revitalize Evaluations” led by USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios. His four-part campaign 
aims to improve the way evaluations are conducted and used, as well as to increase the 
number of evaluations conducted by missions. Drawing on a recent study termed an 
“Evaluation of USAID Evaluation Experience”, the agency now argues that the number of 
evaluations conducted dropped throughout the 1990s and that an increase would help 
“improve USAID’s design of programs and policies, by doing a better job of capturing and 
learning from experience.”351 In the area of democracy assistance, some of the key indexes and 
measurements come from such annual publications as Nations in Transit by Freedom House 
and the “NGO Sustainability Index” by USAID. The general idea is that program design and 
planning would be increasingly driven by performance evaluations per sector and per country 
and, thus, assistance could be downsized in some thematic areas while being maintained in the 
others. This turn within the assistance discourse makes it possible to give up the notion of a 
post-Soviet “region” generally in need of assistance, while at the same time maintaining a 
number of assistance activities in the respective countries. Interestingly, in this new sector-
based rather than region/ country-based approach civil society retains a prominent position 
and the funding for and through NGOs is unlikely to decrease in the near future.352  
The proportion of democracy programs within the FREEDOM Support Act (FSA) 
budget for Ukraine increased (even though the overall FSA budget for Ukraine dropped) in 
the period 2002-2004. Democracy assistance has gone from one-fifth of the FSA budget for 
Ukraine to nearly one-third. In the words of Steven Pifer, Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
European and Eurasian Affairs: “We have kept our investment in promoting democracy and 
civil society a strong one. […] We believe that this type of support reinforces what is already a 
very encouraging trend in post-independence Ukraine: namely, the growth of civil society.”353 In 
                                                 
351 Evaluation of USAID Evaluation Experience USAID, 2005 [cited 11 August 2005. Available from 
http://www.dec.org/partners/evalweb/. 
352 Fox, August 9, 2004, interview by author. 
353 Pifer, Steven. "Testimony before the House International Relations Committee." Washington, DC: US State 
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the following section I show how exactly a particular conception of civil society has been 
developed within the assistance discourse.  
 
4.2. Civil Society in Three Steps: The “Industry” at Work 
 
The concept of civil society has been and remains a very important component of the 
assistance discourse. Already in the first year of assistance, the US government introduced the 
“democratic pluralism initiative” aimed at facilitating democratization in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union. It comprised four core components: political and civic organizations, 
the independent media, the rule of law and governance, and public administration. It might be 
said to have reinforced an idealist position in American foreign policy, namely the belief that 
the spread of democracy will lead to greater stability and prosperity in the world. As stated in 
one of the USAID documents: 
 
Democratic governments are more likely to advocate and observe international 
laws and to experience the kind of long-term stability, which leads to sustained 
development, economic growth, and international trade. Countries that are 
experiencing economic growth and are actively engaged in trading 
relationships are less likely to engage in acts of war.354 
 
The idea to focus on the promotion of democracy was supported by a range of 
institutional measures. This meant that the newly emerging discourse on democracy and civil 
society materialized in the form of particular resources, positions, and administrative 
structures. The Center for Democracy and Governance was founded in 1994; in addition, each 
of the regional bureaus received their own democracy and civil society advisors. The Center’s 
role is to provide technical and intellectual leadership to USAID’s decentralized mission-based 
structure by developing tools and methodologies needed to support democratic 
development.355 The Center does not have planning or budgetary authority; it is a purely 
advisory unit. In principle, the Center’s task is to facilitate the democracy and civil society 
building effort across the different regional bureaus; however, it is up to the regional bureaus 
and field missions to choose to work together with the Center. Therefore, the existence the 
Center should not be mistaken for a sign of coherence of USAID’s overall worldwide 
democracy and civil society support.  
In fact, the ideas at the core of civil society support in the former Soviet Union were 
very different from those that were the basis for civil society programs in other regions. The 
conception of civil society within the post-communist assistance discourse was framed in 
much broader and vaguer terms as a response to the “empty” nature of the assistance 
discourse itself. This made this civil society assistance discourse different from other civil 
                                                 
354 USAID. "Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework." 24: Center for Democracy and 
Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and Research, November 1998, p.1. 
355 Ibid, p.5. 
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society programs implemented overseas. In the words of Gary Hansen, Chief of the USAID 
Civil Society Division:  
 
Most of our programs overseas are not designed to build civil societies writ 
large, we’re interested in civil society organizations that are advocating on the 
behalf of good governance and political reform and so forth […]; in this office 
we are not interested in a lot of organizations they were supporting in the 
Europe and Eurasia Bureau.356 
 
However, as I show below, the proclaimed difference between civil society assistance to the 
“region” and to other parts of the world depends exactly on its vagueness rather than on a 
substantively different conception of civil society.  
4.2.1. Institutional capacity building: “Let a thousand flowers bloom” 
 
“Institutional capacity building” is a discursive center that defines civil society in terms of 
formal organizational features and technical tools. It served as a link between “aid” and 
“assistance” and allowed the USAID staff to bring the models and tools of “development aid” 
into the new “assistance” programs. The below quote from an interview shows clearly how 
this link was created:  
 
I think that what we found in Ukraine was that it didn’t need the same kind of 
things Africa needed; for instance, in Africa it was basic education, immunizing 
children and things like that. […] What was missing was something we always 
had as our high priority, which we call institutional development […]. We found 
that while the actual types of things we did in Ukraine were different, the 
institutional capacity still needed to be developed. [People] were good technicians 
but they weren’t good managers, had no inventory or budgeting capacity. So 
we found those sorts of skills were actually quite valuable.357 
 
In this way a connection was established between “aid” and “assistance”: While the 
content was admitted to be different, the old tools and skills were argued to be applicable to 
the “assistance” setting. This opened the door for some programs and models developed for 
other parts of the world. Another important component of assistance that is evident from the 
above quote is “assistance as teaching”. The assistance recipients were seen as “good 
students” who had taken the wrong classes, and in this way one of the goals of assistance was 
defined: to teach new skills and to provide the locals with new information.  
 “Institutional capacity building” found wide application in the civil society assistance. 
It aimed at providing tools and trainings that would make NGOs resemble their American 
counterparts in terms of their formal structure. Following the “institutional capacity building” 
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 111 
idea USAID established a New Partnerships Initiative (NPI) in 1995 “to stimulate lasting 
economic, social, and political developments by building local institutional capacity in non-
governmental organizations, competitive small business, and democratic local governments.” 
The “NGO Strengthening” or “NGO Empowerment” component was meant to promote 
“the active participation of citizens in political and economic decision-making through training 
and small grants.”358 “Increased capacity” meant that NGOs would become more professional 
and show the formal organizational features characteristic of their American counterparts. 
NPI was meant to “strengthen the direct contribution of local organizations to development, 
and […] help increase their professionalism, efficiency, accountability, and transparency.”359  
The initial understanding of civil society by the Agency was that at the time when the 
assistance programs began civil society in Eastern Europe was 
 
either nascent or nonexistent in most countries in the region [because] most 
populations lacked the basic rights of a democratic civil society: freedom of 
expression, the right to organize, to advocate one’s interests, to form 
independent political parties, to hold free and fair elections.360 
 
Indeed, USAID officers were not finding the same kinds of local partners in the fSU as they 
were used to finding elsewhere. Some of the core categories, such as service delivery NGOs, 
think tanks, advocacy NGOs, grass-roots groups etc., either did not have any real world 
equivalents here at all or were only applicable to the old institutionally strong Soviet 
associations. Thus, in the beginning most of the effort was invested into helping create these 
kinds of organizations. 
Since there were no organizations in place whose capacity could be built up according 
to the USAID scheme, the discursive center of “institutional capacity building” initially had a 
component that was captured by a metaphor: “let a thousand flowers bloom!” Apparently, 
nobody at USAID was aware of the origins of the slogan in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, 
and so it was embraced as an appropriate metaphor for the newly acquired democratic 
freedoms and democratic pluralism in the fSU.361 This approach was new to the USAID, in 
the words of Gary Hansen, the Chief of Civil Society Division at USAID:  
                                                 
358 USAID/West NIS. "Ukraine: Results Review and Resource Request (R4)." June 3, 1996. 
359 USAID. "Core Report of the New Partnerships Initiative (Internal Draft)." Washington, DC: USAID, July 21, 
1995. 
360 USAID. "Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story. Building Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe 
and the New Independent States." USAID Bureau for Eastern Europe and Eurasia. Office of Democracy and 
Governance, October 1999, v. 
361 The phrase comes from a speech delivered by Chairman Mao Zedong shortly before China’s Cultural 
Revolution.  In the original, “let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend” was 
proclaimed to encourage freedom of expression, debate, and independent thinking, and gave rise to the Hundred 
Flowers movement of 1956-57. However, shortly afterwards it was twisted to mean that upper-class artists, 
writers, and scientists should have no greater claim than their proletarian counterparts. In fact, it was said, the 
upper classes had been monopolizing the cultural and scientific spheres for too long. Politically, this translated 
into the Communist Party of China demarcating a clear line between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. 
As Lu Ting-Yi, the director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, announced: “No freedom should be extended to counter-revolutionaries: for them we only have a 
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The Europe and Eurasia Bureau (E&E) was very different in respect to civil 
society from the other regional bureaus; it defined civil society very broadly. 
When the transition began the E&E said “our role is to build any kind of 
associations that are there to appear.” […] The culture of association as an 
independent initiative had been pretty much crushed by the communist 
government so the idea was to give people incentives to start working 
together, organizing themselves one way or the other.362  
 
The “thousand flowers” approach was implemented through “small grants” programs 
that were aimed at supporting as many different initiatives as possible. USAID was not 
investing in long-term relationships but in engaging as many different organizations as 
possible. “USAID’s goal is to create a large, diverse community of local NGOs capable of 
promoting sustainable development. […] NGOs are everywhere a potentially critical vehicle 
for articulating collective interests and for ensuring citizen participation in the development 
process.”363 
The “thousand flowers” approach meant that funds were spent to ensure there were 
NGO-like initiatives in place as soon as possible. In this way, the approach was by definition 
supply-driven, meaning that USAID was supplying funds for particular kinds of flowers to 
bloom. Questions of how to create NGOs relevant to the Ukrainian context were never 
raised. While high levels of technical assistance were put into providing tools and skills, the 
issue of who exactly would be using those, and for what purposes, was never addressed. So, 
thousands of Ukrainian activists were taught NGO management skills at rates that were higher 
than the numbers of NGOs to be managed. There was a strong belief that civil society 
assistance should be about putting in place a critical number of “properly” managed NGOs. 
However, the question was never raised whether such organizations would be able to function 
in the Ukrainian context and to meet the needs of the Ukrainian civil society. In fact, the 
connection between the growth of professional NGOs and the institutionalization of a strong 
civil society was never investigated either. After several years of civil society assistance, 
USAID could report the former but not the latter as an achievement. Moreover, it had to face 
a range of criticisms that I discussed in chapters one and two, such as for example, corrupt or 
nepotistic practices among NGOs that received assistance.  
In response, by the end of the 1990s USAID had to admit that institutionalizing a 
strong civil society in countries like Ukraine would take longer than was initially expected. On 
the one hand, the explosive growth of NGOs was seen as a positive indicator attributed to the 
success of assistance: “USAID and other donor assistance has helped fuel the explosive 
growth of NGO sectors in these countries.”364 On the other hand, the agency attributed the 
                                                                                                                                                    
dictatorship. A clear political line must be drawn between friend and foe.” (Lu Ting-Yi, May 26 1956) Within 
months, the same slogan was used to justify persecution and purges of political opponents. 
362 Hansen, 5 August 2004, interview by the author. 
363 USAID. "Core Report of the New Partnerships Initiative”. 
364 USAID. "Lessons in Implementation”, p.xi. 
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apparent problems (such as lack of financial viability, poor organizational management, lack of 
public awareness of NGO activities, failure to effectively serve or represent constituencies and 
clients, etc.) to the nature of the transformation process itself and not to assistance. It argued 
that the rapid NGO growth was triggered by greater freedom of association, heightened 
awareness of global issues, and “vigorous response to the opportunities and responsibilities 
that accompany democracy.”365 The donors were positioned not as another influential factor 
for the growth and its shortcomings but as yet another party overwhelmed by rapid change, 
almost as a victim. It was the accelerated change that was said to have challenged donors’ 
capacity to be phased and strategic in their programs and not the problematic design and 
shortsightedness of those programs. Here, again the thousand flowers metaphor came in to 
stress that such flowers do and should grow on their own.  
 
For donors, the pace of growth has made it difficult to keep abreast of 
developments in the sector and to know whether they are working with organizations 
with a viable, authentic constituency. […] In general, accelerated change – coupled 
with the desire to exert an early positive impact – has challenged donors’ 
capacity to be phased and strategic in their program design; instead, donors 
have tended to concentrate on the merits of individual projects and the 
strength of individual organizations.366 
 
Interestingly, the “thousand flowers” metaphor meant that there were no clearly defined 
eligibility criteria for the NGO projects - an organization only had to have some formal 
features of an NGO, and so the notions of “viable, authentic constituency” were never part of 
the civil society assistance discourse to begin with. 
 I argue that the “thousand flowers” metaphor did not mean more openness and 
pluralism. Ironically, its meaning and function within USAID was not so different from its 
original one in the history of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. The “thousand flowers” 
metaphor was employed to engage with local civic actors prior to clarifying the terms of such 
engagement in order to recruit civic leaders and introduce them to different socialization 
programs. However, it did not presuppose either space for actually learning from those civic 
leaders or mechanisms for including this local knowledge into the civil society assistance 
principles and programs.  
The longer presence of “assistance” in Ukraine – even if initially unexpected – 
necessitated the extension of the civil society assistance discourse. In other words, the 
discourse had to account for more than just a temporary technical intervention. It had to 
respond to the developments that were taking place in Ukraine, to address difficulties or even 
failures that were becoming apparent, and to deliver its longer-term vision for the future. In 
the next subsection I show how this has been made possible through the rise of the discursive 
center of “empowerment”.  
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4.2.2. Empowerment: Getting the “mentality” right 
 
Even though the assistance discourse never considered local ideas about and forms of civil 
society, it developed discursive mechanisms to adapt to the local environment. Throughout its 
assistance “career” in Ukraine, the US government constantly had to respond to the harsh 
social and economic realities and political tensions that resulted from the collapse of the 
previous socialist system. In 1996 USAID was saying that since 1994  
 
there has been considerable progress mixed with significant setbacks. While 
President Kuchma’s commitment to the reform program appears firm, support 
within the ranks of government has been uneven. The Parliament especially 
has often proved an obstacle to reform […]; as long as the quality of life 
continues to deteriorate for Ukrainian citizens, maintaining political and 
popular will to see the reform process through will be a constant challenge.367 
 
Uneven local responses to reform and deteriorating conditions were putting the US supported 
reform process in danger. In addition, there was always the fear that Russian influence would 
be resumed. USAID was worried about such tendencies as the “renewed Russian dominance, 
compounded by the resurgence of Russian Communism, and the popularity of the 
Communist Party candidate in the 1996 Russian presidential election.”368 Here another 
concern comes out clearly – to make sure that hardships in Ukraine would not lead to Ukraine 
“falling back” into the sphere of Russian influence.  
By the late 1990s the situation in Ukraine was not improving as expected. The years of 
1998-1999 were marked by important political and economic events. The shortcomings of the 
reform process were exacerbated by the Asian financial crisis of 1998, which had a grave 
impact on both Russia and Ukraine. There was also an apparent rise in support for left-wing 
parties and movements in Ukraine. In the parliamentary election of 1998 the Communist 
Party of Ukraine was far ahead of the other parties, taking about 25% of the votes; the other 
two left-wing parties, the Block of the Socialist Party of Ukraine and the Agrarian Party of 
Ukraine and the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, gained 8.5% and 4% of the votes 
respectively.369 These developments led to the adoption of another important discursive center 
- “empowerment”. The “empowerment” concept entails three related notions: social 
transition issues, awareness-raising and information distribution, and mentality change. 
Assistance not only had a prescriptive claim on what kinds of institutions had to be built but 
was also developing a set of responses to the political, social, and economic challenges in 
Ukraine.  
The focus on “social transition issues” was meant to ensure that the critical mass of 
the Ukrainian population would stay “with their heads above water”, so that poverty and 
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disillusionment would not ignite conflicts or a national crisis. These concerns were voiced 
from early on: “Popular support for reform will evaporate unless social benefits and services 
are maintained […], if affordable methods are not developed to shelter the poor from rapid 
price increases, falling incomes, and the deterioration of basic public services.”370 
In 1999 again an increasing emphasis was placed on “social transition issues”; ten years 
of economic and political restructuring had led to “greater poverty and hardship than 
anticipated at the beginning of the transition.”371 Fearing that hardship and the disillusionment 
with reforms would increase the popularity of left-wing parties,372 USAID decided to pay 
greater attention to improving the quality of life in Ukraine to mitigate any backlash against 
the reform process. The worry was that the population was growing cynical about the reform 
process and apathetic toward participation in citizens’ groups in Ukraine.373  So it was argued 
that “USAID has a role to play in bringing the benefits of systemic change to a broader 
population.”374 
The agency believed this could be achieved through empowering populations and 
increasing economic opportunity at the provincial and local levels. Activities at the local level 
were defined as key for assuring the actual implementation of the nationally adopted reforms. 
“Successful transition requires public confidence and acceptance of new ways of operating.”375 
Reaching out to a broader constituency at the grassroots and regional levels was seen as 
necessary for building an understanding of and a demand for reform and developing a cadre 
of local leaders for change. Thus, in addition to improving social conditions there was a 
perceived need for changing people’s attitudes towards reform or, in broader terms, their 
“mentality”.  
People in Ukraine were believed not to be aware of “the universe of possibilities” for 
improvement that existed. “They cannot articulate the changes they want, therefore their 
advocacy policies are ineffective.”376 Thus, it was seen as imperative to invest in information 
campaigns that would explain and popularize the reforms. One of the most expensive civil 
society projects in Ukraine was UMREP – the Ukraine Market Reform Education Program 
established in 1993 as a joint project of the governments of Ukraine and the US through 
USAID. Its rationale was that:  
 
Increased, better-informed citizens’ participation in political and economic 
decision-making is essential to the development of a viable democracy in 
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Ukraine. USAID’s independent media program is enabling Ukrainian citizens 
to become better informed about current events in general, including issues 
related to economic reform.377 
 
In addition to informing people about the substance of and the need for the US-
supported reforms in Ukraine, this objective also contained a stronger educational claim. It 
aspired to change what was believed to be the wrong mentality inherited by the Ukrainians 
from their Soviet past. This is, for example, captured by the following quote: “Given the 
Ukrainian history of top down political and economic decision-making and service to the 
state, changing people’s expectations and behavior to accept that the state is responsive to 
influence by the people is a major transition.”378 
It is on the basis of these ideas that the discursive center of “empowerment” was 
defined. The key assumption of “empowerment” was the need to replace the wrong Soviet 
mentality with new liberal values and beliefs among the population. In addition to the task of 
“institutional capacity building”, the Agency was increasingly speaking of the need to change 
individual values, attitudes, and behaviors: “The importance of individual attitudes, practices 
and behaviors for successful transition had been underestimated.”379 In 2002 the Agency 
commissioned a multi-party investigation into USAID’s civic programming in order to 
understand how and under what conditions civic education contributes to the development of 
a more active and informed democratic citizenry and to explore perspectives of integrating 
civic education components into other assistance programs. The rationale for engaging with 
civic education was that “for a democracy to survive and flourish, a critical mass of its citizens 
must possess the skills, embody the values, and manifest the behaviors that accord with 
democracy.”380  
Individual participation was seen as essential for shaping and deepening the reform 
process. The goal for the assistance area “democratic transition” was to “foster democratic 
societies and institutions through the empowerment of citizens.”381 For purposes of 
“empowerment” civil society activity was broadly defined as participation in political and 
economic processes by well-informed and responsible citizens.382 Across the portfolio, the 
Agency placed an emphasis on public education, training and exchange programs as well as 
selective interventions for curriculum change in schools. In 1999 education was identified as a 
priority for the future. While the short-term objective remained to push for top-level 
structural reforms, the long-term goal was seen as “working to prepare the next generation or 
perhaps the generation after for coming to power.”383 
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The education approach worked in two ways: it aimed at promoting the so-called 
“demonstration effects”, on the one hand, and at bringing up a new “critically thinking” 
generation of Ukrainians, on the other. The former goal was highly reminiscent of the liberal 
idealist belief that all it takes is to expose peoples to liberal democratic values and they could 
not but embrace them eagerly. The educational efforts were related to the idea of a “wrong 
mentality” in the sense that much blame was directed towards the legacies of communism, 
which meant that older generations were almost perceived as hopeless for building a new 
democratic society.  
“Empowerment” was defined in terms of individual values and concerns, “[g]etting 
people to believe in themselves, to rely less on government to guide their daily lives, and to 
take control of their destiny through economic opportunities and political choices.”384 The 
extent to which “empowerment” colonized the civil society assistance discourse is striking. On 
the one hand, this being a question of survival in the first place, it is hard to believe that those 
people who had the resources (for example, material and physical resources and networks) and 
belonged to advantaged social and demographic groups at the beginning of transition would 
not have used the available opportunities to guide their daily lives. On the other hand, 
according to the Agency’s own analysis, the biggest “losers of transition”, such as children, 
ethnic and religious minorities, women-led households, female pensioners, etc., are the ones 
who more often oppose reform or show apathy. These groups are unlikely to benefit from 
“demonstration effects” unless provided with structural opportunities and financial means to 
improve their positions.  
4.2.3. Sustainability: Enabling the “phase out” 
 
Defining “assistance” in terms of facilitating “transition” on a short-term basis meant that 
there has always been a clear idea of a “phase out”. In terms of the time that was believed to 
be needed to achieve the assistance goals, in the early 1990s the Americans aimed at the 
shortest possible intervention not exceeding three to five years. From 1991 on, U.S. assistance 
programs: 
 
…operated on the premise that a small number of targeted interventions in 
economic policy reform, coupled with selective support for democracy 
building, would help move countries of Europe and Eurasia far enough along 
the transition path that they could enter normal economic and political relations 
with other countries and complete the journey on their own.385 
 
In 1994 a USAID administrator confirmed: “Our mandate is not a protracted program of 
economic support, but one that is strategically targeted to support a critical period of 
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economic and political transition and then phase out.”386 The discursive center of the “phase 
out” thus has been an important part of assistance from its very first day – even before any 
substantial assistance reached its recipients USAID had started talking about the “phase out” 
and, ironically, it continues to do so still. 
Now there seems to be a general consensus within USAID that the initial policy 
assumptions about the transition timeframe were not realistic. This view is also supported by 
Barbara Turner, the USAID Deputy Assistance Administrator:  
 
At that time [in the beginning of assistance] US government thought that we 
would have a short-term program in those countries; we were invited by the 
State Department to keep our projects to no more than three years because the 
feeling was that for Russia and Ukraine (and we always knew that Central Asia 
would be different) - those were pretty sophisticated countries, they had high 
levels of education, nuclear power, scientists, governments that knew how to 
function, so they would transform more quickly. Clearly we underestimated 
the complexity of shifting from communist centrally run society and economy 
to a pluralistic society and economy […] . So we had to do a lot more 
programs than we ever anticipated.387 
 
Already in 1999, much more circumspect judgments were put forward about the 
anticipated impact of assistance. Generally, USAID withdrew from claiming to know how to 
“do transition” and turned around to downplay the impact it could have on the country’s 
development:  
 
The euphoria that greeted independent Ukraine in 1991 has subsided. The G7 
countries anticipated a quick and thorough destruction of Ukraine’s Soviet 
past, but expectations were overly ambitious and greatly exceeded what could 
realistically be done. […] The donors have learned that the problems for 
countries in transition are unique and complex. Lack of political will does not 
fully account for lack of progress. Western experts hold neither precise nor 
clear remedies for Ukraine’s troubles.388  
 
However, updating the timeframe and toning down the ambitions of “assistance” did not lead 
to a dismissal of the notion of a “phase out”, which remains one of the core discursive 
centers.  
The main implication of the discursive center of the “phase out” is that it defines long-
term processes and goals in terms of short-term interventions. It therefore prevents the 
emergence of long-term commitments and of experimenting with various organizational 
forms and with different assistance partners. With the shadow of “phase out” looming above 
the heads of USAID officers from the very beginning of assistance, very little incentive was 
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created for investing time and effort into building up long-term relationships. Instead, 
preference was given to those partnerships that would enable spending money and getting 
reportable results on a yearly basis.  
The idea of a “phase out” was important for civil society programs also because it 
translated into an emphasis on the “sustainability” of NGOs. NGOs had to reach a certain 
degree of “sustainability” in a relatively short time by means of increasing their organizational 
effectiveness and professionalism. The standard of professionalism was set by the American 
NGOs implementing NGO programs in Ukraine. The idea was that the sooner Ukrainian 
NGOs resembled their American counterparts, the sooner NGO programs could be phased 
out and the activities that constituted them could be relegated to Ukrainian NGOs. This 
meant that the “sustainability” of Ukrainian NGOs was not defined in terms of their position 
in Ukrainian society in the after-funding phase but in terms of how instrumental they could 
become in facilitating the “phase out” of assistance. Professional and cost-effective NGOs 
were argued to accelerate the “graduation” from assistance.389 
 
USAID’s experience with small NGO grants and local development activities 
is that they are information and staff intensive. However, under NPI [New 
Partnership Initiative], most of these responsibilities will be transferred to 
USAID’s development partners by focusing on capacity building of local 
organizations early in the process and encouraging the development of 
intermediary organizations […]. USAID’s direct management role will be reduced, 
providing considerable cost savings.390 
 
Thus, the discursive center of sustainability also meant that local NGOs were expected 
to become capable of taking over some of the assistance activities implemented by USAID 
and its implementing partners, making assistance cheaper for USAID. This also led civil 
society assistance in Ukraine to become increasingly similar to such programs in other parts of 
the world. Over the past few years, there is no more talk of the “thousand flowers”; instead, 
the USAID and other democracy program implementers are increasingly concerned with 
promoting professional advocacy organizations.391  
A new Assistance Strategy for Ukraine for the fiscal years 2003-2007 was written up in 
a much more enthusiastic tone than the previous one due to the improved situation in the 
country in terms of impressive levels of economic growth and increased social and economic 
stability. The proposed activities were said to “fine-tune existing activities building on previous 
successes.”392 The period was framed as extending “beyond transition” and into sustainable 
economic growth. The Agency made a definite claim that the basic institutions needed were in 
place and therefore the assistance should focus on increasing their effectiveness and 
sustainability. In addition, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 changed the language in 
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which civil society is talked about today considerably. Civil society is now widely seen as 
already in place, as having revealed itself at a critical moment.  
 
While the governments can put in place laws to protect our most cherished 
institutions and freedoms, that in and of itself is not enough. There must be a 
civil society where democratic values live in citizens’ hearts and minds, where 
people stand up for what is right and where the rule of law, not the rule of 
crime and corruption, prevails. In recent weeks, Ukraine’s people have shown 
that they have been building a civil society.393 
 
For the fiscal year (FY) 2005394 the administration had initially requested less than 
eighty million dollars for Ukraine (compared to around USD 225 million per year in the late 
1990s); however, in February 2005 (just two months after the revolution) it doubled the 
budget request up to USD 165.5 million, including sixty million for democracy assistance to 
consolidate the achievements in the progress towards democracy. Once again, Ukraine 
became the largest recipient of American governmental assistance in the former Soviet Union. 
Despite the recent “phase out” measures and performance evaluations, civil society and 
democracy are among the sectors that are unlikely to see considerable funding drops in the 
near future. Indeed, as stated in the FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations:  
 
In FY [fiscal year] 2005, FSA assistance will be used to broaden Ukraine’s 
growing civil society, foster participatory democracy, and buttress the independent 
media. … The United States will therefore focus increased resources on 
strengthening local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and independent 
research institutions395 that serve as watchdogs over the government’s activities 
and articulate public interest. In addition, funding will continue for legal 
support and training for independent media. FSA funding will also continue to 
support the development of and access to the Internet throughout Ukraine 
and grassroots activism aimed at community empowerment.396 
 
After the 2004 presidential election, which is widely labeled the “victory of civil society and 
democratic forces in Ukraine”, it is also likely that democracy support will be increased in the 
countries whose democratic success is being questioned by the USA (e.g. Moldova or Central 
Asian countries). The events in Ukraine are believed to have a broader impact on the region in 
the sense that  
 
[they] will signal millions of people that democratic freedom is on the 
ascendance, this will help bolster pro-democracy NGOs, even as authoritarian 
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governments in Belarus, parts of Central Asia, and elsewhere in Eurasia 
advance crackdowns on pro-democracy civil society groups.397 
 
This changing understanding of the potential of civil society support was visible 
already in 2002, when support to civil society was defined as aiding a “citizenry increasingly 
engaged in promoting their interests and rights for a more democratic market-oriented state.” 
The ultimate goals were (1) to increase the extent to which citizens believe that they can 
influence the government and (2) to increase civic activism - the former reflecting the 
discursive center of “empowerment” and the latter that of “advocacy”.398  
“Advocacy” is a relatively new term for the USAID programs for Ukraine. Although 
advocacy techniques were mentioned before (more in passing than in a directive sense) in 
documents for Ukraine this is the first time that advocacy training is mentioned as a part of 
civil society assistance. According to USAID, “advocacy” is a method to demand transparency 
and accountability from the government by employing a range of professional tools, such as 
“information, coalition building, engaging the mass media, and lobbying.”399 The introduction 
of the notion of “advocacy” marked an almost total abandonment of the “thousand flowers” 
idea. Instead of supporting many different NGOs, the notion of “advocacy” privileged a few, 
well-developed, professional, and “institutionally capable” organizations with good track 
records. These were the kinds of organizations that would facilitate “sustainability” and 
“phase out”. The introduction of “advocacy” as well as the overall increase in the 
professionalization of civil society has made more recent civil society programs in Ukraine 
similar to those in other parts of the world.  
In general, the more recent trends in USAID assistance show that it moved from 
granting the region an unconditional importance to trying to integrate it with other activities 
of the Agency. Overall, the discursive centers of “institutional capacity building” and 
“sustainability” highlight the idea that, rather than building civil society per se, civil society 
assistance should be based on a few targeted interventions aimed at creating and developing 
organizational structures that are professional and effective enough to implement assistance 
project activities, especially after the “phase out”. The fact that the civil society assistance 
discourse draws on three different notions to sustain itself in effective ways shows that despite 
the seeming inflexibility and even arrogance of “assistance” it permits a considerable degree of 
adaptation and transformation. However, these adaptations are aimed at sustaining the core 
meaning of “assistance” rather than at questioning or substantially changing it.  
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4.3. Gender and Women’s Issues: How Are They Defined? 
4.3.1. Women as a target group: “Marginal and powerless” 
 
The Office of Women in Development (WID) was established in 1974 “to help ensure that 
women participate fully and benefit equally from the US development assistance programs.”400 
Similarly to other technical offices within USAID (e.g. the Center for Democracy and 
Governance) it is meant to be providing technical expertise on this particular (cross-cutting) 
issue to USAID bureaus and field missions and has no planning or budgetary authority. “WID 
is the focal point for technical expertise and leadership on gender issues, leading, advocating, 
and providing assistance in USAID as the Agency incorporates gender considerations into its 
programs.”401 As far as the “assistance” programs are concerned, the WID Office was never 
involved in their actual design or implementation. However, the “women in development” 
discourse played a role within USAID in terms of creating a space to raise “women’s” and 
later “gender” issues as one of the priority areas. The content of “women in development” 
issues is well established and institutionally accepted. Attempts to (re)define “women’s issues” 
in a particular context are often based on a dialogue with the “women in development” 
discourse, and some notions and tools are inevitably transferred from other contexts.  
In this dissertation I focus particularly on the discursive center “women as a target 
group” that sustains the discourse of “women in development”. It is based on two core ideas: 
first, women in their entirety form a group that shares certain characteristics and is overall 
underprivileged compared to men; and second, women as a group are particularly vulnerable 
and exposed to threats such as disease and criminal activity.  
The main effect of the discursive center “women as a target group” is to support the 
view that women belong to the underprivileged and marginalized and that instead of 
aggravating these inequalities development aid should strive to help overcome them. This 
agenda is driven by a growing awareness of the problems that women in the so-called 
developing countries face, such as poor access to education, absence of property rights, health 
problems, and so on. One of the main recommendations developed is that women have to be 
given more assistance compared to men and to benefit from women-specific programs. From 
here a whole portfolio of programs targeting women has grown – micro-credits, trainings, 
educational programs – that is organized under the heading of “women in development”.  
However, the other side of the consolidation and institutionalization of the discourse 
of “women in development” is that by identifying a specific target group marked by lack and 
deviance it naturalizes those qualities. Women become defined in terms of being universally 
oppressed and underprivileged. The problematic nature of these notions is also understood 
within the WID bureau; however, such opinions are excluded by the discourse of “women in 
                                                 
400 USAID/WID. About WID [cited 10 August 2005. Available from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/wid/about_wid.html. 
401 USAID/WID. About WID Activities [cited 10 August 2005. Available from 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/activities/activities.html. 
 123 
development”. One of the former WID employees expressed a similar concern over the 
meaning of women as a target group: “It is another form of marginalization, another way of 
making it be about another underprivileged minority that did not get something.”402  
So how exactly are the connections maintained between the notions of “women as a 
target group”, “women’s issues”, and “gender”? The following quote is instructive.  
 
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) recognizes 
that equal opportunity for women and men is necessary not only for the well-being of 
their families but also because women’s involvement is key to advancing economic 
and social development and promoting democracy. Even today many women are 
not able to fully share in the political and economic life of their societies. They 
face enduring economic, legal and customary barriers to their participation in 
development. In addition, in recent years the toll of HIV/AIDS on women and 
the abominable practice of trafficking in women and children have held back 
women’s progress and that of their countries. The Agency addresses gender 
inequalities […]; gender considerations cut across all aspects of USAID programs.403 
 
The paragraph above clearly illustrates the understanding of “gender inequalities” and 
“gender considerations” that the WID seeks to promote throughout the whole set of USAID 
programs. The WID promotes “equal opportunity for women and men” through improving 
the position of women both in terms of their increased participation in social, economic, and 
political life and in terms of protecting them from health and criminal threats. In other words, 
“equal opportunity” means upgrading women’s status to that of men rather than ensuring 
equality of both women and men. “Gender inequalities” imply that one gender is made inferior 
to the other. As I have argued in chapters one and two, this essentializes positions of women 
and men in the society and in this way reinforces rather than ameliorates gender inequalities.  
 Another important dimension to such constructions of “gender”, “women”, and 
“men” is the emphasis on issues that render women particularly vulnerable and define them in 
the context of physical disability. Those issues are the HIV/AIDS pandemic and trafficking in 
women. I argue that the Agency focuses on these two issues as opposed to other, more locally 
specific issues of gender violence or of health risks due to their perceived global nature. This 
provides discursive alignment with the “global reach” orientation that characterizes American 
post-Cold War assistance and especially its direction in the aftermath of September 11. In this 
way, these specific issues are constructed in ways which link them to the perceived immediate 
strategic concerns of the US.  
 Such a “globalization” of the relevant issues is of consequence for how they are 
understood and defined, for it implies that women everywhere are affected by these issues in 
the same way. “Everywhere” of course refers to every aid/assistance recipient rather than 
indeed everywhere in the world. Thus, the divide is further maintained between those who are 
affected by disease or subjected to criminal activities and those who are not. The sharp 
distinction between the donor who develops “women’s programs” and the aid/assistance 
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recipient who suffers from a problem contradicts the nature of those (global) issues and, thus, 
prevents their solution. In other words, if these issues are indeed global, they are the result of 
processes that are going on in different countries and of connections and mutual 
dependencies between countries that are rich and poor, or more or less democratic. One of 
such “global” issues that has been receiving considerable attention from USAID is the 
trafficking in women.  
Trafficking in women was first introduced on the USAID agenda in the late 1990s and 
was seen as a problem that is particularly acute in the fSU.  In 1998 the Global Survival 
Network (no longer active) presented the results of a two-year undercover investigation into 
the trafficking of women for prostitution from Russia and the Newly Independent States in 
the form of a final report entitled Crime & Servitude: An Expose in the Traffic in Women for 
Prostitution from the Newly Independent States, and a 42-minute documentary video entitled Bought 
& Sold. In addition, the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement was 
increasingly concerned with the interconnections between organized crime, drug trafficking, 
trafficking in weapons, and trafficking in human beings. By now assistance to combat these 
issues is growing; for example, as of 2004, the Office of the Senior Coordinator for 
International Women’s Issues reported that eight out of eleven initiatives it was supporting 
throughout the world had to do with supporting women in war and conflict zones and 
fighting the spread of violence against and trafficking of women.404 
In her remarks to the organization Women in International Security, Paola J. 
Dobriansky, Under-Secretary of State for Global Affairs, made a connection between women 
and “global” or “transnational” threats and the issue of American security. It was argued that 
women are part of the “drugs, bugs, and thugs” threat to national security. They fall victim to 
transnational threats that are either illegal or contagious. Infectious diseases, such as SARS, 
avian flu or HIV/AIDS then “cause both direct harm to the health and well-being of those 
infected and ancillary damage to societies and economies.” Drawing on the National Intelligence 
Reports she emphasized the fact that these diseases “endanger US citizens at home and 
abroad, threaten US armed forces deployed overseas, and exacerbate social and political 
instability in key countries and regions, in which the US has significant interests.” In a similar vein,  
 
crimes like trafficking in persons can contribute to a vicious cycle of collapsing 
order and increasing criminality that destabilizes states and even regions, [… and] the 
forced prostitution that is frequently related to trafficking in persons can 
expedite the spread of HIV, TB, and other diseases.  
 
Further, the connection is made to drug trafficking, “a well-known cousin of trafficking in 
persons [that] sets in motion a vicious cycle of corruption and violence and can ultimately 
weaken states and give rise to elements that threaten our security and also that of our allies and friends.”405 
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What is important here is the connection to such key elements as the recently 
introduced US government concept of “failing states” and their implications for international 
security. An idea has been recently reinforced that US security is dependent on maintaining 
stability globally and intervening in the “failing states” whose collapse can potentially create a 
threat. As can be seen very well from the concluding paragraph of the same speech:  
 
What is important is that we have grasped the importance of transnational issues, 
and with others, we seek to resolve these global problems. Our ability to meet 
these challenges will bear heavily on international security and prosperity […]; our 
tasks are to recognize how critical these issues are, to see their direct 
correlation to our security and overall well-being, and to continue to work for 
their resolution.406  
 
This points to an important shift that took place over the past decade of assistance – 
assistance is no longer only about giving aid to a particular country or region, it is about 
“global” interference to maintain order and stability. The strategic alignment of the most 
recent discursive change within USAID with these larger discursive shifts in US foreign policy 
more generally helps strengthen the discursive center of “women as a target group” that is 
particularly vulnerable.  
According to one of the former employees of the WID, maintaining a close 
connection with the core US foreign policy concerns has always been characteristic of the 
discourse and practice of the organization.  
 
I think that women’s issues resonate very deeply with the core of USAID 
internal politics. That’s something people like, that’s something that’s very easy 
to do, that’s something that appeals to the right-wing and to the left-wing. An 
office like WID has less to do with what is needed overseas than with what is 
needed here in Washington.407  
 
Even though the particular institutional politics of the WID back in Washington do not 
translate directly into women’s programs in Ukraine, due to the technical advisor status of this 
office, its programs are representative of the meaning of “women” and “gender” that is 
dominant within the assistance discourse in Washington DC.  
 
4.3.2. Women’s empowerment through NGOs 
 
As a direct consequence of the meaning of “women as a target group” discussed above, the 
notion of “women’s empowerment” has a particular meaning in this context. The assistance 
discourse maintains that women are empowered by being provided with a women-specific 
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realm, such as an NGO sector. Thus, women’s high levels of participation in civil society 
programs is discussed in highly positive terms. From the very beginning of assistance in 
Ukraine, women were more actively involved in many programs and initiatives than men. In 
fact, the civil society programs were and still are largely dominated by women. Many USAID 
officials have singled that out to remark upon:  
 
What was different were the local women themselves, who organized very 
quickly; they were very vocal, very articulate, mostly well educated. My 
experience as a whole was that Ukrainian women definitely wanted the change 
and they were prepared from very early on to get organized and work towards 
it. As a general concept I found women much more reform-minded than men. 
Many men benefited from the old system, they were little concerned about the 
reform, they were more cautious.408  
 
Another report about the NIS Exchange and Training Program (NET), which began 
in 1993 and consisted in sending Ukrainians to the US for trainings, states:  
 
A recent NET project evaluation shows that women find the training 
experience more positive than men, and are more likely to be expected to 
return with new ideas to the workplace. Women returnees appear to have 
received more increases in job responsibilities upon return from NET 
trainings.409 
 
Drawing on the “women in development” discourse, USAID saw the feminization of 
NGOs as a sign of women’s empowerment and a guarantee that “women’s” issues would be 
addressed.  
 
Stronger NGO sectors appear especially to benefit women and minority groups, as 
well as to be naturally reflective of social concerns and public policy issues 
important to women and minorities. Although NGO sector support programs 
that the Agency [USAID] has sponsored in CEE/NIS countries were not 
initially designed to emphasize women’s issues, they have been effective in 
responding to them. […] Most NGOs appear to provide equitable professional 
opportunities to women. […] For women especially, NGOs have provided a 
vehicle of self-expression, an opportunity to take leadership roles, and a 
mechanism for dealing with pertinent social issues.410  
 
As is evident from the quote above, the discourse of “women in development” is 
based on the idea that women are not “good enough” (even if for social and political reasons) 
to express themselves in the same spheres as men. So the idea emerged that women have to 
be provided with their own public space, in which exclusively by virtue of being women they 
will address the kinds of social problems that are otherwise overlooked in the society. The 
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following quote captures this essentialist notion of women being a marginalized but 
“naturally” better and more socially responsible group. According to USAID, the civil society 
sector  
 
[…] offers women one of the few avenues currently available to them to 
promote broad-scale socioeconomic change, not just change connected with 
women’s issues. It is a sector that is relatively devoid of corruption. This is 
attractive both because of women’s dislike of corruption per se and concern 
about physical harm.411 
 
Perhaps in an unintended way, this gendered perception of the “civil society” sector 
contradicts the expectation of a high social and political impact of civil society, and thus the 
idea of empowerment itself. Defining “civil society” as a realm for those who cannot fulfill 
themselves in other spheres gives it the aura of a specialized and secluded realm. The 
contribution of civil society to the overall democratization of society is then no longer seen in 
its direct impact on “mainstream” social and political developments. Instead, it is much more 
indirect because it consists of providing special opportunities for those who would not get 
them elsewhere. Keeping a particular segment of the population happy is no doubt beneficial 
for the society as a whole, and yet it is unlikely to contribute to substantial democratic 
transformation or to address deeper issues that are at the heart of social inequalities, be those 
due to gender or to other factors.  
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
4.4.1. What it means to assist 
 
The discourse of “assistance” emerged out of a sense of urgency to act in a world that was 
rapidly transforming as a result of the end of the Cold War. Understanding this impulse at its 
origin is important for understanding its limitations. “Assistance” did not develop as a 
response to particular problems that needed to be resolved, even if it presents itself as a force 
capable of “making a difference” for developments in other countries. Instead, “assistance” 
developed as a response to the political imperative to spend money in the part of the world 
previously closed to any intervention by the infamous Iron Curtain. This points to a 
fundamental problem not unknown to philanthropy in general: Being created as a response to 
an opportunity to spend money – even if for a “good cause” - makes any “good cause” 
secondary to the need to create an infrastructure that would facilitate the spending.  
The notion of “assistance” itself was introduced to emphasize the novelty of the 
programs implemented in the former Soviet Block as well as their differences from the 
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development “aid” administered elsewhere. It conceived of the political changes that occurred 
in the late 1980s in terms of unique opportunities it offered to the US government to exert 
influence over the development of its former Cold War rival countries. The novelty of the 
assistance discourse necessitated new answers to the core questions of assistance: who should 
support whom, how, and why. I have shown how these questions were addressed through a 
set of discursive and institutional measures. The discourse defined and enabled the creation of 
new assistance institutions as well as made it possible to accommodate some of the already 
existing ones, such as experts and programs from other parts of the world. I have shown that 
it is the core meaning of “assistance” itself that made this continuity possible. The discourse 
of “assistance” also introduced new political geographies, into which the recipients of 
assistance were placed. In the newly constructed “region” of assistance Ukraine was given a 
prominent place. 
However, the discourse of “assistance” is less specific about how exactly assistance 
programs have to be designed and what exactly they are to achieve. I argue that this vagueness 
of “assistance” is key to its successful functioning over a relatively long period of time and 
under conditions of rapid political change and overall instability in the former Soviet Block.  
As I show in chapters five and six, its concrete content is filled into the “assistance” category 
in other sites of interaction – in Kiev and at local NGOs. Such vagueness or emptiness of the 
assistance discourse – rather than being just an initial stage – became one of its founding 
principles and determined a set of core ideas concerning ways of assisting civil society in 
Ukraine.  
“Assistance” as “teaching” and expertise transfer implies that countries that “assist” 
already hold the knowledge of “proper” development and have the right conception of “civil 
society”, which they then pass onto the assistance recipients. From the very beginning of 
“assistance” onward, “transition” has been defined as a temporary period of change whose 
nature and destination are assumed to be well-understood and clearly defined. Thus, 
“assistance” is meant to be a purely technical input that will give this change a push and 
introduce the right tools to go further; it has never been seen as a longer-term commitment. It 
is for this reason that early “phase out”, somewhat ironically, has been an immediate goal 
from the very beginning of “assistance” and remained so for more than a decade. In a way, 
this has turned short-term intervention into a permanent state of “assistance”, thus re-
enforcing the understanding of long-term processes in a short-term way. 
4.4.2. What it means to promote civil society through assistance 
 
Although the idea of promoting democracy was not entirely new to US assistance, the 
prominence given to the notion of civil society within the assistance discourse is 
unprecedented. The assistance discourse in fact played a significant role in the (re)invention of 
the idea of civil society. The civil society assistance discourse is based on three main discursive 
centers: “institutional capacity building”, “empowerment”, and “sustainability”. “Institutional 
capacity building” means enabling the setting up and development of particular organizational 
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structures – NGOs - and training them in key procedures. Since these kinds of organizations 
were non-existent at the beginning of “assistance”, “capacity building” was defined in terms of 
reaching out to a wide audience of actual and potential leaders of different organizational 
forms. This idea of spreading out widely was captured by the metaphor “let a thousand 
flowers bloom”, which made the initial civil society assistance look different from the civil 
society programs implemented in other “regions”. However, I would argue that this initial take 
was less different from the promotion of civil society elsewhere than it might at first seem. 
Importantly, the “flowers” that were invited to bloom in Ukraine and elsewhere in the region 
were all of the same kind, and the openness of this discourse did not go beyond allowing 
anyone to join in the space that was already externally defined. This is evident from the highly 
technical nature of civil society assistance defined through the discursive center of 
“institutional capacity building”. In fact, creating “institutionally capable” NGOs was not just 
an initial stage in civil society assistance but its founding principle and primary content that 
remained at the core of the discourse throughout the whole period I investigated. Assistance 
has evolved from building up basic “organizational capacity” towards introducing more 
sophisticated tools and techniques, such as “advocacy”. Its technical nature, however, remains 
intact. This means that even in the “thousand flowers” period civil society assistance was not 
aimed at promoting an open playing field for civil society groups of different kinds and 
ideologies. Neither had the relevance of the NGO “flowers” for the Ukrainian context been 
made into an issue to be addressed by assistance.  
The technical nature of civil society assistance is particularly prominent in the 
discussion of the “sustainability” of the newly emerging/created civil society. The discursive 
center of “sustainability” endorsed the idea that after NGOs are created they have to be 
trained to become professional enough to take over the functions fulfilled by their American 
counterparts. This led to an increase in professional trainings for NGOs towards the year 
2000. Instead of promoting a “thousand flowers”, USAID is now developing programs to 
strengthen think tanks, resource centers, and advocacy NGOs – all being defined as 
organizations with highly skilled staff that provides technical expertise in the areas related to 
“assistance”. In the context of a permanent “phase out”, the “sustainability” of Ukrainian civil 
society is thus understood in terms of the capacity of Ukrainian NGOs to facilitate 
“assistance”.  
The paternalistic conception of assistance as top-down teaching implied that the donor 
reserved the right to decide not only who but also what had to be taught. The relationship 
between the ones who know and the ones who have to be taught was further sustained 
through the discursive center of “empowerment”. It consisted of three key elements: the 
notion of “social transition issues” that defined Ukrainians as being in a dramatic state of 
disarray because of the social and economic difficulties transition entailed; the notion of 
information and awareness raising that implied that Ukrainians were disapproving of the 
reform because they lacked information about its virtues; and the notion of the wrong 
mentality that Ukrainians were said to have developed during the oppressive Soviet period and 
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that seemed to be in the way of their fully embracing the promise of transition to democracy 
and market economy. On the basis of these three core notions, “empowerment” is defined as 
education towards embracing the new ideals offered by “assistance” and liberation from the 
legacies of the past that may be in the way. The heavy emphasis on mentality change implied 
that there was something inherently wrong with the way Ukrainians thought of themselves 
and of their opportunities and responsibilities, and thus it constructed the demand for being 
taught. Even more importantly, it downgraded locally grown ideas about civil society and 
activism as stemming from the dark communist past. In other words, if Ukrainians were more 
interested in other issues or different forms of activism deemed inappropriate by “assistance”, 
the wrong Soviet mentality must have been responsible. 
The discursive center of “empowerment” enabled the civil society assistance discourse 
to address concerns about problems and failures of a structural nature without actually 
offering structural solutions or taking an explicitly political stand. It helped redefine socio-
economic and political inequalities in terms of individual emotional and psychological 
problems and move them to the realm of “cultural” or “mentality” issues. In her analysis of 
women’s health projects implemented by the World Health Organization (WHO) in Russia, 
Michele Rivkin-Fish makes a similar observation about the workings of “cultural” arguments 
in assistance: “Seeing the problems as based in the need for emotional revival worked to deny 
the fact that problems of power inequalities […] were products of larger political processes 
and arrangements.”412  
I argue that recognition of and attention to local politics in the broad sense of the 
word would be a crucial starting point from which assistance could develop programs that 
would indeed empower Ukrainians to address their problems. However, this will not happen if 
assistance systematically and perhaps even purposefully overlooks those inequalities in the first 
place.   
 
4.4.3. What it means to empower women 
 
The women’s agenda sustained in Washington is largely driven by the “women in 
development” discourse dating to the 1970s. Although it is not directly applied to 
“assistance”, it still has a strong formative power. Most of the women’s programs developed 
for “assistance” are based on the “women in development” discourse, which is sustained by 
the discursive center of “women as a target group”. The latter constructs women as a generally 
underprivileged and marginalized group that is defined by its shared experience of oppression 
and violence against its members. This also implies defining women as an unproblematically 
uniform category. In other words, once a women’s issue is defined it is implied that all women 
                                                 
412 Michele Rivkin-Fish, "Health Development Meets the End of State Socialism: Visions of Democratization, 
Women's Health, and Social Well-Being for Contemporary Russia," Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 24, no. 1 
(2000): p.98. 
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in the target region are affected by it in the same way. Moreover, the women in the target 
region are implicitly juxtaposed to those from the assisting countries. This discursive center is 
more recently reinforced within USAID through its connection to the discourse on “global 
threats and security”. To make this connection explicit, a particular emphasis is laid on the 
issues of the HIV/AIDS pandemic and of trafficking, both having a stronger “global” 
connotation than any other issue related to women’s health or exposure to violence. This new 
global system of meanings implies that women in “other” countries that are in need of 
assistance are particularly vulnerable because they can fall victim not only to domestic forms 
of violence and oppression but also to transnational threats. Transnationality, however, is not 
taken as far as to include more developed, “assisting” countries in the picture when solutions 
to the threats observed are sought.  
The discursive center of “women as a target group” is central for the ideas related to 
women’s empowerment that are sustained in Washington DC. It is believed that women’s 
empowerment arises from a women-specific forum for self-realization and action. Rather than 
addressing the structural gender problems in the society as a whole, this discourse tends to 
show preference for creating a “ghetto”-like space that would be available only to women, in 
which they could safely practice social activism. Assistance assigns this role to the NGO 
sector, whose feminized nature is defined as a sign of women’s empowerment – the more 
women are engaged in NGO work, the more empowered they are believed to be as a whole.  
The notion of gender, even though present within the organizational discourse of 
USAID, did not form a discursive center. It was incorporated as a response to the increased 
use of the term in policy-making internationally (as, for example, with respect to “gender 
mainstreaming”) but has not to this date gained the power to structure the discourse on 
women and women’s issues in the context of assistance. However, it is one of the terms that 
was introduced to the recipient countries as part of the “assistance” language, and thus it is 
part of the language shared among (or at least known by) professionals in both Washington 
DC and Ukraine. I will look more into the life of the notion of “gender” in Kiev in the 
following chapter (section 5.3).  
In this chapter I have outlined the origins of the civil society assistance discourse and 
the core discursive centers that define it. I have particularly focused on continuities within 
USAID organizational discourse and practice. I have shown that despite the overall emphasis 
on the novelty and unprecedented nature of “assistance”, “old” ideas and practices were 
successfully incorporated into “assistance” as well. I have also stressed several points of 
ambiguity or instances of vague meaning that are evident in the core discursive centers. In the 
following chapter, I will show how the civil society assistance discourse is filled with more 
specific meanings as a result of intense East – West interactions that take place in Kiev, the 
capital of Ukraine, between USAID representatives and Ukrainian mediators and recipients of 
“assistance”. 
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Chapter 5: In Kiev. Points of Mediation 
 
Being the capital city of Ukraine, Kiev is a meeting point for a range of actors, such as the 
USAID Mission, American NGO subcontractors and implementing partners, and Ukrainians 
that work as local staff or at NGOs that administer assistance. Standing in between assistance 
suppliers and recipients, Kiev is best characterized as a point of mediation between the US 
assistance policy and its reception by and implementation in the local context of Ukrainian 
NGOs. The implementation of assistance programs has been dependent on local expertise or 
at least technical support. American subcontractors needed local partners as well as local staff. 
That is why Kiev is not just a point of transfer of funds from the donor to the recipient, but a 
meeting point for American and Ukrainian mediators of assistance. It is one of the most 
salient sites of (re)enactment of the assistance discourse.  
USAID opened its Missions in Moscow (to serve operations in Russia), Kiev (Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova), Yerevan (TransCaucasus region) and Almaty (Central Asia) in 1993.413 
Initially, those were maintained by only one or two American members of staff assisted by a 
few local employees. The budget appropriations were made for the whole of the NIS and the 
programs were planned and controlled from Washington DC. By the mid-1990s this changed: 
the local missions received bigger budgetary authority and started planning and implementing 
their own grant programs within the overall budget that would be appropriated by the US 
Congress per country. Missions could do their own procurement work and solicit proposals. 
This is significant because there was gradually more decision making power coming out of the 
actual interactions between the Americans and the Ukrainians working at and with the 
Mission.  
An important element of assistance is the group of subcontractors and implementing 
partners that work with USAID within a certain assistance category. According to the 
regulations, the US government assistance rarely goes directly to organizations in the recipient 
country; much more often there is a bidding procedure among American subcontractors. The 
subcontractors work either on the basis of contracts, including so-called indefinite quantity 
contracts (IQC), or on the basis of grants and cooperative agreements.414 In the area of 
democracy and civil society assistance most of the work is done on the basis of grants and 
cooperative agreements. This means that subcontractors compete not only on the basis of 
their rates and quality of services but also on the basis of their proposals, in which they try to 
                                                 
413 USAID. "Fact Sheet: USAID NIS Task Force Activities in the New Independent States of the Former Soviet 
Union." Washington DC: USAID: Office of External Affairs, June 1993. 
414 The contracts (including indefinite quantity contracts) are contracts for doing specific types and amounts of 
work that are awarded to (mostly) for-profit organizations after a bidding procedure; cooperative agreements are 
essentially grants.  
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match their best selling points and expertise with the priorities of USAID. Thus, the 
subcontractors play an important role in the actual process of program design. There is also 
observable continuity between the programs they are implementing in different parts of the 
world. Before the USAID Mission in Kiev gained more responsibilities and planning authority 
over the field, the subcontractors and implementing partners had been key in running the 
programs on the ground. These organizations were among the first to start doing work in the 
field; this turned them into bearers of knowledge and expertise in particularly high demand.  
According to the Bakhtinian framework of dialogical discourse analysis, this site of 
interaction is characterized by the highest level of (re)negotiation based on immediate personal 
encounters between representatives of the “assistance” discourse and locals. Importantly, 
these encounters take place within the confines of the assistance discourse rather than on a 
“neutral” territory. This implies that the roles of participants are divided between “insiders” 
and “outsiders” to the discourse. In the first section of this chapter I uncover the meaning of 
mediating assistance that developed through interactions between Americans and Ukrainians 
in Kiev. This meaning is embedded in the discursive center of the “world/ international 
community” as a shared space for joint effort from both sides. I argue that this discursive 
center is constitutive of an identity change among both Americans and Ukrainians. For 
Americans it involved a shift towards becoming “global” rather than domestic NGOs, while 
for Ukrainians it implied socialization into a new internationally recognized profession. In the 
second section, I explore how this meaning of mediating assistance is reflected in the 
transformations of the three discursive centers of the civil society assistance discourse – 
“capacity building”, “empowerment”, and “sustainability”. The third section explores the 
transformation of ideas about gender and women’s issues. 
 
5.1. Assistance: “East Joins West for Change”? 
 
One of the early programs implemented in Ukraine through Winrock International, an 
American NGOs subcontracting women’s programs from USAID, had the following subtitle: 
“East joins West for Change.” This slogan is largely representative of the assistance discourse 
that developed in Kiev. It implies a shared effort towards a common goal, in which the West 
knows how the goal can be achieved and the East joins in. Thus, even though the aspiration is 
the same, the contributions of the two sides are different. These ideas are further embedded in 
the discursive center of the “world/ international community”.  
The concept of the “world/ international community”, as it is used in the assistance 
discourse, was created by Americans, many of whom saw this new West–East dialogue as an 
opportunity to expand their activities to the “global” scale. For example, Counterpart 
International is one of the key USAID subcontractors in the area of civil society assistance. 
The organization was registered in 1965 as a New York-based Foundation for the Peoples of 
the South Pacific (FSP), dedicated to the rehabilitation, welfare, and growth of the Pacific 
islands after the Second World War. It continued working exclusively in the Pacific Region 
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until 1992, when its whole image and direction of work were changed. The Board of Directors 
decided to expand the organization’s activities and to move its headquarters to Washington 
DC, thus positioning the organization in a new way. It received its present name – 
Counterpart International, and its new mission statement is worded in a more global language: 
“Counterpart’s mission of building One Just World through service and partnership – helping 
people to help themselves to create a more ecologically and socially sustainable world.” By 
now Counterpart boasts experience in “some 60 countries around the world […] and the 
number is growing.”415 The first “global” move Counterpart International made was to 
Ukraine in 1993, where it stayed for almost a decade as one of the biggest USAID 
subcontractors for civil society assistance. In the late 1990s it expanded further in the post-
Soviet space to the countries of Central Asia. More recently, it bid successfully for 
development projects in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Another US-based NGO, Winrock International, is exemplary in many ways; an NGO 
from Arkansas known for its work in the area of agriculture, it went “global” in 1985 when it 
initiated its agriculture programs in the Third World. The way it became known in the former 
Soviet Union as a women’s NGO is puzzling at the first sight. In 1989 the leadership 
development project of Winrock in Africa was led by Elise Fiber-Smith, who made it a 
successful project by connecting different women’s groups under the heading of women’s 
empowerment. The success of this program gave her a mandate to expand its geographical 
scope, and she was among the first representatives of American NGOs who went to the 
former Soviet Union. Having participated in a series of conferences on women in transition, 
Elise Fiber-Smith started joint initiatives with representatives of Russian and Ukrainian 
women’s organizations. In this case, the heading of “women’s empowerment” proved to be a 
good term that connected the development experience of Winrock with the new opportunities 
to expand into the post-Soviet space.  
The assistance discourse created a new space for different NGOs to redefine their 
activities and experience in universally applicable terms that frame them as having appeal and 
importance for “the whole world”.  This also meant, however, that the applicability of these 
concepts and methods for the Ukrainian context was asserted before there was time to learn 
more about it.  
These tendencies are organized by the discursive center of “world/ international 
community” that framed the interaction between Americans and Ukrainians in Kiev. This 
discursive center embodies the desire of both sides to establish a common ground. Based on 
the concept of “world/ international community”, the Westerners see assistance as a way to 
socialize Ukrainians into their world of projects and fundraising. The Ukrainians see assistance 
as a channel to (re)enter the “world/ international community” by acquiring the tools and 
skills that are in demand internationally.   
                                                 
415 Counterpart International. "Counterpart Millennium Report." Washington, DC: Counterpart International, 
2000. 
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The idea of assistance is that Ukrainians are provided not only with resources as such 
but also with access to information about where and how these resources can be obtained. 
What the Americans working on the ground were bringing was the expertise they themselves 
had in fitting into the world of assistance and handling the challenges and requirements it 
entails. In the words of Sarah Tisch, former coordinator of the NIS-US Women’s Consortium 
that was formed with the help of Winrock International, 
 
there were women’s groups organizing amongst themselves but our role was to 
get the Western resources for them. Clearly, if they were organized on their own they 
had no money […]; civil society organizations had no place to turn but the 
outside […]; our job was to make all that happen, so it was the facilitating 
role.416 
 
 
In addition to the idea of sharing resources, the discursive center of “world/ 
international community” includes the idea of a shared policy language. Americans have a role 
in translating Ukrainian issues into this language, whereas Ukrainians struggle to accommodate 
the “assistance” language. Many of the concepts used in assistance discourse have no 
equivalents in Russian or Ukrainian; they are either used in their English versions, such as 
“advocacy” or “gender”, substituted by a descriptive term, as is the case with “awareness 
raising” or “outreach”, or Ukrainian terms have been found for them, which, however, remain 
very new and unclear, such as empowerment – upovnovazhennia, or sustainable development – 
stalyi rozvytok. It is believed to be important to introduce the key terms into assistance contexts, 
even if they have no equivalents in the respective languages, because sharing a term creates an 
entry point for models and procedures. The difficulties as well as the necessity of translation 
are captured in the following quote from a Ukrainian with more than a decade of experience 
in mediating assistance:  
 
We had Americans, we had someone from the Diaspora in our office, and yet 
we spent a whole month trying to translate “advocacy” and “outreach” and we 
failed, although we could understand what those notions meant […]; then we 
gathered our first grantees for a training and they said: we don’t know the term 
advocacy but we are doing it […]; the term is important because if people give 
a name to what they do, they start doing it differently, they use different 
tools.417 
 
The discursive center of “world/ international community” helps to socialize its new 
Ukrainian members into assistance discourse and practice. The Western mediators of 
assistance see their role as one of sharing the professional knowledge, introducing the skills 
and the language that determine whether an NGO will be able approach donors with 
successful projects. The Ukrainians who are involved with assistance are eager to prove that 
                                                 
416 Tisch, 23 August 2004, interview by the author, emphasis added. 
417 Tatarinova, 28 April 2005, interview by the author. 
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they can be just as “professional” as their Western partners in using the language and the 
tools.  
 
When we conduct trainings, presentations or other events, we explain that we 
want to be part of the international community. That is why it is important for 
us to know all this terminology in English. We need it to be able to 
communicate, to write, to understand – without it professionalism is 
impossible.418 
 
“World/ international community” is not a shared place strictly speaking; rather, the 
Americans are the representatives who see their role akin to that of missionaries. An example 
from my interview about the 1998 Trafficking Prevention Program mentions two leaders, one 
of whom was very enthusiastic about the project but proved “not realistic with money”, 
whereas the other turned out to be “too independent”. As one interviewee put it: “I have my 
own constraints: people who give money have their priorities; she [the NGO leader] was too 
independent, which is good, but then if she wants to be that independent why doesn’t she find 
her own money?” As a result, both organizations were dropped from the list of project 
partners. The Americans felt that their role was not just simple resource transfer but also 
mediation of assistance rules and requirements. Their knowledge of the assistance world was 
one of the key areas of expertise they could and wanted to offer: “… The donors were 
holding us responsible. So on all the paperwork it had to be [us] instead of the consortium 
leaders, because we were the channel through which the money came.”419  
The inequality between the American and the Ukrainian parts of the new “world/ 
international community” has always been exacerbated by their unequal access to resources. 
As one of the former Winrock employees recalls her experience in Ukraine:  
 
The discussion was also perceived as to be about “where the money should 
go”; people smell the money […]; it’s easy to be the rich one in the room, us 
naïve Americans asking about what has to be done. But people don’t say: this 
is not our thing, we won’t do it. They say of course we could learn how to do 
it.420  
 
 On the other side, some Ukrainians felt that the line between sharing knowledge and 
being arrogant and disrespectful had been crossed by some of their American colleagues. They 
were very sensitive to being intentionally kept in a position of less qualified little sisters. One 
of my respondents recalls:  
 
If we did not know something, this did not mean that we would never learn. It 
also did not mean that we were incapable of understanding that, even though 
our colleagues declared that they were listening to us, in practice they were not. 
                                                 
418 Tatarinova, 28 April 2005, interview by the author, emphasis added. 
419 Tisch, 23 August 2004, interview by the author. 
420 Scott, 1 October 2004, interview by the author. 
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I personally felt as if I had been exchanging one yoke for another. And this 
was not what I expected from new initiatives.421 
 
However, the notion of “world/ international community” is not a static entity; it 
changes as the terms of the American-Ukrainian interaction change. Over the period under 
study, a substantial number of Ukrainians have been socialized into assistance discourse and 
practice and thereby also acquired a stronger claim over the “world/ international 
community”. Increasingly, Ukrainians talk about the importance of having a say in the choice 
of priorities and themes that are supported by the donor. Remarkable in this context is an 
event that took place on 29 and 30 September 2004 in Kiev: the Ukrainian National 
Conference on Ethics Guidelines for the Third Sector organized and sponsored within the 
framework of the USAID-funded project “Ukrainian Community Action Network” (UCAN). 
The idea of the conference can hardly be claimed to be “home-grown”; rather it is a follow-up 
on similar events taking place in other countries (the Czech Republic and Slovakia being 
particularly prominent examples). Neither is the idea exclusively native to civil society or even 
the Third Sector; it is also adopted in other sectors and is increasingly part of various 
professional codes. In fact, one of the presentations at the conference was dedicated to 
“Developing Professional Ethics Codes for PR Specialists.” 
Adopting ethics codes is also a topical issue for the donors, as is evident, for example, 
from the recent activities of the Ukrainian Forum of Donors. The forum is an informal 
assembly of donors and administrators of assistance operating in Ukraine, which resembles 
similar formats in other countries. These different forums meet within the framework of 
annual East European Donors Meetings that have taken place since 1996. The main goals of 
the forum are to improve coordination between donor organizations and to raise the 
professional standard of their work. Every forum has adopted its own ethical code. And so 
the idea that Ukrainian NGOs gather to discuss ethical standards not only has its origins 
outside of the NGO community but is also a way to pick up an initiative going on in other 
countries. This event closely reflects the discursive center of the “world/ international 
community” in that it is based on the aspiration to follow the most recent trends in the world 
of assistance and beyond. 
There are several features, however, that made this conference stand out among other 
donor-inspired ideas and events. First, instead of announcing the conference from the start, 
UCAN worked for two years on engaging different NGOs in a dialogue about whether or not 
and in what form they would like to address the issue of ethics. Second, most of these 
activities were not funded and, thus, depended mostly on the initiative and enthusiasm of 
different local NGOs. Third, the majority of participants were Ukrainian, including the 
representatives of granting agencies. Such participatory planning created a format in which the 
actual forum for discussion became as important as the (externally introduced) issue.  
                                                 
421 Suslova, 11 April 2005, interview by the author. 
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The resulting discussion is very interesting for the variety of re-interpretations, 
contestations, and discursive openings it contained. It reached out to such fundamental 
questions as what the assistance is meant for and how to improve it. The failures of assistance 
were framed as a shared problem of those who tend to abuse donors’ funds as well as the 
donors themselves, whose lack of context-sensitive programming is harmful, unprofessional, 
and irresponsible. The question of why and how NGOs have to be ethical was broadened in a 
variety of ways that can be seen as openings in the donor-driven discourse on NGOs.  
At the panel discussion “Ethics of the Relationships between Donors and Civil Society 
Organizations” participants were on several occasions employing the distinction between 
“donors”, i.e. foreign governments and private bodies that were actually giving the funds, and 
“administrators of assistance”, i.e. those who actually administer and distribute assistance. As 
one of the participants explained:  
 
There are programs and priorities, and there is the actual implementation – the 
latter can be influenced. You can implement the programs in a stupid 
straightforward way as the donor tells you or you can say “no, this is not a 
good way.” You can influence the donor by saying that for this country and 
under these conditions this is not going to work.422 
 
Here the mediators of assistance are entrusted with much agency in that they are 
perceived as a capable and legitimate agent of change and influence in the world of assistance. 
This is very recent rethinking. In the beginning of assistance to Ukraine the main divisions 
were between those who were giving funds and those asking for them. In a sense, Ukrainians 
working at subcontractors’ offices were also on the side of the recipients of assistance, since 
they were only there to learn and to be paid for fulfilling certain tasks rather than to participate 
or innovate in the program design.  
The recent rethinking of this division has much to do with the fact that the number of 
Ukrainians distributing assistance and implementing donor projects as well as their technical 
expertise have increased over the past decade. The emergence of the new “assistance elite” – 
Ukrainians professionally doing assistance – led to the emergence of the new idea that the 
donors have to be influenced and that Ukrainian concerns have to be communicated more 
forcefully in the assistance dialogue. As one of the Ukrainians said: “our task is to make sure 
that the donors – seeing all the failures – do not tell us that our country is hopeless; we have 
to communicate to them, to work to improve the programs together.” It is interesting that the 
consolidation of the Ukrainian assistance elite leads to the emergence of a new discourse on 
the quality and professionalism of assistance and on the responsibility that various assistance 
professionals have. Another participant of the Ethics Conference underlined:  
 
It is important for donor organizations to practice what they preach […]; there 
should be no situations when a donor is imposing its own idea, its own narrow 
                                                 
422 UCAN. "Ukrainian National Conference "Ethics Guidelines for the Third Sector" (CD)." Kiev: UCAN, 
September 29-30, 2004, emphasis in the original. 
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specialized projects and programs on an NGO because donors should follow 
their own ethic norms and stick to the principle “resources are ours – ideas are 
yours.” […] There should be open initiatives accessible to everyone: if a donor 
can find the clients for it, it’s fine; if not, this means the initiative is bad.423 
 
Here the notion of competition is placed in a new context: it is not only the NGOs 
that have to deliver quality and compete for donors’ projects but also the donors, whose ideas 
have to be vindicated by the local interest. Ethical standards, it is argued by another 
participant, have to be applied not only to the NGOs but also to the donors themselves. 
Iaryna Borenko noted: “Donors are responsible as professionals to have ethical norms; in 
their professional behavior they have to adhere to certain ethical principles.”424 Some concerns 
are even voiced as to whether or not the concept of “professional ethics” should be applied to 
NGOs at all. Another participant explained: 
 
If we aim at adopting the professional ethics code, it means that we exclude 
certain kinds of people, for example, those who work in the civil society aside 
to a different kind of job. This would mean that we choose to enhance the 
current tendency of professionalization of the civil society, but maybe we need 
mechanisms to keep civil society more open as a sector.425 
 
The notion of “world/ international community” is re-thought in that it is no longer 
primarily  seen as a prescription to be followed but rather as a way to qualify and become 
eligible. This means that once Ukrainians felt they had gained that status, they started to create 
more openings around the questions of what priorities to follow and which assistance 
programs should continue in the longer term. The need to learn the concepts and procedures 
of “assistance” is legitimized with the discursive center of “world/ international community”; 
however, the applicability of those concepts and procedures is kept an open question. Another 
participant of the ethics conference argued:  
 
The knowledge that has been accumulated in the world is so big. Maybe the 
ideas that the donors introduce do not work for Ukraine now but we will get 
there; maybe in a year, maybe more we will want to use this knowledge. 
However, we always have to ask the donors why they think this is a good thing 
for Ukraine.426 
 
Here again, the connection to the “world/ international community” is a way to present 
particular ideas (note that they are here referred to as knowledge) as important; however, their 
relevance and applicability to the context are left open. It is up to Ukrainians to develop at 
their own speed and to see whether or not and when these ideas will fit them. In the next 
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section I look at whether or not the core discursive centers that define civil society were 
accepted, transformed, or rejected altogether as they “traveled” from Washington DC to Kiev.  
 
5.2. Civil Society: Insiders or Outsiders? 
 
5.2.1. Capacity building: How to become “professional” 
 
The fact that NGOs in Ukraine first had to be created and then supported led to particular 
developments. Civil society assistance budgets are not meant to be spent on one big project. 
In line with the “thousand flowers” metaphor, as discussed in chapter four, the idea is to 
reach out to as many recipients as possible and to support as many small activities as possible. 
To accommodate this idea within the assistance bureaucracy USAID relies on intermediaries 
who receive an annual budget to be distributed in this way. For example, in the early 1990s the 
US government established the Eurasia Foundation, through which it was distributing most of 
its small grants mostly geared towards civil society. The idea was to extend small amounts of 
money to many different groups.  
One of the core activities of Winrock International in the 1990s was also the 
distribution of seed grants to women’s NGOs in the NIS. Starting in 1994 the Seed Grants 
program was run by Winrock in Moscow on the basis of a USD 95,000 grant from the Eurasia 
Foundation and later a grant of around half a million dollars from USAID. Seed grants were 
ranging in size from USD 500 to USD 5,000. There were several application rounds per year 
that were assessed by a board comprised of Winrock staff and representatives of local 
women’s NGOs with a ratio of 4:3 (local members on a rotation basis). The eligibility criteria 
included that the organization had to be a registered women’s NGO, with special 
consideration given to applications from the region, i.e. not based in the capital or a big city, 
and to NGOs that had never received a grant before. Giving priority to newly established 
organizations remained one of the key principles throughout the whole period of the NIS-US 
Women’s Consortium activities. The idea behind distributing seed grants was to give 
organizations a push, to spread the word among the groups with a potential to become a 
women’s NGO rather than investing in long-term partnerships with a few organizations. 
Several Winrock coordinators highlighted that the rationale for seed grants was to support as 
many women’s groups as possible “to be able to see who was there to work with.” 
So in Kiev the “thousand flowers” approach was also a matter of practicality: the 
subcontractors simply did not know with whom to work. As Katie Fox, one of the current 
NDI staff who worked in Ukraine in the early 1990s, explained: “The ‘big seminar’ approach 
was good: we used to invite up to forty people and then out of those there [would be] five or 
ten we could actually work with.”427 For the NDI as well as most other subcontractors, 
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spreading support to many organizations was a way to “research” the field they knew nothing 
about and to establish local partners with whom they could continue working on more 
specific programs.  
The overall workings of the discursive center of “capacity building” in Kiev are 
captured in the following quote: 
 
… The Russian and Ukrainian women at the time had very little exposure to 
the outside – how could they? … So our job was to help these groups make 
connections and also make them more professional so that they could hold their own 
with other western women’s coalitions, and that means that they had 
transparent operating procedures, that they could be audited, that they had 
democratic rules, vote on the president, have a budget, everybody would 
contribute and so a lot of it was building the capacity of those organizations. To work 
together through this umbrella organization and also by virtue of belonging to 
the umbrella organization, they would take some of the things that they were 
learning and apply them to their own organizations to make them more fundable 
and more attractive not only to foreign donors but also to what we hoped would 
be a growing group of Ukrainian philanthropists.428  
 
Seed grants are a tool for “capacity building” that has, besides just a technical, also a 
socializing effect. The guidelines and requirements for seed grants were largely borrowed from 
the small grants program of the Global Fund for Women. The idea was that during the 
application and selection procedure women would learn the appropriate procedures and could 
apply for grants from other foundations on their own. Moreover, with the permission of the 
applicant, proposals not selected for a seed grant but receiving a favorable review were 
forwarded to other grant-making agencies. In such a way, women’s groups would be socialized 
into the “assistance industry”: rules of operation for NGOs, fund raising procedures, and so 
on.  
 
Grants from the Consortium are not only infusions of funds but also educational tools. The 
mere process of preparing a proposal is an opportunity for NIS women to 
learn […]. Receiving grants provides not only an opportunity to pay for an 
activity but also to learn the skills of grants managements and accountability.429 
 
This idea of learning the skills of grants management is the most prominent one in the 
overall understanding of “capacity building” in Kiev. It further connects to ideas of 
“professionalism” and managerialism. “Professionalism” is defined in Kiev through business-
like categories, such as clients, competitive products and services, and effective management. 
A good example of the professionalism discourse are the criteria for ethical work of NGOs 
during election campaigns that were presented at another panel of the ethics conference, 
“Ethical Aspects of CSO Activities during the Election Period”: “honesty, transparency, 
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professionalism, quality of the product that is being delivered, a strong self-evaluation 
component, corporate responsibility.” Many Ukrainians felt that the donor-NGO relationship 
should be more business-like. In the words of Iakov Rogalin from the Charitable Foundation 
Dobrota (Kindness) in Donetsk: “Let us face it – there are few resources and many people who 
want to get them. This means that there is competition, which is a healthy and important 
quality because there is no progress without the competition.”430  
Business-like professionalism is also the notion that is used to define quality and is 
given precedence over the actual content of the social issues it deals with:  
 
If we say that we do social entrepreneurship, it means that we approach it 
gradually and seriously. We train people, we prepare business plans, and we 
enhance the understanding that in the first place this should be business; that first 
and foremost it has to be a competitive product and then all the other social stuff […]. 
We have good trainings on strategic management given by an American 
professor of a business school. He says that approaches to managing NGO 
projects are just like those in business. Only the profit is different. But 
professionalism in reaching the goals is the same.431 
 
Another example of how business-like professionalism is used to define the purpose 
and the goal of an NGO is the discourse applied by the Counterpart Creative Center Charity 
Foundation (CCC): 
 
The mission of Counterpart Creative Center Charity Foundation is to lead civil 
society organizations to the successful results of meeting the clients’ needs, to 
high standards of work and high quality services, which will make these 
organizations a leading force of the civil society […]; we support the 
development of civil society through quick response to clients’ needs.432 
 
Under the heading of how to take advantage of CCC trainings one of the options reads: “you 
can order individual and corporate trainings”; the web site is also marked by an abundance of 
business-like marketing slogans: “We love the work we do. We help others grow.”433   
This reinvention of “capacity building” in terms of building up “professionalism” is 
connected to another significant transformation in meaning. In the next section I show how it 
enabled a locally driven contestation of the discursive center of “empowerment”.  
5.2.2. Empowerment: Which “mentality” is wrong after all? 
 
The discursive center of “empowerment” is present in Kiev; however, there is also an opening 
in its meaning. In DC empowerment has everything to do with changing the way people think 
about themselves, their opportunities as well as their responsibilities. It is about helping 
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people overcome what is believed to be the wrong Soviet mentality. This discursive center 
played a crucial role in several projects in Kiev. As the UCAN Program Director Larisa 
Tatarinova explained to me:  
 
Our project has an implicit goal to change the mentality and the culture. We 
want to help people switch from just demanding – you owe me something – to 
doing things yourself – you can [here a play on words with the title of the 
program UCAN434]. This can only be learnt by doing, it cannot be written 
down or explained and it is all a matter of time.435 
  
Thus, in continuity with the interpretation emanating from Washington DC, “empowerment” 
means teaching people to be more pro-active in their everyday lives.  
However, when narrowed down to the issues that concern civil society groups in 
Ukraine, the meaning of these discursive centers changes. The “wrong mentality” that has to 
be overcome is defined as a much more recent phenomenon than the Soviet legacies. A “new 
wrong mentality” is seen as the result of the early donor interventions that were conducted in 
an erratic and badly informed manner. Thus, empowerment is defined in terms of improving 
the assistance practices themselves in a joint effort between the Western and the Ukrainian 
partners.  
 
In the beginning, when they [the donors] just came, nobody knew what it 
would lead to – neither the NGOs that were literally mushrooming, nor the 
donors. Everything was done at random, without thinking; … it was all a mess. 
I’ve seen this receipt written in the early 1990s: “I have received 20,000 dollars 
to promote democracy in Ukraine. Signature.” That’s it. And all the money was 
coming in cash. It was an orgy!436  
 
Here a heavy portion of the blame is placed on the donors for the way in which they were 
distributing the resources. Inconsistency in NGO agendas is also blamed on donor 
programming. The director of the Ukrainian Women’s Fund, Natalka Karbowska, referred to 
the early assistance practice to illustrate this fact:  
 
Women’s organizations at the time were exclusively oriented towards donors’ 
priorities. If one day a donor announced a grant competition on reproductive 
health, everyone was doing reproductive health. If the next day the 
competition was on economic empowerment of women, everyone would start 
doing economic empowerment projects. As a result, the quality suffered 
because NGOs were not focused. Now this is changing a lot. NGOs are 
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becoming more specialized and more focused, and thus the quality of their 
work increases.437 
 
What is particularly important in the quote above is the emphasis on the “quality” of 
NGO work that is believed to be key to the empowerment of the NGO sector as a whole. It 
is also claimed that, due to a lack of clear direction as well as transparency and accountability, 
the assistance was encouraging tension, competitive behavior, and corrupt practices:  
 
Gradually we are managing to change things and what is very uplifting is that 
people are changing […]; what is most important is that there is no place 
anymore for all those “grantoїds” [grant-eaters] and “pocket NGOs”. The 
donors are gradually withdrawing, so there is less assistance and it is much 
more focused and aimed at results […]; we have to change something inside 
ourselves. The assistance created many problems in its early years – fights for 
resources, competition; people did not know how to work together, they did 
not want to share information.438 
 
What is very important here is that the agency for mentality change is attributed to Ukrainians 
working at and with NGOs and that this change is seen as occurring in spite of rather than 
thanks to the assistance. Again, the blame is placed on the wrong assistance practices and not 
on legacies from the Soviet or even earlier times.  
This new meaning of the “wrong mentality” has implications for two other discursive 
centers – “professionalism” and “sustainability”. For “professionalism” it means that this 
notion is turned around and applied to assistance practices themselves. This is a recent shift in 
meaning, and it has also to do with the fact that more administrative responsibility was shifted 
to Kiev in the late 1990s. In addition, an increasing number of Ukrainians are working to 
administer and implement assistance now as compared to the early and mid-1990s. The new 
meaning of “professionalism” suggests that learning is not just something expected from the 
assistance recipients but is also indispensable for administering and distributing assistance. For 
example, in my interviews at the USAID mission in Kiev two respondents emphasized that 
the mission’s approach became “more focused” and that the communication between the 
different divisions of the mission as well as between different donors improved, so that there 
is now more oversight and coordination.439 
The design of the recent USAID-funded civil society program UCAN also reflects 
some of these changes within assistance in Kiev: 
 
This was already much more professional also for the USAID and its staff 
[…]. We have worked for several months on Monitoring and Evaluation […]; 
we had to develop all the indicators, the measurements, the control groups. We 
have never worked like that before [on a USAID project].440  
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At the panel on “Ethics of Relationships between Donors and CSOs” a discussion 
took place about whether or not it is ethical to accept funding from donors in certain 
situations. However, together with the “new wrong mentality” idea, a new way to look at this 
issue was raised. It is also unethical – it was argued - on the part of the donors to offer funds 
for certain purposes or in certain ways. Olena Suslova, who has had a long experience in 
assistance projects, stated this very explicitly:  
 
The donors have been very negative about the level of corruption in Ukraine, 
especially in the beginning. However, I always felt so furious about the way 
they operated themselves. They were working in cash and did not bother to 
ask for any serious proofs on how the money was spent. They were clearly 
tempting people. They were tempting people with a bribe, which is a crime in 
itself, you know!441 
 
These attitudes are emerging not only in Ukraine. A Georgian civic leader expressed a very 
similar concern in his recent article in an NGO newsletter: “Many international organizations 
also ignore Georgian law: they do not bother to register their offices properly or to register 
their staff in the government’s taxpayer list. To avoid taxes, they use the personal accounts of 
their expatriate employees to pay salaries to their local employees.”442 These and other similar 
statements point to a discrepancy between donors’ proclaimed professional norms and their 
modes of operation on the ground.  
Such a critical attitude towards “assistance” is different from either suspicious and 
negative or uninformed but positive attitudes towards it that were typical of the early 1990s. I 
argue that it became possible due to the close interaction between Ukrainians and Americans 
in Kiev and to the standards of “professionalism” shared (even if with slightly different 
meanings) by both sides. In the next section I investigate whether these changes in meaning 
also led to the transformation of another important discursive center, “sustainability”.  
5.2.3. Sustainability: Who takes over 
 
Although “sustainability” has always been an important discursive center in the discourse of 
assistance, in Kiev its use peaked recently, when many major donors and especially USAID 
faced the need to “phase out” soon. The discursive center of “sustainability” as the basis for a 
“phase out”, which (as discussed in chapter four) was introduced in Washington DC, can also 
be found in Kiev. For many Ukrainians mediating the assistance it is important to become like 
their Western partners. They are eager to learn the skills of those partners because they believe 
that they could be doing their jobs just as well. Here the story of a Ukrainian organization, 
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CURE – the Center for Ukrainian Reform Education, is indicative of the workings of 
“sustainability” and its implications.  
 CURE is registered as an international charitable organization that is active not only in 
Ukraine but also in other countries of the former Soviet Union. Its goals are “to provide 
information support to economic, political, and social reforms in Ukraine and to increase 
Ukrainian citizen involvement in the process of reforms that promote the development of 
civil society and a market oriented democracy.”443 It was created on the basis of the Ukrainian 
Market Reform Education Program (UMREP), one of the bigger USAID projects in Ukraine 
since 1993 (Ukrainian Reform Education Program/UREP since 2002). The U(M)REP was 
dedicated to conducting public information and education campaigns on the national and local 
level. It was particularly well known for its TV and radio programs concerning privatization 
and other market reforms; its overall purpose was to popularize the reforms among the 
Ukrainian population. The U(M)REP was established as a joint project of the governments of 
Ukraine and the United States through USAID and was no different in its structure and mode 
of operation from other USAID projects. As usual, it was implemented by subcontracting 
organizations, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers or Gavin Anderson (at different times and 
together with other subcontractors). The fact that this project is now implemented by CURE 
signifies more than just a change of abbreviation, for CURE is one of the first subcontractors 
organized and run by Ukrainians. One of its long-standing coordinators, Victoria Marchenko, 
now with USAID Media and Civil Society Programs, recalls: 
 
In the beginning there were many foreign experts working on the project 
because we had no proper expertise. Then, gradually, we were pushing out the 
foreigners because we became more professional. I have an MBA in marketing 
communications myself, you know. So we started with 12 foreign experts in 
1993 and we ended with none.444  
 
Now the Center is one of the few Ukrainian organizations that receive direct funds 
from such donors as USAID, the Charles Steward Mott Foundation, the National 
Endowment for Democracy, and the International Renaissance Foundation, because its 
financial management and audit procedures meet donors’ requirements. CURE is a “success 
story” that reflects the ideas and aspirations of many Ukrainian assistance professionals in 
Kiev, while at the same time it serves as an embodiment of the discursive center of 
“sustainability/phase out”. This is significant because the donor-driven understanding of 
“sustainability” has converged with locally shared notions of success, and has materialized in 
particular organizational forms that are “sustained” exclusively by Ukrainians.  
Another example of assistance tasks being delegated to a new Ukrainian organization 
is the Ukrainian Women’s Fund (UWF). The UWF was founded when the Network Women’s 
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Program445 run by the Soros Foundation446 in Ukraine was phasing out and had as its primary 
goal to take over that Program’s tasks. This development was part of the general “phase-out” 
strategy that the Soros Foundations are currently implementing in most of the former Soviet 
countries. With start-up funding from the Global Fund for Women (USA), the UWF was 
founded in 2000 and is mostly engaged in fund-raising and grant giving. It provides grants to 
women’s NGO projects that vary considerably in their goals and financial needs – from a 
94,162 USD project to buy a mammography scanner to the (typical) series of trainings of up 
to 2,000 USD and trips abroad to attend conferences on topics related to NGO activities.  
An important addition to the structure of grants is a special category of grants for 
newly formed and start-up NGOs. Since 2001 the UWF even provides funding for women’s 
organizations to register as NGOs. There is also additional funding for UWF grantees that 
would like to become hubs of information for their respective region and to reach out to 
NGOs from smaller cities and villages. In this way the UWF aims to spread the NGO 
network throughout the country and, thus, in a way revives the “capacity building” approach 
of “letting a thousand flowers bloom” from the early 1990s, which I discussed in chapter four. 
This time, however, the “thousand flowers” approach is much more about building up an 
effective network than just encouraging NGO growth. The UWF director Natalia Karbowska 
explained to me: “When we receive grant applications, we do not always know where they 
come from, nor do we have an opportunity to travel every time to meet this NGO.” Bigger 
NGOs that act as information centers are envisioned as “contact persons” for the UWF in 
different regions of the country. Women’s NGOs seem to be picking up on this initiative: Out 
of 22 projects supported in the spring of 2005 about one third are aimed at working with 
smaller and newly registered organizations.447  
The UWF is another Ukrainian NGO whose rationale and operations fit 
organizational requirements of assistance. In other words, this is a Ukrainian initiative that 
received its impetus from both Ukrainian and American concerns to preserve assistance 
projects to women. It uses its relative independence to draw more on Ukrainian experiences 
with assistance and the lessons learnt but it maintains the overall discursive and organizational 
structure of assistance as shaped from abroad.  
Another important example is the “Empowering Education” program. “Empowering 
education is a pedagogy of empowerment that prepares boys and girls for their roles of mutual 
support, civic activism, and state building on the basis of partnership models.”448 Its 
methodology relates to other approaches in pedagogy, such as Feminist Pedagogy, Civic 
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Education, Critical thinking, and Debate.449 It is thus a mixture of approaches that were 
introduced as part of alternative methodologies and trainings for assistance, especially by the 
Soros Foundation. Its founder explains the impetus for developing such a program in the 
following way:  
 
When I first visited a training [on women’s leadership organized by Winrock 
International] in 1995, I liked it a lot. However, lots of other Ukrainian women 
did not like it at all. They were saying: “again those Americans are pushing 
something on us!” or “this is not our thing, all this sitting in a circle and 
discussing stuff, it contradicts our mentality.”450 I was trying to understand why 
we have such different impressions. […] We started our program 
[“empowering education”] in order to show that this can be something for us. 
[…] This was both, thanks to and despite of American influence. We wanted 
to find those best things we could borrow for ourselves.451 
 
In 1997, the all-Ukrainian Association of Empowering Education and Communication 
was registered. In 1999 it became one of the Soros Foundation Network programs. Through 
the Soros network it has spread into the following countries: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The program has also conducted 
trainings for trainers in Afghanistan, Burma, and Indonesia. Currently, the theme and the 
methodology of “Empowering Education” are widely known both to NGOs and to donors. 
For the Soros Foundation it has become the only network program that originated in a former 
Soviet country. Different women’s NGOs apply for grants to implement “empowering 
education” in the same way they used to apply for donor-initiated programs. In 2004 the 
Ukrainian Women’s Fund (UWF) supported six NGO projects aimed at “conducting trainings 
on empowering education” or “implementing empowering education programs”, and even at 
“creating networks between NGOs working on empowering education.”452 Whereas in the 
examples of CURE and the UWF Ukrainians took over an assistance project, what is 
significant about this program is that Ukrainian women themselves created a project that is 
now being exported as part of assistance elsewhere around the world.  
 The donor-driven understanding of achieving “sustainability” through establishing 
assistance-like organizations also found its application in the concept and practice of creating 
and supporting Resource Centers throughout the country. The Eurasia Foundation is 
implementing the biggest resource center’s initiative funded by the USAID. According to the 
criteria of the Eurasia Foundation, Resource Centers grew from the NGOs that by 1996 had 
already demonstrated a track record in working on donor projects, had experience in training 
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NGO leaders on a broad range of issues concerning organizational management, and had 
their own libraries with specialized literature. They were meant to represent or even replace 
donors on the ground in that they would be conducting most of the work connected with 
administering grants, such as “professional support to NGOs including information provision, 
assistance in program design and their expertise, modeling development strategies for NGOs 
in the region, their effective management, consultations on writing projects, and choosing the 
potential donors to receive grants.”453  In addition, the resource centers could take over some 
of the technical and legal responsibilities for projects proposed by groups that are not yet 
registered as NGOs and, thus, help them become NGOs in the future. Although this project 
was also meant to help donors reach the smaller NGOs in the region, what it did is to 
strengthen a few better-established NGOs and turn them into local replicas of their foreign 
donors’ organizational set-up.  
Another element of the idea of “sustainability” that is shared among both Ukrainians 
and Americans in Kiev concerns financial independence from the donor. Whereas in the early 
1990s assistance administrators were reporting on activities they supported financially, now it 
is considered a sign of improved “sustainability” to report on activities that were not 
supported and could take place anyway. Instead of saying “we paid for this and this and that”, 
nowadays the assistance implementers say “we only paid for brochures, or for rent; the rest 
NGOs did themselves.”  
Active involvement of Ukrainian professionals in running assistance programs in Kiev 
played an important role in transforming the meaning of “sustainability”. This discursive 
center became more specific and its new meaning reflects the tensions between the foreigners 
and the Ukrainians and their conflicting visions for the future. These tensions are also evident 
from the negotiations of meaning of the other two discursive centers: “capacity building” and 
“empowerment”. In the following section I focus on the specific realm of gender and 
women’s issues and show how the dialogue between the foreigners and the Ukrainians 
transformed the meaning of such discursive centers as “women as a target group”, “women’s 
empowerment”, and “gender”.  
 
5.3. Gender and Women’s Issues: How Are They Mediated?  
 
As I have highlighted above, Kiev is a site in which the direct dialogue between “Westerners” 
and “Ukrainians” is most intense. In the early to mid-1990s most of the “Western” women 
who came to establish contacts with local women’s groups stayed in Kiev; and up to the 
present day most foreigners are based in the capital, although their visits to other cities have 
increased substantially. Many Ukrainian women I interviewed in Kiev complained about the 
initial lack of understanding between the two sides. Overall, the feeling was that the foreigners 
who came knew little about the situations and the concerns of Ukrainian women and yet acted 
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in a fairly authoritarian and self-confident way. Ukrainians, who lacked any previous contacts 
with foreigners, mostly did not know English and felt particularly self-conscious in front of 
the guests from the “civilized” world, were not very outspoken and, thus, did not help bridge 
the gap in communication. Olena Suslova, one of the veterans of the Ukrainian women’s 
movement, recalls:  
 
There was a group of women from the United States [back in 1992-93] and we 
were to meet them in the library. Very few of us knew English, and so there 
were boys and girls interpreting, which was difficult because they were trained 
in Soviet universities and also did not know many of those terms. We were invited to 
discuss women’s issues but we were quite shy in the beginning. So those 
American women started explaining to us what they do back at home. They 
said they were working on changing the welfare system because, for example, 
at the time medical insurances were not covering important services like 
dentists, which is too expensive for many women and so on. I was looking at 
myself and at other women – we could not buy food at the time, our whole 
political, social, and economic life went completely upside down. And so we 
were listening to those ladies as if they flew in from Mars.454  
 
This recollection points to important features of the early dialogue between American 
and Ukrainian women-activists. Americans assumed that women-activists are the same 
everywhere and are preoccupied with similar issues or at least can relate easily to other 
women’s concerns. They were not conscious of the lack of similar terminology and of the 
inappropriateness of certain formats for interaction. The fact that both were not familiar to 
local women inhibited their ability to contribute to those exchanges freely and on equal 
footing. Such interactions on women’s issues had the same features as other civil society 
interactions I have addressed in the previous section. In this section I show how these 
interactions re-enact core discursive centers that define women’s issues.  
5.3.1. Women as a target group: “At risk” of what? 
 
I begin by exploring further the (re)interpretation of the discursive center of “women as a 
target group” by looking in more detail at the USAID Anti-Trafficking Initiative in Ukraine. 
This Initiative consists of three key components: prevention, protection, and prosecution. 
These include such measures as “public education and outreach”, implemented through 
USAID media programs as in the Community Response to Trafficking and Domestic 
Violence Program (DOS), and work with enforcement and prosecution personnel as 
implemented through the International Organization for Migration (IOM); there are also 
projects directly connected to women affected implemented by Winrock International, namely 
the Trafficking Prevention Program (TPP) and the Women’s Economic Empowerment 
program (WEE). These two programs are seen as mutually reinforcing components that 
address the issue of trafficking.  
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While the initial push to develop a program on trafficking came from Washington DC, 
the initiative and its components were mostly designed in Kiev as a result of collaboration 
between several external American experts, the USAID Mission in Kiev, and Winrock 
International. The issue was new and relatively unexplored, and those who designed the 
initiative had a mandate to develop a new model and use new tools.  
The Trafficking Prevention Program (TPP) started in 1998 as a pilot project and 
continued with additional funding till 2004; it established seven Trafficking Prevention 
Centers, called “Women for Women Centres” (WfW), in the country on the basis of existing 
women’s NGOs that were members of the NIS-US Women’s Consortium. The selection 
criteria for those NGOs were “demonstrated experience in cooperating with other NGOs, 
health providers, and the legal community, as well as with the local government.”455  These 
centers were conducting three types of activities: the job skills program, the crisis prevention 
program, and provision of legal services. A year later, in February 1999, the Women’s 
Economic Empowerment (WEE) program started and continued till July 2004. It established 
six Women’s Business Support Centers that offer business training to women and cooperate 
with affiliated credit unions to support their students in starting up their own businesses. Both 
TPP and WEE were conceived as “preventive” programs aimed at working with “women as a 
target group”, namely their aim was to identify and work with “women at risk” of being 
trafficked rather than with actual cases or victims of trafficking. As I will show later on in a 
discussion of the discursive center of “women as a target group”, their connection to 
trafficking remained very loose, and the notion of “women at risk” was reinterpreted to a 
considerable extent.  
The third component – “prosecution” – was addressed through another project, 
Community Response to Domestic Violence and Trafficking in Humans (DOS), which 
continued from 1999 to 2002. This project was funded by the US Department of State Bureau 
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and was aimed at conducting research into 
domestic violence and trafficking, working with NGOs and community leaders, conducting 
public awareness campaigns, and cooperating with government officials, law enforcement, 
court systems, and medical institutions. Therefore, its main goals and objectives were not only 
defined on the basis of “women as a target group” but included other target groups as well.    
This component is now part of the new project funded by the USAID and 
implemented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM). One of its core goals is:  
 
Increasing awareness by ensuring that governmental and community leaders, 
service providers and the general public are well informed about the problem 
of trafficking in persons, and that at-risk groups are knowledgeable about how to 
protect themselves and are motivated to do so.456 
 
                                                 
455 Winrock International. "Trafficking Prevention in Ukraine: A Pilot Program." Winrock International, July 
1998. 
456 USAID/Kiev. USAID Is Launching "Countering Trafficking in Persons in Ukraine" Project [cited 28 April 2005. 
Available from http://www.usaid.kiev.ua. 
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The discursive center of “women as a target group” is at the core of all these programs; 
however, its meaning is not the same in each of them. 
The “preventive” nature of TPP and WEE does not mean that they work to stop 
those who perpetrate trafficking but that they prevent those women judged likely to fall victim 
to trafficking from finding themselves in that predicament. One may argue that this is not the 
most logical interpretation of the idea of “prevention” and choose to advocate other methods 
of combating trafficking. For the purposes of this chapter, however, I do not go into that 
debate; instead, I analyze the effects this idea of “prevention” has had on the core discursive 
center of “women as a target group”. Namely, it implies that there are reasons that expose 
women to the dangers of trafficking and there are things that can be done to affect their risk 
of such exposure. In other words, the question is who are those women that have to be 
“prevented” from being trafficked and why are they “at risk” of being trafficked.  
A broad definition of “women as a target group” in both TPP and WEE implies that 
potentially all women are “at risk” of being trafficked; their susceptibility is explained by their 
psychological and physical weakness as well as by ignorance, lack of experience, and an overall 
disadvantaged position in society. The discursive center of “women as a target group” that 
developed in Washington is reiterated – women are generally disadvantaged because they are 
women and compose a marginalized group. For example, the need for an economic 
empowerment program for women in Ukraine is described as follows:  
 
Ukraine’s transition from a centralized to a market economy has brought 
progress as well as problems. Women have been left out of the process or alienated by 
the closing of state enterprises, with women constituting seventy percent of the 
newly unemployed. Grossly under-represented in public institution leadership, 
they are less likely than men to be elected to decision-making positions.457 
 
Here the general idea is that women as a whole experience transition differently from men and 
are generally more likely than men to lose out. Thus, they need to benefit from women-
specific interventions. This means that women are already, by virtue of being women, at 
greater risk of falling victim to both domestic and external threats.  
In terms of domestic conditions, a connection is made to two issues: domestic 
violence and the lack of women-entrepreneurs. In both cases, it is argued that women are 
treated unfairly because they do not believe in their own powers and have internalized the 
status of being oppressed. This meaning of “women as a target group” is developed through 
the idea of crisis prevention implemented by WfW Centers. Crisis prevention trainings, walk-
in services, and telephone hotlines focus on the following themes: women’s leadership, 
women’s human rights, prevention and dealing with instances of trafficking. An important 
element of the program is to support groups that consist of women dealing with similar 
situations and are led by a professional psychologist. Interactive trainings that take place 
                                                 
457 Winrock International. "Project Fact Sheet: Women's Economic Empowerment: Ukraine." Kiev: Winrock 
International, 1999, emphasis added. 
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within TPP are said to be aimed at “increasing self-confidence of women, and helping women 
develop basic practical life skills.”458 
Another component of the TPP program addresses the issue of domestic violence. 
What is interesting here is that, despite a seeming coherence of the TPP program, there is 
hardly any evidence that establishes a direct connection between domestic violence and 
trafficking in women. Moreover, the vagueness of this connection is recognized by program 
implementers themselves.459 One of the respondents suggested that this connection was first 
introduced in a study of trafficking and domestic violence conducted by the Minnesota 
Advocates for Human Rights (commissioned by the US Department of State and completed 
in 2000). Although this connection remains unclear for people who deal with the issue of 
trafficking, TPP made its contribution in naturalizing it. The TPP program speculates that 
victims of trafficking often come from dysfunctional families or have suffered from abusive 
husbands, in other words, that the target group originates in an oppressive context. These 
experiences are said to have aggravated psychological problems of those women, in particular 
the so-called victim syndrome. What is important here are the discursive shifts from defining 
women in their entirety as “at risk” to searching for specific pathologies that increase women’s 
susceptibility to trafficking. In other words, there is a tension between the fact that women are 
defined as one uniform target group and the specificity of the issue.  
For TPP, women are “at risk” because they are “in crisis”. The TPP crisis prevention 
component suggests the following symptoms of women in crisis: lack of self-confidence, 
feelings of loneliness, hopelessness, and negative attitudes towards life, thus adding a highly 
psychologized and medicalized quality to the target group. This reiterates the idea of 
inadequacy and lack of agency on the part of women and constructs the target group as the 
locus of abnormality. The Crisis Prevention Program is repeatedly reported to have been 
capable of fighting these feelings in women through a series of trainings, consultations, and 
sessions in self-help groups.  
The idea that women lack self-confidence, and that these psychological problems 
prevent them from seizing the opportunities there are for them, is strong in the Anti-
Trafficking Initiative as a whole. For example, the target group of Women Business Support 
Centers (WBSC) funded through Winrock International as part of the WEE program is 
defined as “women who, while motivated, lack funds, self-confidence, training, and 
experience.” It is argued that women are constrained by their “preconceptions about the 
difficulty and even impossibility of starting a business.” As a result, one of the important 
components of WBSC’s activities is seen to be “the interactive training method and 
atmosphere, where participants develop relationships that last beyond the course.”460 One of 
the core trainings delivered by WEE on “how to start your own business” reads: “The aim of 
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459 Tymoshenko-Yakunina, February 18, 2003, April 14, 2005; Samolevska, February 4, 2003, interviews by 
author. 
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the training is to increase inner women’s potential to resolve vital problems, to raise the motivation 
of self-occupation, to provide basic knowledge on entrepreneurship, and to acquaint women with 
realities of running their own business in contemporary Ukraine.”461 Here the emphasis is put 
on psychological intervention, helping to adapt and building self-confidence. At the same 
time, the practical knowledge that is to be provided through training is only “basic”, as if such 
a level is more than enough for women to get started. In addition, the need to introduce 
women to the realities of running a business implies that they do not have an idea (or have the 
wrong one) about how things “really” work in their own country. 
This meaning of “women as a target group” that is “at risk” because of their ignorance 
and lack of experience is most prominent in discussions that are directly related to the issue of 
trafficking. This is, first and foremost, visible in the awareness-raising component of the 
project. The image that comes across in most of the trafficking stories and, most vividly, in 
the USAID-funded three-part fictional docudrama “If I Do Not Return” features naïve 
inexperienced girls who are deceitfully lured into trafficking by criminals in disguise. These 
young women are shown as not taking the responsibility for their lives, as captured by dreams 
of easy and flamboyant futures. Their experiences are ultimately the experiences of having 
been turned into a commodity within a highly criminalized context. 
Ideas of the incompetence and inadequacy of women are prominent in the stories that 
report the actual instances of trafficking. For example, Julia, 24 years old and single, is said to 
have “… dreamed her life would turn into a fairy tale – that a prince in shining armor would 
whisk her off her feet and take her away from all her problems.” Her story continues with the 
experience of being trafficked through an Internet marriage arrangement. “Dreaming about 
the shiny world out there” is a persistent metaphor in descriptions of instances of trafficking. 
These representations overemphasize the irrational and emotional side of women who end up 
as victims of trafficking. Too often do these women come out as incapable of thinking for 
themselves. Another victim of trafficking presented in “Women’s Stories” is said to have been 
put on the ferry and told that “the ship would take her to the United States, where she would 
be met. Of course, the boat was not bound for the U.S. but for Turkey. L. found it out too 
late – she was already en route when she learned of the ferry’s destination.”462 Not calling into 
doubt the instance of trafficking itself, it is still difficult to comprehend how a twenty-four 
year old woman in her own country could get on a ferry without knowing its destination, not 
to mention the fact that there cannot be any direct ferries from Ukrainian shores to the U.S. 
for the mere reason of geographical distance. Interestingly, the study conducted by Winrock 
International itself reveals some puzzling figures that contradict the constructions discussed 
above. According to this study, up to 12% of Ukrainian victims of trafficking for sexual 
exploitation admitted knowing they would be in the sex industry prior to their departure.463 
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TPP program constructs “women as a target group” as ignorant and, thus, being 
particularly “at risk” should they cross their country’s borders. A recent assessment conducted 
by Development Alternatives Inc recommends targeting anti-trafficking more effectively and 
identifing “at-risk” groups in a more informed way. It contests the current understanding 
behind identifying the target groups that defines those “at risk” as those who are highly 
interested in going overseas for work or marriage and those willing to break rules or take risks 
to do so.464 More has to be done to improve our knowledge about factors that create the 
difference between successful migration and instances of trafficking. The assessment 
emphasizes that those people willing to take risks or break rules may be more likely to migrate 
but they are not necessarily more likely to be trafficked. In addition, it points to the fact that 
an unspecified treatment of “women as a target group” leads to overlooking particular 
categories of cases. 
 
One particularly at risk group that does not seem to be the focus of many 
prevention programs includes women who are already involved in prostitution 
in their countries of origin. […] In addition, many such women may already be 
victims of internal trafficking. Yet, in many countries of the region, few 
programs are targeting the prevention of internal trafficking into the sex 
industry.465 
 
Further, methods and tools of anti-trafficking programs have to be tailored to particular forms 
of trafficking, as, for example, children of certain ethnic minorities are at higher risk of being 
trafficked for begging. This “target group” clearly needs a different type of assistance than 
highly educated but currently unemployed Ukrainian women. Thus, the assessment further 
expresses concern about a remarkable silence over victims of trafficking for other than sexual 
exploitation, especially concerning the trafficking of men and exploitation of male migrants. 
“In fact, possibly as a result of the style and content of trafficking awareness campaigns, there 
is widespread belief that trafficking in persons is synonymous with trafficking for 
prostitution.”466 
The increasing awareness of these inconsistencies and problems in defining “women 
as a target group” in the context of the issue of trafficking has led to important shifts in the 
meaning of this discursive center. The most recent Anti-Trafficking Project incorporated 
many important changes that respond to criticisms and reinterpretations discussed above. 
USAID started to fund a new initiative “Countering Trafficking in Persons” (TIP) in Ukraine 
over the period July 2004 – June 2006. This project is implemented by the International 
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Organization for Migration (IOM) Mission in Ukraine. Technically, the project differs from 
those implemented by Winrock in important ways. It builds upon the existing partner network 
of NGOs in 25 different oblasts of Ukraine, including seven “Women for Women” Centers. 
Its main tool is funding NGO projects through micro-grants. Such direct support constitutes 
92% of the operational budget. Overall, IOM can support up to 40 such NGO projects. This 
means that NGOs can apply with their own projects for funding on a rolling basis. In practical 
terms, this means that, rather than being a coherent program with centrally developed 
components as used to be the case with TPP, TIP is more of an umbrella structure to a varied 
set of NGOs that propose to address one or several of the TIP priorities. These priorities are: 
1) increasing awareness about the issue of trafficking; 2) assisting victims and insuring their 
rehabilitation; and 3) strengthening coordination of national and regional counter-trafficking 
programs.467 
At the moment (2006) there is only one program funded within the USAID Anti-
Trafficking Initiative. The USAID budget for this initiative for 2004-2006 is roughly half of 
what was allocated in previous years. The TIP program is as much the result of this lack of 
funds as it is of the changing approach that USAID/Ukraine developed towards the problem 
of trafficking. The agency chose a project that allows it to substantially cut administration 
costs, while at the same time providing a framework for more focused initiatives and covering 
all the regions of Ukraine. The NGO members that form this network obtain the funding to 
maintain and expand their own activities rather than to start a new project. This is evident 
from the variety of approaches and tools that are reported by participating NGOs. For 
example, the former “Women for Women” Center in Donetsk continues to work according to 
the methodology developed for the TPP project. Another NGO, “Salus” Charity Foundation 
based in Lviv (in the west of Ukraine), has been providing medical, diagnostic, and 
information services to victims of rape and violence since 1996. The Foundation keeps this 
more specialized medical focus also in the framework of TIP. It provides consultations before 
and after HIV testing, ultra-sound gynecological examinations, venerological consultations and 
monitoring of medical treatment and other related medical services.468 Such a focus would not 
have been funded within the framework of previous USAID Anti-Trafficking Initiatives, and 
yet it is one of the services much needed in the context of victim rehabilitation. 
In response to the criticism469 that all the previous components of the Anti-Trafficking 
Initiative had no focus on providing practical assistance to the actual victims of trafficking, 
TIP explicitly aims at “assisting victims and ensuring their dignified reintegration.”  
 
Reintegration assistance helps trafficking victims rebuild their lives. 
Rehabilitation support not only helps victims of trafficking, but also the 
families who lose mothers, fathers, sisters, and brothers to trafficking. These victims are 
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able to return to their families and become healthy and productive members of 
their communities.470 
 
Not only does this program introduce a new component of reintegration, it also redefines and 
broadens its “target group” in significant ways. It defines women in a broader context of their 
social relations. A more open and less prescriptive discursive structure of this new program 
also enables alternative ideas of “target groups”. One such proposition that would not have fit 
any of the previous USAID trafficking programs came from the Coordinator of USAID 
trafficking programs, Tetyana Tymoshenko: “We also have to pay attention to the demand side 
of the trafficking problem. It is important to understand who those clients are and how we 
could target them. This is a very interesting issue, which is completely under-researched.”471 
TIP is also less exclusively oriented towards issues of slavery in the sex industry and 
includes other forms of exploitation into its area of concern. The example below illustrates 
this shift. A victim of trafficking from Donetsk, a big industrial city in the east of Ukraine, is 
said to have had a degree in economics and yet to have been unable to find a full-time job. She 
opted for taking up a seasonal construction job in Russia, which she arranged through a 
representative, paying a fifty-dollar fee. However, in Russia her passport was confiscated and 
she was forced to work seven days a week on construction sites. This example cited on the 
home page of the USAID Mission in Kiev is important for its apparent lack of resemblance to 
more “juicy” and sensational stories I quoted above. The victim is neither too young nor from 
a small rural place. The work abroad she chooses does not seem lucrative in any way; 
moreover, the “abroad” itself is practically next door. Her choice of destination is not clouded 
by romanticized images of the distant Promised Land. Coming from a mostly Russian-
speaking city, she is unlikely to face any linguistic or cultural hurdles. She ends up doing the 
job she planned but without any pay or opportunity to complain, rather than getting into the 
plot of a crime novel. Unfortunately, this is something that could have also happened within 
her own country.  
The IOM is increasingly focusing on different forms of exploitation; for example, it 
organized a workshop titled Development of Counter-Trafficking Mechanisms in Ukraine; Non-Sexual 
Forms of Exploitation in Kiev on 16th  February 2006. In the following section, I discuss the 
implications of such (re)enactments of “women as a target group” for the issue of “women’s 
empowerment”.  
5.3.2. Women’s empowerment: Gender or “ladies’ trifles”?  
 
Surprisingly, Kiev is the only site of interaction in which the discursive center of “gender” is 
employed in significant ways. The term “gender” is widely used among Ukrainians in Kiev (by 
now also in other bigger cities like Kharkov or Dnepropetrovsk) despite - and in fact thanks 
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to - its clearly foreign origin. Larisa Tatarinova, UCAN Program Director, explained this 
dynamic in the following way:  
 
When gender equality projects started, they were brought in from the outside; there 
was no need for them. But those were world-recognized approaches and so they 
were important to know. Now that many people have been trained, we can 
start thinking whether we need it at all. Maybe Ukraine does not need this but 
it is good that people know this terminology well and understand different 
approaches.472 
 
What is very important in this quote is the alignment of the discursive center of “gender” with 
that of “international/ world community”: These concepts are important because knowing 
them allows one to qualify for participation in the “world/ international community”. In fact, 
it is in this context that “gender” has gained more prominence in Kiev than it did in 
Washington, even though its origins are clearly with the latter. And yet, the meaning of 
“gender” in Kiev is not the same as that employed by most assistance professionals or trainers 
in/from Washington DC. Larisa Tatarinova explained further: “Gender does not mean 
fighting for women’s rights, whereas 99% of people, including those who do gender trainings, 
think this is one and the same thing. This is absolutely incorrect! […] For us, gender is about a 
proper balance between sexes, about their synergy.”473 She explained to me why her project 
does not address either women’s issues or gender education:  
 
Our project [UCAN] is oriented towards local needs […]. We conducted many polls 
and roundtables and we understood that this topic is of no priority to our 
NGOs. Moreover, they already know a lot about it. There have been so many 
trainings on this topic; every second NGO leader has been trained. So we have 
decided not to do it.474 
 
In other words, “gender” is utilized by Ukrainian women who mediate assistance to justify 
their lack of interest in women-specific programs. They point to the convergence between 
“gender” and “women’s issues” that is typical of most assistance policies in order to show 
how the “proper” meaning of “gender” is being misunderstood in assistance.  
Another Ukrainian respondent, who asked not to be quoted by name, restated this 
idea in a much more critical tone:  
 
As far as technical assistance is concerned, I think that all the money spent on 
gender trainings and all these other ladies’ trifles is money wasted. People have 
simply learnt how to say not a “chairman” but a “chairwoman” […] people have 
received salaries, there is no harm in it, of course, but these ideas will not live 
on. 
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“Ladies’ trifles” (zhenskie shtuchki) is a somewhat derogatory term that simultaneously refers to 
little tricks and ladies’ bijoux and has a diminutive connotation. The phrase is colloquial and is 
commonly used in private contexts. In the context of women’s programs, its original meaning 
as well as its misplaced usage point to the uselessness and empty nature of those programs.  
The fact that the NGO sector is highly feminized is stressed to further ridicule the 
notion of the oppression and discrimination of women. The notions of “professionalism” and 
the emphasis on delivering a competitive product or service that I have discussed above 
contradict the idea of civil society as a “safe haven” for marginalized groups that is popular in 
Washington DC. Instead, Ukrainian women emphasize that in NGO work it does not matter 
whether you are a man or a woman as long as you are professional enough.   
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
5.4.1. What it means to mediate assistance 
 
In Kiev the actual content and method of the assistance discourse is (re)interpreted through 
the interaction between Americans and Ukrainians. This interaction is facilitated through a 
new discursive center, that of a “world/international community”. Even though this center 
has an external origin, it connects to the local Ukrainian aspirations, especially among the 
professional elites in Kiev, to bridge the gap between Ukraine and the rest of the “civilized 
world”. However, the notion of “community” is somewhat misleading here, since in the 
context of “assistance” this space is not shared between its members in the same way. Rather 
than having equal status within the community, Americans and Ukrainians are related 
hierarchically as teachers and students, and this division is maintained through the boundaries 
of expertise. Moreover, the goal of teaching is not to develop the capacity of the recipients of 
aid per se but to enable them to work efficiently on the tasks defined by “assistance”. 
As I have discussed in chapters one and two, some researchers have rightly argued that 
the new assistance elite has a stake in sustaining assistance rather than alleviating the problems 
for which it is given.475 And yet, my own findings show that becoming part of the assistance 
machinery has also granted agency to that elite. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not 
this agency is going to make local knowledge matter more in the assistance discourse. In other 
words, giving the locals more voice does not directly translate into more locally relevant 
assistance programs. If this local agency is driven by the survival concerns that are shared 
between Ukrainian and American assistance professionals, it may help solidify the existing 
assistance discourse and practice rather than substantially transform it. On the other hand, if 
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new meanings of mediating “assistance” gain more prominence, assistance discourse and 
practice in Kiev may indeed change.   
5.4.2. What it means to mediate between civil society and assistance 
 
In Kiev the dynamic of “capacity building” is largely shaped by the interaction between 
different mediators of assistance, both American and Ukrainian. Acting together in the shared 
space provided by the discursive center of the “world/international community”, both sides 
work to mediate the ideas of “assistance” that come from Washington and the Ukrainian ideas 
of what “assistance” can do. As I indicated earlier, this is not an interaction of equals, 
although the two sides need each other for “assistance” to take place. Americans are the ones 
who know how assistance works and see their task in teaching this to their Ukrainian 
counterparts. “Capacity building” means that Ukrainians are taught how to apply for 
assistance, manage grants, do reporting, and so on. The Ukrainians who have gone through 
this training are supposed to become trainers themselves and to disseminate this knowledge 
further, to smaller NGOs and outside of the capital. In this way, “capacity building” has the 
meaning of socializing Ukrainian counterparts into the “assistance” world. The important 
components of “capacity building” on this level are “seed grants” and “trainings”; the former 
is the practical embodiment of the “thousand flowers” idea and the latter is the socialization 
tool.  
The success of socialization (as defined by the assistance discourse) is particularly 
visible in the example of the “Empowering Education” program, which was developed by 
Ukrainians according to the “assistance” rules and now travels back along the assistance chain 
and is incorporated into the “assistance/aid” package that is offered to other countries or 
“regions”. Other examples of successful socialization would be the increase in Ukrainian staff 
within various grant-giving agencies and the appearance of fully Ukrainian organizations that 
have become eligible for implementing and administering “assistance” projects that were 
previously given only to their American counterparts.  
The assumption of socialization into a shared space gives an interesting tilt to the 
notion of “empowerment”. For Ukrainians mediating the assistance the issue of the “wrong 
mentality” inherited from the Soviet period is believed to have been overcome early on 
through the “capacity building” efforts. These Ukrainians are positioned as the “enlightened” 
group, the ones whose task is to spread the word further. Ukrainians are considering 
themselves as just as “professional” as their American counterparts, and just as suited to doing 
the assistance job. From this perspective, instances of corruption and misallocation of 
resources are understood by Ukrainians in a new way. Rather than blaming them on the Soviet 
legacy, they attribute these problems to the failures of assistance itself. An opening embodied 
in the notion of the “new wrong mentality” has emerged that recognizes the problem of 
mentality but attributes it to the malfunctioning of assistance itself. Due to the understanding 
of assistance as a “community” of which the new Ukrainian assistance professionals see 
themselves as part, “empowerment” is defined in terms of improving the assistance itself. 
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Thus, even though the assistance discourse itself is not questioned, some room is created for 
its change from within by Ukrainians.  
Along the same lines, the notion of “sustainability” acquires an additional meaning. 
Although the idea of leaving behind a set of organizations that would be capable of managing 
assistance on their own is not questioned directly, a debate is opened on what organizational 
forms and activities can realistically live on beyond the assistance cycle. This debate opens up 
the meaning of assistance and introduces questions as to whether assistance is conducive to 
“sustainability” at all. 
5.4.3. What it means to empower women 
 
In Kiev the meaning of the discursive center of “women as a target group” has undergone 
substantial transformation over the cause of the last decade. This is particularly visible in the 
changes incorporated into the most recent Anti-Trafficking Initiative – the Countering 
Trafficking in Persons program implemented by IOM. The notion of “women as a target 
group” is redefined both to make it more specific and to include other potential target groups, 
such as family members, male migrants, or trafficked children. Particularly visible are the 
attempts to redefine the issue of trafficking so as to include various other forms of 
exploitation rather than just slavery in the sex industry.  
The idea of providing women with a women-specific space and programs that is 
developed in Washington DC is often treated with skepticism, if not with overt hostility, in 
Kiev. Pejorative terms such as “zhenskie shtuchki” (ladies’ trifles or tricks) are used to point to 
what Ukrainians believe to be a simplistic view of women’s empowerment. Moreover, in Kiev 
the notions of “women as victims” and “women’s empowerment” are perceived as largely 
incompatible. In other words, women are believed to be empowered not through giving them 
the special status of an oppressed and underprivileged group but through denying them that 
status and showing that women do not have to be treated any differently than men. It is 
emphasized that gender roles, divisions, and conflicts encumber both men and women 
equally. 
Interestingly, Ukrainian women who have undergone assistance training mobilize the 
term “gender” to open up the meaning of “women/ women’s issues”. Although “gender” 
remains a specialized term with no equivalent in Russian or Ukrainian, some Ukrainian 
women perceive that it allows them to dispute the assistance on its own terms by showing 
their proficiency in the assistance language and, thus, their own “professionalism”. In the next 
chapter I move to the other site of interaction – within local NGOs. By taking the same three 
steps – from assistance, to civil society, to women’s NGOs – I elicit the stability as well as 
transformations of discursive centers of the civil society assistance discourse.  
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Chapter 6: At a women’s NGO. 
 
This chapter explores what sustains the civil society assistance discourse on the ground and 
more specifically within women’s NGOs located outside of the Ukrainian capital.476 Below I 
lay out the mechanisms through which the assistance discourse is sustained and/or 
reinterpreted in interactions on the ground and discuss how these discursive mechanisms 
structure the nature and activities of NGOs and define their conditions of possibility. As with 
the previous chapters, the goal is to bring out the interaction between actors as well as 
between concepts. I answer three related questions: what it means to be assisted, what it 
means to be(come) an NGO, and what it means to be addressing a gender or women’s issue.  
 According to the Bakhtinian framework of dialogical discourse analysis, this site of 
interaction is characterized by fewer immediate encounters. This means that, especially on the 
most general questions of the meanings of assistance (in section 6.1.), the interaction takes 
place more on the level of the symbolic and the imaginary rather than on the level of practical 
rules of the game (as in Kiev). Moreover, this site of interaction is the most fragmented one – 
geographically as well as discursively. Given this complexity of the site, my primary focus in 
this chapter remains on capturing local responses to and understandings of the civil society 
assistance discourse – a more modest task than reconstructing the whole range of discourses 
that characterize this site of interaction.  
In the first section I investigate the crucial convergence between the imported notion 
of assistance and the local opposition between the “West” and sovok (Soviet legacy). I argue 
that this convergence is what facilitated the acceptance of assistance as teaching and the 
symbolic importance it has in the local context. Importantly, this also grants legitimacy to the 
forms of knowledge that come from the outside. In the second section, I look more 
specifically at assistance to civil society and investigate the workings of three discursive centers 
– “capacity building”, “empowerment”, and “sustainability” – that I have identified as key to 
the civil society assistance discourse also in the other two localities/ sites of interaction. 
Within local NGOs these discursive centers are largely sustained through the notions of 
“trainings” and “information” and are reinterpreted on the basis of a local notion of 
“professionalism”. The new meanings that they acquire locally makes these discursive centers 
operate in a much more individualized and even privatized capacity than in the other sites of 
interaction. “Trainings” and “information” ensure short-term security for the NGOs that 
                                                 
476 Even though both NGOs in Kiev and those outside of the capital have different levels of access to the 
various resources available from foreign donors, their location (in Kiev or outside) remains crucial for their 
development.  
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accommodate them most efficiently, as they provide a direct entry to donors’ resources and 
adherence to donor’s agendas and practices. However, in the longer term the effects are an 
over-emphasis of the format at the expense of the content of NGO activities and an 
aggravation rather than mitigation of the impact of the volatile socio-economic situation in 
Ukraine on the NGOs. In the third section I adopt a specific thematic focus on gender and 
women’s issues. I analyze how the discursive centers of “women as victims”, “gender”, and 
“women’s empowerment” are retranslated and reinterpreted within local NGOs dealing with 
gender and women’s issues.  
 
6.1. Assistance: “The West Is the Best”?  
 
The purpose of this section is to explore what it means for local women’s NGOs to be 
assisted as described so far. I show how this meaning is sustained through the convergence 
between assistance as teaching and the home-grown opposition between the “West” and sovok 
(Soviet legacy).  
In the local Ukrainian discourse the “West” is not a reference to specific countries, 
rather it is an idealized notion of what (post-) Soviet Ukraine is not, but would like to become. 
In this sense it is different from the concept of “world/ international community” that 
developed in Kiev, which refers to the actual interactions with professional actors from 
countries like the US or EU member states. The concept of the “West” is loaded with ideas of 
prosperity, opportunity, and of being accepted by the “world community”, being recognized 
as one of the “developed and civilized countries”. It is not prescriptive in the sense that it 
does not promote a particular model of development; rather, it embodies the aspiration to 
change and the willingness to accommodate many different models that come from the 
outside. These ideas of “catching up” and of “progress” converge to a certain degree with the 
donors’ discourse of “assistance”/”transition”. The “West” is considered a standard to look 
up to, a “civilized world”. Historically, it has a certain positive ring about it because during the 
Soviet period Ukrainians were deprived of direct access to it, and were often led to believe it 
was an antipode to everything that was bad about the Soviet system. After the collapse of the 
Soviet system, synchronizing with the “West” is seen as a way to bridge this gap and to prove 
that Ukrainians are capable of leading a “civilized life” according to “proper” standards. In 
many interactions that I had in Ukraine the “West” is identified as a reference point on many 
levels – from the functioning of political institutions to the quality of consumer goods.  
This local discourse has facilitated the convergence between the Western discourse on 
“assistance” as top-down teaching of Ukraine by the “West” and the local discourses and 
practices, thus making assistance part of the local reality rather than just an import. The 
resulting locally negotiated meaning of assistance emphasizes the need and the importance of 
adopting western models and developing the ties with the Western world. One should not 
underestimate the significance of these discursive centers for the way in which the interaction 
between assistance agencies and the local NGO leaders has developed. These meanings 
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facilitated the acceptance of being influenced from the outside, and they stand for the locally 
attributed legitimation of “being assisted”. This argument, however, should not be read as 
claiming that the locals were naïve in their interpretation of assistance or blind to its 
drawbacks. On the contrary, they have taken up different meanings of “assistance” in creative 
ways. If we want to understand the effects of assistance on local NGOs, it is key to look at 
what forms and meanings assistance takes as it goes outside of the donor’s office.  
In order to understand the encounter between American assistance and Ukrainians, 
one first has to look into some concepts through which the latter had related to the “West” 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union. As some personal accounts I collected in Ukraine 
indicate, seven decades of the Soviet state in Ukraine477 were marked by a rigid opposition 
between this socialist country and the capitalist “West” that was constantly reinforced through 
ideological propaganda as well as the complete impossibility of immediate access to the reality 
of the “West”. In the popular perception, however, the “West” became an embodiment of 
everything the Soviet state was not. Moreover, as people were becoming disillusioned with the 
Soviet system, it acquired a positive connotation (although, of course, not for everyone in the 
same way). The “West” was imagined as a land of plenty, a “really existing”478 example of a 
truly functioning democracy and market economy, the place where all the wished for things 
not conceivable under socialism could easily come true. The increasing disillusionment with 
the Soviet system and the belief that the alternative could be looked up in the “West” can 
actually be seen as some of the factors that facilitated the collapse of the Soviet Union. Well 
before the actual encounter, the idea of the “West” held a significant place in the (post-) 
Soviet symbolic order. 
As my fieldwork experience indicates, developments in Ukraine are widely discussed in 
relation to the actual or imagined situation in the “West” also today. Interestingly, knowing 
that I was coming from a Western institution, some people I interviewed referred to the 
(perceived) difference between Ukraine and the “West”. Sometimes when asking for an 
explanation for why things function one way or another, I would be told that it was “simply 
because here it is not the West, you know.” In other words, people measured Ukrainian 
problems in terms of the overall distance of the Ukrainian situation from that in the “West”. 
The concept of the “West” also holds one of the central places in the visions of an alternative 
future, of things that should come now that socialism has withered away. These ideas are 
directly linked to a new post-Soviet notion of “professionalism”, which is a notion that 
captures the post-Soviet inspirations to learn new skills and acquire new professions. I will 
explore the workings of the notion of “professionalism” in more detail in the next section.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the “West’s” opposite, the notion of socialism 
transformed from something that defined people’s existence in very real ways to a symbolic 
                                                 
477 Here seventy years are counted from the first proclamation of the Soviet state, which initially included the east 
of Ukraine and a few years later Kiev. Other parts in the west of Ukraine were annexed to the Soviet Ukraine 
later, on the basis of the secret Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact of 1939 and after the Second World War.  
478 “Really existing” is a reference to a cliché widely used in official Soviet propaganda on “really existing 
socialism”.  
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notion of a historical legacy. It received a derogatory name - sovok479 – that was used to refer to 
everything that people saw as typical of the socialist system and were hoping to overcome – 
from the old consumer goods and services to the mentality associated with the system. The 
notion of sovok embodied a widely shared belief and aspiration that new models had to be 
introduced and old ways extirpated. Thinking in terms of this opposition is widespread in 
Ukraine even now, since everyone in their thirties or older has experienced the Soviet system 
and its collapse.  
This discourse is also very visible among NGOs. For example, the Memorandum of 
the League of Resource Centers reads: “The level of awareness of Ukrainian citizens remains 
post-totalitarian: the values of civic responsibility have not been formed and the traditions that 
would help develop civil society in Ukraine are absent.”480 Here the values and the mentality of 
Ukrainians are presented as backward, and the development of civil society is seen as impeded 
by them. The quote below introduces the solutions and the source of learning for Ukrainians 
that are supposed to help overcome this legacy. As one of the NGO activists trained at the 
Counterpart Creative Center Trainer School put it: “If we want to be a part of Europe, to 
become a world accepted country, world accepted nation, we need employees that have 
international worldwide vision. And the trainings help us prepare such people.”481 This quote 
introduces two important ideas: the aspiration to become a “world accepted” country, in 
which the “world” means first and foremost developed countries, and the construction of an 
“international worldwide vision” as a new mentality for which the “West” serves as a 
reference point.  
In this way, the propagandistic Soviet opposition between capitalism and socialism was 
not given up after the collapse of the Soviet Union but reinvested with new meaning. The new 
meaning of the “West” is based on the aspiration to catch up and to re-enter the world 
community. Much significance is attributed to proving that “we are not like some developing 
country, we are good enough to be part of the civilized world.” Adopting the Western models 
and making them work in Ukraine is an important part of the new meaning of the “West”. 
This optimistic view is of course not the only one that can be found in Ukraine, and it clearly 
has a stronger call for younger professionals based in metropolitan areas. Thus, the positive 
notion of the “West” is not an idea that exhausts the complex world of present-day Ukraine; 
rather it is the one that proved vital in the life of assistance on the ground. The “West”, 
although not a clearly worked out concept, is a discursive center that helps accommodate the 
idea of assistance as teaching and holds together the discourse of being assisted.  
 Being assisted in terms of learning from the “West” means that NGOs have to look 
up to their foreign donors and their Western counterparts to receive guidance as to their 
                                                 
479 In addition to the phonetic similarity between the words sovok and Soviet, the literal meaning of sovok is 
“dustpan”. It is this parallel with a dull household object that gives the word its derogatory connotation.  
480 League of Resource Centers. Memorandum of the League of Resource Centers, October 15, 2003 [cited 10 June 2005. 
Available from http://www.ligarc.org.ua. 
481 Counterpart Creative Center. Trainings [cited 20 July 2005. Available from http://www.ccc.kiev.ua, emphasis 
added. 
 167 
identities and possible and meaningful activities. Illustrative is the history of one of the 
women’s NGO that I visited. Its director Liliia Kim recalled the following beginnings:   
 
We had our first conference, and our mayor at the time suggested me as a 
president of the Women’s Fund. That was in 1994, and I really had no clue 
what we were going to do in the beginning. Then in 1995 I went to Beijing, 
where I met lots of women and I understood that we were really lagging behind over 
here. So I started to explore, to ask about the foundations, how to write grant 
proposals, and so we started to write projects, started working.482  
 
This NGO was initiated by a new team of civil servants as part of a democracy reform 
package that, as I discussed earlier, had a strong NGO component. However, the activities of 
this NGO only gained form and content after its leader was exposed to similar practices in the 
“West”; and for her “working” itself became synonymous with applying for grants and 
interacting with foreign donors. Thus, the innovation here comes from the “West”, or rather 
from the local understanding of what the “West” is.  
 Similar framings of assistance can be found, for example, in the description of the 
history of the League of Resource Centers: 
 
The experience of civil society development in Western countries has long ago 
been generalized and the state and development of the Third Sector 
researched. Educational courses on different aspects of NGO management 
have been designed on the basis of such research. Since 1993 this knowledge 
together with the financial support has started coming to Ukraine.483 
 
As is evident from the quoted paragraph, the development of civil society in Western 
countries is assumed to be an appropriate model also for Ukraine. The interchangeability of 
the term “civil society” with the “Third Sector” that is increasingly common in the assistance 
discourse is also taken for granted. Moreover, a slight frustration slips through in the text – 
since the “West” has had these experiences before and done its “homework” by writing them 
up in neat guidelines, why would one want to reinvent the wheel? In other words, the fact that 
the “West” holds the appropriate knowledge is framed as widely accepted. The legitimacy 
granted to Western models is enhanced by the choice of the word “knowledge” and its 
position in the sentence – it is mentioned first, as something of higher importance than, in this 
case, financial resources. These ideas area also captured in the quote below: “While in other 
countries the Third Sector is well developed, and non-governmental non-for-profit 
organizations act professionally to tackle certain social issues, in Ukraine they have been 
developing mostly in an amateurish way.”484 What is constructed in this quote is an opposition 
                                                 
482 Kim, 20 April 2005, interview by the author, emphasis added. 
483 League of Resource Centers. History of the League, December 4, 2003 [cited 10 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.ligarc.org.ua/, emphasis added. 
484 Deichakivskiy, Mykola, Oleksandr Sydorenko, and Natalia Iasko. Tretii Sektor V Ukraini Ta Organizatsii Shcho 
Rozbudovuiut' Ioho Infrastrukturu [Third Sector in Ukraine and the Organizations That Build up Its Infrastructure]. Kiev, 
1996. 
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between the outside – “other countries” – and Ukraine, in which the former is defined as 
“well developed” and “professional”, while the latter is “developing” and “amateurish”. From 
this opposition comes the justification for learning and “catching up”.  
Introducing things that come from the outside has a strong legitimacy. This, however, 
does not mean that these things really exist in the “West” – talking of “import” is somewhat 
misleading here. The relevant models were not brought back into the country by Ukrainians 
with a thorough knowledge of the western context. Instead, they originate in the imaginary 
“West”. Quite telling in this context is another notion, the use of which goes far beyond the 
realm of NGOs or of assistance. It is the notion of “euro”. Contrary to what an English 
speaker would assume, it has very little to do with Europe. “Euro”-offices, “euro”-standards, 
“euro”-services are not copied from the standards and services that exist in various European 
contexts. Instead, the prefix “euro” is meant to signify that the things it defines belong to a 
new, non-sovok lifestyle. The distinction between these notions and the actual practices in 
Western or European countries is important. It highlights the fact that the locally perceived 
legitimacy of introducing Western practices into the Ukrainian context is divorced from the 
actual Western practices and has more to do with the home-grown discourse of catching up 
with the imaginary “West”.  
I argue that the opposition between the “West” and the sovok has proven crucial in the 
interaction between Western donors and local recipients of assistance. The discourse of 
assistance as a transfer of knowledge has been enhanced by the local ideas about the “West”. 
They have allowed Ukrainians to share with foreign donors in the belief that models had to be 
imported from the “West”, and that foreigners had something to say that was of value for 
Ukrainians. This finding is important because it shows that the idea of introducing Western 
models into the Ukrainian society was seen as valuable and legitimate not only by foreign 
donors but also by Ukrainians. It adds a new dimension to the story of the “locals” making 
pragmatic use of Western resources by pointing out that assistance has not only a material but 
also a symbolic significance for its recipients. However, as the discourse and practice of “being 
assisted” developed, a tension emerged between the idealistic notions of the “West” and the 
actual practices of receiving assistance. To explore this further, I look into the specific case of 
assistance to NGOs. 
 
6.2. Civil Society: “Professionals without a Profession” 
 
This section explores what “being assisted” means for a particular subset of assistance 
recipients – NGOs. It investigates what it means to be(come) an NGO in Ukraine and 
examines the reinterpretations  on the ground of the discursive centers that I have identified 
as key for civil society assistance: “capacity building”, “empowerment”, and “sustainability”. 
In order to understand these reinterpretations I look into the meaning of a local notion of 
“professionalism” that has simultaneously facilitated the acceptance of American civil society 
assistance discourse and prepared the ground for the main transformations in the meaning of 
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its key discursive centers, taking them away from their “original” meaning. I explore these 
transformations by identifying and analyzing the workings of such key notions as “trainings” 
and “information”.  
As I have shown in the previous section, the notion of sovok as a “wrong mentality” 
has justified a certain degree of acceptance of Western models; it has also facilitated the 
emergence of another important discursive center, that of “professionalism” as the “right” 
kind of mentality. Adhering to ideals of “professionalism” has made people more self-critical 
and more open to learning and training. It has also meant that successfully synchronizing with 
some “Western” ways is perceived as an achievement in and of itself.  
As some Ukrainians emphasized in their conversations with me, “professionalism” as 
a notion did not exist within the socialist discourse. People were expected to work because it 
was ideologically right. They were seen as little mechanisms within the large machine of the 
socialist state. Individuals were subordinated to the bigger authority of the “system” in both 
their private and public lives. At the workplace there was little incentive to perform beyond 
the expected minimum (or rather “maximum”) or to innovate. Illustrative is one of the Soviet 
sayings: “Initiative is punishable.” In the post-Soviet period, the notion of “professionalism” 
became one of the key anti-sovok notions, a way to break away from the constraints of the old 
system and to put the individual back into the symbolic order of the post-Soviet society.  
The convergence of “professionalism” with the discourse of assistance is important 
for understanding the direction in which Ukrainian NGOs developed. In the early 1990s 
Ukrainians were eager (but also forced by difficult circumstances) to acquire new 
qualifications, to learn new, better marketable techniques, and to master new professions. In 
this context, many also perceived NGOs as a new form of employment. This convergence 
enabled the creation of a whole infrastructure of NGOs whose sole purpose is claimed to be 
the improvement of “professionalism” of NGOs as well as of networks of NGO experts and 
professionals. An example is the network of resource centers, which is defined in the language 
of managerial effectiveness: “The ineffective management of the increasing number of NGOs in 
Ukraine called for the creation of organizations that would aim at delivering professional 
assistance to other NGOs.” A related idea is that for these goals to be achieved real “NGO 
specialists” are needed: “Creating resource centers in Ukraine will yield the biggest effect if they 
combine in a national network and increase their specialization in the functions in which the 
specialists of respective centers have reached the highest level of professionalism.”485 
 The centers position themselves in business-like terms:  
 
The League of Resource Centers of Ukraine connects organizations that work 
professionally on the development of the Third Sector in Ukraine. This means 
that the Kirovograd Creative Initiatives Support Center offers its clients a full 
package of services that are characteristic of an NGO resource center.486 
 
                                                 
485 League of Resource Centers. History of the League. 
486 League of Resource Centers. Members of the League, 2002 [cited 10 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.ligarc.org.ua/, emphasis added 
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The corporate language of “services” and “clients” turns NGO activities into technical 
operations. The actual “clients” with their concerns and in their diversity are absent from the 
reports of these NGOs. They are left anonymous, and their possible uses of the “services” 
offered remain obscure. The Resource Center for the Development of Civil Society 
Organizations “GURT” (Kiev) lists the following “services” it offers: “trainings and seminars, 
consultations, looking for partners, disseminating information about social events, and 
administering events and programs.”487 What is striking is that these “services” are presented 
in a way that makes them completely devoid of their own content. I illustrate this tendency 
further in the next sub-section dedicated to the notion of “trainings”. 
6.2.1. Capacity building though trainings 
 
“Professionalism” of NGOs is attained through certain tools, the most prominent of which is 
“trainings”. As I have shown in the previous chapter, in Kiev “trainings” are one of the key 
tools that fall under the notion of “capacity building”. On the local level of a women’s NGO, 
however, they transform into a powerful discursive center in and of itself. I argue that this is 
illustrative of an important impact of assistance locally – technical tools acquire a life and a 
meaning of their own and often push out other more specific notions or ideas.  
 The early experience of Ukrainians with “trainings” was not unproblematic. Many 
women felt ill at ease with sitting in a circle, doing team-building and “ice-breaking” exercises, 
having a round-about discussion instead of getting directly to the point. Others thought it 
childish and school-like that Americans were fond of drawing little schemes on those portable 
boards they brought to every meeting or training. Not only were these formats not commonly 
used for other public meetings organized by the locals, they did not fit with the teaching 
methods and educational formats in which Ukrainian audiences were trained. This disconnect 
made it easy for many Ukrainians to dismiss the whole message as “stupid” and “primitive”, 
adding to somewhat pejorative attitudes towards American culture in general. Even more 
importantly, however, these formats were conflated with “assistance” itself. In other words, 
being assisted meant learning these formats.  
The concept of “trainings” embodies more than just a kind of activity: This seemingly 
technical term orders the discourse that defines the purposes and the forms of activities 
conducted by an NGO. It defines the skills and tools that have to be attained for the purposes 
of establishing and successfully running an NGO, thus implying that there is a well-defined 
way to be(come) an NGO. I argue that the notion of “trainings” has a strong prescriptive 
influence on how NGOs emerge and function. In this subsection I explore the “life” of 
trainings within a local NGO.  
 “Trainings” include a multitude of mostly technical rather than substantive topics, 
such as training modules on planning, financial management, public relations, fundraising, 
project design, project management, report writing, etc. The idea of delivering a training is 
                                                 
487 Ibid. 
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disembodied from a specific problematic or a target group; almost any interactive exchange 
can be framed as a training. “Trainings” are meant to give (potential) NGO personnel certain 
tools for establishing and running an NGO; the elaborate programs of these trainings 
emphasize the importance of expertise in the technicalities of setting up and managing an 
NGO. The biggest emphasis is placed on acquiring new skills, learning new techniques, and 
taking up new formats. Through trainings on organizational capacity an NGO is constructed 
not as a means to an end but as an intricate prescription that has to be adhered to regardless 
of the ends. The way training modules are spread around the country reveals the assumption 
that the format of NGO activities should be the same regardless of the kind of work they do. 
There is a core of techniques that are believed to be universally important.  
 “Trainings” are meant to deliver the basic skills that are believed to be the basis for 
qualifying as an NGO in the first place. The assumption is that succeeding in having an NGO 
is an achievement in and of itself. Thus, establishing an NGO is seen as a tangible outcome of 
various projects (as opposed to focusing on what those projects did for local communities, for 
example). One of the key results that are often presented at the end of trainings or other 
projects is the creation of a new NGO. This is, for example, the case with the Youth City 
Council project in Rivne. This project, funded by the Counterpart Partnership Alliance, is now 
registered as a youth NGO, “Youth Council”, in the city of Rivne. At the end of a Eurasia 
Foundation Resource Centers project as well, two members of the League of Resource 
Centers registered two new organizations.  
 The aim of a training is not to make new skills and techniques work in a certain 
environment but to spread them further. For example, the Volyn Resource Center has a 
project called “The School of Developing Local Resources for NGOs”, in which it conducts 
trainings of 20 competitively selected NGOs throughout Ukraine. The main goal is to turn the 
trained NGOs into “models” for developing local resources and make them capable of 
training others themselves. Thus, the goal of the project is not to apply a particular 
methodology to some local issues but to replicate it within other organizations. This points to 
a significant tendency in the development of NGOs in Ukraine. The emphasis that is placed 
on the importance of acquiring technical skills and on successful management has an impact 
not only on the content and form of the trainings themselves but also on the direction in 
which trainings are taken afterwards, i.e. their after-project life.  
 One of the significant outcomes here is that Ukrainians are first of all trained to train 
others rather than trained to apply the new skills elsewhere. The director of the GURT 
Resource Center Vasylyna Dybaylo is quoted as saying the following about her participation in 
the “train-the-trainer” program organized by UCAN for its grantees: “The training and 
coaching I received was the most unique and effective I have ever received. It will profoundly 
and concretely affect my work as a trainer. I have learned how to use innovative teaching 
techniques and how to teach fresh materials.”488 This quote reflects the rationale of trainings 
                                                 
488 UCAN. Working for a Stronger Ukraine: Practical Resources to Help Civil Society Organizations Succeed. Kiev: UCAN, 
2003. 
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that are meant to improve trainings. It refers to the vast experience Dybaylo has already had 
with trainings and shows her commitment to continue offering trainings further.  
 The need for organizational capacity trainings is framed as a commonsensical idea that 
there has to be an NGO in place before meaningful civic action can happen. The idea that 
NGOs have to be preceding their initiatives created a phenomenon that I term an “NGO set” 
- several organizations in one created by the same leader(s) to cater to different types of 
projects with different eligibility criteria. One such set that I have researched counts seven 
different organizations run by the core personnel of five women working together since 1994. 
The agenda of the respective NGOs in this set reflects the shifts in the funding priorities of 
major donors. Among other projects, the set features a women’s credit union since 1997, a 
women’s crisis center and a shelter for victims of domestic violence since 1998, and a recently 
formed youth club.  
 “Trainings” connect directly to the discourse of assistance as teaching. One of their 
most important functions is the construction of learning and expertise. The skills necessary to 
run an NGO cannot be developed on the basis of experience in a certain area; they have to be 
taught by qualified experts. Thus, the role of “NGO experts” is significant. “Trainers” are the 
people who have not only been trained themselves on specific topics but also passed through 
“trainings of trainers”, thus acquiring a new marketable qualification. Conducting a “training” 
is a skill in high demand in the NGO world. Again, the implication is that trainings are not 
seen as a means to acquire a tool that could be utilized in some future activities; they are 
themselves valuable skills that can be turned into an activity in its own right. There also 
emerges a professional divide on the basis of trainings. Being proficient in “trainings” creates a 
certain affinity among the groups that belong to the “training” network. In this sense, 
“trainings” work as a kind of gate-keeping mechanism towards the groups and NGOs that 
have not had this kind of experience and cannot demonstrate the same skills.  
 From the beginning, training services were offered at a rate higher than the actual 
demand for them, and thus a discourse developed simultaneously on why it is important to 
pass through a training – to justify their new skills “trainers” had to develop a discourse on its 
significance. “Trainings” were hooked into the idea of “professionalism”, in a way creating a 
divide between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ of the training world, a socialization pattern that would 
define the “right” trajectory of NGO development. For example, the League of Resource 
Centers and its members position themselves counter the first civil society organizations that 
are said to have had “badly concealed political goals” from the very beginning and to have 
engaged mainly in protest actions. The organizations that grew out of these earlier civil society 
groups and  
 
… their leaders received the experience and the skills of running an 
organization only through the actual day-to-day experience, from their personal 
life experience, and drawing on their previous education. Expert knowledge of 
NGO management was practically inaccessible in Ukraine at the time.489 
                                                 
489 League of Resource Centers. History of the League, emphasis added. 
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Here indigenous concerns and daily experiences are subordinated to the “expert knowledge” 
that is framed as a much sought-after resource.   
 The importance of technical expertise is spread through the language itself, which 
employs a great deal of jargon, making it at times impenetrable for a lay person. Here my own 
fieldwork experience is illustrative. Many of my interviews conducted in Russian and 
Ukrainian were transcribed by a Ukrainian research assistant, who had done this kind of work 
before but not with interviews on this particular topic. As I got back to my office and started 
listening to the interviews, I was surprised to discover many passages either missing or full of 
mistakes that, at times, changed the meaning to its complete opposite. Upon closer inspection, 
I realized that the person simply could not follow some of the interviewees whose speech was 
heavy with technical terms and English words. Frustrated at first, I then became excited about 
being pointed by an outsider to something that both I and my informants – steeped in our 
common language of NGO expertise – were taking for granted. The lack of intelligibility of 
the NGO language came through at once.  
To illustrate this issue, I offer the following quote from one of the NGO web sites, 
which reads: “Civil society organizations need increasingly more services ranging from very 
simple ones (technical assistance, trainings) to more significant ones (facilitation, lobbying).”490 
Here, “technical assistance” is a term that is not self-evident for outsiders to the assistance 
world; one would need to explain what kind of assistance is meant. Also, most people would 
connect lobbying to US politics and would not see its applicability to the Ukrainian context. 
“Trainings” and “facilitation” are transliterated English words that have no meaning at all 
outside of the NGO – donor community. The use of cryptic language that sounds vague and 
supposedly clever and the proliferation of technical terms and English words create a 
boundary of “professionalism”, an insider jargon that keeps at a distance those who have not 
mastered it. This tendency sits uncomfortably with the idea of self-sustainability or even 
independence of NGOs. Ironically, both are the key objectives of many donor programs.  
The transformations of the discursive centers described above show how the same 
concept can change its meaning in significant ways when it is employed in a different site of 
interaction. However, these transformations do not make these notion less powerful. For 
example, the impact of the discursive center of “trainings” can be seen in the way NGOs 
absorb the format and allow it to substitute for other kinds of activities that they can be 
performing. In this sense, the format of what an NGO should be and how it should function 
has taken over the NGO world at the expense of the content. This tendency is also visible in 
the way the meaning of “empowerment” has changed tremendously compared to its 
understanding in Washington DC.  
                                                 
490 Volyn Resource Center. About Us, February 17, 2005 [cited 11 June 2005. Available from www.vrc.rv.ua. 
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6.2.2. Empowerment through information 
 
Another donor-introduced discursive center - “empowerment” and specifically the idea of 
empowerment through information - is substantially transformed within local NGOs. 
“Information” is constructed as something that has a value in and of itself, regardless of what 
kind of information it is and through what kinds of channels it is disseminated. Just to 
illustrate this point: Out of 31 projects supported by grants that were administered by the 
Creative Center Counterpart (a Kiev-based NGO that among other activities administered the 
grants from EU Tacis and the EU-US Transatlantic Initiative) in 1996-97, 18 mention as their 
goal or their primary activity “information and consultation services”, “to create information-
methodology center”, “to increase information flow”, “to improve knowledge”, “to provide 
information”, “to spread ideas”, “to conduct seminars and trainings”, “to create information-
education center”, “to share information.”491 Also the following quote shows that information 
is believed to be a sufficient means of civic intervention: “To promote citizen participation we 
have published seven brochures dedicated to the activities of the Third Sector and two 
‘Guides of Chernihiv NGOs’ that contain exhaustive information about fifty active city 
NGOs,” says the AHALAR Resource Center in Chernihiv.492 
 For the majority of NGOs whose work I researched, acting on an issue involves first 
and foremost disseminating information on that issue. Moreover, very often the information 
does not have to be connected to a specific issue at all. The idea that NGOs are there to be 
hubs of information is so naturalized that no explanation of the purpose of that information is 
required. NGOs engage in a range of activities aimed at disseminating information, such as 
consultations, seminars, and roundtables and in institutions dedicated to disseminating 
information, such as resource centers. The League of Resource Centers sees its role in 
“disseminating the information about the role of the Third Sector in a developed society among 
broader public, private and public structures.”493 Here the information is important not 
because of the work that NGOs do but because the Third Sector plays an important role in 
any “developed society”. Here one can again see the connection to the notion of the “West” 
as an embodiment of the state of being “developed”. 
 Framing NGO activities in terms of “information” facilitates increased flexibility for 
people working in an NGO in terms of their priorities and activities. It supports the practice 
of diversifying agendas (and, thus, sources of income) as much as possible, while at the same 
time ensuring maximum continuity in NGO structures of activities and personnel. To ensure 
inflow of grants, NGOs have to follow donors’ priorities rather closely. To make sure they 
                                                 
491 Counterpart Creative Center. "Activity Report for 1996-2001." Kiev: CCC, 2002. 
492 League of Resource Centers. Members of the League. 
493 League of Resource Centers. About Us, 2002 [cited 17 July 2005. Available from http://www.ligarc.org.ua. 
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don’t miss the boat, NGOs invest in the stability of the format of their activities at the 
expense of the content of what they do. For example, a woman told me during one of my first 
interviews back in 2001: “Strange you are interested in women’s NGOs: really, you see, you 
don’t do women these days, now all the funding is going to youth programs.” Acting on her 
own advice, she is now the head of a youth NGO that often combines work on women’s 
issues with the theme of youth by, for example, organizing education activities for girls. 
 NGOs do not have to have expertise in a certain issue area to be able to disseminate 
information on it. Since every new topical interest of the donors comes with funds available 
for supporting the associated “information and awareness campaigns” throughout the 
country, there is always a way to claim eligibility for those funds. In the case of the USAID-
supported nation-wide anti-trafficking initiative, the topic became so popular in the late 1990s 
that roughly half of all women’s NGOs introduced it onto their agendas. For example, an 
NGO dating back to 1995 started off by conducting mainly humanitarian, social safety net 
activities; then in 1998 the organization initiated a crisis center for women who suffer from 
domestic violence. Currently, its agenda is summarized as follows:  
 
DANA is currently focusing on civic education, emphasizing human rights, 
legislative activity, and a program directed against trafficking in women. It has 
raised public interest in this problem and created much press and TV attention 
on the issue. Thanks to DANA, a compulsory course in human rights was 
introduced into Ukraine's schools as a result of its efforts.494 
 
Another organization says its goal is “to promote democratization in Ukraine; to 
provide help to women and children that suffer from domestic violence; [and] to facilitate the 
growth of women’s NGOs in Ukraine.”495 Among its many varied activities, the NGO reports 
to be offering legal, psychological, and medical services to battered women and their children; 
organizing lunches and concerts for the disabled, veterans, and orphans; working with mass 
media and publishing newsletters and brochures; reading lectures to teenagers on prevention 
of trafficking and on the harmful effects of alcohol and drugs; and doing psychological 
trainings with women-prisoners.  
 Such eclectic NGO agendas make it sound like some of them are really inducing a 
profound change in several important fields (although the sheer range of activities seems an 
overstretch for any one NGO). In fact, they are disseminating “information” on every 
funding-eligible topic they come across. The implication is that NGOs do not develop 
expertise in a particular area or deepen their knowledge of a particular problem. Instead, they 
find it possible and meaningful to be doing everything and nothing at the same time.  
 To summarize, the discursive centers of “capacity building” and “empowerment” have 
found embodiment in two core notions of “trainings” and “information” that define the 
discourse on the ground on what an NGO should and can possibly do. The workings of the 
notion “trainings” are such that it inflates the space and the importance attributed to the 
                                                 
494 DANA. About Dana [cited 29 June 2005. Available from http://www.civilsoc.org/nisorgs/ukraine/dana.htm. 
495 Mir Zhenshchin. The History of Our Organization/ Unpublished Brochure. Kharkov, 2001. 
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format and the technicalities of managing an NGO and performing NGO-related activities. 
This prevents the NGOs from putting the format at the service of the content and the goals 
of activities. At the same time, the notion of “information”, instead of deepening the 
knowledge of NGOs, has translated into the idea and practice of having eclectic agendas and 
of not focusing on results. This brings me to the third discursive center of the civil society 
assistance discourse – “sustainability”. As I have shown, both “trainings” and “information” 
work in a way that kidnaps/hijacks the incentive of NGOs to define the purpose of their 
activities and to aim at tangible results. This promotes short-term thinking about the plans and 
aspirations of a particular NGO. These tendencies conflict with the volatility of the socio-
economic context in Ukraine that, to the contrary, makes people over-emphasize the 
importance of “securing the future” and “ensuring stability”. I explore this tension further in 
the next sub-section dedicated to local understandings of “sustainability”.  
6.2.3. Sustainability: Sitting on suitcases or finding the right business?  
 
The donor-supported idea of “sustainability” is tightly connected to reproducing NGOs and 
enhancing their dialogue with the donors. The incentive to reproduce NGOs is strengthened 
by the services that are made available to them. For example, the Volyn Resource Center 
reports on having offered  
 
568 consultation and information services to NGOs of Rivne and Volyn oblast 
in 2000 on the following issues: information about the programs of donor 
organizations, strategic planning for NGOs, writing projects to international 
donor organizations, accounting, and forming and registering an NGO.496 
 
This is a list of what one might need to know to be able to qualify for receiving NGO grants 
from various donors. In addition, the same resource center reports to be  
 
regularly organizing presentation meetings between foreign funds’ 
representatives and NGOs, spreading information that it receives from the 
funds, researching the Internet, and consulting other NGOs on the expediency 
of applying to particular funding structures. An additional service is offered to 
ease the communication between NGOs and foreign partners – the translation 
of projects, letters, and general information about the activities of a particular 
fund.497 
 
This naturalizes the idea that NGOs become successful and meaningful first and foremost 
through their connection to the donors. As a result, sustainability is defined in terms of 
proximity to the world of assistance, and the way to help NGOs is believed to be to socialize 
them into the culture of donor projects. This points to the power of the assistance discourse 
in that it managed to introduce “being assisted” as the only way forward for local NGOs. 
                                                 
496 League of Resource Centers. Members of the League. 
497 Ibid. 
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However, this donor-inspired meaning of sustainability is largely contested on the ground. It is 
admitted here that the activities that are funded in the name of sustainability – such as the 
Resource Centers - are not only limited in ensuring sustainability but are also often 
unsustainable themselves.  
 
The League of Resource Centers in its present form is not well fit to exercise a 
systematic influence on the activities of the Third Sector in Ukraine. The 
potential of separate organizations is not sufficient since the coordination 
mechanism between them is underdeveloped.498 
 
There are conflicting ideas about the sustainability of resource centers. According to 
Svitlana Suprun, Civil Society Consultant at the Mott Foundation:  
 
We sincerely hope that in the next phase of their development, the NGOs 
served by these resource centers will continue to substantially contribute to the 
strengthening of the civil society in Ukraine. We recognize that many centers 
will select new routes to advance their goals and may no longer exist as resource 
centers. Some will transform into training centers; some will become charitable 
foundations. Some resource centers may even close down as their personnel shift 
to other NGOs, businesses, or local government. All this reflects the 
evolutionary trends facing the development of Ukrainian civil society.499 
 
What creeps into these quotes is a doubt as to how sustainable these centers are once left to 
their own devices. Since practically all the funding was invested into strengthening the capacity 
of those particular NGOs and links between them, expressing such doubt means more than 
just speculating about the future. It puts in question almost eight years of assistance to 
resource centers as well as the idea that they have to be assisted at all as a means to improve 
the “sustainability” of Ukrainian civil society. While the proximity to donors’ procedures and 
agendas (as ensured by “trainings” and “information”) and donors’ funds improves the short-
term sustainability of NGOs to a significant extent, it stands in conflict with ideas about their 
long-term sustainability.  
 The homegrown notion of sustainability is very different from that of the donors and, 
in fact, does not depend on either “trainings” or “information”. It is also rarely embedded in 
the idea of an NGO itself. In fact, very few NGO activists I met see the NGO itself as their 
main focus of activity for the coming decade or beyond. They are either constantly “sitting on 
their suitcases,”500 despairing about the lack of clarity about the future, or complementing their 
activities with other “side businesses” (pobochniy biznes).  
 An example of the former is one of the “Women for Women” centers that I visited in 
2003, i.e. roughly one year before the funding for the Winrock Trafficking Prevention Project 
                                                 
498 League of Resource Centers. History of the League. 
499 Suprun, interview quoted in Eurasia Foundation. Eurasia News, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine. NGO Resource Centers: 
Time of Changes. Kiev: Eurasia Foundation, 2003-2004 (Winter # 4), emphasis added. 
500 Sidet’ na chemodanah is an expression that means one lives with an idea that one might need to move at any 
moment. 
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(TPP) was due to run out. The biggest concern of the organization back then was what they 
could possibly do in the after-funding phase. One of its leaders explained to me that it was 
most unlikely that other grants would give them an opportunity to function on the same scale, 
to maintain their personnel and their office space. The range of reactions the NGO was 
contemplating went from hoping the funding would continue to doing something completely 
different from trafficking prevention to giving up the idea of having an NGO altogether (at 
least in its present form). Clearly, these concerns were not helpful for developing a strong 
identity and a clear vision for the future of that NGO.  
 An example of the latter is an “NGO set” – several organizations in one created to 
cater to different types of projects with different eligibility criteria – that I encountered in 
Kharkov and that was partly funded through the other Winrock program on Women’s 
Economic Empowerment (WEE). Apart from being a City Council deputy and in close 
contact with the region and the city administrations, its leader opened her own consulting 
company, which is now offering some of the training modules that were developed under the 
Winrock program. More specifically, the company bids for tenders at the City Employment 
Office to provide employment and business trainings throughout the whole of the Kharkov 
region, making around 50-60,000 UAH per month501 and employing around 30 people as 
trainers. In addition, it sells specialized courses to entrepreneurs, such as on business writing, 
business ethics, etiquette, etc. “We understand how we can make money,” the director proudly 
stated.502 Another project is under way for opening a Business Internet Center that would 
offer information and consultancy services to businesses and connecting it to other similar 
centers around Ukraine. “Consulting is not very well developed yet, and for those who 
understand, this is a very good business. I really found my own business! All these restaurants 
I was doing before, I don’t want to be bothered anymore.”503 
 Thus, the more NGOs adhere to the discourse of “trainings” and “information”, the 
more their activities contradict the homegrown idea of being a sustainable and long-term 
arrangement. The dominant discourse creates conditions of possibility for particular kinds of 
NGOs: formalized business-like structures, a source of employment for their staff, whose 
technical expertise is prioritized over the issues they address. These NGOs are characterized 
by eclectic and frequently shifting agendas; they also find it difficult to be clear in their 
purpose and their future goals. Assistance was particularly successful at producing certain 
types of NGOs – ones that closely resembled their American counterparts which were 
implementing donor programs in Ukraine. These concepts do not exhaust the story of what 
NGOs in Ukraine are like and what they do; however, they point best to the regularities in 
NGO activities that can be attributed to the impact of foreign assistance. What is striking is 
that, although NGOs remain central to the discourse, the discussions about the democratic 
role of civil society have moved out of reach.  
 
                                                 
501 Between eight and ten thousand euro.  
502 Kim, 20 April 2005, interview by author 
503 Kim, 20 April 2005, interview by author 
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6.3. Gender and Women’s Issues: What Do They Mean Locally? 
 
In the following sections I examine two discursive centers: “women as a target group” and 
“women’s empowerment” that have structured the assistance discourse on gender and 
women’s issues in Washington DC and in Kiev. Similarly to what I found in Kiev, both 
discursive centers are extensively questioned and transformed. However, the notion of 
“gender” is not employed in these transformations and openings; in fact, its use at local 
NGOs is limited. Although the term is used by local NGOs in grant projects alongside other 
“assistance” terms, such as “trainings” or “information”, I have not found other ways of 
employment of “gender”. For example, an NGO from Vinnitsa is implementing a project 
with the support of the Ukrainian Women’s Fund that is aimed at “spreading the gender 
culture among the population of the region by organizing trainings with representatives of 
mass media, press clubs, and publication of information materials.”504 However, this term does 
not feature beyond such specialized “trainings”.  
6.3.1. Women as a target group: Is there really such a thing? 
 
As I have shown in chapters four and five, an important component of the notion of “women 
as a target group” is the idea that women are generally oppressed, discriminated against, and 
tend to fall victim to violence. Trafficking and domestic violence are interesting because 
“assistance” played a significant role in constructing them as central women’s issues. 
Especially with the issue of trafficking, donors’ interference has made a whole world of 
difference, and one could safely argue that it actually created the awareness and the 
infrastructure aimed at resolving the problem, even if not all donor programs were equally 
effective in addressing it. Despite this external push that was given to raising these issues, their 
relevance is hardly contested locally. Most Ukrainians are genuinely concerned about these 
problems and do not deny or downplay their significance for Ukrainian women and society as 
a whole. However, what involves much negotiation and contestation are the suggested causes 
of these problems and the proposed solutions to them.  
 While in Washington DC the discourse on these issues grounds itself in the discursive 
center of “women as victims” and makes an unambiguous connection to the supposedly 
universal idea of women’s subjugation and marginalization, local women go to great lengths to 
argue that these problems are not about women but about structural socio-economic failures 
in the society. Local women are particularly ill at ease with the idea that “any woman can 
become a victim of trafficking.” This construction was forcefully imposed during the USAID-
funded national awareness campaign. Ironically, these kinds of representations prompted the 
women working on trafficking projects to construct alternative stories, which downplay 
women’s susceptibility to trafficking, like the following one.  
 
                                                 
504 UWF. Projects Supported by UWF in 2004. 
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I have a friend who went in search for work to Italy; she had to stay in that 
square before she found a family to work for as a babysitter. She said she saw 
those people offering this kind of jobs but if you don’t want to, you won’t get 
into trouble. Of course, you have to be careful.505 
 
The argument is that women are not vulnerable because they are women or because they 
travel abroad. There is strong resistance to the tendency to view any international migration of 
women as equal to trafficking.   
Local reinterpretation of the discourse on trafficking has involved the substitution of 
this issue with a broader issue of migration. This is a way to ensure that the criminalizing and 
sensationalist framing of trafficking does not impact on other women who travel abroad, 
especially since increasing numbers of women travel abroad for work these days. It is a way to 
protect them from being stigmatized because of the power of the trafficking discourse. To 
these ends, a different locally coined term - “women returning from working abroad” - is 
introduced by some women’s NGOs, especially those working in the areas hardest hit by 
illegal emigration for work purposes. 
To counterbalance the trafficking discourse much space is given to discussing other 
experiences abroad and the importance of helping these women reconnect to their local 
communities when they come back. In many interviews that I have conducted in Ukraine the 
reasons for leaving the country for work are constructed in terms of difficult choices that 
people make and costs they pay, but also, importantly, in terms of pride they take in 
succeeding in these difficult struggles. For example, women taking care of the elderly in Italy 
are proud of what they are doing:  “Thanks to Ukrainian women Italian elderly are taken care 
of; … we have basically solved welfare problems of the Italian state.” “My Seniora is 82, and I 
have virtually raised her to her feet again because I need work. I have been consulting with my 
sister who is a doctor in Ukraine. My Seniora’s children see this.”506 The difficulties connected 
with working illegally and in a strange environment often get quoted as examples of women’s 
stamina and strength. Women are presented as the ones who took up the challenge of finding 
the money to feed and educate their children in times of economic despair, because women 
are stronger, whereas men have shown to be unable to quickly adapt to the changing situation 
in the country.  
 
Women migrate in bigger numbers; this is due to the demands on the labor 
market abroad but also due to Ukrainian feminine mentality. It is the mentality 
of a berehynia; 507 she would always rush to help, take the responsibility for her 
family; […] she goes to save her family but when she comes back the problems 
begin.508 
 
                                                 
505 From an interview at one of the Women for Women Centers, March 3, 2003, interview by author. 
506 From a documentary by Khabailo, Viacheslav. "Zamky Na Pisku [Castles on the Sand]." Ukraine, 2002. 
507 “Guardian-lady” in Ukrainian, a term especially widely used in national historiography and epos. 
508 Mruchkovska, 3 March 2003, interview by author. 
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The discursive center of “women returning from working abroad” helps redress the 
problem definition of trafficking and constructs new ideas about such notions as 
“vulnerability” and “trauma”. It is argued by women’s NGOs that “women returning from 
working abroad” often need assistance for dealing with traumas resulting from their 
experiences abroad. The “trauma”, however, is being re-positioned from beyond the country’s 
borders to the local and familiar settings. WfW staff quotes a so-called “post-immigration 
syndrome” – mostly psychological difficulties of reintegrating into one’s own society after 
having spent a considerable amount of time in a different country with a higher level of 
economic development. This “syndrome” is believed to be aggravated by the lack of 
information that migrant women receive about their home countries while abroad. These 
women often feel unfit for re-employment in their hometowns, firstly, because they are often 
seen as lacking some basic skills and knowledge that are currently in demand on the labor 
market, and secondly, due to the dubious, almost indecent, character that is being locally 
ascribed to their employment abroad. “They say: we know what you’ve been doing there!”509 
This other “trauma” is not a part of a woman’s body, like sickness; neither it is something that 
everyone is subjected to by the mere fact of crossing the border at her own risk (as the 
discursive center of “women as victims” implies). Rather it is something that is inflicted at 
home and, therefore, women should not be prevented from going but helped to stay abroad 
safely and assisted in coming back.  
The contestations of the discursive center “women as victims” are also strong when it 
comes to the issue of domestic violence. Women who work on this issue argue that this 
notion often creates more problems than it helps resolve. In one of my interviews it was 
explained to me that  
 
the law on domestic violence has this article on the so-called “victim” 
behavior. Just today we have had a visit from a woman who went to the police 
to report violence against her, and they told her she had been provoking the 
violence herself. In cases like this, the law turns against the victim and so we 
want to lobby for an amendment. This has to be done with several NGOs and 
we’ve already made an agreement with the others, and passed a resolution on 
this.510  
 
The solutions to domestic violence suggested are also closely related to the 
understanding of who should be helped and why. For example, most of the donor-funded 
activities to combat domestic violence involve various kinds of consultations and services to 
battered women, thus seeing them more as patients rather than as active agents. In contrast, 
the local agenda is often about giving the battered women tools to safeguard their positions 
by, for example, finding legal ways to ensure that battered women are not deprived of their 
homes or forced to relocate.   
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Remarkable is the example of an NGO coalition that is emerging in Kharkov to lobby 
for a change in the regulation concerning domestic violence. One of my respondents shared 
the following:  
 
Currently, the law on domestic violence says that battered women have a right 
to be provided with a shelter. We want to raise the question why those are 
women who have to leave together with their children, while the perpetrator 
stays in their common flat. What we suggest is that there should be a 
rehabilitation center for such men.511  
 
Undoubtedly, the nature of issues like domestic violence and trafficking in women is 
such that it involves criminal activities against women. However, what remains open to 
negotiation is the definition of causes of and solutions to these problems. Local women are 
disturbed by the way the “women as victims” discourse naturalizes the marginal status of 
women; instead, in the home-grown discourse more emphasis is placed on structural gender 
misbalances, lack of appropriate services, and the difficult economic situation in the country.  
 The problematic impact of the discursive center of “women as a target group” as it is 
defined in Washington DC is that women are often defined in negative ways as those who 
lack something, who are subjugated and marginalized. This further creates a tension between 
women as a target group and women working at NGOs. Since the NGO sector in Ukraine is 
highly feminized, representations of Ukrainian women generally are of direct relevance for the 
image and identity of the NGO staff, and local women’s NGOs are very conscious of this 
fact.   
6.3.2. Women’s empowerment is not only about women 
 
Another way in which the discursive center of “women as a target group” is reinvented locally 
is through questioning the existence of such a target group altogether. The discourse that is 
sustained by local NGOs breaks this notion up into multiple sub-groups that can be targeted. 
This move is based on the assumption that women differ according to their demographics and 
social backgrounds, and that each of the resulting sub-groups is affected by different issues 
and in different ways. Between June 1999 and March 2002 Winrock International supported 
13 women’s organizations working on the theme of women’s economic empowerment (WEE 
project). These projects defined a variety of target groups: unemployed women enrolled at 
local Employment Centers; women who were not satisfied with their salaries; women-mothers 
of children who suffer from consequences of the Chernobyl disaster; women from rural areas; 
women-farmers; women-entrepreneurs who just started their own businesses; and high school 
and university students. Depending on which target group an NGO worked with, it developed 
its own definition of the problem of women’s economic empowerment and the ways in which 
it can be addressed.  
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The problem of employment is argued by women’s NGOs to have regionally specific 
features and, therefore, to demand tailored approaches and context-sensitive definitions of 
target groups. For example, the Union of Rural Green Tourism in Simferopol developed an 
educational program tailored to promoting self-employment in the Bilohorodskiy rayon of 
Crimea, an area that is distinguished from other parts of Ukraine by the highest level of 
unemployment and the biggest number of repatriates. The Mykolayiv Women Business 
Support Center points out that each rayon of its oblast is characterized by a different set of 
problems as well as potentials; for example, Ochakiv is a resort area, Pervomaysk is mostly 
inhabited by the military, and Novy Bug is largely agricultural.  
Another attempt at specifying the target group is evident from the work of one 
Women for Women Center which targets teenagers from orphanage establishments. This is a 
particular group that due to the circumstances of being brought up in a relatively closed 
environment has different head start opportunities than other young people of the same age. 
The definition of a target group that carries the characteristics of innocence and incompetence 
is narrowed down to a particular case, whereas the definition of the problem that has to be 
addressed is broadened to include not only trafficking, and not only illegal labor migration, but 
also opportunities for starting one’s own life in Ukraine. “These are a group at risk indeed 
because they are not only unready to go abroad; they are not even ready to do anything 
outside of the orphanage.”512 It is through this construction of variety that the discursive 
center of “women as a target group” falls apart on the local level of women’s NGOs. This is 
also evident in the way the Anti-Trafficking Initiative turns from one whole project as it is 
envisioned in Kiev into several (almost) unrelated sets of activities.  
While in Kiev the Trafficking Prevention Program (TPP) and the Women’s Economic 
Empowerment Program (WEE) are seen as two components of the same bigger initiative, 
they work with different target groups on the ground. Women Business Support Centers 
(WBSC) are mostly reporting on their work with women from oblast centers, with higher 
education, aged between thirty and forty. Again, the selection criteria for most business 
training programs are such that they are more favorable to women with life experience and 
clear goals rather than to innocent and ignorant girls who are often described in the TPP 
project.  
Some of the success stories reported by Winrock International are illustrative of this 
bias. By the time Tetyana Aginina from Crimea came to the business training, she had already 
had a small hotel business in Phoros, one of the most luxurious places on the Crimean 
southern coast. She had gone from simply buying and renovating a house in Phoros to taking 
up a more proactive managerial position and turning it into a successful business. After the 
training, Tetyana organized a union of entrepreneurs and took up plans to include a 
conference hall in her hotel complex. Another training participant, Valentyna O. from Lubny 
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in Poltava oblast, had had a steep administrative career from being a doctor to becoming the 
head of a local clinic. She used the knowledge from the training to start a private clinic.513  
In fact, contrary to the idea that “women as a target group” have to be supported in 
their entirety, most women’s NGOs that implement women’s economic empowerment 
programs report having conducted selection procedures among the women-candidates for 
their trainings. Some NGOs even took pride in developing selection procedures rigorous 
enough to admit only the most promising candidates. For example, a women’s association in 
Makiivka, Zhinochiy Dar (“Women’s Gift”), developed a two-day training for women on how 
to find a job that is especially designed for women with university education. Other NGOs 
included the presentation of a business idea in their selection interviews. Such components of 
the women’s economic empowerment program changed its focus from women-specific 
empowerment to the socialization of women into the business world alongside men. Many 
Women Business Support Centers (WBSC) also did not offer their services exclusively to 
women, and although men remained a minority among those who received trainings, this 
further impacted local definitions of “women as a target group” as well as the identities of 
WBSCs themselves.  
These tendencies deepened after the funding from Winrock International had run out 
in 2004. Many of the NGOs that used to work on the women’s economic empowerment 
program now seek to increase their after-funding sustainability by offering competitive 
training services to a wide range of groups, first-time entrepreneurs as well as those who need 
more advanced training on specific topics. Some of the WBSCs started working with the 
concept of a family business, for example the Chernihiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Simferopol 
WBSCs. They report the growth of family business, especially in small towns and villages, and 
suggest more work has to be done to tailor the trainings to their particular needs.  
Overall, the idea of economic empowerment itself is connected to notions of 
economic success and entrepreneurial spirit. This spirit is argued to be shared by both men 
and women, a resource they have equal access to. Contrary to the idea that “women as a target 
group” are particularly disadvantaged due to their subjugated status as women, many women’s 
NGOs argue that women face the same problems as men and, therefore, it is not women who 
have to be empowered personally but structural problems that have to be resolved. The 
“Kharkiv Institute of Community Development” reports on the following findings of its 
survey conducted among women-entrepreneurs, representatives of women’s business 
associations, and civil servants in departments that deal with economic development and 
enterprise registration. According to the Institute, the problems that impede the development 
of small business in general are the same as those faced by women-entrepreneurs in particular. 
These problems fall into two broad categories: first, imperfections of public institutions, such 
as legislative frameworks, bureaucracy, corruption, etc.; second, lack of personal training of 
entrepreneurs in such areas as marketing, strategic business planning, etc.  
                                                 
513 Winrock International. "Women's Economic Empowerment, Final Report". 
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In another survey conducted by Winrock International itself, Women Business 
Support Centers were asked to name the most common obstacles that women face when 
starting a business. Out of a long list of obstacles that were reported,514 only a few were 
directly attributable to their status as women, such as births and lack of family support. In the 
stories that are told about the experiences of women-entrepreneurs obstacles are discussed in 
terms of structural and institutional failures that affect small business development in Ukraine 
as a whole. A business training participant, Iryna Kharchenko from Kiev oblast, came to the 
training with a long entrepreneurial experience. She had started her business in 1991 and 
reported that the main obstacles to her work were unfair interferences from the local 
government. Motivated by possible bribes and black profit, departments of the town 
administration terrorized her with endless inspections, a lawsuit, and unfair fines. Iryna 
recalled that “this led to a crash of confidence to such an extent that I stopped my work. […] 
Disappointment, dissatisfaction, and despair were my constant feelings.”515 Iryna saw 
corruption as a major factor and did not perceive it as affecting her more or differently 
because she was a woman.  
The local discourse on “women’s empowerment” through more opportunities and 
gender equality is quite strong, and many women like to emphasize that they are not 
discriminated against. In fact, the whole idea of discrimination against women is often 
perceived as a western import: “They have that problem there.” Rather than seeing this as 
some kind of denial and false consciousness, I argue that these ideas point to an alternative 
discourse on gender and women’s issues in Ukrainian civil society. Thus, tension arises 
between the discursive center of “women as victims” of oppression and the homegrown 
concerns with structural factors and gender misbalance and, ultimately, “women’s 
empowerment” through addressing those. 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
 
6.4.1. What it means to be assisted 
 
Due to the lack of direct contact with the outside world, the understanding of the assistance 
relationship developed locally within an NGO is more rigid than in Kiev – it draws a clearer 
line between ‘us’ and ‘them’, between Ukraine and the ‘outside’. Local perceptions of 
assistance come closer to those in Washington not in terms of meaning but in terms of the 
rigidity of the us/them opposition that is at their basis. On the local level, the opposition is 
between the ideal West and the Soviet legacies embodied in the notion of sovok. Here the 
                                                 
514 The obstacles named were: family situation; lack of start-up funds; fear of using property as collateral, or lack 
of collateral; high interest rates; small amounts lenders lend to first-time businesses; changing, unstable legal 
framework for businesses; lack of a business partner; daunting registration process; lack of character to pursue 
business or lack of business idea; pension reform that drives even existing businesses into the shadows.  
515 Winrock International. "Women's Economic Empowerment, Final Report", p.28. 
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notion of the West is rarely used to refer to a knowledge of actual practices in other countries; 
rather it represents an ideal of what Ukraine could become should the post-communist 
changes lead in the right direction.  
This opposition was re-invented on the basis of Soviet ideas that were reversed into 
their exact opposite; or, rather, of the ideas that developed in the “parallel” society during the 
Soviet period and were the opposite of the official Soviet ideology. In this reversed Soviet 
discourse the West was not the mean capitalist oppressor but the embodiment of the world of 
opportunities for everyone, the world that could offer everything the Soviet state could not, 
economically, politically, and culturally. As a direct consequence of the insularity of the USSR, 
this idealistic notion of the West was not combined with much direct exposure to different 
aspects of life in the West. Its domestic opposite was captured by a pejorative term sovok – 
everything that was of bad quality or in bad taste in the Soviet world. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the notion of sovok gained even more prominence – it not only embodied 
dissatisfaction but also the aspiration and the perceived opportunities of change. The notion 
of the West, however, is only gradually losing its imaginary quality and turning into an 
empirical notion. 
The re-invention of the East-West opposition is a complex process that develops 
along a whole spectrum of possible perceptions of the West and the sovok. What is important 
for assistance is that this symbolic opposition between East and West remains at the core of 
the discursive map that defines the ‘new’ assistance relationship. The rigidity of the opposition 
and its polarity are shared between both the providers and the recipients of assistance. 
Moreover, the relationship between the former and the latter replicates the West-East 
opposition. This accounts for a certain degree of convergence between Ukraine and its foreign 
donors on what had to happen with the beginning of assistance: The East and the legacies of 
its socialist past had to be abandoned and the West would serve as a model towards which the 
post-socialist East should strive.  
This shared understanding (or so it is assumed to be) facilitates an agreement between 
different sides that the West is the source of knowledge and a legitimate example for the 
possible trajectory of the East. It facilitates the acceptance on the part of the Ukrainians of 
being assisted in the sense of being taught.  
6.4.2. What it means to be(come) civil society through assistance 
 
The understanding of “capacity building” as teaching technical skills has a strong impact on 
the developments within local NGOs; however, this notion takes an unexpected turn on the 
ground. The goals of “capacity building” shift from the institutional to the individual level. 
The idea of teaching technical skills is taken to its logical conclusion that these skills are an 
individual quality rather than an organizational component.  
Local NGO leaders who have already passed a number of “trainings” comprise a new 
profession – that of NGO experts and specialists connected through a network. In this way, 
“capacity building” works to empower a select number of individuals and to maintain the 
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boundaries of expertise between different local NGOs and their activists. In this way, 
“trainings” serve as one of the core gate-keeping mechanisms; not only do they fail to 
contribute to the development of civil society within local contexts but they also enhance the 
divisions and inequalities therein. The shift from institutional to individual “capacity building” 
perpetuates the fragmentation, the rivalries, and the fragility of local civil society. Whereas in 
Washington “assistance” is defined as a guarantor of “sustainability”, locally it is increasingly 
perceived as a factor that induces volatility.  
In addition, the elements that formed part of the notion of “empowerment”, such as 
information campaigns and education, work to redirect NGOs’ priorities from long-term 
survival to short-term gains. This happens because the idea of educating and disseminating 
information is disembodied from a specific issue. The choice to “raise public awareness” on a 
certain issue does not come from the expertise the NGO holds but from the temporary donor 
driven interest in that issue. The way “information dissemination” programs are set up allows 
one NGO to apply for all of them without having to prove any knowledge about the issues at 
stake. These kinds of “empowerment” programs are a way for NGOs to tap into donors’ 
resources by closely following the donors’ shifting agendas, and so they constantly reinvent 
themselves at the expense of specializing in a certain area. This has eventually led to a whole 
local infrastructure consisting of consultations, seminars, roundtables, and resource centers. 
Contrary to the belief endorsed in Washington, the more these NGOs specialize in these 
kinds of programs, the more their long-term sustainability outside of “assistance” becomes 
questionable on the local level. In stark contrast to what is argued in Washington, local NGOs 
often frame “sustainability” as something that can only be fully attained in spite of rather than 
thanks to “assistance”. There is a shared belief locally that many NGOs will disappear if they 
drop out of the “assistance” cycle. This has a strong impact on the overall political 
sustainability of this kind of civil society. 
6.4.3. What it means to empower women 
 
The discursive center of “women as a target group” is transformed locally in two ways. First, it 
is argued that this is not a meaningful category because it does not refer to a real-life group; 
instead, different women belong to different social and demographic groups and therefore 
face different problems and require different forms of assistance. Consequently, the first point 
of transformation is the breaking up of the category of “women as a target group” into many 
different sub-categories. These ideas of regional specificity and of focused definitions of target 
groups are both prominent in the most recent USAID anti-trafficking project, “Countering 
Trafficking in Persons in Ukraine,” implemented by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM), which I have discussed in chapter five. This is an example of how “local” 
ideas discussed above are incorporated at the Kiev level.  
In a second transformation the discursive center of “women as a target group” is 
altogether substituted with other discursive centers that are based not on the idea of a target 
group but on the identification of different social issues that have to be addressed. In other 
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words, the agenda is not defined in terms of who has to be helped but in terms of what 
problem has to be tackled. This second transformation often leads to a different construction 
of women’s situations, which is close to the discursive center of “gender” as it emerged in 
Kiev. Agendas are defined as relevant for both men and women, and the view that women 
face the same problems as men, rather than being subjected to particular women’s grievances, 
empowers women because it assumes their equality to men. Issues that are directly connected 
to crimes against women are often rethought by NGO activists in terms of structural gender 
problems rather than as problems of women’s oppression. Even though the term “gender” 
does not exist locally, most of the reinterpretations created by local women can be described 
by it. In other words, there is a concern with problems that men and women face as a result of 
gendered divisions and stereotypes.  
Women’s issues as conceived of in Washington have reached a high degree of 
institutionalization locally in the form of multiple crisis and consultation centers for women, 
all based on the assistance ideas supporting women’s issues. However, the long-term 
sustainability of these activities is just as questionable as the sustainability of the NGOs 
themselves. Many are likely to abandon women’s programs once the donors stop funding 
them. This does not add to the local legitimacy of that particular women’s agenda. To increase 
the sustainability and the legitimacy of a women’s agenda locally women’s NGOs tend to 
either make it more specific or to open it up to the general social support of different groups. 
In the next, concluding chapter I elaborate at greater length on how different reinterpretations 
of core discursive centers travel across the three sites of interaction. 
 189 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
In this concluding chapter I revisit the story about the puzzling world of “public 
organizations” (obshchestvennie organizatsii) in Ukraine and their interaction with foreign 
assistance. I conclude that the apparent contradiction between the stated democratic goals of 
civil society assistance and the nature and activities of Ukrainian civic organizations that were 
created by assistance goes beyond problems of language competence or lack of information. I 
have shown that the civil society assistance discourse has introduced and enabled the 
domination of a particular type of civic organization: an elitist and technocratic community of 
“professionals without a profession”. The emergence of these civic organizations has led to a 
range of politically problematic effects: These organizations are widely used to address private 
rather than public interests, they enhance elitist and undemocratic practices, and, importantly, 
they have substituted the politically powerful concept of civil society with a set of technical 
tools, thus leading to its depoliticization.  
I start by redressing the main theoretical and methodological positions of the 
dissertation; I then summarize my findings according to the three core questions: What 
assistance means, what it means to assist civil society, and what it means to empower women. 
I answer these three questions on the basis of discursive processes that I have discovered in all 
three sites of interaction – Washington DC, Kiev, and local NGOs. In the last two sections I 
elaborate on the social and political effects that I attribute to the civil society assistance 
discourse, and then on the larger theoretical implications of my findings.  
 
7.1. The Focus and the Approach 
 
Starting off with the premise drawn from by now extensive literature on foreign assistance to 
civil society that there is a strong connection between foreign assistance and the development 
of civil society in the recipient countries, this dissertation went further to explore the 
mechanisms that give foreign assistance its social and political effects. More specifically, this 
dissertation was aimed at understanding the nature and the scope of the impact that foreign 
assistance has had on the development and institutionalization of civil society in Ukraine in 
the period from 1992 to 2005. Most of the primary material was drawn from a case study of 
American governmental assistance delivered to Ukrainian women’s NGOs through the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID). 
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There are different ways to understand and conceptualize the effects and power of 
foreign involvement depending on the theoretical and epistemological positions one takes. 
There can be the overtly coercive power of military threat or economic sanctions, which have 
often been referred to as the “sticks” of international relations. There are also more “soft” 
forms of power, such as are exerted via various systems of benefits and incentives, often 
labeled as “carrots” that some states offer to others.516 Another way to look at political 
dynamics is by analytically separating material from ideational forms of power. Simply put, 
material power is imbedded in, for example, money flows or military troops – something 
visible and easily quantifiable; ideational power is visible in the domination of certain ideas, 
norms, and values over others – a form of domination that is less measurable. However, the 
effects of ideational power can be as clear and explicit as those of material power. The division 
between ideational and material power is, after all, more of an analytical tool than an empirical 
reality. Both “sticks” and “carrots” are a combination of acts of exerting material power and 
the ideas, norms, and values that define, guide, and often defend them. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War led to a shift in both ideas and practices of 
international and transnational relations. New ideas, including those about the value of 
democracy and the role of civil society, became the cornerstones of relations between 
“Western” countries and the former Soviet Republics. They became constitutive of new 
relations of power and their material effects.  
To investigate the constitutive nature of ideas and systems of meaning, I adopted an 
interpretative-constructivist perspective that conceives of social and political processes and 
phenomena in terms of meaning-making. It is based on the idea that the ideational realm of 
meanings, ideas, and discourse is intertwined with material reality in that it is simultaneously 
constituted by it and constitutive of it. This implies that, even though ontologically material 
phenomena can have an existence of their own, epistemologically they cannot be separated 
from the meanings and ideas we invest into them. One cannot conceive of political and social 
reality outside of the structures of meaning and discourses within which it is embedded and 
which it constantly reproduces. The object of this dissertation therefore has been the civil 
society assistance discourse as it is enacted through interactions between American donors 
and Ukrainian recipients of assistance since the end of the Cold War.  
There are different ways to analyze discourse, depending on the practical and 
theoretical aims of the research. In this dissertation I was particularly interested in the stability 
and change of civil society assistance discourse across the different contexts in which it is 
enacted. To these ends the Bakhtinian model of dialogical discourse analysis provided an ideal 
framework. The notion of stability is defined through the Bakhtinian notion of centripetal 
forces that keep together a “unitary language” or a discourse. Here a discourse is defined as a 
system of meaning that constitutes a coherent idea or definition of what can be meaningfully 
said and done about a certain issue. Centripetal forces are embedded in core discursive centers 
– notions that form a set of reference points from which one makes sense of the world and of 
                                                 
516 Nye, Soft power: the means to success in world politics. 
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the particular social and political phenomena in question. In the civil society assistance 
discourse, as I elaborate below, such discursive centers are “capacity building”, 
“empowerment”, and “sustainability”. Discursive centers are mutually re-enforcing, and they 
all add up to the common core idea or rationale supported by the discourse. This means that 
discursive centers work to preclude alternative interpretations and explanations of 
phenomena; they have an inherent authoritative claim to unity and universality within the 
discourse.  
The centripetal forces of the assistance discourse organize assistance, its goals, and its 
procedures around several related ideas about why and how different countries and their civil 
societies are to be assisted. Operating simultaneously with these centripetal forces, centrifugal 
forces act to disrupt the unity and coherence of a discourse. They bring in openings - 
alternative meanings and interpretations or new concepts that transform the discourse from 
within. Openings are as important for any discourse as discursive centers, because they 
introduce a degree of flexibility into the “unitary language” that enables its existence across 
different (and constantly changing) cultural and linguistic contexts. Such flexibility is an “in-
built” mechanism that facilitates acceptance and perpetuation of a particular discourse and, 
thus, enhances its power on the whole. However, openings can also expose the limits of a 
particular discourse.  Thus, the focus on the interplay between centripetal and centrifugal 
forces has allowed me to account not only for the hegemony and structuring power of the 
civil society assistance discourse but also for the limits to this hegemony and transformations 
in its core meanings.  
In order to understand how exactly the centripetal and the centrifugal forces interact, I 
have drawn on another Bakhtinian notion: dialogicality or dialogism (dialogichnost’). 
Dialogicality implies that the relationship between the centripetal and centrifugal forces and 
the discursive phenomena that they co-create is not static. Different discursive centers as well 
as the discourse as a whole are constantly (re)enacted within various sites of interaction. 
Within each moment of (re)enactment certain discursive centers can lose their prominence for 
the discourse, change meaning and/or acquire additional notions that define them, or be 
rejected.  
In the case of USAID civil society assistance to Ukraine I have identified three core 
sites of interaction in which such (re)enactments take place: Washington DC, Kiev, and local 
NGOs. Within each of these sites of interaction I have analyzed the civil society assistance 
discourse in three steps. First, I have identified the central ideas and the boundaries of the 
discourse of assistance. I have argued that the particular circumstances of the origin of the 
civil society assistance discourse determined its core notions that relate to the idea of 
“teaching and expertise transfer” conceived in a highly technical fashion. Second, I have 
explored how these ideas translated into the specific case of assistance to support civil society. 
I have identified three core discursive centers that define the civil society assistance discourse 
at all three levels of interaction. The particular combination of three core centers of “capacity 
building”, “empowerment”, and “sustainability” is not accidental and is directly determined by 
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the nature of the assistance discourse – all three centers sustain a technical and deliberately 
depoliticized meaning of assistance. They make it possible for assistance efforts to act quickly 
towards short-term goals and at the same time to maintain the position of superior knowledge 
and expertise. Third, by focusing on women’s and gender issues, I have considered in greater 
detail the meanings of “empowerment” through civil society. The meaning of 
“empowerment” becomes substantially transformed across the three different sites of 
interaction, and thus an opening in the civil society assistance discourse is created.  
Below I first present the main findings of the analysis and then elaborate on the social 
and political implications of the discursive phenomena and processes I discovered and on how 
they relate to the existing academic research in the field.  
 
7.2. The Findings: Unpacking the Civil Society Assistance Discourse 
 
Following my three-sited dialogical research model I have identified core discursive centers 
and accounted for transformations in their meanings in each of the sites. Table 2 summarizes 
these findings. Overall, Washington DC is the site in which the civil society assistance 
discourse is created and defined; it is characterized by its monological and unitary nature. In 
contrast, interactions in Kiev and at local NGOs represent the actual encounters between the 
assistance discourse and “local” ones. These two sites demonstrate substantial adaptations and 
departures from the “original” meanings of civil society assistance. However, these 
adaptations are still defined in terms of “assistance” rather than in terms of other, local 
notions. The discussion below is aimed at explicating in more detail the dynamic across the 
three sites of interaction.  
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Table 2: 
Core notions of civil society assistance discourse at three levels of abstraction in three 
sites of interaction 
 
  
Washington 
 
Kiev 
 
NGO 
 
Assistance 
 
What does it mean to assist?  
 
 
“teaching” and expertise 
transfer: occurs in a top-down 
manner from US(AID) to 
recipients;  
the goals of “assistance” are 
conditioned by the idea of 
“transition” as  a temporary 
period of change with clearly 
established goals and content;  
characterized by short-term 
perspectives and anticipation 
of a “phase out”; the discourse 
is kept “empty” 
 
 
What does it mean to mediate 
assistance? 
 
“teaching” and expertise 
transfer: is mediated through 
the notion of  “world/ 
international community”, 
which connects Ukrainian 
professional elites to their 
American assistance partners; 
this “community” is not 
shared by the two sides in the 
same way: the boundaries of 
knowledge and expertise 
maintain divisions between 
teachers and students 
 
 
What does it mean to be assisted?  
 
 
“teaching” and expertise 
transfer: the opposition 
between the imaginary “West” 
and the legacies of Soviet past 
(sovok) facilitates a certain 
degree of acceptance of 
assistance locally 
 
Civil 
society  
 
What does it mean to promote civil 
society through assistance?  
 
“capacity building”: 
promoting particular 
organizational forms (NGOs);  
 
 
 
 
“empowerment”: providing 
access to information and 
psychological training to help 
people face “social transition 
issues” and overcome the 
“wrong” Soviet mentality;  
“sustainability”: through 
professionalization, considered 
achieved when NGOs can 
perform assistance tasks on 
their own 
 
What does it mean to mediate 
between civil society and assistance?  
 
“capacity building”: through 
socialization of Ukrainian 
professional elites into the 
assistance rules and 
procedures;  
 
 
“empowerment”: the “wrong 
mentality” idea and the role of 
assistance is questioned;  
 
 
 
“sustainability”: the debate 
on what organizational forms 
and activities will survive 
beyond assistance is extended 
to include local perspectives 
 
What does it mean to be(come) an 
NGO?  
 
“capacity building”: 
embedded in “trainings” that 
lead to formalization and 
professionalization of NGOs 
and to fragmentation and 
competitiveness of the sector 
as a whole;  
“empowerment”: 
instrumentalized for the short-
term survival goals of 
individual NGOs;  
 
 
“sustainability”: largely 
perceived in contradiction to 
assistance, something that is 
possible “despite of” rather 
than “thanks to” assistance 
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Gender 
women’s 
issues 
 
What does it mean to empower 
women?  
 
“women as a target group”: 
defined as generally 
underprivileged and 
marginalized and subjected to 
“threats”;  rooted in the 
discourse on “women in 
development”; 
 
 
 
“women’s empowerment”: 
said to take place through 
provision of women-specific 
spaces, of which the NGO 
sector is the most common 
one; 
“gender”: is present but does 
not form a discursive center 
 
What does it mean to empower 
women?  
 
“women as a target group”: 
(and a related discursive center 
of “women as victims”) 
questioned; alternative target 
groups suggested;  
 
 
 
 
 
“women’s empowerment”: 
seen as attainable through 
fighting gender misbalance and 
inequality rather than 
discrimination of women;  
  
“gender”: often mobilized to 
phrase this position in 
“assistance”-friendly language 
and reinforced by the notion 
of “professionalism” 
 
 
What does it mean to empower 
women?  
 
“women as a target group”: 
transformed by 1) being 
dismissed as not having a real-
life basis and pluralized by 
showing the multiple 
backgrounds of women; 2) 
altogether substituted by other 
discursive centers that focus 
on  a specific issue rather than 
a target group; 
“women’s empowerment”: 
defined through rejecting the 
idea of women’s specificity; 
 
 
 
“gender” is not prominent at 
this site 
 
7.2.1. What does “assistance” mean?  
 
Any discourse is organized around one or several core ideas that define its nature, purpose, 
and normative basis. The assistance discourse I have examined is organized around the core 
idea of teaching and expertise transfer. This is the “face” of assistance that is often overlooked 
by institutionalist or materialist accounts of assistance as a transfer of material resources. The 
prevalence of the idea of teaching and knowledge transfer means that interactions between 
providers, mediators, and recipients of assistance are based on a clear division of roles 
between the side that holds the knowledge and expertise and the side that is to be taught. This 
teaching is top-down and unidirectional because it is believed that those who are taught have 
no knowledge to contribute to the exchange. The discourse of assistance as teaching is 
supported by several discursive centers that define the space for and the participants in the 
interaction.  
The core ideas of the assistance discourse are a combination of new and old themes. 
The old theme helps legitimize the discourse by building on widely accepted and well-known 
ideas, whereas the new theme helps position the discourse as an up-to-date response to 
significant political changes. In Washington DC it is extensively emphasized that the 
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organizational history of aid or assistance extends beyond the case of civil society assistance to 
the former Soviet Union and to Ukraine more specifically. By means of this reference to a 
larger historical and geographic context, USAID is positioned not only as the source of 
knowledge or the teacher in this particular interaction but also as the side that has had long-
term teaching experience across different time periods and contexts. Frequent references to 
the Marshall Plan reconstruction effort are an example of this legitimating discursive move. 
An organizational teleology is evoked as a historical basis for defining assistance in terms of 
teaching and for identifying USAID as the legitimate teacher.  
The emergence of “assistance” was driven by ideas of urgency, novelty, and difference 
from “aid”. As a consequence, ideas about who should be providing “assistance” to whom 
and why it was important were (re)defined and supported by legislative and institutional 
measures, such as the SEED and FSA Acts and the new regional bureaus within the US 
Department of State and USAID. The assistance discourse goes to great lengths to explain the 
unprecedented nature of the political, social, and economic developments taking place in the 
former socialist countries, all of which go by the newly coined term of “transition”. The 
rationale for assisting the new “region” was constructed in terms of teaching and expertise 
transfer from the democratic and economically developed “West” to the formerly Soviet 
“East”, which was believed to be capable of catching up with the “West” within a relatively 
short timeframe. However, the urgency with which the assistance discourse emerged also 
came at the expense of defining how exactly assistance should take place. Being conceived as a 
short-term effort, “assistance” also had few discursive mechanisms at its disposal that would 
enable some learning from the recipients of “assistance” or other innovative changes within it. 
In other words, defining “assistance” as a quick transfer of expertise meant that questions of 
how it could become relevant for the local context were not only overlooked at the initial 
stage but were altogether excluded from the discussion. Given the lack of knowledge about 
the new “region” of assistance, the combination of urgency with lack of focus came at a social 
and political cost that I discuss in more detail below. Overall, “assistance” can be understood 
as a powerful discursive frame with little specific content, whose “emptiness” was of a 
deliberate rather than accidental nature.  
These processes of constructing the assistance discourse are not entirely confined to 
the site of its origin; instead, the discourse is constantly transformed and adapted across 
different sites of its (re)enactment. In Kiev the discourse of assistance as teaching is 
transformed to accommodate the higher heterogeneity of actors involved in designing and 
implementing assistance. In addition to American experts working at the USAID Mission in 
Kiev, there are also their Ukrainian colleagues (even though they mostly hold lower ranking 
positions), different implementing partner NGOs, both American and Ukrainian, and 
women’s NGOs that receive assistance. In other words, Kiev is a meeting point between 
those who provide assistance as teaching and those who receive it. It is a site of interaction 
that is more “dialogical” by nature, to use a Bakhtinian term. In Kiev the discourse of 
assistance as teaching is complemented by the discursive center of the “international/world 
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community”. Clearly, this center evokes the idea of a more inclusive and egalitarian framework 
for interaction. While still being engaged in the “teaching”, the mediators of assistance from 
the West and from Ukraine reinvent it as a shared endeavor. Yet the meaning of the 
“international/world community” is not exactly the same for the two sides. The Westerners 
perceive it as a chance to reinvent themselves as experts on a global scale: The “world/ 
international community” is themselves, and they constitute it through their interactions with 
multiple local sites of assistance around the world. Mediating assistance to different regions of 
the world, as became possible after the end of Cold War, is a format that enables such a 
reinvention. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, see the “international/world community” as a 
space from which they have been excluded. However, the interaction with the Westerners and 
the acquisition of Western expertise are believed to be key for entering that space and being 
recognized there.  
On the level of local NGOs, the interaction with Westerners is less direct; in fact in 
certain places it hardly exists, even today. Although a similar process of alignment of the 
“new” with the “old” occurs, these interactions take place more on the level of the 
“imaginary”. The civil society assistance discourse is strengthened by its convergence with a 
home-grown discourse that defines the “West” as an ideal to be aspired to and the Soviet 
legacy (sovok) as a constraint to be overcome. The discursive center of sovok serves as a kind of 
a contrast space: Since its rejection is widely perceived as necessary, the new alternative 
embodied in the discursive center of the “West” is legitimized. In other words, it helps 
naturalize the idea of learning from the “West”. Thus, in both sites of interaction – in Kiev 
and within local NGOs – the discourse of assistance as teaching remains intact through 
adaptations to the locally relevant notions that take place in the course of interactions in these 
sites.  
Overall, the assistance discourse has a highly prescriptive character: It promotes 
particular organizational forms and procedures in a top-down manner through its thematic 
priorities, assistance procedures, eligibility criteria, and timeframes. Having defined themselves 
from the position of “the ones in the know” and the teachers, USAID and its American 
partners reserve for themselves the space to define the content and the format of teaching. In 
order to explore these features further and to identify the mechanisms that sustain them I 
have looked into the specific case of civil society assistance. 
7.2.2. What does it mean to assist civil society? 
 
In the area of civil society assistance, teaching is aimed at promoting the growth of specific 
organizational forms, namely non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which are socialized 
into procedures of assistance. In the course of this socialization, the form(at) of NGOs is 
overemphasized at the expense of the content and purpose of NGO activities. The assistance 
discourse defines the interaction between the donor and the NGO as a transfer of expertise 
based on top-down technical trainings. This formalistic and technicalized character of civil 
society assistance is sustained through the discursive centers of “capacity building” and 
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“sustainability”. Both define civil society building in terms of tools and skills that are necessary 
to sustain the assistance industry or to create organizational structures that will be capable of 
replacing it should the assistance institutions themselves, such as for example the USAID 
Mission in Kiev, withdraw from the country. The relevance of NGOs for the local context is 
not the key concern of assistance; instead, the main goal is to reproduce structures that are 
compatible with the assistance itself.  Such a bias in the civil society assistance discourse leads 
to the broad-scale creation of what I call “professionals without a profession”. In a way that is 
similar to training a doctor on how to maintain state-of-the-art equipment without teaching 
her how to treat people, foreign assistance facilitates the training of thousands of NGO 
specialists without making a connection between their new skills and the democratic purposes 
of civil society. 
To understand this idea of teaching a comparison with corporate trainings is useful. 
Namely, the assistance industry can be seen as offering corporate trainings to select candidates 
that allow the latter to pursue their careers within the industry, thus ensuring the proper skill 
acquisition of the industry’s employees and its improved operation in the country in question. 
To a certain degree, of course, the personal gains acquired through such trainings contribute 
to the overall well-being of the society in question, and some of the transferred skills are made 
useful in other spheres. However, even if there is a certain degree of spill-over into the society 
as a whole, it does not translate into building a civil society. Essentially, the assistance 
discourse does not function in a way that would provide for anything but running the 
assistance industry itself. In terms of the content and format of teaching, the difference 
between assistance trainings and sustainable knowledge creation is similar to that between 
corporate trainings and university education. Whereas the former is aimed at training 
employees in the skills the company needs them to apply, the latter exists to give people access 
to the knowledge they want to acquire in accordance with their personal vision and idea(l)s. 
The discursive center of “empowerment” defined in terms of changing individual 
“mentality” emerged as a means to respond to the longer-term concerns and structural 
problems in Ukraine while at the same time preserving the technical nature of “assistance” 
and its core rational of “teaching and expertise transfer”. This means that even though there is 
nothing wrong with the idea of individual “empowerment” per se, its employment within the 
assistance discourse resulted in the further empowerment of assistance rather than of 
Ukrainian civil society.  
The interactions in Kiev are of a more dialogical nature because Ukrainian mediators 
of assistance open up all three discursive centers – “capacity building”, “empowerment”, and 
“sustainability” – in order to create space for themselves and their own agency. However, 
none of these transformations is aimed at subverting assistance altogether. Instead, these 
adaptations make it more viable locally. “Capacity building” is redefined through the notion of 
“professionalism”. Ukrainian “assistance professionals” argue that it is assistance itself that has 
to be transformed so that they could be empowered through improved “professionalism”. In 
addition, “sustainability” is defined as a successful take-over of assistance by Ukrainian 
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professional elites. However, the standard of “professionalism” remains the one that is set by 
Western colleagues. Altogether, the discursive transformations of the conception of civil 
society in Kiev are all undertaken within the framework of the civil society assistance 
discourse and do not open it up to alternative conceptions. In fact, a certain convergence of 
interests seems to develop between the “Westerners” and the Ukrainians on making the NGO 
sector that developed as a result of assistance a sustainable socially and politically relevant 
structure.  
On the local level, the most important difference is the absence of such a commitment 
to the NGO sector as a whole. The idea of “capacity building” that is aimed at increasing 
“professionalism” is here redefined in private individualist terms – acquiring professional skills 
is important for one’s individual economic success. The relevance of these skills is determined 
with a reference to local demand on the labor market rather than to sustaining the NGO 
sector. In other words, NGO activists invest time and effort into building up expertise and 
skills that they could also market elsewhere rather than into developing their NGOs. A tight 
financial dependence on assistance and the constant threat of its withdrawal lead to conflicting 
interpretations of the discursive center of “sustainability”. For what is sustainable for 
assistance is not sustainable outside of it. While, for example, assistance invests in the creation 
of NGO resource centers as future upholders of assistance and thus organizations with long-
term prospects, the Ukrainians working at those NGOs define them as unsustainable, short-
term administrative arrangements that will have to be changed once the assistance “is over”. 
Locally, “sustainability” is realized through the privatization of the tools and skills acquired 
through NGOs and their instrumentalization towards increasing individual gains.  
Altogether, it is clear that a set of very particular discursive centers that define what 
civil society is about and how it should function remains intact across all three sites of 
interaction. This means that no alternative meanings of civil society are enacted and 
manifested in alternative organizational forms and practices. The transformations in meanings 
of those particular discursive centers enable their functioning in different sites and, thus, 
strengthen the civil society assistance discourse as a whole rather than contest it. In order to 
explore in more detail how these discursive mechanisms impact on the activities and agendas 
of Ukrainian NGOs, I have investigated the programs that are implemented through women’s 
NGOs.  
7.2.3. What does it mean to empower women?  
 
Assistance has introduced many new concepts, most of which are not fully accepted within 
the NGO community and even less so outside of it; such is also the case with the concepts 
that define women’s and gender issues. As I have discussed in chapters four to six, the 
discourse on gender and women’s issues is kept together by two core discursive centers – 
“women as a target group” and “women’s empowerment”. I have shown that, to a certain 
extent, the term “gender” is present in Washington DC; interestingly, it is also mobilized by 
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women’s NGOs in Kiev to oppose the ideas associated with viewing “women as a target 
group”. However, it has very little presence on the ground.  
In Washington DC – largely due to the power of the “women in development” 
discourse – the notion of “women as a target group” defines women as “victims” and 
“oppressed” and is based on the idea that women are underprivileged, subjugated, and 
marginalized on the basis of their gender. They can therefore be singled out as a group that 
needs specific intervention and is comparable to powerless and marginalized minorities. In 
Kiev, the discursive center of “gender” is mobilized to contest this discursive center and is 
used to communicate a concern with problems that men and women both face as a result of 
gendered divisions and stereotypes that exist in society. Here, women’s issues are not seen as a 
result of the existence of females but as arising from a human-made misbalance between men 
and women. The solution is therefore to eliminate the socio-economic causes of such 
misbalance. In this sense, “gender” represents a concern with gendered division and inequality 
rather than with the oppression and subjugation of women. The fact that “gender” is an 
imported “Western” concept is important because, as Ukrainian women argue, it allows them 
to question the discourse of “assistance” on its own terms and with the help of a concept that 
donors brought to Ukraine themselves.  
Within local NGOs (unlike big NGOs in Kiev) the discursive center of “gender” is 
not widely used; it remains a specialized term with no equivalent either in Russian or in 
Ukrainian. Here, the discursive center of “women as a target group” is contested by, first, 
questioning the existence and nature of this target group and, second, by redefining the 
meaning of “women’s empowerment”. Both in Kiev and locally, Ukrainian women express 
discontent with the Washington-driven meanings of “women as a target group”. They contest 
implicit ideas that all women lack self-confidence, are potentially “at risk”, in a perpetual 
psychological “crisis”, exposed to domestic violence, and incapable of ensuring their 
economic independence. The shared discontent over these representations has led to 
redefining the notion of “women as a target group”. More tailored and focused definitions of 
target groups have been brought forward; in addition, an emphasis has been introduced on 
other victims of domestic and transnational threats, for example male migrants or homeless 
children, and on other forms of exploitation as opposed to sexual exploitation exclusively. At 
local NGOs women invest considerable effort into negotiating more agency for women 
because they themselves feel threatened and offended by the meaning of “women as a target 
group” that is embedded in Washington programs.  
Striking is also the difference in ideas across sites about what the real obstacles are that 
women face when they want to change their economic situations either through new 
employment or by starting their own businesses. While in Kiev it is argued, notably by 
Winrock International, that women face psychological problems, such as a lack of self-
confidence, that prevent them from changing their economic situations, local NGOs are 
mostly focused on increasing practical skills of women and in general argue that women and 
men face similar structural problems when they try to start a business, especially for the first 
 200
time. Such an emphasis on the absence of differences between men and women in the world 
of business can be understood as a way to stress that women are just as “good” as men and 
thus to empower them in this way.  
New meanings and discursive centers that arise as a result of such transformations can 
sometimes travel between (related) sites of interaction. The evolution of the discursive center 
of “women as a target group” in the context of the issue of trafficking is exemplary of the 
learning that takes place within the assistance discourse. New meanings have been 
incorporated into the most recent Anti-Trafficking Initiative implemented by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM). This is a good example of how meanings can be 
transformed in a particular site of interaction in politically significant ways. 
 
7.3. Social and Political Effects of the Civil Society Assistance Discourse  
 
The dominance of the civil society assistance discourse as described above has significant 
implications for social and political developments in Ukraine for two reasons: Not only does 
assistance fall short of the proclaimed goal of democracy-building, it also impedes the 
development of civil society because the assistance discourse and practice introduce and help 
institutionalize undemocratic practices or are utilized towards undemocratic ends. I argue that 
this latter effect (even if unintended) is endogenous to the assistance discourse itself rather 
than a result of processes external to it.   
 The assistance discourse is focused upon itself and self-sufficient in the sense that its 
goals and activities are aimed at sustaining its own rationale for existence. Defining assistance 
in terms of teaching implies that USAID is in a position to offer knowledge of value for the 
recipients. This means that if either this position of the teacher or the content of what is being 
taught are questioned, assistance loses its rationale. The transformations within the discourse 
that I have described keep intact the core idea of teaching, as questioning this core idea would 
dissolve the discourse as a whole. This means that the assistance discourse purposefully 
excludes a whole range of alternative possibilities, such as building on local knowledge and 
expertise, granting the primary agency to local actors, establishing a two-way dialogue, and 
including a larger range of voices. In practical terms, assistance supports one particular type of 
local actors that are involved in an unequal relationship of dependency with the assistance 
agency. Altogether, assistance is preoccupied with justifying its presence in the assistance 
context, and therefore the activities it supports are primarily concerned with ensuring its own 
continuity and survival. Therefore, the sort of civil society it aims at building is an 
organizational structure designed to ensure the “sustainability” of assistance itself and its 
privileged position within the new governance of the former Soviet Union.  
Another feature of the civil society assistance discourse that prevents substantive 
transformation of the underlying “teaching” relationship is its reliance on short-term frames 
of reference. This relationship has a problematic starting point, namely the fact that the actors 
who are doing the teaching are outsiders. Their strength – material and political independence 
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from local power struggles and patterns of resource distribution – is also their weakness. 
Having no stake in local struggles, outsiders are also having a more difficult time proving their 
commitment, which is key to any attempts to reach a common understanding on the best 
possible course of action. By adopting the discourse of short-term technical intervention, 
USAID excludes possibilities for transforming the terms of the dialogue it has with the local 
civil society. This in turn undermines the effort of assisting civil society altogether, because 
heralding ideas of civil society comes with a responsibility for the ways in which these ideas 
are communicated.  
Defining assistance as a transfer of “technical” expertise allows USAID to defend 
itself against two potentially problematic accusations: of political partisanship and of 
disrespect for local choices. In other words, it allows USAID to say that it is not supporting 
particular organizations but “civil society” in general and that it remains up to the local civic 
leaders to determine how the newly acquired technical expertise could become beneficial for 
the development of their organizations specifically and of civil society in general. However, I 
show that this “strategy” engenders opposite effects because the technical expertise USAID 
transmits presupposes the development of particular types of civic organizations. It also 
predefines a range of activities that these organizations can be performing. 
As I have discussed above, the idea of “empowerment” – contrary to what one might 
infer from the label – does not help overcome these shortcomings of assistance. The 
discursive center of “empowerment” suggests a change of individual attitudes and values to 
ones that are more democratic, egalitarian, and reciprocal; it is said to be about building trust 
in oneself, the others, and in new institutions. Yet, civil society assistance projects aimed at 
“empowerment” are hierarchical, bureaucratic, competitive, and distrustful towards both the 
assistance world itself and the recipients of assistance. This irony of “empowerment” does not 
escape those Ukrainians who are acquainted with assistance. In the words of one of the local 
civic leaders: “Few foreigners are able to demonstrate, by their words and actions, that their 
efforts […] are not directed more toward securing privileges for themselves than to insuring 
fair competition, the rule of law, and security for everyone.”517 Here the point is not to blame 
the foreigners for being self-interested and definitely not to overlook those partnerships 
between the locals and the Westerners that have been able to establish a relationship based on 
trust. Instead, I would like to emphasize that the terms of the dialogue matter as much as its 
proclaimed goals. Democracy cannot be built through undemocratic practices, especially not 
when it concerns civil society, an institutional field whose entire rationale for existence is 
predicated on democratic participation. 
The issue of trust is also crucial on the institutional level. As I have shown in chapter 
five by analyzing the notion of the “new wrong mentality”, many Ukrainians are concerned 
with the fact that “assistance” is supportive of the corrupt institutional practices that it is 
supposed to help overcome. The practices of assistance on the ground are far less different 
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from those that dominate local “ways” than its practitioners would like to admit. Its reliance 
on favors and closed networks of “professionals”, its non-meritocratic distribution of material 
resources, and sometimes even unlawful practices, such as tax evasion, are all signs of its 
convergence with local ways to “get things done”. I suggest that this is a troublesome 
tendency rather than a temporary shortcoming because the donors are building the capacity of 
local institutions with one hand and are undermining it with the other. They demand 
transparency and accountability from the local institutions, while their own actions reveal 
distrust in those institutions. Moreover, these practices make it clear that the donors’ own 
transparency and accountability are not directed towards the people of the country they assist.  
The issue of “sustainability” is also problematic, and the sustainability of civil society 
organizations is in fact seriously undermined by assistance despite its claims to the contrary. 
Due to the impact of the civil society assistance discourse, civil society in Ukraine is equated 
with a professionalized NGO sector that provides mostly administrative services either to 
foreign donors or to other actors, such as local authorities or, more recently, private 
organizations. As such, this sector is a source of relatively stable and well-paid employment in 
the capital of Ukraine. However, in other parts of Ukraine, especially small cities, such services 
face very little demand and, thus, NGOs are perceived as temporary and unsustainable. This is 
not true for every NGO, because their chances of survival also depend on how well their 
leaders manage to fit into the local context. Some NGOs represent success stories of 
establishing a good niche for themselves and finding alternative resources. Altogether, 
however, the commitment of civic activists to the NGO sector as a whole is low. Many NGO 
leaders choose to channel the resources and human capital they have acquired through their 
NGOs towards developing various forms of individual entrepreneurship, thus privatizing the 
resources they acquired at public expense. Therefore, these discursive features of assistance 
stand in the way of building a civil society that would be vibrant and committed to democracy 
building in Ukraine.  
One could argue that, shortsighted as it seems, such an approach to civil society 
assistance does not cause any immediate harm to the societies that receive assistance: Even 
though the assistance practice falls short of the proclaimed goal of democracy-building, it does 
not prevent democracy from thriving. However, the dominance of the civil society assistance 
discourse that I have discovered leads me to conclude the opposite. This assistance discourse 
and practice should not be considered as yet another approach co-existing in some kind of 
peaceful heteroglossia with a few other alternative visions, each having their say in Ukrainian 
political and social life. The relative dominance that the civil society assistance discourse has 
gained in Ukraine has enabled it to colonize the larger discursive space of democratic 
transition and has put it in a position to steer the debate and the political practice pertaining to 
civil society and democracy-building. Coming back to the observation discussed in the 
beginning of this dissertation, the strange subculture of “public organizations” (obshchestvennye 
organizatsii) has become synonymous with civil society as a whole, both in the eyes of its 
members as well as in the public perception. This means that the power of the assistance 
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discourse lies in the definition and institutionalization of a particular idea about what civil 
society is and how it should operate. To use the discourse analytical vocabulary that I have 
introduced in chapter three, the assistance discourse creates conditions of possibility for a 
particular form of civil society, and thus denies them to other possible forms of civic 
participation.  
Politically, the dominance of the civil society assistance discourse is problematic 
because of its depoliticizing effect on the Ukrainian society. It is depoliticizing because it 
substitutes the potentially powerful political concept of civil society with a purely technical set 
of tools. As I have discussed in chapter one, ideas about civil society as a democratic 
guarantor in the Eastern European intellectual tradition precede assistance to civil society by a 
few decades. In fact, some Eastern European thinkers went to great lengths discussing what 
exactly ensures the democratic role of civil society. Different thinkers contended that civil 
society should be a process of refining, sharing, and upholding democratic values. They saw 
the purpose of civil society in (re)creating and constantly developing a democratic public 
based on mutual trust and respect. Many of them were particularly suspicious of treating civil 
society as an end goal of social and political transformation. The lesson one learns from this 
scholarship is that the discussion of what civil society is and should be has to come before and 
to accompany any discussion of which technical tools are therefore important. Assistance to 
civil society after the collapse of socialism, however, took a very different course. One of the 
biggest substantive problems of this assistance is that it not only reversed this sequence: It 
effectively precluded a discussion of substantive and normative questions regarding the 
meaning and role of civil society by developing a powerful technical civil society assistance 
discourse. By focusing exclusively on the pre-defined goals of “transition”, it overlooked the 
local ideas laid out above and focused instead on introducing a set of technical tools that it 
deemed appropriate given its experience at home as well as in other parts of the world. Thus, 
despite proclaiming a democratic goal, it operated in what might be called an imperialistic 
fashion.  
In this way, the dominance of the civil society assistance discourse as I have described 
it also comes at the expense of other, home-grown meanings of civil society. Whether or not 
certain local ideas of civil society will have their renaissance in the future remains to be seen. 
However, as I have shown with the help of dialogical discourse analysis, the social and 
political developments in Ukraine cannot be described as a simple antagonism between 
indigenous and externally imposed ideas and practices. Rather, they are constituted by the 
interaction between assistance and local civic actors, and the resulting civil society represents a 
“shared” creation rather than the victory of a particular imposed political project.  
The fact that the concept and the institutions of civil society in Ukraine are 
depoliticized through assistance discourse and practice not only means that little or no 
influence is granted to Eastern European ideas about the democratic role of civil society. I 
argue that this depoliticization created a more sinister effect: It has actually enabled the use of 
civil society concepts and practices in ways that do not relate to democracy building or even 
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lead to undemocratic political practices. Having been turned into a set of tools, “civil society” 
is utilized to serve various political interests that are not necessarily rooted in democratic 
values. This is the case with the assistance industry itself that prioritizes its own 
“sustainability” over that of the civil society it claims to build. This is also the case with local 
political elites who have learnt how to utilize such organizational forms as resource centers, 
“think tanks”, and other types of NGOs in order to exert political influence and consolidate 
resources. Perhaps one of the most ironic examples is the recent initiative of the former 
Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma, who has founded Blagodiina Organizatsiia Prezidentskyi 
Fond Leonida Kuchmy Ukraina (Presidential Charity Fund of Leonid Kuchma “Ukraine”), an 
NGO aimed at supporting social and educational projects as well as providing independent 
analytical expertise. Even though the former president is infamous for endorsing corrupt and 
undemocratic practices, his choice to join the world of civic organizations in Ukraine did not 
seem controversial either to Ukrainians or to foreign donors.  Examples such as this one show 
that at this point the nature of assistance discourse and practice cannot be attributed 
exclusively to foreign donors: Instead, they have been appropriated by a variety of local actors. 
This is reason to conclude that the effects of assistance I have described are of a longer-term 
nature and may indeed impact on Ukrainian politics beyond the “phase out” of assistance. 
Thus, it seems that a distorted kind of “sustainability” of civil society activity has indeed been 
achieved. Its relationship with the goals of democratization is, however, precarious at best. 
 
7.4. Revisiting Some Questions 
 
7.4.1. Assistance  
 
As I have shown in the previous chapters, despite the recent growth of the literature on the 
subject of civil society assistance, there are several puzzles that remain unpacked; let me revisit 
them here. Scholars who have had a more direct research experience with different sites of 
assistance have skillfully exposed the inherent tensions and contradictions in civil society 
assistance.518 There is a vast body of literature available that shows the contradictions in how 
donors operate and draws attention to a whole range of (un)intended consequences that they 
produce in recipient societies. Having exposed the problems, however, this literature tells us 
little about how it is possible that these are established practices rather than one-time failures. 
This led me to raise the following provocative questions: Are the donors blind or do they just 
not care; are the locals wicked or just plain stupid; and how is it that both sides continue doing 
what they are doing?  
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The employment of the Bakhtinian model of dialogical discourse analysis enabled me 
to tackle this question. Seeing assistance in dialogical terms makes it possible to account for 
transformation, adaptation, and eventual acceptance of the core idea of the assistance 
discourse across different sites in which it is enacted. The discourse of “assistance” as 
“teaching and expertise transfer” is originally defined in Washington DC through notions such 
as “transition” that imply short-term technical intervention. The same discourse is mediated in 
Kiev through the notion of an “international/ world community” that connects the external 
“experts” with the Ukrainian professional elite. Within local NGOs, despite the evident 
distance between the ideas set forth in Washington DC and those articulated by local 
communities, the discourse of assistance as “teaching” is sustained by its convergence with 
home-grown notions, such as the opposition between the “West” and sovok. A relationship is 
developed between the assistance discourse and local ideas about becoming like the “West” 
that gives the assistance discourse a particular meaning locally. In other words, in each site of 
interaction the same assistance discourse continues to make sense, although its meaning 
becomes substantively different. This helps us understand why the idea of civil society 
embodied within a local NGO comes to mean something quite different from the ideas that 
were initially proclaimed in Washington DC, and yet the overall assistance discourse remains 
stable. 
The assistance discourse, therefore, should not be seen as hegemony imposed from 
the outside. Even though its origin is external to Ukraine, its existence is enabled through and 
dependent upon interactions between Americans and Ukrainians. Assistance would not have 
become a well-established political practice if it had remained an idea of American policy-
makers. What makes assistance politically significant is its enactment through dialogue and 
exchange between different actors. The discourse of assistance is powerful precisely because 
very different actors adhere to it, and even if they choose to do something that contradicts the 
original ideas from Washington DC, they make sense of their activities in terms of 
“assistance” as laid out above and not in terms of other notions.  
Having identified the contradictions and the effects of assistance some scholars argue 
that the problem with assistance is not the idea itself but the way it is put to practice.519 
However, I show that analytical separation between ideas and their enactment inhibits rather 
than furthers our understanding of the workings of assistance. By exposing the 
technicalization of the assistance discourse that occurs through notions of “expertise 
transfer”, “capacity building”, and “sustainability” I have shown how certain ideas constitute 
certain practices and preclude others. I have shown how thinking in terms of “capacity 
building” led to the substitution of the idea of supporting civil society with that of transferring 
technical tools. I have further cautioned that such substitution actually contradicts the idea of 
civil society support because one cannot first “build capacity” and then hope it would yield 
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certain democratic effects by itself. Quite on the contrary, envisioning the desired democratic 
effects is the precondition for choosing an appropriate set of “capacity building” tools.  
The recent wave of “colorful” revolutions in Serbia, Georgia, and Ukraine presents 
insightful examples. In all three cases civic protests and acts of non-violent civic disobedience 
were facilitated by activities of “professional revolutionaries” and of highly sophisticated think 
tanks and expert groups. Professionally trained youth groups such as Otpor in Serbia and Pora 
in Ukraine formed the avant-garde of civic protests, worked to mobilize the population, and 
“branded” the symbols and slogans for the revolution. In addition, exit polling conducted as 
part of the “parallel vote tabulation” by election monitoring groups mostly trained and funded 
by the US government through its democracy programs proved vital for mobilizing 
opposition against fraud and vote-rigging. These and other technical tools were important for 
the success of the respective revolutions. However, they should not be seen as the recipe for 
their success. Although the same trainings and technical programs were implemented in 
Belarus, Moldova, and Central Asian countries, the outcomes of their respective elections 
turned out very different. Russia presents an even more puzzling case: The revolutionary 
“cookbook” and the tools it offers are appropriated by both pro-Putin regime and opposition 
supporters. The example of Russia clearly shows that by itself “technical expertise” on 
creating democratic change can yield both democratic and undemocratic effects. If assistance 
is about “expertise transfer”, one cannot straightforwardly assume an inherent democratic 
effect of that expertise. 
7.4.2. Civil Society  
 
American aid and assistance policy-makers have often been accused of ethnocentrism and 
cultural insensitivity in that they tend to impose their particular normative and practical ideas 
of civil society on other parts of the world. The analysis presented in this dissertation adds a 
new aspect to that story. Namely, it shows that, although some of the initial premises of civil 
society assistance are specifically American, the actual civil society that develops as a result of 
multi-sited interactions between Americans and Ukrainians is more complex than just a 
normative and empirical replica of an American model. The civil society that is developing in 
Ukraine is a result of interaction between American and local ideas not only about civil society 
as such but also about the common good as well as the meaning of the public and the private 
realms and of the position of the individual vis-à-vis both.  The discussion in chapters one and 
two points to the dynamism and change in (re)configurations of the private and public during 
and after the collapse of the Soviet Block and the complex transformations of identities and 
activities that go with it. Important divergences between the (formerly) Soviet countries as 
well as between pre- and post- 1989 developments point to the fact that, even before we 
introduce the issue of foreign assistance to civil society into the discussion, the question of 
what kind of civil society there is and should be is far from straightforward and lends no 
simple answer. 
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 In fact, I point out the limits of research that portrays the development of civil society 
in the former Soviet Union as a tension between “indigenous” and “externally supported” 
civic groups.520 This dichotomy may be useful if one wants to measure whether or not there is 
a difference between the groups that are supported from the West and those that are not. 
However, I argue that once the agreement that assistance matters is reached, dichotomizing 
the “indigenous” and the “external” prevents one from seeing the full picture. More 
specifically, I emphasize that civil society is constituted through the interaction between 
Ukrainians and Americans. From the perspective of dialogical discourse analysis, the terms of 
the dialogue between the two sides are constitutive of the civil society that is created through 
such dialogue. This means that the effect of assistance as a whole goes beyond the effects of 
operations of each individual actor. I have shown that assistance defines “capacity building” as 
creating civic organizations that fit the organizational model defined by the donor and their 
“sustainability” as the ability to perform the tasks rendered important by the donor. Moreover, 
the assistance discourse sees “empowerment” as a way to overcome the presumed 
psychological deficiency of Ukrainians. Altogether, these discursive centers define the dialogue 
between Americans and Ukrainians in terms of unequal power relations and poor 
commitment to long-term development. Looking at the relationship between the 
“indigenous” and the “external” in this way has led me to conclude that the problematic 
nature of “assistance” lies not in the fact that an externally defined notion of civil society is 
being imposed on the local context but in the way in which “assistance” constitutes the 
relationship between Americans and Ukrainians. In other words, civil society assistance is not 
to be remedied by finding a better notion of civil society but by transforming the core 
principles of assistance itself.  
7.4.3. Gender and Women’s Issues 
 
The analysis of gender and women’s issues in the civil society assistance discourse points to 
the complexities of defining a particular (politically significant) issue in different contexts. This 
leads to a related argument that I put forward vis-à-vis the literature on transnational/ global 
civil society, which defines civil society as composed of “moral entrepreneurs” who act 
transnationally to deal with social issues and to mobilize resources for those on the margins of 
global politics.521 Without necessarily questioning the sincerity of those particular actors on the 
transnational scene, it is important to keep the agenda of these actors, on the one hand, and 
the conceptual apparatus for scholarly analysis, on the other hand, analytically separate. It is as 
important to study, for example, the discourse on the “empowerment of women” as it is to 
study the actual practical achievements of such activities. Since ideas are treated as a 
strategically mobilized tool by the civil society actors, it is important to analyze the tool itself 
                                                 
520 Henderson, Building Democracy in Contemporary Russia: Western Support for Grassroots Organizations, Hrycak, "From 
Mothers' Rights to Equal Rights: Post-Soviet Grassroots Women's Associations." 
521 Keck and Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, Sperling, Ferree, and Risman, 
"Constructing Global Feminism: Transnational Advocacy Networks and Russian Women's Activism." 
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and the implications of its usage in different contexts, rather than just the success or failure of 
its employment.  
 As I have shown with the help of dialogical discourse analysis, the notion of “women 
as a target group” and the related notion of “women’s empowerment” are powerful discursive 
centers strongly institutionalized in policy circles in Washington DC. This makes them 
potentially useful for mobilizing resources and institutional support for different women’s 
programs around the world. However, as my study of the other two sites of interaction has 
shown, it is precisely the embeddedness of women’s programs in those two particular 
discursive centers that makes them irrelevant if not harmful in the eyes of Ukrainian women.  
In sum, I have shown with the help of multi-sited dialogical discourse analysis that 
notions of civil society acquire their political meaning through interactions in particular 
contexts. First, this means that the mere employment of the notion of civil society does not 
necessarily create the projected social and political effects. Second, in a particular context the 
notion of civil society can come to mean something completely different and, thus, lead to the 
emergence of discourses and practices that contradict the (initial) notions of civil society and 
the women’s agenda. I have further stressed that ideas and intentions do not exist in their pure 
form somewhere outside of the actual social and political world. Even if they did, there would 
be no way in which one could study them bypassing the actual instances in which ideas are put 
to practice. One can only judge their political value by looking at particular instances of their 
enactment. Ideas about why and how USAID should assist civil society in Ukraine cannot be 
understood without looking at how such assistance is actually conducted and made sense of in 
particular sites. The idea of assistance and the way it is put to practice are mutually constitutive 
and must be examined as such. 
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Whenever  English versions of the names were not available, the romanization table of the Library of Congress 
was used to transliterate them.  
 210
Kachanova, Natalia, director, Kharkiv Charity Fund “Public Initiatives”, Kharkov (Ukraine), 
June-July, 2002 
Kapeliushna, Olga, Program Coordinator, Counterpart Creative Center, Kiev (Ukraine), April 
03, 2003 
Kapinus, Natalia, volunteer, Kharkiv Charity Fund “Public Initiatives”, Kharkov (Ukraine), 
June-July, 2002 
Karbowska, Natalka, Director, Ukrainian Women’s Fund, Kiev (Ukraine), April 13, 2005 
Khmyz, Tanya, Project Officer, Partnership for Reform in Ukraine, Freedom House, Kiev 
(Ukraine), February 3, 2003 
Kim, Liliia, Director, Kharkov Women’s City Fund, Kharkov (Ukraine), April 20, 2005 
Kobelyanska, Larysa, Project Manager, UNDP Equal Opportunities Program, United Nations 
Development Program in Ukraine, Kiev (Ukraine), April 26, 2005 
Kochemirovskaia, Olena, Director, Kharkov Region Organization “Youth Initiatives”, 
formerly a coordinator at Kharkiv Center for Women’s Studies, Kharkov (Ukraine), 
June-July, 2002 
Kolesnyk, Artem, Information Coordinator, International Renaissance Foundation, Kharkov 
(Ukraine), April 4, 2003 
Kolesnyk, Svitlana, Program Management Assistant, Office of Democracy and Governance, 
USAID Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Kiev (Ukraine), April 27, 2005 
Kopytko, Oleksii, Vise President, Association “Youth League”, Kharkov (Ukraine), June-July, 
2002 
Kovtun, Olga, Kharkov City Public Organization “Nadezhda”, Kharkov (Ukraine), April 20, 
2005 
Kropivianska, Olena, Trainer-consultant, Project “Toloka”, Counterpart Creative Center, Kiev 
(Ukraine), April 3, 2003 
Kuchynska, Olga, Coordinator, Assistance in Further Strengthening Democratic Governance 
in Ukraine, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Project 
Coordinator in Ukraine, Kiev (Ukraine), April 27, 2005 
Kuharenko, Tetyana, Women’s Programs Coordinator, International Renaissance Foundation, 
Kiev (Ukraine), April 4, 2003 
Kulinich, Oleg, Head of the Committee for Family and Youth, Kharkiv Municipal Council, 
Kharkov (Ukraine), June-July, 2002 
Levchenko, Kateryna, National Coordinator, Program Prevention of Trafficking in Women in 
Central and Eastern Europe, La Strada/ Ukraine, Kiev (Ukraine), February 19, 2003 
Lyday, Corbin, formerly at WID/USAID, Washington DC (USA), August 20, 2004 
Marchenko, Victoria, Media and Civil Society Programs, USAID Mission for Ukraine, Belarus 
and Moldova, Kiev (Ukraine), April 27, 2005 
Mruchkovska, Elvira, Coordinator, Crisis Prevention Program, Chernivtsi Local NGO 
“Women’s Center”, Chernivtsi (Ukraine), March 14, 2003 
 211 
Myhaylyuk, Lesya, Assistant, Crisis Prevention Program, Chernivtsi Local NGO “Women’s 
Center”, Chernivtsi (Ukraine), March 14-15, 2003 
Mykhalniuk, Taras, Coordinator, Regional Bureau for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Kiev (Ukraine), April 13, 2005 
Nesterenko, Polina, Program Manager, Counterpart Creative Center, Kiev (Ukraine), February 
4, 2003 
Noè, Sascha, Program Officer Eastern Europe, N(o)VIB/ Oxfam Netherlands, the Hague 
(the Netherlands), April 15, 2002 
Novakivska, Dzvinka, Information Coordinator, Eurasia Foundation, Kiev (Ukraine), 
February 4, 2003 
Osovska, Olga, Director of the Center, Job Skills Training Coordinator, Chernivtsi Local 
NGO “Women’s Center”, Chernivtsi (Ukraine), March 14-15, 2003 
Ovdienko, Inga, Information/ External Affairs Coordinator, Ukrainian Women’s People 
Democratic Association “Diya”, Kiev (Ukraine), April 1, 2003 
Piñeiro Costas, Begoña, Anti-trafficking Project Officer, Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Project Coordinator in Ukraine, Kiev (Ukraine), 
April 27, 2005 
Pogrebinskiy, Mikhail, Director, Kiev Center of Political Studies and Conflictology, Kiev 
(Ukraine), February 3, 2003  
Pojman, Ruth Freedom, Anti-trafficking Advisor, Europe and Eurasia Region, USAID, 
Washington DC (USA), August 16, 2004 
Propp, Brian, Vice President, Counterpart International, Washington DC (USA), August 5, 
2004 
Puglisi, Rosaria, Political Affairs Officer, Political, Press and Information Section, European 
Union Delegation of the European Commission, Kiev (Ukraine), April 12, 2005 
Rastrigina, Tatyana, Business Development Specialist, Office of Private Sector Development, 
USAID Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Kiev (Ukraine), February 18, 2003 
Rosenberg, Ruth, Consultant, Trafficking in Persons, Gender and Development, Washington 
DC (USA), August 17, 2004 
Rudenko, Tetyana, Assistant/ Information Coordinator, Trafficking Prevention Project, 
Winrock International/ Ukraine, Kiev (Ukraine), March 11, 2003 
Samolevska, Natalka, Coordinator, Community Initiatives to Prevent Domestic Violence and 
Trafficking in Women (DOS), Winrock International/ Ukraine, Kiev (Ukraine), 
February 4, 2003 
Savich, Liliia, Vise President, Educational Programs Coordinator, La Strada/ Ukraine, Kiev 
(Ukraine), February 19, 2003 
Scott, Sheila, former (West) NIS-US Women’s Consortium Coordinator, telephone interview, 
October 1, 2004 
Shulga, Tetiana, Project Manager, Civil Society, European Union Delegation of the European 
Commission, Kiev (Ukraine), April 26, 2005 
 212
Suslova, Olena, Gender Activity Coordinator, Indiana University Parliamentary Development 
Project, USAID Democratic Parliamentary Strengthening Program, also head of 
Women’s Information Consultative Centre, and a former coordinator of US-West NIS 
Women’s Consortium, Kiev (Ukraine), April 11, 2005 
Tarelin, Andriy, Program Director, Kharkiv Non-Governmental Center for Private Initiatives 
Assistance, Kharkov (Ukraine), June-July, 2002 
Tatarinova, Larisa, Program Director, Ukraine Citizen Action Network Program (UCAN), 
Kiev (Ukraine), April 28, 2005 
Tisch, Sarah, Chief of Party, dot-Gov Program of the USAID dot-Com Initiative, Internews 
Network, former Coordinator, West NIS-US Women’s Consortium, Winrock 
International, Washington DC (USA), August 23, 2004 
Turner, Barbara, Deputy Assistance Administrator, Bureau for Policy and Program 
Coordination, USAID, Washington DC (USA), August 17, 2004 
Tweed, Sarah, Coordinator, Trafficking Prevention Program in Ukraine (TPP) and 
Community Response to Domestic Violence and Trafficking in Women (DOS), 
Winrock International, telephone interview, August 6, 2004 
Tymoshenko-Yakunina, Tatyana, Training Officer, Mission Gender Advisor, USAID Mission 
for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, Kiev (Ukraine), February 18, 2003, April 14, 2005 
Usov, Anton, Research and External Affairs Coordinator, European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), Kiev (Ukraine), June-July, 2002 
Vandenberg, Martina, former NIS-US Women’s Consortium Coordinator, Winrock 
International, telephone interview, August 17, 2004 
Wallin, Bob, Team Leader, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, USAID, Washington DC (USA), 
August 19, 2004 
 
 
 
 
 213 
Appendix II: Cited documents and other primary material 
 
Advocacy Institute. Dovidnyk Z Advokasi [Advocacy Manual], 2003. 
ARD, Inc. "Assessment of Non-Governmental and Civil Society Organizations in Ukraine 
and Moldova." Submitted to USAID/Kyiv Office of Democratic and Social 
Transition, July 26, 2001. 
Atwood, Brian J. "Statement before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations." Washington, DC: US Department of State, January 24, 1994. 
Blumberg, Rae Lesser, and Olha Shved. "Curbing Sex Slavery Abroad by Helping Women 
Earn a Living in Ukraine : Assessment of the Economic-Empowerment Aspects of 
the Anti-Trafficking Project, USAID/Kiev." Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI), 
September 2002. 
Boucher, Richard. "Press Statement." Washington, DC: US Department of State, October 14, 
2004. 
———. "US Department of State Daily Press Briefing." Washington, DC: US State 
Department, December 3, 2004. 
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. "America Must Back Ukraine's Struggle for Democracy." Financial 
Times, December 27, 2004. 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU). Returns of 1998 Election to the Ukrainian Parliament, 
1998 [cited 10 June 2000. Available from www.cvu.kiev.ua. 
Counterpart International. "Counterpart Millennium Report." Washington, DC: Counterpart 
International, 2000. 
Counterpart Creative Center. About Us [cited 15 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.ccc.kiev.ua. 
———. "Activity Report for 1996-2001." Kiev: CCC, 2002. 
———. Trainings [cited 20 July 2005. Available from http://www.ccc.kiev.ua. 
CURE. Home Page, March 19, 2003 [cited 20 July 2005. Available from 
http://www.cure.org.ua/eng. 
DANA. About Dana [cited 29 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.civilsoc.org/nisorgs/ukraine/dana.htm. 
Deichakivskiy, Mykola, Oleksandr Sydorenko, and Natalia Iasko. Tretii Sektor V Ukraini Ta 
Organizatsii Shcho Rozbudovuiut' Ioho Infrastrukturu [Third Sector in Ukraine and the 
Organizations That Build up Its Infrastructure]. Kiev, 1996. 
Dine, Thomas A. "Statement before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States 
Senate, One-Hundred-Third Congress, Second Session." Washington, DC: USAID, 
October 4, 1994. 
Dobriansky, Paola J. "Bugs, Drugs, and Thugs: Dealing with Transnational Threats/ Remarks 
to Women in International Security." Washington, DC: US State Department, May 12, 
2004. 
 214
Eurasia Foundation. Eurasia News, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine. NGO Resource Centers: Time of 
Changes. Kiev: Eurasia Foundation, 2003-2004 (Winter # 4). 
Internews/Ukraine. "Internews Network Ukraine: Final Report Including Progress Report for 
August-December 2002." Internews Ukraine, USAID: Regional Mission to Ukraine, 
Belarus, Moldova, March 18, 2003. 
IOM/Ukraine. Ukrainian NGO Counter-Trafficking Newsletter # 3. Kiev, May 2004. 
Khabailo, Viacheslav. "Zamky Na Pisku [Castles on the Sand]." Ukraine, 2002. 
Kuts, Svitlana. "Deepening the Roots of Civil Society in Ukraine: Findings from an Innovative 
and Participatory Assessment Project on the Health of Ukrainian Civil Society." 
Center for Philanthropy, USAID: Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 
August 2001. 
League of Resource Centers. About Us, 2002 [cited 17 July 2005. Available from 
http://www.ligarc.org.ua. 
———. History of the League, December 4, 2003 [cited 10 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.ligarc.org.ua/. 
———. Members of the League, 2002 [cited 10 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.ligarc.org.ua/. 
———. Memorandum of the League of Resource Centers, October 15, 2003 [cited 10 June 2005. 
Available from http://www.ligarc.org.ua. 
Mir Zhenshchin. The History of Our Organization/ Unpublished Brochure. Kharkov, 2001. 
MSI (Management Systems International). "Midterm Evaluation of the USDOL/IREX 
Regional Empowerment Initiative for Women: Romania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Moldova, 
and Lithuania." Washington, DC: MSI, 2003. 
———. "USAID/Ukraine Anti-Trafficking Program Strategy Review and Legal Component 
Design." Washington, DC: MSI, 1999. 
NIS-US Women's Consortium. "Strategic Plan (Internal Document)." November 7, 1995. 
Office of Spokesman/U.S. Department of State. "Interview with Secretary of State Powell." 
Washington, DC, May 13, 2004. 
Peyser, Melanie , and Theodora et al Turula. "Assessment of Non-Governmental and Civil 
Society Organizations in Ukraine and Moldova." Associates in Rural Development, 
Inc. (ARD), USAID. Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, USAID. Bureau 
for Global Programs, Field Support and Research Center for Democracy and 
Governance, July 26, 2001. 
Pifer, Steven. "Next Steps in Ukraine: The US Must Help Viktor Yushchenko Succeed as 
President." Washington Post, 1 January 2005. 
———. "Testimony before the House International Relations Committee." Washington, DC: 
US State Department, May 12, 2004. 
Pressley, Donald L. "Preface." In A Decade of Change: Profiles of USAID Assistance to Europe and 
Eurasia, edited by USAID. Washington, DC: USAID, 1999. 
 215 
Rosenberg, Ruth, Sebastian Lazaroiu, and Elena Tyuryukanova. "Best Practices for 
Programming to Prevent Trafficking in Human Beings in Europe and Eurasia." 
Development Alternatives, Inc, September 2004. 
Ruud, Jane. "Report on Trafficking Prevention Efforts in Ukraine: Impact of the Women for 
Women Centers on at-Risk Teen and Adult Women." Winrock International, USAID: 
Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 2001. 
———. "Summary Report of Trafficking of Women in Ukraine." Winrock International, 
USAID: Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, 2002. 
Stuart, Jennifer. "The 2002 Ngo Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia." Washington, DC: USAID, 2002. 
Talbott, Strobe. "Testimony before the House of Foreign Affairs Committee." Washington, 
DC: US Department of State, January 25, 1994. 
Teft, John. "Ukraine's Election: Next Steps/ Testimony before the House International 
Relations Committee." Washington, DC: US State Department, December 7, 2004. 
Traynor, Ian. "US Campaign Behind the Turmoil in Kiev." The Guardian, 26 November 2004. 
UCAN. "Ukrainian National Conference "Ethics Guidelines for the Third Sector" (CD)." 
Kiev: UCAN, September 29-30, 2004. 
———. Working for a Stronger Ukraine: Practical Resources to Help Civil Society Organizations Succeed. 
Kiev: UCAN, 2003. 
US Congress. Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasia Democracies and Open Markets (FREEDOM) 
Support Act, 1992 
———. Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act, 1989. 
US Department of State. "FY 2001 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign 
Operations." Washington, DC, 2000. 
———. "FY 2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations." Washington, 
DC: US Department of State, 2004. 
———. "US International Women's Issues Initiatives: Fact Sheet." Washington, DC: Office 
of the Senior Coordinator for International Women's Issues, May 18, 2004. 
USAID. "A Decade of Change: Profiles of USAID Assistance to Europe and Eurasia." 
Washington, DC: USAID, 1999. 
———. "Approaches to Civic Education: Lessons Learned." Washington, DC: Office for 
Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian 
Assistance, June 2002. 
———. "Conducting a DG Assessment: A Framework for Strategy Development." 
Washington, DC: USAID Center for Democracy and Governance, November 2000. 
———. "Core Report of the New Partnerships Initiative (Internal Draft)." Washington, DC: 
USAID, July 21, 1995. 
———. "Democracy and Governance: A Conceptual Framework." Washington, DC: Center 
for Democracy and Governance, Bureau for Global Programs, Field Support, and 
Research, November 1998. 
 216
———. Evaluation of USAID Evaluation Experience USAID, 2005 [cited 11 August 2005. 
Available from http://www.dec.org/partners/evalweb/. 
———. "Fact Sheet: USAID NIS Task Force Activities in the New Independent States of the 
Former Soviet Union." Washington DC: USAID: Office of External Affairs, June 
1993. 
———. "From Transition to Partnership: A Strategic Framework for USAID Programs in 
Europe and Eurasia." Washington, DC: USAID Bureau for Europe and Eurasia, 
December 1999. 
———. "Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story. Building Civil Society in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the New Independent States." USAID Bureau for Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia. Office of Democracy and Governance, October 1999. 
———. "Policy Implementation: What USAID Has Learnt." Washington, DC: USAID 
Center for Democracy and Governance, January 2001. 
———. "U.S. Assistance Strategy for Ukraine 1999-2002." Washington, DC: USAID, March 
29, 1999. 
USAID/Kiev. "Annual Report [AR] FY 2002." USAID. Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, USAID. Regional Mission to West New Independent States, March 2002. 
———. "Annual Report [AR] FY 2003." USAID: Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, March 13, 2003. 
———. "Annual Report [AR] FY 2004." USAID: Regional Mission to Ukraine, Belarus, 
Moldova, June 15, 2004. 
———. Assistance for Victims of Trafficking Restores Hope and Lives [cited 20 July 2005. Available 
from http://www.usaid.kiev.ua. 
———. "Countering Trafficking in Persons: Executive Summary (Internal Document)." Kiev: 
USAID, 2004. 
———. "Ukraine: Country Strategic Plan for FY 2003-2007." Kiev: USAID Regional Mission 
for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, September 2002. 
———. USAID Is Launching "Countering Trafficking in Persons in Ukraine" Project [cited 28 April 
2005. Available from http://www.usaid.kiev.ua. 
USAID/West NIS. "Ukraine: Results Review and Resource Request (R4)." June 3, 1996. 
———. "Ukraine: Results Review and Resource Request (R4)." May 19, 1997. 
USAID/WID. About WID [cited 10 August 2005. Available from 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/wid/about_wid.html. 
———. About WID Activities [cited 10 August 2005. Available from 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/wid/activities/activities.html. 
———. Gender Matters: Integrating Gender - Achieving Results. Washington, DC: WID IQC 
Brochure, 2002. 
Usupashvili, David. "NGO Lessons from Georgia: Failed Expectations, New Cooperation." 
Give & Take: A Journal on Civil Society in Eurasia 4, no. 4: Winter (2002): 9-10. 
 217 
UWF. Projects Supported by UWF in 2004 UWF, 2004 [cited 20 June 2005. Available from 
http://www.uwf.kiev.ua/. 
Volyn Resource Center. About Us, February 17, 2005 [cited 11 June 2005. Available from 
www.vrc.rv.ua. 
Winrock International. "Project Fact Sheet: Trafficking Prevention Program: Ukraine." Kiev: 
Winrock International, 1998. 
———. "Project Fact Sheet: Women's Economic Empowerment: Ukraine." Kiev: Winrock 
International, 1999. 
———. Short-Term Business Training Winrock International, 2000 [cited 23 March 2004. 
Available from www.winrock.org.ua/WEE. 
———. "Statistical Analysis of Surveys of Human Trafficking Victims Who Sought 
Assistance at the Seven Regional Women for Women Centers of the Trafficking 
Prevention Project." Kiev: Winrock International, 2004. 
———. "Trafficking Prevention in Ukraine: A Pilot Program." Winrock International, July 
1998. 
———. "Women's Economic Empowerment, Final Report." Winrock International, July 31, 
2004. 
———. "Women's Stories." Kiev: Winrock International/ TPP, 2002. 
Wolf, Martin. "Ukraine: The Wider Challenge." Financial Times, 29 December 2004. 
Women's Information Consultative Center. Directory of Women's Organizations and Initiatives in 
Ukraine. Kiev: Women's Information Consultative Center, 1996. 
———. Empowering Education: About Us [cited 7 June 2005. Available from 
http://empedu.civicua.org/ukrainian/1-pronas/page1.htm. 
———. Upovnovazhuval'na Osvita: Posibnyk Dlia Treneriv [Empowering Education: Trainer's Manual]. 
Kyiv: Women's Information Consultative Center, 2002. 
 218
Summary in Dutch 
 
Verloren in vertaling – USAID steun aan democratievorming in post-communistisch 
Oekraïne 
 
Het doel van dit proefschrift is om de aard en omvang te begrijpen van de impact van 
buitenlandse steun op de ontwikkeling en institutionalisering van de civil society (organisaties 
buiten de sfeer van de overheid waar mensen vrijwillig deel van uit maken). Meer specifiek kijk 
ik naar de Amerikaanse overheidssteun van het United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) aan Oekraïnse vrouwenorganisaties in de periode van 1992 tot 2005. 
Uit dit onderzoek blijkt dat buitenlandse steun een belangrijk raamwerk biedt voor 
samenwerking en partnerschap. Met name voor de ontwikkeling van de civil society, in casu 
de vrouwenorganisaties, is buitenlandse steun van belang. Dit proefschrift beschrijft de 
discursieve mechanismen die medebepalend zijn voor de aard en omvang van de impact van 
buitenlandse steun. Het onderzoek voegt de discursieve dimensie toe aan literatuur over 
buitenlandse steun. Begrip van discursieve mechanismen is cruciaal omdat, zoals ik laat zien, 
de hulpprogramma’s vaak geen optimaal gebruik maken van de beschikbare menselijke, 
symbolische, en materiële bronnen. Gestelde doelen worden vaak niet gehaald. Aangezien 
buitenlandse steun uitgebreid wordt naar nieuwe landen en onderwerpen is het noodzakelijk 
om lessen te leren van moeilijkheden en fouten uit het verleden.        
In dit onderzoek maak ik gebruik van dialogische discours analyse. Vanuit dit 
perspectief is de discursieve dimensie van politiek van even groot belang als haar materiële en 
institutionele dimensies. In feite zouden programma’s, budgetten, en technische steun om de 
civil society van Oekraïne te ontwikkelen ondenkbaar zijn geweest zonder een voorafgaand 
idee dat de Amerikaanse overheid een rol te spelen heeft in de politieke transformatie van het 
voormalige Sovjet blok en zonder de idee dat daarvoor de civil society opgebouwd zou 
moeten worden. Dialogische discours analyse gaat er vanuit dat deze ideeën niet zomaar 
getransplanteerd kunnen worden van Washington DC naar Oekraïne. De ideeën worden tot 
leven gebracht en krijgen een nieuwe betekenis in de interacties tussen Amerikaanse 
beleidsmakers, hun Oekraïnse partners en de ontvangers van de hulp. In het proefschrift laat 
ik zien dat het bieden van steun faalt als de (her) interpretatie niet gebaseerd is op 
democratische principes. Ondemocraties vertalingen en (her) interpretaties verdiepen de kloof 
tussen de intenties van de buitenlandse hulpprogramma’s en de lokale resultaten. 
Het onderzoek laat zien dat ondanks het doel een robuuste, emanciperende, en 
duurzame civil society te bouwen, buitenlandse hulp heeft geleid tot de ontwikkeling van een 
civil society verre van dit ideaal. Lokale maatschappelijke organisaties worden gedomineerd 
door een elitistische en technocratische groep ‘professionals zonder professie’. Het ontstaan 
van deze organisaties heeft geleid tot een reeks politiek problematische effecten: de 
organisaties worden gebruikt om private belangen in plaats van publieke belangen te dienen; 
zij versterken de elitistische en ondemocratische praktijken; en niet onbelangrijk, zij hebben de 
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betekenis van het politiek krachtige concept ‘civil society’ vertaald naar een gereedschapskist 
gevuld met technische hulpmiddelen. Dit leidt tot depolitisering het de idee van ontwikkeling 
van civil society voor democratisering, en tot depolitisering van vrouwenissues in Oekraïne. Ik 
concludeer dat de buitenlandse steun van USAID niet alleen de gestelde doelen niet haalt 
maar zelfs de ontwikkeling van een civil society verhindert omdat het ‘hulp’-discours een 
ondemocratisch praktijk introduceert, of gebruikt wordt met ondemocratische doelen.       
Ik laat zien dat de tegenstellingen tussen de democratische doelen en de 
ondemocratische aard van de activiteiten van de Oekraïnse organisaties verder gaan dan 
problemen in uitvoering. Het (onbedoelde) ondemocratische effect  is endogeen aan het 
‘hulp’-discours en de ‘hulp’-praktijken. Om tot een aanzienlijke verbetering van de hulp en 
assistentie te kunnen komen, moet het raamwerk waarbinnen ‘hulp’ gedefinieerd is herzien 
worden.  
In het inleidende hoofdstuk 1 beschrijf ik de belangrijkste theoretische noties van dit 
proefschrift, zoals democratie, civil society, en buitenlandse steun. In paragraaf 1.2 bestudeer 
ik de normatieve en theoretische implicaties van het concept civil society op drie gerelateerde 
plaatsen van kennisproductie: ten eerste kijk ik naar theorieën die zijn ontwikkeld in Oost-
Europa en de voormalige Sovjet Unie; ten tweede bestudeer ik ideeën over de civil society die 
ontstaan zijn in West-Europa en Noord-Amerika, en tot slot behandel ik theorieën over de 
transnationale of globale civil society waarin nieuwe ruimtes worden geconceptualiseerd die de 
grenzen van souvereine staten overschrijden. Deze discussies verduidelijken dat theoretische 
ideeën in specifieke omstandigheden ontwikkeld worden en binnen hun eigen context 
bestudeerd moeten worden. Met andere woorden: theoretici van het begrip civil society 
interpreteren het begrip niet altijd hetzelfde. In paragraaf 1.3 behandel ik de meer toegepaste 
theorieën van civil society, zoals theorieën over ontwikkelingshulp en democratisering. Die 
discussie laat zien dat ideeën niet neutraal zijn maar bijna één op één vertaald kunnen worden 
in politieke projecten in bepaalde landen die impact hebben op politieke en sociaal-
economische ontwikkelingen.     
In hoofdstuk 2 verken ik civil society als een empirisch fenomeen. Ik bekijk de 
verschillende vormen van maatschappelijk activisme in Oekraïne voor en na 1989. Hoofdstuk 
3 is gewijd aan de methodologische benadering in dit proefschrift. Ik laat zien hoe de 
theoretische en empirische puzzels uit de voorgaande hoofdstukken opgehelderd worden met 
een dialogische discours analyse gebaseerd op het werk van de Russische/Sovjet denker 
Mikhail Bakhtin. Met behulp van deze benadering kan mijn casusonderzoek verdeeld worden 
in drie gerelateerde lokaties van interactie: Washington DC, Kiev en de lokale niet-
gouvernementele organisaties. Hoofdstukken 4, 5 en 6 omvatten respectievelijk voor ieder van 
deze lokaties de empirische bevindingen. In hoofdstuk 7 vergelijk ik de drie lokaties en 
bediscussieer ik de stabiliteit en transformaties van het civil society ‘hulp’ discours. Ik 
verhelder ook de sociale en politieke effecten van de buitenlandse hulp in Oekraïne. Tot slot 
kom ik terug op enkele theoretische overwegingen. 
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